视频信息

  • 标题：Ray Dalio 大师课 第3集：在非热门领域发现隐藏价值
  • BV号：BV1QA4m137u4
  • 分集 Part：p4（第3集，30分54秒）
  • 作者：要提前退休的小钢子
  • 发布于：2024-02-20
  • 原始链接：B站视频
  • 同合集：本系列共 6 集，本篇为 第3集；其他集见博客标签 Ray Dalio 大师课 或目录
  • 语言：英语（English speech）+ 中文字幕 / 本博客为中英双语转录（Chinese + English bilingual transcript）

转录说明

  • 转录工具：
    • 英文转录：Groq Whisper large-v3（language=en）
    • 英文标点修复：LongCat-2.0-Preview
    • 中文翻译：LongCat-2.0-Preview（保留数字 / 公司名 / 品牌 / 人名）
    • 分集状态：✓ 完整（30分54秒）
  • 质量说明：音频为纯英语，按"中英双语"规范发布；保留所有专有名词（人名 / 公司名 / 品牌 / 数字）。
  • 段落切分：按 90s 音频切片 + 3s overlap 自动切分，每段先英文后中文逐段对照。

视频摘要

核心要点

  1. Steven Price 的背景：多届投资大赛冠军，2021/2022 投资比赛他 +62.8% vs 标普 -18.1%，专门挖掘小型/中型公司。
  2. 为什么不买科技股：2020 年他关注 Amazon/Airbnb 等"伟大公司"，但股价已大涨，估值过高——他要找"被市场忽略的好公司"。
  3. 废物管理行业的"小公司"：Stericycle、Clean Harbors 等废物管理公司，市场认为"无聊"，但 5-10 年复合回报高。
  4. VSE Aviation（航空零部件维修）：市值 5 亿美元，专做老旧飞机的零部件维护。商业模式稳定，管理层回购股票。
  5. Heico（航空售后市场）：市值 80 亿美元，垄断小型航空零部件，与 Boeing/Airbus 互补。
  6. United Rentals（设备租赁）：市值 600 亿美元，设备租赁行业的领导者。
  7. Matthews International（死亡关怀）：市值 8 亿美元，做墓地/纪念品——市场认为"不性感"，但现金流稳定。
  8. 他如何做研究：从 CUSIP 表格、SEC 文件、彭博终端开始，然后打电话给行业专家。
  9. 为什么"非热门"是 Alpha 来源：热门公司有 200 个分析师盯着，定价接近完美；非热门可能只有 3-5 个分析师。
  10. 投资建议：少看新闻：不看电视，不看 Twitter/财经新闻——你买的不是新闻，是公司 5-10 年后的现金流。

视频全文转录（中英双语）

以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。按 90s 音频切片 + 3s overlap 切分。

Segment 1

[English]

Investing is knowing how to value a business, research and timing, psychological endeavor. Investing without knowing what you’re looking for is like running through a dynamite factory with a burning match. There’s a very, very dangerous jungle out there. How do I successfully cross the jungle? There are thousands of different approaches to investing. There’s no formula anybody can give. It’s not like the Colonel’s secret recipe. If you’re a self-starter and you work really hard, you can make a difference. At the turn of a new millennium, I was starting to think I was the only person left out of the party. Growth of sales on the Internet are set to explode in the next five years. In ‘98, ‘99, there was a little bit of an Internet bubble. And anything that wasn’t involved with the Internet was to be avoided. And we happened to invest most of our money in those other things. It’s the men who founded these firms who are building unthinkable businesses.

[中文]

投资就是懂得如何评估一家企业、研究时机把握以及心理博弈。如果你不知道自己在寻找什么就去投资，那就像拿着一根燃烧的火柴跑过炸药厂一样危险。外面的世界是一片极其危险的丛林。我该如何成功穿越这片丛林？投资有成千上万种不同的方法。没有人能给你一个现成的公式——这不像肯德基上校的秘方。如果你是一个自我驱动力很强的人，并且真的非常努力，你就能脱颖而出。在新千禧年交替之际，我开始觉得自己是唯一一个被这场狂欢派对遗忘的人。互联网销售额的增长将在未来五年内爆发式增长。在98年、99年，出现了一点点互联网泡沫。任何与互联网无关的东西都被避之不及。而我们碰巧把大部分资金投在了那些非互联网的东西上。正是那些创立这些公司的人，正在缔造超乎想象的商业帝国。

Segment 2

[English]

I founded these firms who are building unthinkable, unimaginable fortunes. I have to say, when everyone’s making a lot of money and you’re losing money, that’s perhaps the hardest test. There’s a lot of people making money in the market besides the brokers. There’s a lot of, you know, investors who are making a lot of money. It’s hard to think you’re right when the market is saying you’re not so right. But the key is, was your process right? And was your thinking correct? And I think it’s very hard to stay disciplined at doing this. Sometimes when the market gets crazily enthusiastic, it may conceal some bigger troubles ahead. The market index crashed over 350 points down. And the internet bubble, well, it’s burst. And then things changed. Part of investing is an art or a craft that comes with experience. Part of it is having good fundamentals. Part of it is having a good plan, a good process to examine opportunities, to evaluate opportunities. And putting all these things together takes some time. It’s a little bit of the school of hard knocks. I’m Joel Greenblatt. I’m co-CIO of Gotham Asset Management in New York City. And as I’ve said, if you don’t lose money, most of the other outcomes

[中文]

我创立了这些公司，它们正在创造难以置信的、不可思议的财富。我不得不说，当所有人都在赚钱而你却在亏钱时，那可能是最严峻的考验。市场上除了经纪人之外，还有很多人在赚钱。你知道，有很多投资者都在赚大钱。当市场在说你不对的时候，你很难相信自己是正确的。但关键问题是，你的决策过程是否正确？你的思维是否正确？我认为在执行这件事上保持纪律性是非常困难的。有时候，当市场变得异常狂热时，它可能掩盖了前方更大的麻烦。市场指数暴跌超过350点。互联网泡沫，嗯，它破裂了。然后一切都变了。投资在一定程度上是一门艺术或手艺，它需要经验的积累。一部分在于拥有扎实的基本功。一部分在于拥有一个良好的计划、一套完善的流程来审视机会、评估机会。而把所有这些要素整合在一起需要一定的时间。这有点像是从实践中跌跌撞撞地学习。我是乔尔·格林布拉特。我是纽约哥谭资产管理公司的联合首席投资官。正如我所说，如果你不亏钱，大多数其他结果

Segment 3

[English]

As I’ve said, if you don’t lose money, most of the other outcomes are good. When I was at business school at Wharton, what they were teaching at the time, and this is the late 70s, was that the market was efficient. In other words, stock prices represented the correct price at each time because there were plenty of smart people who would buy and sell stocks and get you to the right price. In those days, newspapers had something called a 52-week high and low for individual stocks. And one time during the year, a stock like IBM was at 50, and another time during the same year, it was at 100. And according to my business school professors, each price was correct, and that didn’t seem right. So I was reading an article in actually Forbes magazine one day about this guy named Benjamin Graham, who I didn’t learn anything about in business school. He just described the stock market as, you know, a very emotional place. He had a very simple analogy that is very helpful, Mr. Market. Think about Mr. Market as your partner in a business. And sometimes Mr. Market wakes up happy, and he’s willing to pay you a lot for your partnership interest in the business. Sometimes he wakes up sad and is willing to sell you his interest at a very low price. Your job is not to care what Mr. Market says unless he’s very emotionally excited or very emotionally depressed. And you’re never forced to sell to Mr. Market or buy from Mr. Market.

[中文]

正如我所说，只要你不亏钱，大多数其他结果都是好的。当我在沃顿商学院读书的时候——那是70年代末——当时教授的理论是市场是有效的。换句话说，股票价格在任何时候都代表了正确的价格，因为有大量聪明的投资者在买卖股票，会把价格推向正确的水平。那时候，报纸上有一个东西叫52周最高价和最低价，是针对个股的。一年中的某个时候，像IBM这样的股票是50，同一年另一个时候，它变成了100。而根据商学院教授的说法，每个价格都是正确的，这似乎不太对。所以有一天我在《福布斯》杂志上看到一篇关于一个叫本杰明·格雷厄姆的人的文章，我在商学院完全没有学过关于他的任何东西。他只是把股票市场描述为一个非常情绪化的地方。他有一个非常简单的比喻，非常有用，叫市场先生。把市场先生想象成你生意中的合伙人。有时候市场先生醒来时心情很好，他愿意为你在生意中的合伙权益出很高的价。有时候他醒来时心情很差，愿意以极低的价格把他的权益卖给你。你的工作就是不要在意市场先生说什么，除非他情绪非常激动或者情绪非常低落。而且你永远不必被迫向市场先生卖出或者从市场先生那里买入。

Segment 4

[English]

To sell to Mr. Market or buy from Mr. Market, but if Mr. Market is being very emotional, you can take advantage of him. That really rang a bell and set off a light bulb with me. Benjamin Graham’s philosophy centered around an idea called value investing. Ben Graham sort of said, buy it cheap. Figure out what it’s worth, pay a lot less, leave a large margin of safety. Leave a large distance between what you think something’s worth and where it’s trading so that even if you’re wrong, you still can make money. Back when I was in business school, when I had read about Benjamin Graham together with some of my classmates, we wanted to see if his basic principles worked well, and computers were pretty early at that time. So we created our data by hand by looking at S&P, Standard & Poor’s manuals, and using a computer that took up about, you know, a football field of room. So the question really is, what is cheap? And we just decided to use a crude metric, which is, how much cash is that company earning every year? And what are we paying for the business? So if we could buy the business for $10 and it earned $1 a year in cash flow, that’s a 10% yield. If I can only get 3% or 4% in the bank, buying that business for $10 and getting a 10% yield sounds better. And we simply said, 12% is better than 10%.

[中文]

向市场先生卖出或从市场先生那里买入，但如果市场先生情绪非常激动，你就可以利用他。这句话真的让我茅塞顿开、豁然开朗。本杰明·格雷厄姆的投资哲学围绕一个叫做"价值投资"的理念展开。本·格雷厄姆大致的意思是，买便宜的。估算出它的价值，用低得多的价格买入，留出巨大的安全边际。在你认为某样东西的价值和它的实际交易价格之间留出足够大的空间，这样即使你判断错了，你仍然能赚钱。当我在商学院读书时，我和一些同学一起读到了本杰明·格雷厄姆的理论，我们想看看他的基本原理是否管用，而那时候计算机还处于相当早期的阶段。所以我们通过手工方式创建数据，查看S&P, Standard & Poor’s的手册，使用的电脑大约占了一个足球场那么大的房间。所以问题归根结底是：什么才算便宜？我们决定采用一个粗略的衡量标准，那就是：这家公司每年能赚多少现金？而我们为这笔业务付出的代价是多少？所以如果我们花$10就能买下这笔业务，它每年能产生$1的现金流，那就是10%的收益率。如果我在银行只能拿到3%或4%的利息，那么花$10买下这笔业务、获得10%的收益率听起来就更划算。我们很简单地得出结论：12%比10%更好。

Segment 5

[English]

And we simply said, 12% is better than 10%. 10% is better than 4%. Let’s rank companies based on how cheap they are, based on how much earnings do I get. And while it was crude and certainly untested, it gave us a path to experiment with opportunities in the market. Before I started Gotham, I found a very small real estate business that was liquidating. They had a prospectus, which is what a company puts out when they’re going to go liquidate or do something special, and they’re required, according to the SEC, to disclose everything they’re doing. And they disclosed that the value of the real estate that was being liquidated was about $9 a share and the stock was trading at $3. Sounds pretty simple. And I thought, boy, that’s a large margin of safety. So I bought it at $3. And one of the things I learned there was that the people liquidating the business were going to lose their job when the business liquidated. So their incentive was to take a long time. And it ended up eating up much of the profits I was expecting to have because it took them a long time to liquidate the business. But here’s another great lesson about value investing. I was wrong on that one. I didn’t end up making money on that, but I also didn’t lose. Even though I didn’t make the $9, I didn’t lose money. I ended up getting my $3 or $4 back plus a little. And when Ben Graham said you should invest with a margin of safety, one of the things he meant was not just leave a large space between what you think something’s worth and what you pay, but also make…

[中文]

我们当时很简单地说，12%比10%好，10%比4%好。让我们根据公司有多便宜来排名，根据我能获得多少收益来排名。虽然这个方法很粗糙，而且肯定没有经过验证，但它给了我们一条在市场中探索机会的路径。在我创办Gotham之前，我发现了一家规模非常小的房地产企业正在清算。他们有一份招股说明书，就是公司在准备清算或进行某些特殊事项时发布的东西。而且根据SEC的要求，他们必须披露所有正在做的事情。他们披露的信息显示，被清算的房地产价值约为每股9美元，而当时的股价是3美元。听起来非常简单。我当时心想，哇，安全边际真大。于是我就以3美元的价格买入了。我从中学到的一点是，负责清算业务的人在公司清算后就会失去工作。所以他们的动机就是尽量拖延时间。结果这把我预期中的大部分利润都吃掉了，因为他们花了很长时间才完成清算。但这是价值投资的另一个绝佳教训。在那笔投资上我判断错了。我最终没有赚到钱，但我也没有亏钱。即使我没有拿到那9美元，我也没有亏损。我最终拿回了我的3美元或4美元，还多了一点点。当本·格雷厄姆说你应该留有安全边际地投资时，他的意思之一不仅仅是让你认为的价值和你支付的价格之间留出很大的空间，而且还要……

Segment 6

[English]

Worth and what you pay, but also make conservative assumptions. So when you’re evaluating a business, you always want to look at, you know, not the best case, but maybe, you know, what could go wrong. You can ask, what are the insiders doing? And where do the incentives lie? In other words, do the people running the company make more money if the stock price goes up, or do they make more money from their salary and bonuses? What will the expenses be? How long will something take? What are the odds that it actually happens the way you expect? And these are all things you take into account when you’re discounting what you’re expecting to eventually get and what you’re paying for it. You know, one of the fun things about investing over a long period of time is that you’re actually always making mistakes. And the key to that is learning from those mistakes because next time you’ll have the opportunity to bring those new lessons into your process. I think the biggest change from when I started way back in the 80s was I was much more of a Ben Graham type investor looking for cheap businesses. My evolution, and luckily it happened pretty quickly in the businesses, realizing you really have to dig a little deeper than that. And from there, I just started reading everything I could about Benjamin Graham and ending up with his best student, a guy named Warren Buffett. Warren Buffett evolved Ben Graham’s theories, which made

[中文]

价值与你要付出的价格，同时也要做出保守的假设。所以当你评估一家企业时，你总要看的是，你知道的，不是最好的情况，而是，你知道的，可能会出什么问题。你可以问，内部人在做什么？激励机制在哪里？换句话说，公司管理层是从股价上涨中赚更多钱，还是从工资和奖金中赚更多钱？费用会是多少？某件事需要多长时间？事情按你预期的方式发生的概率有多大？这些都是你在折现你最终预期能得到的回报以及你为此付出的价格时所要考虑的因素。你知道，长期投资的一个有趣之处在于，你其实总是在犯错。而关键是从这些错误中学习，因为下次你就有机会把这些新的教训带入你的投资流程中。我认为从我在80年代刚入行时到现在，最大的变化是我当时更像一个本杰明·格雷厄姆类型的投资者，专门寻找便宜的企业。我的进化——幸运的是，在企业分析方面这种进化发生得相当快——意识到你真的必须比那更深入一步。从那以后，我就开始阅读所有我能找到的关于本杰明·格雷厄姆的资料，最终接触到了他最优秀的学生，一个叫沃伦·巴菲特的人。沃伦·巴菲特发展了本杰明·格雷厄姆的理论，这使得

Segment 7

[English]

Warren Buffett evolved Ben Graham’s theories, which made him one of the richest people in the world. He said, “If I can buy good business cheap, even better.” I wanted to go back to sort of my business school days and test whether good and cheap would also work very well and we could prove that it made sense. We ranked companies based on good and cheap, combined those rankings, and then looked at the results. If you did a combination of good and cheap and bought the best combination, that did the best. If you broke it into deciles, the top 10% of companies with the best metrics did the best, the second 10% did the second best. And so that ended up being the magic formula. And the real question is, why doing something so simple works? So imagine that if you have a business that you think is worth $10 today, and you can buy it at five, that’s Ben Graham. But if it’s not a good business and it’s worth $10 today, but it might be worth $8 a few years from now. Well, now my margin of safety is shrinking. So imagine another example where I also think a business is worth $10, but it’s a really good business, and I think it could be worth $12 or $14 or $15. Could I pay $7 for that business, more than the $5 that was at $10 in the Ben Graham type example, but now I’m paying $7 for a business I think is worth $10 today, but has a good shot of growing to $12 or $14 or $15? Which one has a big margin of safety?

[中文]

沃伦·巴菲特在本·格雷厄姆理论的基础上进行了发展，这使他成为世界上最富有的人之一。他说，如果我能便宜地买到好生意，那就更好了。我想回到商学院时代的那种状态，检验一下"好"和"便宜"是否也能运作得非常好，并且我们能够证明这是有道理的。我们根据"好"和"便宜"对公司进行排名，将那些排名综合起来，然后观察结果。如果你把"好"和"便宜"结合起来，买入最优的组合，它的表现就是最好的。如果你把它分成十分位，指标最好的前10%的公司表现最佳，第二个10%表现第二好。于是这就成了所谓的"magic formula"。真正的问题是，为什么这么简单的事情竟然有效？试想一下，如果你认为一家企业今天值$10，而你花$5就能买到，这就是本·格雷厄姆的做法。但如果这不是一门好生意，它今天值$10，但几年后可能只值$8。那么，你的安全边际正在缩小。再想象另一个例子，我也认为一家企业值$10，但它是一门非常好的生意，我认为它未来可能值$12、$14甚至$15。我能不能花$7来买这家企业？这比本·格雷厄姆那种$10只花$5的例子付得更多，但现在我花$7买的企业，虽然我认为它今天值$10，但它有很大概率增长到$12、$14或$15。哪一个的安全边际更大呢？

Segment 8

[English]

14 or 15. Which one has a big margin of safety? I could easily argue that the second business that’s growing its value is the better investment and the larger margin of safety, both of those things. I’m not giving away buying cheap. I’m just saying I’m having the wind at my back with a good business and the wind in my face with not a great business. People often call this way of thinking growth investing, but there’s only one type of investing. Figuring out what something’s worth, paying less. How much the business will grow is a part of valuation. So there is no dichotomy between cheap and good or value investing and growth investing. Growth and value are tied at the hip, as Warren Buffett would say. And once again, it just comes down to doing your work. Growth is a component of value. And you have to stick to things that you feel like you have a little bit of an edge on. The truth is that 99 plus percent of people don’t know how to value a business. It’s not so easy. It takes some skill sets that most people don’t have. What I liken to is digging a hole. You got to keep digging to learn more and more and more about something and unpeel the layers of an investment. But if I said you’re digging for buried treasure, it gets a little more interesting. You now have a purpose. And if you’re digging for buried treasure, no sense in digging up the whole neighborhood. It’s better if you can find a big X someplace where this might be an opportunity and then start digging into

[中文]

14还是15。哪个有更大的安全边际？我可以毫不费力地说，第二家正在增值的企业才是更好的投资，也拥有更大的安全边际，这两点都成立。我并不是在说买便宜货。我只是说，好的企业让我顺风而行，而差的企业则让我逆风而上。人们常常把这种思维方式称为成长型投资，但其实只有一种投资方式。搞清楚一样东西值多少钱，然后以更低的价格买入。企业能增长多少，是估值的一部分。所以，便宜与好、价值投资与成长投资之间并不存在对立。正如沃伦·巴菲特所说，成长和价值是绑在一起的。归根结底，还是要靠你自己下功夫。成长是价值的一个组成部分。你必须坚持那些你觉得自己稍微有一点优势的东西。事实是，超过99%的人根本不知道如何给企业估值。这并不简单。它需要一些大多数人并不具备的技能。我把它比作挖洞。你得不停地挖，才能对某件事了解得越来越多，一层一层地剥开投资的表皮。但如果你说你在挖埋藏的宝藏，事情就变得有趣多了。你现在有了目标。如果你在挖宝藏，没必要把整个街区都挖一遍。最好你能找到一个大"X"标记，那里可能是个机会，然后开始往那个方向挖。

Segment 9

[English]

This might be an opportunity, and then start digging and doing your work there. You have to look in the right places. When I’m looking for cheap businesses, I’m always looking for a little hook that might make this something that other people won’t be looking at. I’ll have less competition, and we’ll be able to find a little bit of an edge. For instance, my in-laws used to have a place in Connecticut, and they’d spend their weekends looking at country auctions and estate sales, and they were looking for art that they could buy at a bargain price, you know, way below what they thought it was worth. But the key thing for them was, if they saw a painting at a yard sale that they liked, they didn’t ask, “Is this painter going to be the next Picasso?” That’s really hard to know. The real question they asked was, “Well, was there a painting by the same painter that looks similar to this that just went for auction for two or three times what I can buy this one for?” And that’s a much different question. It’s a much simpler question. It has to do with locating that opportunity. It has to do with recognizing that opportunity is similar to another opportunity. And it really comes from looking in the right places rather than being able to pick the next Picasso. The idea is to recognize something that doesn’t look quite right and then really examine whether the market is right or maybe there’s really an opportunity here. Most of the time the market is right, but sometimes you can really find

[中文]

这可能是一个机会，然后开始在那里深入挖掘、做你必须做的事情。你得去对的地方找。当我寻找便宜的公司时，我总是在找一个小契机，能让这个东西成为其他人不会去关注的目标。这样我的竞争就会少一些，我们就能找到一点优势。举个例子，我岳父母曾经在康涅狄格州有一处房子，他们每个周末都会去逛乡村拍卖和地产销售会，寻找那些能以低价买到的艺术品——你知道的，价格远低于他们认为的实际价值。但对他们来说，关键是，如果他们在庭院拍卖上看到一幅喜欢的画，他们不会问：这位画家会不会成为下一个毕加索？这真的很难知道。他们真正问的问题是：有没有同一画家的一幅看起来和这幅差不多的画，刚刚在拍卖会上拍出了我能买这幅画的价格的两到三倍？这是一个完全不同的问题。这是一个简单得多的问题。它关乎找到那个机会。它关乎认识到这个机会和另一个机会是相似的。而这确实来自于去对的地方寻找，而不是有能力挑出下一个毕加索。这个理念是，识别出某个看起来不太对劲的东西，然后真正去审视市场是否是对的，或者这里是否真的存在一个机会。大多数时候市场是对的，但有时候你真的能找到

Segment 10

[English]

Most of the time the market is right, but sometimes you can really find a real kernel of value. When I’m looking for bargains, usually I like reading the business press, particularly the Wall Street Journal, but it could be coming from anywhere. Where I’m reading something, I say, oh, that’s interesting. That’s a little weird. Or, boy, no one’s going to really want to look at this. That sounds terrible. Or a company is going through a transition. It’s spinning off a company that’s much smaller than the original company that people were investing in. And so it’s something maybe people don’t look at as closely. In the early 90s, we found a really interesting situation just by reading the Wall Street Journal. Marriott was splitting into two companies. It had a real estate company that owned hotels, and then it had a management company that managed hotels. And most people thought the management business was better because you don’t have to go put a lot of money into a hotel and build it. Maybe it’ll work and maybe it won’t. Maybe there’ll be a real estate depression or maybe there won’t. But if you have a management company, it’s a steady stream of earnings. In other words, you’re managing other people’s properties. And Marriott had both. And when they split, most people were interested in the management company. So naturally, I looked at the part of the business that most people didn’t want. So the question is, if no one’s looking at it, maybe I should look at it. Maybe I’ll find something a little better. Luckily, the person who designed the whole program of splitting the business was gonna run the business that no one wanted, and I said,

[中文]

大多数时候市场是对的，但有时候你确实能发现真正的价值内核。当我寻找便宜货的时候，通常我喜欢阅读商业媒体，尤其是《华尔街日报》，但也可能来自任何地方。我在读某条新闻时会说，哦，这挺有意思。这有点奇怪。或者，天哪，没人会真正想去看这个。这听起来太糟糕了。或者一家公司正在经历转型。它在分拆一家比原来人们投资的那家公司小得多的公司。所以这可能就是人们不太仔细关注的东西。在90年代初，我们只是通过读《华尔街日报》就发现了一个非常有意思的情况。万豪正在拆分成两家公司。它有一家拥有酒店的房地产公司，还有一家管理酒店的管理公司。大多数人认为管理业务更好，因为你不需要投入大量资金去建一家酒店。也许能成也许不能成。也许会出现房地产萧条也许不会。但如果你有一家管理公司，那就是一笔稳定的收入流。换句话说，你是在管理别人的资产。而万豪两者都有。当他们拆分的时候，大多数人对管理公司感兴趣。所以我自然而然地去看大多数人不想看的那部分业务。所以问题是，如果没人关注它，也许我应该去关注。也许我能发现一些更好的东西。幸运的是，设计整个业务拆分方案的人，要去经营那家没人想要的公司，我就说，

Segment 11

[English]

was going to run the business that no one wanted. And I said, I don’t think he’d do that unless there was something really there, and it just made me look a little harder than maybe other people at what were the hidden gems within that business. If you looked a little closer, there was a part of the company that we thought was worth about $6. We were paying $4 for the whole company. There was a part of the company that was worth $6 that had no debt on it. And there was a subsidiary that owned all the debt, and the parent company didn’t owe it. So we were paying $4 for something we thought was worth $6 with no debt, with another piece attached that could be worth a lot of money that was the one that had all the debt on it. And we bought that piece of Marriott. Usually you have to be very patient in investing, especially when you’re buying something no one else wants. But in, I believe, four to six months, that stock had basically tripled. But where should you sell? If something’s worth $10 in your mind and you could buy it for $5, do you sell it when it’s at seven? Do you sell it when it’s at eight? Do you sell it when it’s at nine or it’s full value or when it gets overvalued? It’s very hard to know, but once again, if you buy well and don’t lose money, most of the other alternatives are good. And if we hadn’t spent the time looking and looking really hard, we never would have found that. So we didn’t make money because we were investment wizards. We were looking at a place no one else wanted. We did a little more work than other people did. And we knew the type of opportunities we were looking for. So that was the approach we took with Gotham.

[中文]

我打算去做那个没人愿意做的生意。我说，我觉得他不会那样做，除非那里真的有什么东西，这让我比别人更努力地去寻找那个企业里隐藏的宝藏。如果你再仔细看看，公司有一块业务，我们认为它值大约6美元。我们为整个公司只付了4美元。公司有一块没有负债的业务，我们认为它值6美元。还有一个子公司承担了所有债务，母公司并不欠这笔债。所以我们花4美元买下了我们认为值6美元、没有负债的东西，还附带了一块可能值很多钱的部分，而那块才是承担了所有债务的。我们买下了Marriott的这部分。在投资中通常你必须非常有耐心，尤其是当你买的是别人都不想要的东西。但在我看来，大约四到六个月后，那只股票基本上翻了三倍。但你该在哪里卖出呢？如果你心里觉得某样东西值10美元，而你花5美元就能买到它，那你在7美元的时候卖吗？8美元的时候卖吗？9美元的时候卖吗？还是等到它达到内在价值，或者被高估了再卖？这很难知道，但话说回来，如果你买得好、不亏钱，大多数其他选择都不会差。如果我们没有花时间认真去研究，我们永远也不会发现那个机会。所以我们赚钱并不是因为我们是投资天才。我们看的是别人都不愿意看的地方。我们比别人多做了一点功课，而且我们清楚自己在寻找什么样的机会。这就是我们对待Gotham的方式。

Segment 12

[English]

We were looking for. So that was the approach we took with Gotham Capital, and it worked well for us. But there were some bumps in the road. You know, for a large part of my investment career, our portfolio really consisted of six to eight names at any one time, where 80 plus percent of our portfolio. Often because I do a lot of work in each individual security that I put into my portfolio, I’m willing to own a concentrated portfolio. The more you know about how to value a business, the more you can concentrate your investments in those few things that you feel like you have some expertise where you have an edge. Most academics who look at portfolio management as a science would say that’s wildly frisky. That’s very risky. Bad things can happen. But sometimes bad things can actually teach you good lessons. I started Gotham Capital in 1985. Pretty soon after we started, I was investing in merger deals. And I divided my portfolio into eight different mergers, which at the time, I didn’t think was risky because it was a wide range of industries. And actually what happened was there was a glass.

[中文]

这就是我们当时所寻找的方法。所以我们用哥谭资本（Gotham Capital）采取了这种策略，而且效果不错。但过程中也遇到了一些波折。你知道，在我的投资生涯中有很大一部分时间里，我们的投资组合在任何时候实际上只包含六到八个标的，占我们投资组合的80%以上。通常因为我对放入投资组合中的每一只个股都做了大量的研究工作，所以我愿意持有一个集中程度较高的投资组合。你对如何评估一家企业了解得越多，就越能将自己的投资集中在你自认为具有一定专业优势和判断力的少数品种上。大多数把投资组合管理视为一门学术研究的学者会说，这种做法非常冒险，风险极高，可能会出大问题。但有时候，坏事其实也能教会你好的道理。我在1985年创立了哥谭资本（Gotham Capital）。成立不久之后，我开始投资并购交易。我把投资组合分成了八个不同的并购项目。当时我并不觉得这有什么风险，因为涉及的行业范围很广。但实际情况是，当时发生了一件与玻璃行业相关的事情——

Segment 13

[English]

There was a glitch in being able to fund businesses. In other words, there was a problem in the bond market, and that affected all eight companies at the same time. So I thought I had a diversified portfolio, but actually it was really one investment, betting on whether the bond market would be able to finance all these companies. And they couldn’t. So I actually had eight deals that I had invested in that I thought were diversified break all at one time. When that happened, we lost a lot of money. But that loss ended up being a blessing in disguise. That happened in 1986, and things weren’t smelling very good towards the end of 1987. Interest rates were rising, stock prices were rising, and they didn’t make sense going together. And then, all of a sudden, Black Monday came along. It was the largest one-day percentage drop in the history of the Dow Jones, worse than the Great Depression. People were freaking out, but luckily, not us. We had just lost all this money in 1986, so we were more cautious than we usually would. And before the crash, luckily sold most of our positions because something didn’t seem right and it paid to be cautious. And so sometimes bad things can actually teach you good lessons. First, you really have to look hard if you have a concentrated portfolio of what the interconnections of those investments are. Is it one bet? Is it eight bets? Second,

[中文]

在为企业融资方面出现了一个问题。换句话说，债券市场出了问题，同时影响到了所有八家公司。所以我原以为自己拥有一个多元化的投资组合，但实际上那真的只是一场赌注，赌的是债券市场是否能够为所有这些企业提供融资。结果它们做不到。所以我投资的这八笔交易，原以为它们是多元化的分散投资，结果却同时全部崩盘。那次事件发生后，我们损失了很多资金。但那次损失最终因祸得福。那发生在1986年，到了1987年底，情况已经变得非常不妙。利率在上涨，股价也在上涨，这两者同时走高是不合常理的。然后，突然之间，黑色星期一来了。这是道琼斯指数历史上单日百分比跌幅最大的一次，比大萧条时期还要严重。人们惊慌失措，但幸运的是，我们没有。我们在1986年刚刚损失了那么多钱，所以比平时更加谨慎。而在崩盘之前，幸运的是，我们已经卖掉了大部分持仓，因为感觉有些不对劲，谨慎行事是有回报的。所以有时候，坏事实际上能教会你好的教训。首先，如果你拥有一个集中的投资组合，你真的必须仔细审视那些投资之间的相互关联性。它是一场赌注？还是八场赌注？第二，

Segment 14

[English]

Is it one bet? Is it eight bets? Second, when I look at investments, I really have to look long and hard and really think of the worst case. Nothing comes without risk. But if I can think I’m only going to lose a dollar or two, but I can make six or eight, that’s a good risk-reward. And third, there might be ways to be much more conservative when investing. After we lost our money in 1986, I was very conservative investing my money. And yet in that year, we were able to make 60% returns. If we had been taking more risk, maybe we could have made 100% or 200%, but 60% sounded like a good return. And I said, boy, if we can be this conservative and make a good return, maybe I should just make sure that every time I invest, I’m very conservative. And that’s been a lesson I took with me since the crash of 87, that if I want to be very conservative and I still want to buy this investment, then that’s really a good sign that this is a very good investment. Since we started Gotham, we had a pretty impressive track record with conservative investments. We turned a profit every year. But that was all about to change. Through 1997, we never had a losing year. All of a sudden, in 1998, we lost about 5%, but the market that year was up about 28%. And so that’s not a very good one. The market makes 28 and you lose five, that’s not great.

[中文]

这是一笔赌注吗？还是八笔赌注？第二，当我审视投资时，我必须花很长时间认真思考，真正去想最坏的情况。没有什么是没有风险的。但如果我觉得自己可能只会亏一两美元，却能赚六七美元，那就是一个好的风险回报比。第三，投资时可能有办法做到保守得多。在我们1986年亏钱之后，我投资时非常保守。然而在那一年的时间里，我们却实现了60%的回报。如果我们承担了更高的风险，也许能赚到100%甚至200%，但60%听起来已经是一个不错的回报了。我当时说，天哪，如果我们能这么保守还能获得不错的回报，也许我应该确保每次投资时都保持非常保守。这是我从87年股灾中吸取的教训——如果我想非常保守，却仍然想买入这项投资，那这真的是一个信号，说明这是一项非常好的投资。自从我们创立Gotham以来，在保守投资方面有着相当出色的记录。我们每年都实现了盈利。但这一切即将改变。到1997年为止，我们从未有过亏损的年份。然而在1998年，我们突然亏损了约5%，而那一年市场上涨了约28%。所以这个表现并不好。市场涨了28，你亏了5，这可不怎么样。

Segment 15

[English]

The market makes 28 and you lose 5, that’s not great. Then the next year, the market went up another 21%, and we were down 5% again. And we were just doing what we always did, but the market wasn’t agreeing with us. So the question became, was the market wrong, or were we wrong? I taught over two decades at Columbia Business School, and I made a promise to my students the first day of class. I promised them if they did good valuation work, the market would agree with them. And so if they could find something trading way below its fair value, I promised them that someday the market would agree with them. But I didn’t tell them when. Could be a couple weeks, could be two or three years. What happened to us in the late 90s, I believe, is that Mr. Market was smitten with the new internet at the time, and the market was paying more money for something else, something that didn’t make that much sense to us. I have to say, when everyone’s making a lot of money and you’re losing money, that’s perhaps the hardest test. It’s very hard to stay disciplined at doing this, unless you really understand in your bones what you’re actually trying to do. And since the Internet wasn’t really our area of expertise, we just kept staying in the industries that we knew. And so our definition of good and cheap didn’t change. The market didn’t value our opinion.

[中文]

市场涨了28%，你亏了5%，这可不怎么样。接下来一年，市场又涨了21%，我们还是亏了5%。我们一直在做我们一直在做的事，但市场就是不认可我们。所以问题就变成了：是市场错了，还是我们错了？我在哥伦比亚商学院教了二十多年书，第一天上课我就对学生做了一个承诺。我承诺他们，如果他们做了扎实的估值工作，市场最终会认可他们。所以如果他们发现某个标的交易价格远低于其公允价值，我向他们保证，总有一天市场会认可他们。但我没有告诉他们具体是什么时候。可能是几周，也可能是两三年。我认为我们在90年代末所经历的情况是，市场先生当时迷恋上了新兴的互联网，市场在为别的东西买单，而那个东西在我们看来并没有太大逻辑可言。我不得不说，当所有人都在赚钱而你却在亏钱，这大概是最艰难的考验。在这种情况下很难保持纪律性，除非你从骨子里真正理解你到底在做什么。由于互联网并不是我们真正擅长的领域，我们就一直坚守在自己熟悉的行业里。所以我们对"好且便宜"的定义并没有改变。市场并不认可我们的判断。

Segment 16

[English]

The market didn’t value our opinion for a few years. It doesn’t feel good. And so you have to ask yourself, why would you stay with it? Why would you stay with something that doesn’t work for one year, two years, three years? The only reason that you would stay with something is that you think what you’re doing makes sense, that you followed a process, and that you believe that the market will agree with you eventually. Luckily, in 2000, the market was down 10%. We were up 115%. We weren’t just basically turned into idiots in 98 and 99 and all of a sudden geniuses in 2000. It’s just that the market decided to recognize what we saw. We just kept doing what we knew how to do and stuck with it. But it was a very rough ride. And, you know, if this were so easy, everyone would do it. And so you have to have that patience and understand what you’re doing and believe the market will recognize that over time. If you’re a good investor, it’s all about continually learning. And many teachers would tell you that they learn more trying to prepare a lesson to teach someone else something. And so about seven or eight years after I started teaching MBAs, I realized I should try to create a process for investing that is based around many of our ideas, but simplified enough for anyone to understand. But how? The truth is that most people have a day job. They don’t have the time to value their work.

[中文]

市场有几年并不认可我们的观点。这让人很不好受。所以你得问自己，为什么还要坚持下去？为什么你要坚持一件一年、两年、三年都不奏效的事情？你唯一能坚持下去的理由，就是你所做的事情是合理的，你遵循了一套流程，并且你相信市场最终会认同你的看法。幸运的是，2000年市场下跌了10%，而我们上涨了115%。我们并不是在98年和99年还基本上是傻瓜，到了2000年突然就变成了天才。只不过是市场终于认可了我们的眼光。我们只是继续做我们擅长的事情，并坚持了下来。但这个过程非常艰难。而且，你知道，如果这真的这么简单，每个人都会去做。所以你必须要有耐心，理解自己在做什么，并相信市场迟早会认可你的判断。如果你是一个好的投资者，最重要的就是不断学习。很多老师会告诉你，他们在准备教别人某样东西的过程中，自己反而学到了更多。所以，在我教了MBA大约七八年之后，我意识到我应该尝试创建一套投资流程，这套流程基于我们的许多理念，但足够简化，让任何人都能理解。但怎么做呢？事实是大多数人都有本职工作。他们没有时间去评估自己的工作。

Segment 17

[English]

That most people have a day job. They don’t have the time to value businesses. And so those people are better off owning a diversified portfolio because investing is figuring out what something’s worth and paying less. And if you don’t know how to value something, you have no business having a very concentrated portfolio. And so that led us to another way that people could apply our investing principles. When we tested the magic formula at first, it was just really crude metrics to say what is cheap and what is good. And those crude metrics worked incredibly well to find companies that were both good and cheap and actually outperform the market. But those were crude metrics. And we said, well, we actually know how to value companies. Can we do something more with this in a very systematic way? And ended up building a big research team to buy a diversified portfolio of companies that sort of used the principles that we had always used in our concentrated portfolios to pick stocks that were both good and cheap. Can we put those principles into work and make diversified portfolios? It was really learning about learning how to make money in a different way, but following the same principles. And we started on a journey to create more diversified portfolios. So I wrote the little book that beats the market. It was a more diversified way for the average investor to take advantage of the principles that I used in my more concentrated investing and make it more universal. You know, one of the great things about writing and teaching is that you really have to think.

[中文]

大多数人都有全职工作，没有时间去评估企业的价值。因此，这些人更适合持有一个多元化的投资组合，因为投资就是判断某样东西值多少钱，然后以更低的价格买入。如果你不知道如何评估价值，你就不应该持有非常集中的投资组合。于是，这让我们找到了另一种方式，让人们可以应用我们的投资原则。当我们最初测试这个"神奇公式"时，它只是一些非常粗糙的指标，用来判断什么是便宜的、什么是好的。而这些粗糙的指标在寻找既好又便宜的公司方面效果出奇地好，实际上跑赢了市场。但这些指标毕竟是粗糙的。我们说，嗯，其实我们知道如何评估公司。我们能不能用一种非常系统化的方式做得更多？最终我们建立了一个大型研究团队，买入一个多元化的投资组合，这些组合在一定程度上运用了我们一直以来在集中投资组合中使用的原则，来挑选既好又便宜的股票。我们能不能把这些原则运用起来，构建出多元化的投资组合？这其实是在学习一种不同的赚钱方式，但遵循的是相同的原则。于是我们踏上了创建更多元化投资组合的旅程。所以我写了《战胜市场》这本小书。对于普通投资者来说，这是一种更多元化的方式，可以利用我在更集中投资中使用的原则，使其更加普遍适用。你知道，写作和教学的一个伟大之处在于，你必须要认真思考。

Segment 18

[English]

Great things about writing and teaching is that you really have to think long and hard, what was I thinking at that time? What’s the principle I used? How can I simplify this? So I think by writing and teaching and trying to simplify things was a great way for me to learn and also a great way to explain in a very clear way to people who want to learn something faster and easier and to take it down to a sixth or eighth grade level and demystify what investing is. But another piece of continually learning is keeping up with a changing world. The question I always ask my students is, what do you do when you’re evaluating a business where the technology is always changing, where the economy is changing, the products are always changing. Remember finding the next Picasso? Many tech businesses and new businesses are more like that skill set. Who is the next Picasso? And the evaluation becomes less about what’s happening now and more about predicting the future. There was a time not so long ago, maybe six or seven years ago, where Apple was trading at a very low multiple, meaning below a market multiple. And there was a debate. What is Apple? Is Apple a hardware company that makes phones and computers? And those don’t usually

[中文]

写作和教学的一个好处在于，你必须认真深入地思考：我当时是怎么想的？我用了什么原理？我怎样才能把它简化？所以我认为，通过写作和教学，努力把事情简化，对我来说是一个很好的学习方式，同时也是一个很好的解释方式，能够非常清晰地向那些希望更快、更轻松地学习的人把复杂的东西降低到小学六年级或八年级的水平，揭开投资的神秘面纱。但持续学习的另一个方面是跟上不断变化的世界。我总是问我的学生这样一个问题：当你评估一家技术不断变化、经济不断变化、产品也不断变化的企业时，你会怎么做？还记得寻找下一个毕加索吗？许多科技企业和新企业更像是那种技能组合。谁是下一个毕加索？评估的重点变得越来越不在于当下正在发生什么，而在于预测未来。就在不久之前，也许是六七年前，苹果的估值倍数非常低，也就是说低于市场平均水平。当时存在一个争论：苹果是什么？苹果是一家生产手机和电脑的硬件公司吗？而这类公司通常不会

Segment 19

[English]

And those don’t usually, you know, they’re subject to a lot of competition and change in technology and everything else. And does that deserve a low multiple? Or is Apple an ecosystem of products that work with each other and grows over time? The stock was priced as if it was the first. It may have been the second. And if you can buy it at a low multiple, pricing it as if it’s just really a hardware company making computers and phones, and there’s a possibility that it’s also an ecosystem that can grow over time. In our diversified strategy, the way we look at it is we’re buying a bucket of apples. When Apple is priced at its lower level, yes, maybe something good will happen. But instead of a few big bets, it’s more like a portfolio of smaller bets. That’s more of what we’re doing nowadays, buying a bucket of apples. Not just we’re right or wrong on Apple, that may be true. But if you tilt the odds in your favor, buying good businesses at relatively good prices, buying a bucket of apples can work as well. But you still have to understand what you’re trying to accomplish. And the importance of that is what Warren Buffett said, understanding your circle of competence. What am I capable of doing? What is outside of my capabilities? And just concentrating when you’re digging for buried treasure in areas that you understand well. And one way to do that is by developing a skill set in specific areas.

[中文]

而那些行业通常，你知道的，它们面临很多竞争和技术等各方面的变化，那是不是就只配得上低倍数呢？还是说苹果是一个产品之间相互配合、随时间不断成长的生态系统？股票定价时把它当成了第一种情况。它可能属于第二种情况，如果你能以低倍数买入，把它仅仅当作一家生产电脑和手机的硬件公司来定价。也有可能它同时也是一个可以随时间成长的生态系统。在我们多元化策略中，我们的做法就像买了一筐苹果。当苹果处于较低价位时，没错，也许会有好事发生。但我们不是下几个大赌注，而更像是构建一系列较小的赌注组合。这就是我们现在的做法——买了一筐苹果，不仅仅是我们对苹果的判断对不对，也许确实如此。但如果你把胜算倾向在自己这边，以相对合理的价格买入优质企业，买一筐苹果同样可以奏效。但你仍然需要明白你想要达成的目标。这一点的重要性正如沃伦·巴菲特所说，要理解你的能力圈。我擅长什么？什么超出了我的能力范围？就像在你擅长的领域挖掘宝藏时，把精力集中在自己真正理解的地方。而做到这一点的方法之一，就是在特定领域培养一套专业技能。

Segment 20

[English]

Developing a skill set in specific areas. You could become an expert in retail, or you could become an expert in finance companies or anything. And to value something, it has to earn something at some point. It doesn’t have to earn it now. It could be losing money now. It could be breaking even. That doesn’t matter. But someday, it has to earn something. Otherwise, I can’t put a value on it. And if it’s really hard to figure out what the business is going to look like two or three years from now, what do you do? The answer is, that I tell them is, skip that one and find one you can figure out. You have no business investing in something where you can’t figure out what normalized earnings are a few years out. When you realize you can’t do that, skip that one and find one you can find. Warren Buffett calls it waiting for your pitch. You can swing at one out of 20 pitches. And as long as that one’s right, everything works out okay. So you can miss a lot of great opportunities, that’s fine. But if the ones you choose to do are your pitch, that works out well too in investing. When I explain to my students about Mr. Market, during the course of a semester, someone always raises their hand. And they say, you know what, there’s so many computers, There’s so many smart people going to Wall Street. What are my chances to take advantage of the market when all these other smart people in

[中文]

培养特定领域的专业技能。你可以成为零售业的专家，也可以成为金融公司或任何领域的专家。而要给某样东西定价，它最终必须能赚到钱。不一定要现在就能赚钱。它现在可能正在亏损，也可能刚好持平。这没有关系。但总有一天，它必须能赚到钱。否则，我无法给它估值。如果你真的很难判断一家公司在两三年后会是什么样子，你该怎么办？我的回答是，我会告诉他们，跳过这个，去找一个你能判断的公司。如果你无法判断几年后的正常化盈利是多少，那你就不该投资。当你意识到自己做不到这一点时，就跳过它，去找你能判断的公司。沃伦·巴菲特称之为等待属于你的投球。20个投球中，你可以挥棒击打其中一个。只要那一球是对的，一切都会顺利。所以，你可以错过很多好机会，这没关系。但如果你选择去击打的球正好是属于你的那一球，在投资中同样会有好结果。当我在课堂上向学生讲解"市场先生"的概念时，整个学期总有人举手提问。他们会说，你知道，有那么多电脑，有那么多聪明人涌向华尔街。在所有这些聪明人都在参与市场的情况下，我还有什么机会利用市场呢？

Segment 21

[English]

Take advantage of the market when all these other smart people and all these resources are going there? We’re getting out of school now. What are we going to do? And so I point out to them that Mr. Market is still alive and well. You know, if many of them were born in, let’s say, 1997, and between 1997 and 2000, the S&P 500, that’s an average of 500 companies, doubled. From 2000 to 2002, it halved. From 2002 to 2007, it doubled. From 2007 to 2009, it halved. And from 2009 till today, it’s tripled with some detours in 2020 and 2022. So if you view fair value as this straight line, and you view the market doubling and halving as the market goes above and beyond that line of fair value, the market is always throwing out pitches. Sometimes it’s underpriced, sometimes it’s overpriced. And people are people. And people are emotional. And I think the biggest edge that people can have is patience, meaning sticking to a disciplined process. And the more information we have, the more news we have, the more instantaneously it’s available online, people get very short-term oriented. And they play games like GameStop or whatever it might be, the flavor of the moment. But if you actually have a two, three, four, five-year horizon, that’s rare. And if you can keep that horizon and not worry about what’s happening in the short term and

[中文]

利用市场，当所有这些聪明人和所有资源都在涌向那里的时候？我们现在正在走出校门。我们打算怎么做？于是我向他们指出，市场先生依然活得好好的。你们知道，如果他们中的很多人出生在比如说1997年，那么在1997年到2000年间，S&P 500，也就是由500家公司组成的平均指数，翻了一番。从2000年到2002年，它跌去了一半。从2002年到2007年，它又翻了一番。从2007年到2009年，它再次跌去一半。而从2009年到现在，它增长了两倍，期间在2020年和2022年有过一些波折。所以，如果你把公允价值看作一条直线，而把市场的翻倍和腰斩看作市场在那条公允价值线上下波动，那么市场总是在投出好球。有时候它被低估，有时候它被高估。而人终究是人。人是感性的。我认为人们最大的优势就是耐心，也就是坚持一套有纪律的流程。我们拥有的信息越多，新闻越多，网上即时可得的信息越多，人们就变得越短视。他们去玩GameStop这样的游戏，或者任何当下流行的东西。但如果你实际上有两到三到四到五年的视野，这是非常难得的。如果你能保持这种视野，不去担心短期发生了什么，

Segment 22

[English]

And not worry about what’s happening in the short term. And that’s very hard to do as a professional because you’re always being judged on a daily basis. But as an individual, you have a big advantage, and your advantage is patience. And so Mr. Market is still alive and well, and I think patience will be the last man standing, and you’ll be able to take advantage of crazy Mr. Market if you’re very patient and disciplined.

[中文]

不必担心短期内的表现。作为一名专业人士，这非常困难，因为你每天都在被评判。但作为个人投资者，你有一个巨大的优势，那就是耐心。所以"市场先生"依然活得好好的，我认为耐心会是最后的赢家，如果你非常有耐心且纪律严明，你就能利用疯狂的"市场先生"来获利。

来源：要提前退休的小钢子-Ray Dalio 大师课 第3集（via bilibili-auto-transcript skill）

Source: MasterClass - Ray Dalio (via bilibili-auto-transcript skill)