视频信息

  • 标题：Ray Dalio 大师课 第2集：2008 金融危机的真正复盘
  • BV号：BV1QA4m137u4
  • 分集 Part：p3（第2集，46分32秒）
  • 作者：要提前退休的小钢子
  • 发布于：2024-02-20
  • 原始链接：B站视频
  • 同合集：本系列共 6 集，本篇为 第2集；其他集见博客标签 Ray Dalio 大师课 或目录
  • 语言：英语（English speech）+ 中文字幕 / 本博客为中英双语转录（Chinese + English bilingual transcript）

转录说明

  • 转录工具：
    • 英文转录：Groq Whisper large-v3（language=en）
    • 英文标点修复：LongCat-2.0-Preview
    • 中文翻译：LongCat-2.0-Preview（保留数字 / 公司名 / 品牌 / 人名）
    • 分集状态：✓ 完整（46分32秒）
  • 质量说明：音频为纯英语，按"中英双语"规范发布；保留所有专有名词（人名 / 公司名 / 品牌 / 数字）。
  • 段落切分：按 90s 音频切片 + 3s overlap 自动切分，每段先英文后中文逐段对照。

视频摘要

核心要点

  1. Becky Quick 的成长故事：从康奈尔大学到 CNBC 当实习生，从记者到全球金融报道标志性人物，她对 Ray 的报道贯穿 2008 危机。
  2. 2008 年 9 月 15 日雷曼破产：Ray 当天在 CNBC 演播室，Lehman 申请破产保护时他"像个被告知自己得了癌症"的病人——没有准备，没有预演。
  3. 桥水 Pure Alpha 2008 回报 +9.5%：在 2008 这个"对冲基金灾难年"取得 +9.5% 收益，但客户更关心"为什么还跌 5%“而不是"为什么这么牛”。
  4. 桥水的"债务大周期"研究：基于对 800 年金融史的研究，他们预见到 2008 年债务危机但无法精确预测时点。
  5. TARP 决策内幕：2008 年 9 月 18 日（雷曼倒下后第 3 天），美联储和财政部在 Fed 办公室从早 8 点到下午 2 点讨论救助方案。
  6. 美林被卖给了美国银行：在雷曼破产同一周，Merrill Lynch 被 Bank of America 收购，救市速度比 TARP 立法快得多。
  7. 为什么没人说"次贷危机"：Hank Paulson 和 Ben Bernanke 担心引发银行挤兑，所有人用"经济减速"代替"危机"——这是危机管理的政治语言。
  8. Ray 对 Bernanke 的高度评价：2014 年 Ray 出版《How the Economic Machine Works》时，Ben 是最早写好评的人之一。
  9. 为什么今天和 2008 相似：QE 政策、债务水平、贫富差距——三件事同步出现，类似 1930-1945 年间。
  10. Ray 给年轻人的建议：“在世界上找到你最有兴趣的事，把它做得比别人都好，然后追随你的兴趣”——这是通往卓越的最快路径。

视频全文转录（中英双语）

以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。按 90s 音频切片 + 3s overlap 切分。

Segment 1

[English]

Investing is knowing how to value a business, research and timing, psychological endeavor. Investing without knowing what you’re looking for is like running through a dynamite factory with a burning match. There’s a very, very dangerous jungle out there. How do I successfully cross the jungle? There are thousands of different approaches to investing. There’s no formula anybody could give you. It’s not like the colonel’s secret recipe. If you’re a self-starter and you work really hard, you can make a difference. On the morning of March 12, 2008, I was about to hit send on one of the most significant reports of my life. I knew a major institution was about to fail, and it would send shockwaves throughout the financial world. Rumors spreading of problems with some of the biggest mortgage lenders in the country. I saw the government give the investment banks a lifeline in ways it had never done before. But I knew it wasn’t enough. This was an enormous crisis brewing. The fault was huge.

[中文]

投资就是懂得如何评估一家企业，研究加上把握时机，是一项心理上的修炼。不知道自己在寻找什么就去投资，就像拿着一根点燃的火柴跑过炸药厂。外面的世界是一片极其、极其危险的丛林。我怎样才能成功穿越这片丛林？投资有成千上万种不同的方法。没有人能给你一个现成的公式。这不像那位上校的秘方。如果你是一个自律的人，并且真的非常努力，你就能脱颖而出。2008年3月12日早晨，我即将发送我人生中最重要的一份报告。我知道一家大型机构即将倒闭，而这将在整个金融界引发轩然大波。有传言称，国内一些最大的抵押贷款机构出了问题。我看到政府以前所未有的方式向投资银行抛出了救命稻草。但我知道这远远不够。一场巨大的危机正在酝酿之中。问题太大了。

Segment 2

[English]

Crisis brewing. The fall was huge. And for some reason, no one else was sounding the alarm but me. So I wrote the report. It was on a Wednesday. And I sat on it because I was scared. I was like, why am I the only one looking at this? And what is this going to mean for the system? And what is this going to mean for me? If some analysts that they’d never heard of, that they made that call, holy shit. When I started out on Wall Street, I was so intimidated by all the smart people. I was a history major. Everybody else was a math major or an engineering major. And I just assumed that everybody was smarter than me. But that became an incredible asset because that just made me work harder. I’m Meredith Whitney. I’m an analyst, I’m an investor, and I’m a storyteller. There’s a lot of complex products within financial services. And I think that Wall Street intentionally makes things very complicated, but it doesn’t have to be that way. What I’ve always seen the role of being an analyst is, is to empower investors to know how to invest and why to invest. And that’s all about storytelling. And sometimes, sadly, that story foreshadows the collapse of entire institutions. But that background as an analyst, looking at macro trends and applying them to specific investments was crucial when I started.

[中文]

危机正在酝酿。那次暴跌幅度巨大。而不知为何，除了我之外，没有其他人发出预警。所以我写了那份报告。那是一个星期三。而我把它压了下来，因为我害怕。我当时想，为什么只有我一个人在关注这件事？这对整个金融体系意味着什么？这对我又意味着什么？如果他们从没听说过的分析师做出了那个判断，天哪。刚踏入华尔街的时候，我被周围那些聪明人吓坏了。我学的是历史专业。其他人都是数学或工程专业的。我一直以为自己不如别人聪明。但这后来却成了一种巨大的优势，因为它让我更加努力。我是梅瑞迪斯·惠特尼。我是一名分析师，一名投资者，也是一名讲故事的人。金融服务业中有许多复杂的产品。我认为华尔街故意把事情搞得很复杂，但其实大可不必。我一直认为，分析师的角色就是让投资者知道如何投资以及为什么要投资。这一切都关乎讲故事。而有时候，遗憾的是，那个故事预示着整个机构的崩塌。但分析师的背景——观察宏观趋势并将其应用到具体投资中——在我创业之初至关重要。

Segment 3

[English]

Them to specific investments was crucial when I started my own investment firm. So whereas an individual may look at one stock in a vacuum, I can’t do that because I can’t give an honest assessment of a stock in a vacuum. I have to take, you know, 20 steps back and look at the industry, secular growth, liquidity, how it stacks up to other companies, chart the revenue growth. And only by comparison will I be able to determine if that stock is worth investing in. From day one, I was determined to outwork everybody around me. My first job ever, and maybe my finest hour, was as a paper delivery girl for the Washington Post. I was the youngest person to ever have that role and only young girl to have that role. First of all, I got the job myself. I thought, no limits. Why wouldn’t I get the job? I was seven or eight years old. Why not? I did the job really well. I woke up early. I gave a differentiated level of service. And I ended up getting a plaque in 1978 for delivering through the greatest snowstorm uninterrupted. It was the kind of plaque where you pulled the adhesive off and then it wasn’t a very high level plaque. But at any rate, not much of me has changed throughout the years. And I think

[中文]

将资金配置到具体的投资标的中，在我创立自己的投资公司之初至关重要。因此，个人投资者可能只看一只股票本身，但我不能这样做，因为我无法脱离大环境对一只股票做出诚实的评估。我必须退后20步，审视整个行业、长期增长趋势、流动性、它与其他公司的对比情况，描绘收入增长曲线图。只有通过比较，我才能判断那只股票是否值得投资。从第一天起，我就下定决心要比身边每一个人都更加努力。我的第一份工作，或许也是我最高光的时刻，是担任《华盛顿邮报》的送报员。我是有史以来担任这个角色的最年轻的人，也是唯一一个小女孩。首先，这份工作是我自己争取来的。我心想，没有极限。我为什么不能得到这份工作呢？我当时大概七八岁。为什么不呢？我把工作做得很出色。我起得很早。我提供了差异化的服务。最终我在1978年因为在一场最大的暴风雪中坚持不间断送报而获得了一块奖牌。就是那种撕掉背胶就能贴上去的奖牌，档次不算高。但不管怎么说，这些年来我并没有太大改变。而且我觉得

Segment 4

[English]

Has changed throughout the years. And I think that’s foreshadowed how I’ve looked at every opportunity. But it also entailed a tremendous amount of hard work. It’s always been very self-directional in terms of when I went to high school, you could get a job pretty much anywhere. You could get a job on the Hill. I chose the senator that I wanted to work with. I was told the most competitive city was New York and the most competitive industry in New York was finance. It didn’t matter how old you were. It didn’t matter if you were a man or a woman. It didn’t matter what your background was. In investing, what is incredible is the meritocracy that exists so that if you’re a self-starter and if you work really hard, you can make a difference. And so that led me to New York. When I was told what an analyst actually did, I was sold. I was immediately sold. It can be many things, but typically an analyst in a research department focuses on a specific industry. And so they’re supposed to be the go-to person, expert on the industry, and then also stocks within that industry. And what you’re trying to do is evoke action and either buying a name or selling a name.

[中文]

这些年来，情况一直在变化。我认为这也预示了我看待每一个机遇的方式。但这也意味着要付出大量的努力。我一直都非常自主地做出决定——比如上高中的时候，你几乎可以在任何地方找到工作。你可以在国会山工作。我选择了我想为之工作的参议员。别人告诉我，竞争最激烈的城市是纽约，而纽约竞争最激烈的行业是金融。你的年龄不重要，是男是女不重要，你的背景也不重要。在投资领域，令人难以置信的是那里存在着一种精英制度——如果你有主动性，如果你真的非常努力，你就能脱颖而出。于是我去了纽约。当别人告诉我分析师到底是做什么的，我就被说服了。我立刻就被打动了。分析师可以有很多角色，但通常情况下，研究部门的分析师专注于某个特定行业。他们应该是这个行业的权威专家，同时也是该行业内个股的专家。而你要做的就是推动行动——要么买入一只股票，要么卖出一只股票。

Segment 5

[English]

Action and either buying a name or selling a name. And I was lucky enough to get a job at Oppenheimer, which was a small investment bank with a big, high-net-worth retail component. I hit the jackpot in covering my industry because it fed into so many other industries. For example, in the mid-90s into the 2000s, TMT was the hot sector. Well, all the banks were lending to tech, media, telecom, so you knew the highs and lows of that sector. Every single thing, be it oil and gas, technology, industrials, you’re exposed to every industry. Oppenheimer had some of the street’s best analysts, and I got to see craftsmanship at work and got assigned to work for a senior analyst named Steve Eisman, and he changed my life. Many of you would know him by the character in The Big Short that Steve Carell played, I would say nicely, and he was entirely unorthodox, irreverent, maybe rude, maybe inappropriate, but the guy’s so smart. What Steve taught me first and foremost was that my responsibility was to getting to the bottom of things. And I better know the answers to questions, and I better ask the questions to have the answers for him. And I better ask the questions in ways that I can understand the answers. He taught me storytelling. And so I can take a

[中文]

行动，要么买入一个名字或卖出一个名字，我很幸运地在奥本海默找到了一份工作，那是一家拥有庞大高净值零售业务的小型投资银行。我在覆盖自己的行业时中了头彩，因为它与许多其他行业紧密相连。比如在90年代中期到2000年代，科技、媒体和电信（TMT）是热门板块。所有银行都在向科技、媒体和电信行业放贷，所以你很清楚这个行业的起起落落。不管是石油天然气、科技还是工业，你都会接触到每一个行业。奥本海默拥有华尔街一些最优秀的分析师，我得以亲眼见证精湛的手艺，并被指派为一位名叫史蒂夫·艾斯曼的高级分析师工作，他改变了我的人生。你们当中很多人可能通过《大空头》中史蒂夫·卡莱尔饰演的角色认识他——我得说他演得相当不错。史蒂夫完全非传统、不敬，也许粗鲁，也许不合时宜，但这人实在太聪明了。史蒂夫首先教会我的是，我的职责就是彻底搞清楚事情的来龙去脉。我最好能回答问题，也最好能提出问题来为他找到答案。而且我最好能以自己能理解答案的方式来提问。他教会了我讲故事的能力。所以我能够……

Segment 6

[English]

Storytelling. And so I can take a very complicated, structured product and boil it down to a simple explanation that anybody can understand. To be able to distill that down shows that you really know what you’re talking about and also is your responsibility as an effective translator to investors so that you bring everybody in and you get your message across. And the power of that is really incredible because you’re trying to reach the widest audience possible. In investment banking, analysts are really the gatekeepers of the industry. They’re the key people that determine what a potential investment’s strengths and weaknesses are. So I worked as a junior analyst for Steve Eisman. I believe it was ‘96, ‘97 when I started having my own, covering my own companies. I was young. I was young for what I was doing. I was a woman. I would get investors calling me and berating me for putting a neutral on a stock because the idea was, what was I doing for him? What was I doing? Like, what was the purpose of my job. I was quite confused at that time because your name is your, like your word is your name and your name is your word.

[中文]

讲故事的能力。所以我能够把一个非常复杂、结构化的产品浓缩成任何人都能理解的简单解释。能够将其提炼到这种程度，说明你真正理解自己所谈论的内容，同时这也是你作为一名高效翻译者的责任——你要向投资者传达信息，让所有人都能理解，把你的意思传递出去。这种力量确实令人难以置信，因为你试图触及尽可能广泛的受众。在投资银行，分析师实际上是行业的守门人。他们是决定一项潜在投资优劣势的关键人物。所以我曾担任Steve Eisman的初级分析师。我想是96年、97年，我开始独立负责，覆盖我自己的公司。我很年轻。以我当时所做的事情来说，我非常年轻。我是一名女性。会有投资者打电话来责骂我，因为我给某只股票评了中性评级，因为他们的想法是，我到底为他做了什么？我到底在做什么？就好像，我的工作目的是什么。我当时非常困惑，因为你的名字就是你的，就像你的话就是你的名字，你的名字就是你的话。

Segment 7

[English]

Your word is your name, and your name is your word. And why would you promote a stock? But in many cases, a lot of analysts were afraid and not expected to put neutral or negatives on stocks. They were expected to promote and be cheerleaders. That was not what I understood the job to be. And so I dropped any of my insecurities because the job required more. Get over yourself. Get over the insecurities. Ask the questions. Get the answers. And by fully embracing this humility, that’s what really set me apart and ultimately set me up for success as an investor in the future. But of course, I still had some learning to do, particularly because we covered an industry called subprime. It was in our best interest and my responsibility to go through numbers and get out any type of inconsistency I saw in the numbers. I am not a cynical person by nature, but I think it’s my absolute professional responsibility, my moral responsibility to put quality out there and assume that once I put my name on it, it’s going to be fact-checked and sort of credibility-checked. But there was a lot of shady stuff out there. I started really getting concerned and writing about the increasing risk in the housing market back in 2005. But in the summer of 2007, there was a Citigroup event that caught my attention.

[中文]

你的的人格就是你的名字，你的名字就是你的人格。那你为什么还要去推荐一只股票呢？但在很多情况下，许多分析师心存畏惧，不敢对股票给出中性或负面的评价。他们被期望去推荐、去当啦啦队员。这不是我理解这份工作的方式。于是我放下了所有的不安全感，因为这份工作要求的远不止如此。放下自我。克服不安全感。去提出问题。去找到答案。正是通过完全拥抱这种谦逊，才真正让我脱颖而出，并最终为日后作为一名投资者取得成功奠定了基础。当然，我还有很多要学的，尤其是因为我们覆盖了一个叫做次级贷款的行业。仔细审查数据，找出数据中任何不一致的地方，既符合我们的最大利益，也是我的责任。我天生不是一个愤世嫉俗的人，但我认为，把高质量的东西呈现出来，是我绝对的职业责任和道德责任——假设一旦我署上自己的名字，它就会接受事实核查和某种程度上的可信度审查。但外面有很多见不得光的事情。早在2005年，我就开始真正感到担忧，并撰文论述房地产市场日益增加的风险。但在2007年夏天，一场Citigroup的活动引起了我的注意。

Segment 8

[English]

In 2007, there was a Citigroup event that caught my attention. Citigroup invited the industry analysts to meet their new CFO, and I’ll never forget that one of the highest-rated analysts, who was, I thought, was smarter than everybody, asked a question and then followed by saying, you know, I’ve just given up on modeling Citi. It’s just gotten too complicated. And I was gobsmacked. I couldn’t believe what I heard. That was your job, right, to model and forecast and give your best estimates on what you think the company could earn. I mean, this is one of the biggest banks in the United States, if not the world. If Citi’s top analyst doesn’t understand the balance sheet of the company, probably nobody does. So I went back to the office, like partially disgusted and more inspired. And after I had done all of the work and all the analysis, I felt there’s a huge problem with these numbers. Why am I the only one looking at this? That was what led into my scariest year professionally. One of the greatest advantages I’ve had throughout my career has been, I’ve always been underestimated. And that is the best gift I could ever ask for. You know, in fact…

[中文]

2007年，发生了一件让我格外关注的花旗集团事件。花旗集团邀请行业分析师来见他们的新任CFO，我永远忘不了当时有一位评级最高的分析师——我一直以为他比所有人都聪明——提了一个问题，然后接着说，你知道，我已经放弃给花旗建模了。它变得太复杂了。我当时目瞪口呆。简直不敢相信自己的耳朵。那不就是你的工作吗？建模、预测，然后尽你所能给出你对公司盈利的预估。我的意思是，这可是美国——甚至可能是全世界——最大的银行之一。如果花旗最顶尖的分析师都不理解这家公司的资产负债表，那恐怕没有人能理解。于是我回到了办公室，带着几分厌恶，但更多的是受到启发。在我完成了所有工作和所有分析之后，我觉得这些数据存在一个巨大的问题。为什么只有我一个人在关注这件事？那直接导致了我职业生涯中最可怕的一年。贯穿我的职业生涯，我所拥有的最大优势之一就是，我一直被人低估。而这正是我能期望得到的最好的礼物。你知道，事实上……

Segment 9

[English]

Ever asked for. You know, in fact, that analyst who said, “I’ve given up on Citi,” gave me a big gift because if they had given up, like, I wasn’t going to give up. If they had stopped doing it, I would figure it out. And I did. Throughout my entire career, I’ve worked for smaller firms. But in 2007, I went from working for a relatively small firm to the harbinger of a looming financial crisis. And it all started with a report I published about Citigroup in 2007, which would become one of the canaries in the coal mine for the disguised risk in the U.S. housing market. So the first step in understanding Citigroup’s finances was to realign all of the numbers and compare them cleanly with the industry. So I went back to the office and started thinking and started looking at Citi. And surely they had reshuffled the deck countless times. And by that, I mean they restated earnings and recast divisions together. Because they changed the format of which they reported, it was very difficult to look for trends. But the one thing in banks that never changes, that you can’t shuffle the deck or scramble the egg on, is leverage. And Citi’s leverage was double all of their peers. That was as simple as I could get. Then I went back further.

[中文]

从来没有人要求过。你知道，事实上，那个说已经放弃花旗集团的分析师给了我一份大礼物，因为如果他们放弃了，我是不会放弃的。如果他们不干了，我也会自己想办法搞清楚。而我也确实做到了。在我整个职业生涯中，我一直在规模较小的公司工作。但在2007年，我从一家相对较小的公司跳槽到了一场迫在眉睫的金融危机的先兆之地。而这一切都始于我2007年发布的一份关于Citi的报告，这份报告后来成为了美国房地产市场隐蔽风险的煤矿中的金丝雀之一。因此，了解Citi财务状况的第一步，就是重新整理所有数据，并将其与行业进行清晰的对比。于是我回到办公室，开始思考，开始审视Citi。毫无疑问，他们已经无数次地洗了牌。我这么说，是指他们重述了收益并重新划分了业务板块。因为他们改变了报告格式，所以很难从中发现趋势。但银行里有一样东西是永远不会变的，你无法洗牌也无法打乱鸡蛋的，那就是杠杆。而Citi的杠杆率是所有同行的两倍。这是我能做到的最简单的结论。然后我又进一步追溯。

Segment 10

[English]

That was as simple as I could get. Then I went back further and said, why is this the case? In the early 2000s, the regulators had put a freeze on Citi. And once it was lifted, they went on an acquisition tear. And so their assets grew by a substantial amount. But what you don’t remember is them raising commensurate capital to fund those acquisitions. They funded them all through debt. And also, by the way, their earnings power had not grown and their dividend had grown. They couldn’t support their dividend. When I saw this and also tried to problem solve for what they could do to remedy this, it became very clear they would have to sell assets to the tune of $100 billion, raise equity to the tune of, I think, $30 billion. And they didn’t have the earnings power to pay their dividend because so many mom and pop, main street investors bought the banks for an income stream. They were paying their bills on the dividend that Citi and other banks were paying. And if for one moment they thought that dividend wasn’t coming true, we would have a big problem. From that point, then I had to tell a story how they got there. And I think of what also is my audience? Who else needs to be protected? Because we’re effective financial stewards.

[中文]

那是当时我能做到的最简单的版本了。然后我又往回追溯，问自己，为什么会这样？在2000年代初期，监管机构对花旗集团（Citi）实施了冻结。一旦冻结解除，他们便开始疯狂收购。因此他们的资产大幅增长。但你可能没有记住的是，他们并没有筹集相应的资本来为这些收购提供资金。他们完全通过债务来融资。而且顺便说一下，他们的盈利能力并没有增长，但他们的股息却增长了。他们根本无力支撑股息。当我看到这一点，并试图为他们想办法解决这个问题时，事情变得非常清楚——他们需要出售大约4000亿美元的资产，筹集大约300亿美元的股本。而且他们没有足够的盈利能力来支付股息，因为许多散户投资者、普通老百姓买银行股就是为了获得稳定的收入来源。他们靠花旗和其他银行发放的股息来支付日常开销。哪怕他们有一瞬间觉得股息可能发不出来，我们就会遇到大麻烦。从那一点开始，我就必须讲述一个故事，说明他们是如何走到这一步的。我同时也在思考，我的受众还有谁？还有谁需要被保护？因为我们是负责任的金融管理者。

Segment 11

[English]

Because we’re effective financial stewards, albeit not managing money, but guiding people in terms of what is safe to invest in and what’s not safe, where the risks lie, where the opportunities lie. And again, this was a time when I took something incredibly complex and distilled it so that anybody could use it as a guidepost to see what would happen when. I wrote the Citigroup report maybe a month and a half after that analyst meeting. And I made sure that report was perfect because I understood the risk that it posed to me and my firm, but I didn’t know how it would hit the market. I became the party spoiler, the killjoy, but that party was destined to be crashed. So I remember pressing send on October 31st, the night before the Citigroup report was released. Went to sleep, woke up, went to work. It was all over the paper, and the market was in an absolute tailspin. November 1st was a Thursday. I never anticipated that the CEO would be gone.

[中文]

因为我们称得上是尽职的财务管理者，尽管我们并不直接管理资金，而是指导人们判断哪些投资是安全的，哪些不安全，风险在哪里，机会又在哪里。再说一遍，当时我面对的是极其复杂的东西，但我把它提炼得足够简单，让任何人都能把它当作路标，据此判断接下来会发生什么。那份花旗集团的报告，我是在那次分析师会议之后大约一个半月写成的。我确保那份报告完美无缺，因为我清楚它给我和我的公司带来的风险，但我不知道市场会作何反应。我成了那个扫兴的人，那个泼冷水的人，但那场派对注定要崩盘。所以我记得10月31日那天晚上，我按下了发送键，第二天花旗集团的报告就要发布了。我睡了觉，醒来，去上班。结果铺天盖地都是新闻，市场陷入了彻底的恐慌。11月1日是星期四。我从未想到CEO会下台。

Segment 12

[English]

Anticipated that the CEO would be gone that Sunday. And then a couple months later, not only would the company cut their dividend, not only would the company raise, you know, basically the amount of money that I thought that they would, but wow. I mean, I had no expectation that it would cause the level of disruption in the market the very first day that it came out. Anybody, any analyst, any market observer had access to the exact same data that I had. I just worked it harder. The city call got people to look up and got people to wake up. And then they got scared because if a non-regulator, a non-government official, you know, some analysts they’d never heard of, that they made that call, holy shit. Like, what else is out there? That was a call that transformed the power balance in Wall Street with investors and institutions dramatically. But that wasn’t the biggest call I made that year. City was in a way a vacuum, but it wasn’t, because it was part of a larger ecosystem that was failed by…

[中文]

人们原本预计那个CEO会在那个周日离职。然后过了几个月，公司不仅削减了股息，不仅筹集了——你知道——基本上是我预期的融资金额，而且哇。我是说，我完全没想到它发布的第一天就会在市场上引起那么大的震荡。任何分析师、任何市场观察者都能获取和我一模一样的数据。我只是研究得更深入。那个电话让人们抬起头来，让人们清醒过来。然后他们开始恐慌，因为如果一个非监管机构的、非政府官员的——某个他们从没听说过的分析师——打了那个电话，天哪。就好像，外面还有什么别的东西？那个电话彻底改变了华尔街投资者和机构之间的权力平衡。但那还不是我那年做出的最大胆的预测。城市在某种程度上确实像是一个真空地带，但它又不完全是，因为它是一个更大生态系统的一部分，而这个生态系统被辜负了……

Segment 13

[English]

Ecosystem that was failed by so many different participants. And it led to some larger questions. Why was such a huge bank allowed to behave so irresponsibly? And what other bad behavior was able to slip through the cracks? The first step in solving this was to look at an industry I knew well called subprime and to try to understand the problems leading up to this point. In the simplest terms, if you look at government regulation, it usually creates big pendulum swings. And one of the pendulum swings that started in the early 90s was the big government push for higher homeownership. Homeownership, which had typically been around 64%, went up to nearly 70% throughout the 90s and 2000s. And companies got addicted to all the volume, and they wanted more and more and more. So there’s this big push on raising the homeownership rate to people who would qualify. And then there was a subsequent push to giving credit to people who maybe wouldn’t be able to qualify or giving excess credit to people who could qualify. You could take a prime customer and make them subprime just by the amount of debt you lent them. A prime borrower is going to be someone with a FICO score of let’s say 680 and above. And a subprime borrower was typically 680 and below. What is important to know about

[中文]

一个被如此众多不同参与者搞垮的生态系统。这引出了一些更大的问题。为什么允许一家如此庞大的银行做出如此不负责任的行为？还有哪些其他不良行为得以从漏洞中溜走？解决这个问题的第一步，是研究一个我熟悉的叫做"subprime"的行业，并试图理解导致走到这一步的问题。用最简单的话说，如果你看看政府监管，它通常会制造巨大的钟摆式摇摆。而始于90年代初的一次重大政府推动，就是大力提高住房拥有率。住房拥有率通常在64%左右，到了90年代和2000年代一路攀升至近70%。而公司沉迷于所有这些业务量，他们想要越来越多的业务。所以出现了这种大力推动提高住房拥有率的热潮，把房子卖给那些本不具备资格的人。随后又出现了向那些可能不具备资格的人发放信贷，或者向那些具备资格的人过度发放信贷。你可以把一个"prime"客户变成"subprime"，仅仅通过你借给他们的债务金额。一个"prime"借款人的FICO分数大概在680分及以上。而"subprime"借款人通常在680分及以下。关于这一点，需要了解的重要信息是

Segment 14

[English]

What is important to know about this is you can give a prime borrower excess debt, causing their debt burden to push them into a lower FICO score. And not only were crazy mortgages being provided at, you know, 100 plus percent LTVs, then there was home equity that was being provided on top of that. So you have 120 LTVs, loan to value. And you had so much debt in a system that people just could not sustain and pay back and afford. So in 2006, the housing market in terms of subprime housing was starting to fray. Subprime was typically held in what was the sand states, California, Nevada, Arizona, Florida. Those were the areas that had huge housing booms and those areas that started to show weakness. But then again, that’s limited to this sort of non-main street area in subprime. So the big banks would say, oh, we don’t have subprime. And every institute, like large cap institution would say, oh, we don’t have subprime. Of course, everybody had subprime because underwriting got so loose. And so the pendulum went from here to the far extreme. It was clear to me that this was unsustainable, but I couldn’t figure out why few others saw it. One idea I had was to learn more about the rating agencies who were supposed to be the final judgment in packaging these subprime mortgages. I wanted to understand the

[中文]

关于这件事，有一点很重要：你可以向优质借款人提供过多的债务，导致他们的债务负担使其FICO评分被拉低。而且，当时不仅疯狂发放着——你知道的——贷款价值比超过100%的抵押贷款，在此基础上还叠加了房屋净值贷款。所以贷款价值比达到了120%。整个系统中的债务量如此之大，人们根本无法维持、偿还和负担。因此到了2006年，房地产市场，尤其是次级住房市场，开始出现裂痕。次级贷款通常集中在所谓的"沙州"——加利福尼亚、内利桑那、亚利桑那和佛罗里达。这些地区经历了巨大的房地产繁荣，也是最先出现疲态的地方。但话说回来，这仅限于次级贷款这种非主流领域。所以大银行会说，哦，我们没有次级贷款。每个机构，比如大型机构都会说，哦，我们没有次级贷款。当然，每个人其实都有次级贷款，因为信贷审核已经变得如此宽松。钟摆从一端摆到了另一端。我清楚地看到这种情况是不可持续的，但我想不通为什么几乎没有其他人也看到了这一点。我有一个想法，就是去深入了解那些本应成为这些次级抵押贷款打包过程中最终裁判的信用评级机构。我想弄明白其中的

Segment 15

[English]

Mortgages. I wanted to understand the relationship between the rating agencies and the securities held on bank balance sheets and understand why and how that connected and to what degree it would connect. So I called the director of research, Richard Brown, at the FDIC to dumb it down for me. How does this work? When you have debt issuer like IBM or GE, they’re issuing all the time. So whatever rating agency is rating these securities, they’re used to the capital structure and they really know the underlying quality of the paper that they’re rating. Whereas mortgage-backed security or a CDO, that’s issued one time. So they rate it one time and they get paid to rate it one time. So there’s no incentive for them to go back and re-rate it. So they just put these things to the side, didn’t look at the quality, didn’t look at the serviceability of these mortgages until they had to do it in massive, massive chunks. And that was something that never should have happened. So at one moment in time, they rated a CDO or a residential mortgage-backed bond, AAA. And then they just left it and didn’t go back and look at it. The banks held capital according to the ratings. So if the rating agencies all of a sudden start a

[中文]

抵押贷款。我想了解评级机构与银行资产负债表上持有的证券之间的关系，想弄明白这种关联是如何产生的、关联到什么程度。于是我打电话给FDIC（联邦存款保险公司）的研究主任Richard Brown，让他用简单的话给我解释一下。这是怎么运作的？当你有一个像IBM或GE这样的债务发行方，它们一直在发行债券。所以不管哪家评级机构来给这些证券评级，它们对资本结构已经非常熟悉，对它们所评级证券的底层资产质量也了如指掌。而抵押贷款支持证券或CDO（担保债务凭证），只发行一次。所以评级机构只评一次级，也只收一次费用。这样一来，它们就没有动力回过头去重新评级。所以它们就把这些东西丢到一边，不去关注质量，不去关注这些抵押贷款的偿还能力，直到不得不大规模、大规模地重新审视。而这种情况本来就不应该发生。所以在某个时间点，它们给一个CDO或住宅抵押贷款支持债券评了AAA级。然后就把评级丢在一边，再也不会回头去看。银行根据这些评级来持有资本。所以如果评级机构突然开始——

Segment 16

[English]

So if the rating agencies all of a sudden started catching up on, wait a second, this bond shouldn’t be rated triple A, it should be rated double A or single A or triple B or single B, the banks would then have to catch up with the rating agencies. But if neither the banks or the rating agencies, you know, let the cat out of the bag, they could go on like nothing was wrong. And that’s what happened for too long. The gap in bank balance sheets, I estimated at the time, $80 billion. I mean, that’s a massive amount of write downs, like unprecedented in my lifetime and probably unprecedented ever within the banking system. It was so shocking to me that all of the things that the banks and the regulators were relying on were completely unreliable. And again, I was the only one focused on this. I thought surely I was crazy, but the math was the math. Math has no opinion. And that scared the daylights out of me. So the banks had taken some write downs in the third quarter. So that would have been October. I published String of Fire, I believe, in December, early December 2007. What was the first thing you did?

[中文]

所以，如果评级机构突然开始纠正过来——等一下，这只债券不应该是三A评级，应该是两A或一A，或者三B或一B——那么银行就必须跟上评级机构的步伐。但如果银行和评级机构都没有，你知道的，没有捅破这层窗户纸，他们就可以假装什么都没错一样继续下去。而这种情况持续了太长时间。我当时估计，银行资产负债表的缺口在800亿美元。我的意思是，这是一个巨额的资产减记，在我的一生中前所未有，可能在整个银行体系中也前所未有。这让我极为震惊，因为银行和监管机构所依赖的所有东西都完全不可靠。而且，再一次，我是唯一一个关注这个问题的人。我当时想，我肯定是疯了，但数学就是数学。数学不带任何观点。这让我吓得不轻。所以银行在第三季度已经进行了一些资产减记。那应该是在10月。我发表了《一串火》，我记得是在12月，2007年12月初。你做的第一件事是什么？

Segment 17

[English]

And so in the ring of fire piece, I broke down specifically what each downgrade in securities would mean in terms of causational change in regulatory capital for the banks. The reaction to that report was not immediate. By fourth quarter, when the banks released in January, they took write-downs again. So fourth quarter for banks, they usually write down everything so they can start fresh in the new year. And so the banks rallied a little bit because people thought, oh, well, that’s behind them. And it wasn’t. Then I wrote another ring of fire and then another one and then another one. Because housing prices kept declining. The rating agencies only scratched the surface with the downgrades. And again, the banks were waiting for the rating agencies. It was the craziest. It was so nonsensical. It was like a feedback loop from hell. In March, something else changed. I was traveling over to Europe, and over the weekend, the government had made some type of intervention with Fannie and Freddie and I didn’t know what it meant. Well, the U.S.

[中文]

因此，在"火圈"那篇报告中，我详细分析了证券评级每下调一级，会对银行的监管资本产生怎样的连锁反应。那份报告的反响并非立竿见影。到了第四季度，也就是银行在1月份发布财报的时候，它们再次进行了资产减记。银行通常在第四季度把该减记的都减记掉，这样新的一年就能轻装上阵。因此银行股价小幅反弹，因为人们觉得，哦，最糟糕的时期已经过去了。但事实并非如此。于是我又写了一篇"火圈"报告，然后又写了一篇，再写了一篇。因为房价持续下跌。评级机构在降级方面只是触及了表面。而银行又一次在等评级机构的动作。这简直太荒唐了。太不合逻辑了。就像一个来自地狱般的恶性循环。到了3月，又发生了变化。当时我正在前往欧洲的路上，那个周末政府对房利美和房地美采取了某种干预措施，我当时还不清楚这意味着什么。嗯，美国……

Segment 18

[English]

With Fannie and Freddie, and I didn’t know what it meant. Well, the U.S. Treasury Department will now buy mortgage securities, in effect ensuring Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s debts. It was announced while I was on flight that they had given sort of a bank lifeline to all the brokers. And I thought, that’s sort of strange. And I thought more closely, and I realized this threatened every other investment bank in the industry. They were all tied to subprime mortgages, especially Bear Stearns. And so I knew this was only the beginning. Bear Stearns, in my opinion, wasn’t going to make it. And so I remember being writing the report. This is it. These are the final days for for Bear Stearns. It was on a Wednesday and I sat on it because I was scared, actually scared by the power of my own pen that it would create such disruption in the marketplace again after the city call. And I called my friend Ken Mullis from a tarmac in Germany and said, is it possible, like, could I be crazy? I think Bear Stearns isn’t going to make it. And he said, the higher leverage, the smaller margin of error. And he didn’t tell me what to do, but I just, I put the report out the next morning. It was Friday morning. There was huge backlash from the trading desk. They’re like, what do you think it’s worth? I was like, I think it’s probably worth $2. Despite the fact that the day before the stock was around $18,

[中文]

房利美和房地美，我当时并不知道这意味着什么。现在美国财政部将购买抵押贷款证券，实际上是为房利美和房地美的债务提供担保。我是在飞机上听到这个消息的，他们向所有经纪人提供了某种银行紧急救助。我当时觉得这有点奇怪。我仔细一想，意识到这威胁到了业内其他所有投资银行。它们全都与次级抵押贷款捆绑在一起，尤其是贝尔斯登。所以我知道这只是个开始。在我看来，贝尔斯登撑不过去。我记得当时在写报告。就是它了。贝尔斯登的最后日子到了。那天是星期三，但我把报告压住了，因为我害怕，真的害怕自己这支笔的力量——怕它会像上次那个电话一样在市场上引发巨大动荡。我从德国的一个停机坪给朋友肯·穆利斯打电话，我说，有没有可能是我疯了？我觉得贝尔斯登撑不过去了。他说，杠杆越高，容错空间越小。他没有告诉我该怎么做，但第二天一早，也就是周五早上，我就把报告发布了。交易台那边反应非常激烈。他们说，你觉得它值多少钱？我说，我觉得大概值2美元。尽管前一天股价还在18美元左右。

Segment 19

[English]

The fact that the day before, the stock was around $18. And later that Sunday, J.P. Morgan bought Bear Stearns for two, its initial bid was for $2. And the rest is history. The collapse of Bear Stearns foreshadowed a wider collapse in the entire investment industry, alongside giants like Lehman and AIG. The crisis of confidence in America’s banking system has spread to the economy itself. One after another, industry giants were failing, which led into what’s now known as the global financial crisis. And with each progressive day, I found myself under a bigger spotlight. I would like to think that before, during, and after the credit crisis, I gave voice and clarity and explanation to a lot of people by taking all the information, all of the things that mattered and distilling it into a story of what was happening, what the consequences were, what would happen, but also the entire time providing solutions of how this could be fixed. That was always very important to me. Throughout my entire career, I always worked for

[中文]

事实是，前一天，股价还在18美元左右。到了那个周日晚些时候，J.P. Morgan以两美元的价格收购了Bear Stearns，最初的出价就是两美元。接下来发生的事情大家都知道了。Bear Stearns的倒闭预示着整个投资行业更广泛的崩溃，包括Lehman和AIG这样的巨头。美国银行体系的信心危机已经蔓延到了经济本身。行业巨头一个接一个地倒下，最终演变成了现在众所周知的全球金融危机。随着每一天的推移，我发现聚光灯越来越亮。我愿意这样认为，在信贷危机之前、期间和之后，我通过汇集所有信息、所有重要的因素，将其提炼成一个关于正在发生什么、后果是什么、将会发生什么的故事，为许多人发出了声音、带来了清晰度和解释，同时自始至终都在提供解决方案，说明如何能够解决这些问题。这一点对我来说一直非常重要。在我整个职业生涯中，我一直在为

Segment 20

[English]

Throughout my entire career, I always worked for another firm. Effectively, I was a franchise player, but I had the backing of a firm. In early 2009, I effectively took my franchise on the road and owned my own franchise. My firm worked on a subscription basis. And so investors would pay to get my research, my regular research. And that was pretty incredible because I had the freedom to do anything I wanted. And one of the things that I did that was unexpected and unprecedented was do an enormous amount of work around the health and fragility of the states. During the credit crisis, the consumer was reeling from either going bankrupt or losing a tremendous amount of home equity value, being overleveraged. And clearly the states that were considered the sand states, the most active in the real estate bubbles, were going to have a hard time coming back because the consumer would be depressed, consumer spending would be depressed, jobs would be lost from the housing bust, and therefore the state’s tax revenues would drop precipitously. You wouldn’t invest in that state, and you likely wouldn’t move to that state. So there’s an immediacy to people’s decision-making based upon the safety, soundness, and surety of the states or institutions.

[中文]

在整个职业生涯中，我一直在为其他公司工作。实际上，我就像是一个特许经营球员，但有公司作为后盾。2009年初，我实际上带着我的特许经营开始单干，拥有了自己的特许经营。我的公司采用订阅制运作。投资者付费来获取我的研究报告，我的常规研究报告。这相当令人难以置信，因为我有做任何想做的事情的自由。我做了一件出人意料且前所未有的事情，就是围绕各州的健康状况和脆弱性做了大量工作。在信贷危机期间，消费者不是濒临破产，就是损失了大量的房屋净值，负债累累。很明显，那些被视为"沙州"的州——即在房地产泡沫中最为活跃的州——将很难复苏，因为消费者会陷入低迷，消费支出会下降，住房市场崩溃会导致大量失业，因此各州的税收收入将急剧下降。你不会投资这样的州，你也不太可能搬到这样的州。所以，人们的决策具有紧迫性，这种紧迫性基于各州或机构的安全性、稳健性和可靠性。

Segment 21

[English]

Of the states or institutions they’re investing in. And what’s tragic is it doesn’t support the people who are most in need in those states. So I finally published what I called Tragedy of the Commons in September, and I rated 10 states. And effectively, what I was aiming to do, aside from create a really clear investment thesis, is actually making a warning call to every individual to look at where they live, to look at the fragility or strength of their own state, of their own community, and make the right decisions for themselves. And my big concern was the slow-motion destruction of the social contract between governments and residents. A lot of consumers don’t appreciate the fact that there are only two things that are guaranteed under states’ tax programs, and that’s pensions and that’s bonds. All the things that consumers think that their tax dollars are going into, education, public safety, infrastructure, those aren’t guaranteed. Those are the areas that get gutted the fastest. Art and sports programs being canceled, roads not being tended to, water systems not being tended to. Note Flint, Michigan, like so many public services that had just really gotten absolutely neglected. And so when those areas are gutted, the folks…

[中文]

他们所投资的州或机构。可悲的是，这些投资并不能帮助到那些州里最需要帮助的人。所以我在9月发表了我称之为"Tragedy of the Commons"的文章，并对10个州进行了评级。实际上，除了提出一个非常清晰的投资论点之外，我真正想做的是向每一个人发出警告，让他们审视自己所居住的地方，审视自己所在州、自己所在社区的脆弱或强大之处，然后为自己做出正确的决定。我最担忧的是政府与居民之间那份社会契约正在被缓慢地、不知不觉地摧毁。很多消费者没有意识到，在州的税收计划中，只有两样东西是有保障的，那就是养老金和债券。所有消费者以为自己的税款会投入的领域——教育、公共安全、基础设施——这些都没有保障。而这些领域恰恰是最先被大幅削减的。艺术和体育项目被取消，道路无人维护，水系统无人维护。想想密歇根州的弗林特。就像许多公共服务一样，已经完全被忽视了。所以当这些领域被削减时，那些……

Segment 22

[English]

And so when those areas are gutted, the folks that leave those areas the fastest are the corporations and the high net worth individuals, therefore robbing the area and state of even more tax revenues. So it becomes a vicious circle. Unlike my research on stocks, issues with government take many years to play out. It’s not a car crash because it’s not that immediate, right? It’s government. So people expected a car crash. It’s like the slowest moving car crash ever. But the impact is real. I liken it to a slow motion run on a bank where the assets or deposits of the bank are evaporating so quickly that it doesn’t support new depositors. So the same thing is true with states when the tax base gets gutted. It saddens me that the states are not doing more to rectify what is a very serious long-term threat to the citizens within that state and the people most in need. And it’s maddening to me, which is probably why I’m not in government. But I’ve tried so many times to help with this because I find it such a crisis of serious proportion. But out of the chaos of tragedy, there are

[中文]

因此，当这些地区被掏空时，最先离开这些地区的是企业和高净值个人，从而进一步剥夺了该地区和州的税收收入。这就形成了一个恶性循环。与我对股票的研究不同，政府相关的问题需要很多年才会显现。它不是车祸，因为它没有那么立竿见影，对吧？那是政府运作。所以人们预期的是车祸式的冲击。这就像是史上最慢的车祸。但影响是真实存在的。我把它比作银行在慢动作中发生挤兑，银行的资产或存款蒸发得如此之快，以至于无法支撑新的存款人。各州的情况也一样。当税基被掏空时。令我感到悲哀的是，各州并没有采取更多措施来纠正这一对该州公民，尤其是最需要帮助的群体构成的严重长期威胁。这让我非常愤怒，这大概就是我不在政府任职的原因。但我曾多次试图帮助解决这个问题，因为我认为这是一场非常严重的危机。但在混乱与悲剧中，总有……

Segment 23

[English]

But out of the chaos of tragedy, there are always opportunities. Throughout my career, there’s always been a case study for theory of displacement, where there is a destruction of capital in one area, there is creation of capital in other areas, and to follow that creation of capital is the investment theme whereby you make money. In focusing on the consumer, it led me to the states and the focus on which regions could grow and which regions couldn’t. And there could be ultimately consumer migration, you know, state arbitrage that would create huge economic boom areas. And the states that had done differently, hadn’t experienced housing bubbles and hadn’t spent wildly would be centers of real growth. So this was the central corridor, including Texas. Texas is the, sorry to be punny, but like the five-star example. Corporations, individuals moving to Texas. It’s a tax-free state, no state income tax, but also land is cheap, and they’re building the infrastructure to support all the businesses that are moving there. After so much work and so much data, and this was brutal in terms of dealing with all the state data, my investment thesis was simple again. The strong states were clearly going to benefit from massive population growth, and that would lead to

[中文]

但在悲剧的混乱之中，总有机遇。在我的职业生涯中，一直有一个关于资本置换理论的案例研究：一个地区的资本遭到破坏，其他地区就会产生资本，而跟随这种资本创造的过程，就是让你赚钱的投资主题。在关注消费者的过程中，我将目光投向了美国各州，关注哪些地区能够增长，哪些地区不能。最终可能会出现人口迁移，你知道，州际套利，这将催生巨大的经济繁荣地区。而那些做法不同的州，没有经历房地产泡沫，也没有大肆支出，将成为真正的增长中心。因此，这个核心走廊包括得克萨斯州。得克萨斯州是——抱歉有点双关的意思——堪称五星级的例子。企业和个人都在向得克萨斯州迁移。这是一个免税州，没有州所得税，而且土地价格低廉，他们正在建设基础设施来支持所有迁往那里的企业。经过大量的工作和大量的数据——处理所有州的数据过程非常艰辛——我的投资论点再次变得很简单。强势州显然将受益于大规模的人口增长，而这将带来

Segment 24

[English]

Massive population growth, and that would lead to housing growth, infrastructure growth, and investment growth. Then, like I usually do, I then boil down to the industries and the companies that would be in those lanes and create an investment thesis along those lines. When I did all the research on the states and published the Tragedy of the Commons, I also published in subsequent periods an entire investment booklet, including industry stock specifics, that you could invest along these lines and in these names that would work. And I remember going to one investor saying, “Why don’t you do this? This is a great idea.” Crickets. So I decided, OK, I’d do it myself. Instead of creating analysis to sell to other people, I could use all of this knowledge and experience to drive my own investments. And that’s what started my journey as an investor. I set up my hedge fund in the fall of 2013. So I found a great portfolio manager, a great trader, and went about investing along these themes. I get asked a lot to help people on individual stock names. So whereas an individual may look at one stock in a

[中文]

庞大的人口增长，而这将带动住房增长、基础设施增长和投资增长。然后，像往常一样，我会进一步聚焦到这些赛道中的行业和公司，并沿着这些思路构建投资论点。当我对各州进行了所有研究并发表《公地悲剧》之后，我还在后续时期发布了一整套投资手册，其中包括具体的行业股票，你可以沿着这些思路、投资这些标的来操作。我记得曾去找一位投资者说，你为什么不这么做？这是个好主意。结果毫无回应。于是我决定，好吧，我自己来干。与其制作分析卖给别人，不如把所有的知识和经验用来驱动自己的投资。这就是我投资者之旅的开端。我在2013年秋季创立了对冲基金。我找到了一位优秀的基金经理、一位优秀的交易员，然后开始沿着这些主题进行投资。很多人经常请我帮忙看具体的个股。所以，当一个人可能只盯着某一只股票时——

Segment 25

[English]

An individual may look at one stock in a vacuum. I can’t do that. I can’t give an honest assessment of a stock in a vacuum. I have to take, you know, 20 steps back. You know, I’m not trading on a day-to-day, month-to-month basis. I’m investing on long-term secular themes. Investing themes for me have always been about picking big secular moves and finding out what names you can invest in those themes. And by secular what I mean are major demographic themes that will last decades and decide the success or failure of entire industries. You know, I apply what I’ve done throughout my career the same way. Hopefully it just gets better with age, but I always take a large secular theme that makes sense within the macro environment and then drill down. So that’s a top-down approach. And then stock ideas that I get are from a bottoms-up approach. And the great combination of the two is that you’ve got data on both sides: great data on the top and really granular data on the bottom. And if that fits together perfectly, then you’ve got a really good investment idea. There’s so many data resources that I pull on that either are supportive or not supportive of an investment theme, and all I care about is being right. If I’m

[中文]

一个人可能会孤立地看某只股票，但我不能这样做。我无法在真空中对一只股票给出诚实的评估。我必须退后20步来看。你知道，我不是按天或按月进行交易。我是基于长期结构性主题进行投资。对我来说，投资主题一直是挑选大的结构性趋势，然后找出可以投资这些主题的相关股票。我说的结构性主题，是指将持续数十年、决定整个行业成败的重大人口结构主题。你知道，我在整个职业生涯中一直用同样的方式来做这件事。希望随着年龄增长会做得更好，但我总是会选择一个在宏观环境下合理的大型结构性主题，然后深入挖掘。所以这是一种自上而下的方法。而我获得的个股思路则来自自下而上的方法。这两者的完美结合在于，你两边都有数据——宏观层面有优质数据，微观层面有非常细粒度的数据。如果两者完美契合，那你就有了一个非常好的投资思路。我参考的数据资源非常多，它们要么支持、要么不支持某个投资主题，而我在乎的只是判断是否正确——如果我判断正确的话。

Segment 26

[English]

Theme and all I care about is being right. If I’m wrong, I’ll go in a different direction until I’m right, if that makes any sense. I have no ego in it. So let’s take an example like Texas, which has proven itself to be a major winner coming out of the credit crisis of 2008 and has become effectively its own investment theme. You might look at what areas of the country where you’re seeing the greatest home price appreciation and then is the macro supportive of the secular growth? You could have a strong housing boom and then the macro environment is the Fed’s raising rates, right? So that squashes it. You don’t make stock-specific investments because of macro. You soundproof the macro environment within the secular theme. But for this example, let’s just make it easy. Let’s pretend rates are staying low, which encourages more building and only reinforces your theme. So you take macro and then secular, which is the boom in housing, and then you take all the industries that would grow along those themes. And then you find the companies, the best players or the most active players within that secular theme. So you would invest in the home builders in those areas. You’d invest in materials companies, logistics companies, infrastructure companies, retail, et cetera. But you can’t just invest in the whole group because there are going to be some bad apples in every industry. You do company-specific research after you get to a sound secular theme within a sensible macro environment. Then you have to look at the company’s

[中文]

主题和我在乎的只是做对的事。如果我是错的，我就会换一个方向，直到做对为止，不知这样解释是否说得通。我在这件事上没有自我 ego。那么，我们以得克萨斯州为例——该州已经证明自己是2008年信贷危机后的一个主要赢家，实际上已经形成了自己的投资主题。你可能会看看全国哪些地区的房价涨幅最大，然后再看宏观环境是否支持这种长期增长。你可能会遇到强劲的房地产繁荣，但宏观环境却是美联储在加息，对吧？那就会把这种势头压下去。你不会因为宏观因素去做个股投资。你是在长期主题中把宏观环境隔绝掉。但为了这个例子，我们简单一点。我们假设利率保持在低位，这会鼓励更多的建设，只会强化你的主题。所以你先把宏观因素拿过来，然后是长期因素，也就是房地产的繁荣，接着你再找出所有会随着这些主题一起增长的行业。然后你找到这些长期主题中表现最好或最活跃的公司。所以你会投资那些地区的住宅建筑公司，投资材料公司、物流公司、基础设施公司、零售等等。但你不能把整个板块都投进去，因为每个行业都会有一些害群之马。在你确定了一个合理宏观环境下的稳健长期主题之后，你还需要做具体的公司研究。然后你必须考察这家公司的

Segment 27

[English]

Macro environment. Then you have to look at the companies. Are the companies viable? Do they have good management? Do they have access to capital? Have they blown up their balance sheet or have they been good stewards of capital? And I’ve learned that the hard way because in my 20s, half of the companies to 75% of the companies went out of business because they lost the ability to raise capital in the public markets. You learn from your, not mistakes, but you learn for why why certain names didn’t work and why certain names did work. And so if you were to ladder this down into an investment in a growth state like Texas, there are good companies in sectors like engineering, materials, even toll roads that have performed exceptionally well. Conversely, the cash-strapped states that are most in need to shore up their finances should make the logical move to sell assets like toll roads, municipal airports, through public-private partnerships, which will also benefit these sectors in these states. And today, as COVID has drawn focus to the fragility of the global supply chain, the reshoring of manufacturing in the U.S. will only accelerate the need for domestic building companies. Everything that I’ve done through my career is the same. Again, I hope it gets better every single day because it’s cumulative, right? What I did in 2007, 2008 has a lot to do with what I did in the 90s and what I saw in the 90s. And then what I did in 2012, 13, 14 is based upon that cumulative research.

[中文]

宏观环境。然后你必须看这些公司。这些公司是否可行？它们的管理层是否优秀？它们能否获得资金？它们是已经让资产负债表过度膨胀，还是善于管理资本？我是付出惨痛代价才学到这一点的，因为在我二十多岁的时候，有50%到75%的公司之所以倒闭，是因为它们失去了在公开市场上筹集资金的能力。你从你的——不是错误，而是你从为什么某些标的没有成功、为什么某些标的成功了中学到经验。所以，如果你把这个逻辑推演到像得克萨斯州这样处于增长阶段的地区进行投资，在工程、材料甚至收费公路等领域都有表现非常出色的公司。相反，那些资金紧张、最需要通过出售资产来巩固财务状况的州，应该采取合乎逻辑的举措，通过公私合营的方式出售收费公路、市政机场等资产，这也将使这些州的这些行业受益。而如今，随着新冠疫情让人们关注到全球供应链的脆弱性，美国制造业的回迁只会加速对国内建筑公司需求的增长。我整个职业生涯中所做的事情都是一样的。再说一遍，我希望它一天比一天更好，因为这是累积的，对吧？我在2007年、2008年做的事情，与我在90年代做的事情以及我在90年代所看到的密切相关。然后我在2012年、2013年、2014年做的事情，也是基于这些累积的研究。

Segment 28

[English]

Based upon that cumulative research on the consumer, on the states, on the various government programs, then specifically on other industries outside of financials that are rooted in the same themes that financials are. And so with this sound process and decades of research on finance, consumers, banks, and states, let’s explore some of the key issues in the investment world today. I was like everybody else when the pandemic hit. I had never seen anything like it. It took a couple months to really figure out what was coming and going. What the pandemic has done has accelerated the state themes that I predicted 13 years ago. On the state-specific finances, they’ve gotten tremendous support from the government. But on migration and state arbitrage, it’s massively accelerated those themes. Rising interest rates and inflation create an even greater reason for people to migrate to more affordable states. I think specific with banks, banks’ challenges are the same as they were, you know, 13 years ago. And I think the reckoning that banks are going to have to come to is how can they be profitable? Banks are on their own to prove to investors that they can be profitable without huge government

[中文]

基于对消费者、各州、各类政府项目的长期积累研究，再具体延伸到金融行业之外、但根植于与金融业相同主题的其他行业。因此，凭借这一严谨的研究流程以及在金融、消费者、银行和州政府领域数十年的研究积累，让我们来探讨当今投资世界中的一些关键问题。疫情暴发时，我和所有人一样措手不及。我从未见过这样的情况。花了好几个月才真正弄清楚接下来会发生什么、又会有什么变化。疫情加速了我13年前所预测的那些州级主题。在州级财政方面，各州获得了政府巨大的支持。但在人口迁移和州际套利方面，这些主题被极大地加速了。利率上升和通胀使得人们更有理由向生活成本更低的州迁移。我认为具体到银行，银行面临的挑战和13年前是一样的。我认为银行必须面对的现实是：它们如何才能实现盈利？银行必须自己向投资者证明，在没有巨额政府支持的情况下，它们依然能够实现盈利。

Segment 29

[English]

Profitable without huge government support in terms of buying securities and having their asset values go up. In terms of a zero interest rate policy where everything’s cheap and you see a big IPO calendar. As we speak today there’s no IPO calendar and so what do banks do for that? Well they’re cutting employees. That’s one one thing that they can do but you can’t cut your way to profitability. You have to create new channels or create new structures through which you can create capital by monetizing assets. I think that the same issues apply to so many different industries. I can say specifically this one, industrials are the same way. You know, there’s a big era of, oh, it’s cool to consolidate. But if you look at what GE is doing, it sold GE capital. It’s slowly selling down assets. So it’s slim lined. And so I think you’ll see in many businesses, they’ll be forced to look at whether a division is a top five market player. And if it’s not core to their operation, they’re going to have to get out of that business. There’ll be two opportunities for investors. One will be the large conglomerate that is getting slimmer and more profitable by selling off non-core assets. And number two, the buyer of those non-core assets that will operate a more efficient, well-run company that will also create shareholder value.

[中文]

在没有政府大规模支持的情况下，银行依然能够盈利——政府大量购买证券，推动资产价值上升。在零利率政策下，一切资金成本都很低，而且你会看到一大波IPO排期。但就我们今天来看，根本没有IPO排期，那银行靠什么来维持呢？嗯，他们选择裁员。这是他们能做的其中一种方式，但你不可能靠削减成本来实现盈利。你必须开辟新的渠道，或者构建新的架构，通过资产货币化来创造资本。我认为同样的问题也适用于许多其他行业。具体来说，工业领域也是如此。你知道，现在是一个大规模整合的时代，大家觉得合并很时髦。但如果你看看GE在做什么——它卖掉了GE Capital，正在逐步出售资产，从而精简业务版图。所以我认为，很多企业将被迫审视自己的某个业务部门是否属于市场前五名。如果不是核心业务，他们将不得不退出该领域。这对投资者来说将有两个机会。其一是那些正在瘦身、通过出售非核心资产来提升盈利能力的大型集团。其二是那些非核心资产的买家，他们将运营一家更高效、管理更完善的公司，同样能为股东创造价值。

Segment 30

[English]

Two of the bigger macro trends to watch are inflation and rising interest rates. Well, inflation is a mixed bag these days because you have inflation surges that affect some industries. And obviously, it’s not good for consumers in some ways. It’s good for banks because they’ve got repricing power in other areas. It’s not good for banks because the loan growth is slower. So the rising rate environment, it’s a reversal of what we’ve had for the last 30 years. So 30 years, the equity market, with disruptions, has been a one-way ticket up the escalator. But that’s no longer the case, at least for now. And so with interest rates rising, that changes our relationship to debt. I think the greatest U.S. export for the last 40 years has been U.S. debt. And that’s corporate. Up until the credit crisis, it was mortgages, it was agency debt, and so much is dollar-weighted. And you’ve had banks make enormous, have enormous revenue growth because the pie is expanding. And so they weren’t necessarily great operators because they didn’t have to manage their expenses so much because the pie keeps expanding. Well, all of that reversed just about at the time inflation started to increase. So you’ve got two counter trends that you

[中文]

需要关注的两个更大的宏观趋势是通胀和利率上升。嗯，通胀目前来说是一把双刃剑，因为通胀飙升会对某些行业产生影响。显然，在某些方面它对消费者不利。对银行来说倒是好事，因为银行在其他领域拥有重新定价的能力。但对银行来说也有不利的一面，因为贷款增长在放缓。所以利率上升的环境，是对过去30年趋势的逆转。过去30年来，股市虽然有波动，但总体上是单边上行的。但至少目前情况已经不再如此了。随着利率上升，这改变了我们与债务的关系。我认为过去40年来美国最大的出口品就是美国债务。这包括企业债务。在信贷危机之前，是抵押贷款、机构债务，而且大量资产都是以美元计价的。银行获得了巨大的收入增长，因为蛋糕在不断做大。所以银行未必是优秀的经营者，因为它们不必太操心控制支出，因为蛋糕一直在膨胀。然而，这一切几乎在通胀开始上升的时候就发生了逆转。所以你面对的是两种相互对立的趋势——

Segment 31

[English]

So you’ve got two counter trends that you’ve had for the last 20 years. So a lot of the things that caused the capital markets to expand and the banks to expand and large cap companies to expand has completely reversed. And so you’ve got to completely reevaluate how you’re going to invest for the next 10 years, how you’re going to invest for the next 20 years, because everything’s changed. You will see businesses that got caught not adapting quickly enough to the changing environment. An example being Silicon Valley Bank, which collapsed because they completely mismanaged their balance sheet in a rapidly changing rate environment. Any failing bank today brings back scary memories of 2008. But I don’t see the sky falling. I just find myself surprised again that smart people can be so dumb. Another part of reevaluating how you invest in this new environment is to consider how these macro trends affect the individual consumer. There are several things that affect the consumer in unique ways. One, where there’s going to be fragility in spending, and it will be different in each demographic. Let’s say the Gen Z-er, they’re not used to credit cards, but they’re very used to the prescription model. 24% of Gen Zers live at home, so they have had greater spending power, which you’re starting to see get a little crimped.

[中文]

因此，过去20年来一直存在的两大趋势如今已经完全逆转。推动资本市场扩张、银行扩张以及大盘股公司扩张的许多因素已经彻底反转。因此，你必须彻底重新审视未来10年乃至未来20年的投资方式，因为一切都已经不同了。你将会看到一些企业因未能足够迅速地适应变化的环境而陷入困境。硅谷银行就是一个例子，它的倒闭完全是因为在快速变化的利率环境中对资产负债表管理不善。如今任何一家银行倒闭都会唤起人们对2008年的可怕记忆。但我并不认为天要塌下来。我只是再次感到惊讶，聪明人竟能犯下如此愚蠢的错误。在这个新环境中重新审视投资方式的另一个方面，是思考这些宏观趋势如何影响个体消费者。有几种因素以独特的方式影响着消费者。其一，消费支出将出现脆弱性，而且不同人口群体的情况各不相同。以Z世代为例，他们不习惯使用信用卡，但对订阅模式却非常熟悉。24%的Z世代住在家里，因此他们拥有更强的消费能力，不过你已经开始看到这种消费能力正在受到一定程度的压缩。

Segment 32

[English]

Get a little crimped. In other words, Gen Z is going to have a lot less disposable income and is going to have a much harder time coming up with a down payment to afford houses. Meanwhile, their parents, the sandwich generation, are going to be financially constrained by supporting their kids, their parents, and dealing with the rising cost of health care. This may force them to sell their houses. With Gen Z less likely to afford new homes and their parents selling them, we may see a potential surplus in housing supply over the next 10 to 15 years. All of these dynamics are going to impact who has money and what they’re spending on. While I don’t have all the answers right now, I know this will be a fundamental aspect of the investment landscape in years to come. I am always optimistic that there are opportunities in any environment to find growth opportunities and make money. You’ll never go wrong focusing on what consumers are doing on a detailed basis. You’ll never go wrong focusing on how demographics are shifting throughout the country or the world. I’ll always be an analyst at heart. I’ve always looked at investment research as being a storyteller. If you get the history and the stories right, you have a good sense of what is to come after that. If you research the data, follow the shifting landscape of consumer behavior, and you really understand the story it’s telling you, I truly believe you’re on the path of becoming a successful investor.

[中文]

手头有点紧。换句话说，Z世代的可支配收入将大幅减少，攒够买房的首付也会更加困难。与此同时，他们的父母——也就是"夹心一代"——将因抚养子女、赡养父母以及不断上涨的医疗开支而在经济上捉襟见肘，这可能迫使他们出售房产。随着Z世代购房能力下降，而其父母又在卖房，未来10到15年内，我们可能会看到住房供应出现潜在过剩。所有这些变化都将影响谁手里有钱以及他们把钱花在什么地方。虽然我现在还没有所有的答案，但我知道这将是未来几年投资格局的一个基本要素。我始终乐观地认为，在任何环境下都有机会找到增长机遇并赚到钱。从细节层面关注消费者的行为，永远不会错。关注全国乃至全球人口结构的变化趋势，永远不会错。我骨子里永远是一名分析师。我一直把投资研究看作讲故事。如果你把历史和故事讲对了，就能很好地预判接下来的走向。如果你研究数据，跟踪消费者行为不断变化的格局，真正理解它向你讲述的故事，我真心相信你正在通往成功投资者的道路上。

Segment 33

[English]

Believe you’re on the path of becoming a successful investor.

[中文]

相信你正在通往成功投资者的道路上。

来源：要提前退休的小钢子-Ray Dalio 大师课 第2集（via bilibili-auto-transcript skill）

Source: MasterClass - Ray Dalio (via bilibili-auto-transcript skill)