视频信息

  • 标题：Ray Dalio 大师课 第4集：Win the Long Game by Managing Risk
  • BV号：BV1QA4m137u4
  • 分集 Part：p5（第4集，41分28秒）
  • 作者：要提前退休的小钢子
  • 发布于：2024-02-20
  • 原始链接：B站视频
  • 同合集：本系列共 6 集，本篇为第 4 集；其他集见博客标签 Ray Dalio 大师课 或目录
  • 语言：英语（English speech）+ 中文字幕 / 本博客为中英双语转录（Chinese + English bilingual transcript）

转录说明

  • 转录工具：
    • 英文转录：Groq Whisper large-v3（language=en）
    • 英文标点修复：LongCat-2.0-Preview
    • 中文翻译：LongCat-2.0-Preview（保留数字 / 公司名 / 品牌 / 人名）
    • 分集状态：✓ 完整（41:28）— 通过 Camoufox 浏览器 fetch 解决 CDN 403 鉴权问题后取得
  • 质量说明：本集音频最初经多次 curl 下载均失败（疑似 CDN 鉴权），最终通过 camoufox 浏览器内 fetch 31MB 数据后落地。音频是纯英语（Seth Klarman 的英文对谈），按"中英双语"规范发布。
  • 段落切分：29 段（按 90s 音频切片 + 3s overlap），每段先英文后中文逐段对照。

视频摘要

核心要点

  1. Seth 的 6-7 岁数字狂热：每天翻 Baltimore Sun 体育版找比赛数据——几个月后从体育版"误入"金融版，发现股票报价，从此改变一生。
  2. 10 岁的第一笔投资：买 Johnson & Johnson 一股（用 Band-Aids 认识产品），正巧赶上 3-for-1 拆股——这成为"投资"这个秘密游戏的入场券。
  3. 价值投资的两大优势（two main advantages）：第一：即时折扣的套利空间；第二：长期成长的复利。Value investing is that stocks become mispriced … you may make more money than just recovering from the bargain to full price.
  4. 多方法估值（避免单一幻觉）：用 PE/同行业比较/历史区间/管理层质量等多维度交叉验证——任何单一估值指标都是危险的。
  5. 安全边际的桥梁比喻（Warren Buffett）：“造桥要让它能承受 3 万磅卡车，但只跑 1 万磅车”——安全边际让你错时仍能赢，不是"避免错误"而是"错误时少亏"。
  6. eBay/PayPal 套利案例（5 年 1 倍）：eBay 拆出 PayPal 时市值 $250 股价 $27。Seth 团队发现分拆后 5 年内 eBay 不能与 PayPal 独家合作——短期股价可能停滞，长期 PayPal 平台的隐藏价值巨大。
  7. 持仓检查清单（test it again）：每次调研都问自己——“如果没持有，是否会买？会买更多、更少、还是同样？忘掉成本价，忘掉过去决定”。
  8. 2008 反思：“未预测到危机"才是常态：Seth 公开承认 Baupost 2008 也没预见到崩溃，但他们做对了一件事——位置合理，估值偏低。在危机中，位置好于预测准。
  9. “病人多年患肺炎，没人治疗”：1990s-2007 年间低利率、监管放松、估值极高——市场在长期牛市中积累的结构性脆弱，没人愿意面对。
  10. Benjamin Graham 也犯错过：哪怕是历史上最伟大的价值投资者，也会因耐心耗尽而失败——Seth 因此为自己和公司设置了"防御线”：强制多元化、严格止损、承认错误并切断。
  11. 2009-2021 年保险机构没经历过损失：任何在 2009-2021 期间入市的投资者都没经历过股票下跌——这是史无前例的"非正常状态"，未来必然均值回归。
  12. 2007-08 的警示：当"房价几年都涨"成"为什么不会继续涨"的论调时，应该读历史——均值回归是金融市场最稳定的规律之一。
  13. 历史是起点，不是终点：Benjamin Graham 1930 年写书时是蒸汽机车+汽配厂；今天我们坐在桌前交易信息——单一理论在不同代际必须重新构建，但"安全边际"的本质不会变。
  14. Clayton Christensen 的"创新者窘境"：当一种新技术出现，老公司被颠覆的速率在加快（不仅金融，包括工业）；你要么拥抱它，要么被它吞噬。
  15. 零利率时代的终结：2020-2021 年的狂热市场（SPAC、IPO、加密、特殊目的收购）本质是零利率副作用——一旦利率正常化，“显而易见的高估值"被强制调整。
  16. 价值投资永不过时：1964 年是，现在是，未来还是——做法的细节在变，基础理念不变。
  17. “在最糟时刻保持精神”：如果市场明天就崩盘，你的位置还能让你站起来吗？就像打高尔夫/篮球——上一杆打飞了，下一杆你必须清空脑袋。
  18. “知道不知道"是 Seth 的座右铭：谦卑 + 同理心 + 坚持过程 + 终身学习 是价值投资者长期胜出的核心——超过任何具体技巧。
  19. 避免"确认你已知"陷阱：当所有人都说"这家公司/国家正在成为……“时，问自己"我看到什么？他们看到什么？我会错过什么？"——怀疑自己比怀疑别人更难。
  20. 长期投资的"心理学准备”：投资成功 = 持续进步 + 谦卑 + 同理心 + 不断反思——Seth 建议从阅读《哈佛经典》开始构建知识地基。

视频全文转录（中英双语）

以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。共 29 段，按 90s 音频切片 + 3s overlap 切分。

Segment 1

[English]

Investing is knowing how to value a business, research and timing, psychological endeavor. Investing without knowing what you’re looking for is like running through a dynamite factory with a burning match. There’s a very, very dangerous jungle out there. How do I successfully cross the jungle? There are thousands of different approaches to investing. There’s no formula anybody could give you. It’s not like the Colonel’s secret recipe. If you’re a self-starter and you work really hard, you can make a difference. There are people who say value investing is a lonely undertaking. I think in some respects it can be. You tend to be going against the grain, going against the consensus of the crowd. That’s not hard for me. That’s natural for me. I tend to be a skeptic. I tend to be a contrarian thinker. I tend to ask at least as much what can go wrong as what can go right. So while broadly investors

[中文]

投资就是懂得如何评估一家企业，研究和把握时机，以及心理层面的修炼。在不知道自己要寻找什么的情况下投资，就像拿着一根燃烧的火柴跑过炸药厂。外面的世界是一片非常非常危险的丛林。我该如何成功地穿越这片丛林？有成千上万种不同的投资方法。没有人能给你一个现成的公式。这不像肯德基上校的秘制配方。如果你是一个自我驱动力很强的人，并且真的非常努力，你就能脱颖而出。有人说价值投资是一项孤独的事业。我认为在某些方面确实如此。你往往会反其道而行之，与大众的主流观点背道而驰。这对我来说并不难。这对我来说很自然。我倾向于做一个怀疑论者。我倾向于逆向思维。我至少会花同样多的时间去思考可能出错的地方，而不是只想着可能成功的地方。所以，虽然从广义上说投资者们……

Segment 2

[English]

So while broadly investors like plain vanilla, they like a stock that’s growing nicely quarter after quarter. Value investors, I think, maybe like Rocky Road. So value investing isn’t like a treasure map that you just follow. And if you get to X, you’ve figured out how to make money. Some people say that value investing is a thing of the past. What do you have to say to those people? Clean version? No. Oh, f*** off. I’m Seth Klarman, I’m CEO and portfolio manager of Baupost Group, which is a Boston-based investment partnership managing about $25 billion, and we’ve been in business about four decades. I got interested in the stock market when I was a kid, maybe six or seven. I was very mathematically inclined. I was interested in the baseball statistics. Every morning our family got the Baltimore Sun papers and I would open the papers straight to the sports section. The baseball statistics, the batting average leaders, and all of that were in there. And I, at some point, turned past the sports section and noticed that there were a bunch of other numbers a few pages later, and those numbers turned out to be the stock exchange listings. I didn’t know what they were, so I asked my dad. He explained that they were stocks and they trade.

[中文]

所以，虽然大体上投资者喜欢普普通通的香草味，但他们也喜欢那种一个季度比一个季度稳定增长的股票。价值投资者呢，我觉得，可能喜欢的是曲奇奶油味。所以价值投资并不是一张你照着走就能到达宝藏的地图。到了X点，你就知道怎么赚钱了。有些人说价值投资已经是过去式了。你对这些人有什么要说的？干净版本？不。哦，滚蛋吧。我是赛思·卡拉曼，鲍伯斯特集团的CEO和投资组合经理，这是一家总部位于波士顿的投资管理合伙企业，管理着大约250亿美元的资产，我们已经在这一行干了大约四十多年。我小时候就对股票市场产生了兴趣，大概六七岁的时候。我从小就对数学很着迷。我对棒球统计数据很感兴趣。每天早上我们家都会收到《巴尔的摩太阳报》，我会翻开报纸直接翻到体育版。棒球的统计数据、打击率排行榜之类的都在里面。后来有一天，我翻过体育版，发现后面几页还有一堆数字，那些数字原来就是股票交易所的行情列表。我不知道那是什么，就去问我爸爸。他解释说那些是股票，是可以交易的。

Segment 3

[English]

He explained that they were stocks and they trade, and so it just fueled an interest and eventually a passion. When I was 10, I thought it was time to take a plunge into the market, and I bought my first share of stock. A kindly stockbroker, Max Silverman, was willing to handle a very small account, and I bought a share of Johnson & Johnson because I knew what the product was because I used Band-Aids. Unbeknownst to me at the time I bought it, the company had already announced a stock split, so a couple of days later I had three shares for my one share. So that was my entree into investing. When I bought my first stock, stocks were kind of pieces of paper that traded. They were blips on the ticker tape that moved up and down. And there was a rhythm to it, but I didn’t understand why it worked or how you would professionally invest to reliably make money for your clients. And value investing was like being let in on a secret. When I was a junior in college, my uncle was on the board of something called Mutual Shares, which was a no-load mutual fund, and he helped me get an internship for the summer. I didn’t know about value investing until I worked at Mutual Shares, and then I became quite absorbed and pretty quickly addicted to it. The idea of value investing is that stocks become mispriced and they become

[中文]

他解释说那是股票，股票可以交易，这激起了我的兴趣，最终变成了一种热情。10岁的时候，我觉得是时候一头扎进市场了，于是我买下了人生第一股股票。一位好心的股票经纪人马克斯·西尔弗曼愿意接手一个非常小的账户，我买了一股强生（Johnson & Johnson）的股票，因为我知道它的产品是什么——我用过创可贴（Band-Aids）。在我买入的时候，我并不知道公司已经宣布了股票拆分，所以几天之后，我的一股变成了三股。这就是我进入投资领域的起点。当我买第一股股票的时候，股票还算是某种可以交易的纸质凭证。它们是行情收录带上上下跳动的闪烁信号。其中有一种节奏，但我不明白它为什么运作，也不懂怎样进行专业投资来为客户稳定地赚钱。而价值投资就像是被人告知了一个秘密。大学三年级的时候，我舅舅在一个叫Mutual Shares的机构担任董事会成员，那是一家免佣共同基金，他帮我争取到了一份暑期实习。在Mutual Shares工作之前，我对价值投资一无所知，后来我就深深沉浸其中，很快就上了瘾。价值投资的理念在于，股票会出现错误定价——它们会变得

Segment 4

[English]

That stocks become mispriced. And they become mispriced essentially because of human nature. Human beings with their emotions, with their greed and fear, will make errors in judgment. They’ll overpay sometimes, and other times they’ll sell something at a bargain price. And that a value investor, by being discerning, by doing deep fundamental analysis, by being patient and waiting for bargains, will have a real edge. Michael Lewis’s Moneyball is an incredible example of that. Moneyball talked about Billy being the general manager of the Oakland A’s. The nature of his approach was to realize that people sometimes overemphasize what a player looks like. Literally, that’s a very impressive athletic build that that player has. But you can actually look at the statistics and say, that player’s not as good based on the numbers as this other player who maybe is a little pudgy, but they’re able to walk a lot and get on base a lot or hit for power more than somebody else. People over-focusing on one type of athlete, one type of stock, one type of bond might mean that others are neglected, overlooked, and therefore undervalued, and therefore better available to you. I think that every investor wants to think about a differentiated perspective. Doing what everybody else does exactly the same way is gonna end up with a market kind of result, but standing apart from the crowd.

[中文]

股票会出现定价错误。而它们之所以会出现定价错误，本质上是因为人性。人类带着自己的情感，带着贪婪与恐惧，会在判断上犯错误。有时候他们会出价过高，有时候又会以便宜的价格卖出。而价值投资者凭借敏锐的判断力、深入的基本面分析，以及耐心等待便宜货的心态，就能获得真正的优势。迈克尔·刘易斯的《点球成金》就是一个绝佳的例子。《点球成金》讲的是比利作为奥克兰运动家队总经理的故事。他的方法的核心在于意识到人们有时候过于看重一个球员的外表。说真的，就是那个球员拥有非常令人印象深刻的运动员体型。但你其实可以看数据，然后说，从数据来看，那个球员并没有另一个看起来可能有点胖的球员那么好，但后者能够频繁保送上垒，或者打出比其他人更强的长打能力。人们过度关注某一类运动员、某一只股票、某一种债券，可能意味着其他类型被忽视、被忽略，因此被低估，从而为你提供更好的机会。我认为每个投资者都应该思考差异化的视角。做和其他人完全一样的事情，最终只会得到市场平均的结果，而你需要做的是从人群中脱颖而出。

Segment 5

[English]

Market kind of result. But standing apart from the crowd, sometimes being a contrarian, other times simply having a different, unique perspective, has a chance to really outperform. And so, at the end of the day, you’re not trying to build a team of how good people look; you’re trying to build a team of how good people play. Value investing has two main advantages over other forms of investing. One benefit will be that you’re buying something at an immediate bargain. You may make more money than just recovering from the bargain to full price, because the company over time might grow. And that raises, I think, the really legitimate question of how you know something’s at a discount and, of course, how do you know what something’s worth? A lot of people bandy about the phrase “intrinsic value” as though a company has an exact value that you can ascertain. And I don’t actually believe that’s possible. I believe in the concept of a range of values. When you think about a business, it has value in so many different ways. It has value as a stock, but it has a different value, or sometimes a different value, to an acquirer. It might have a different value if their capital structure were mostly debt or mostly equity. And so I think that it makes sense to use multiple metrics to kind of triangulate the

[中文]

市场有时候会出现这样的结果。但如果你能脱颖而出，有时候采取逆向思维，有时候只是拥有与众不同的独特视角，就有机会真正超越大盘。所以归根结底，你不是在组建一支看起来多么优秀的团队，而是在组建一支实战表现多么出色的团队。价值投资相比其他投资方式有两个主要优势。一个好处是你买到的东西立刻就是一笔划算的交易。你可能赚到的钱不只是从折价恢复到原价那么简单，因为随着时间的推移，公司可能会成长。而这又引出了一个我认为非常合理的问题：你怎么知道某样东西是折价的？当然，你又怎么知道某样东西到底值多少钱？很多人动不动就搬出"内在价值"这个说法，好像一家公司有一个你可以精确计算出来的确切价值。我其实并不相信这是可能的。我相信的是一个价值区间的概念。当你考虑一家企业时，它的价值体现在很多不同的方面。它作为股票有价值，但对收购者来说，它可能有不同的价值，或者有时候价值会不一样。如果一家公司的资本结构以债务为主或以股权为主，它的价值可能也会有所不同。所以我认为，使用多种指标来交叉验证、从而确定价值是合理的做法。

Segment 6

[English]

Multiple metrics to kind of triangulate into value. So you have to be versatile in your thinking. You can use comparables. You can say other stocks like this company trade at 15 times earnings, which causes you to say, well, is this one a bargain at 11 times? I would always then go further. I don’t just want to know that something is cheap, that something is a bargain, but I want to know why. That’s part of the analytical process is to dig, not just to say, can I trust those cash flows? What about the business makes that particularly safe or particularly risky? But you can also say, well, I think that stock is mispriced from something that went wrong a few years ago, or the management doesn’t have the best reputation because of the following, and that lends itself to analysis. So you have a lot of ways of coming at value, and that helps you kind of calibrate, am I sure I’m getting a bargain? Another really important facet of value investing is having a margin of safety. I think we all understand in some way that when you have a certain amount of money, doubling that amount of money may not make all that much difference to your lifestyle. But losing all that money would make a devastating difference. The idea of a margin of safety is that you have comfort because by buying at a discount, things can go wrong. You can have bad luck. You can have imprecision. You can have just the vicissitudes of the business.

[中文]

多种指标可以交叉验证来锁定价值。所以你的思维方式必须灵活多变。你可以用可比估值法。你可以说，类似这样的公司股价是15倍市盈率，那你就会问，这家公司11倍的市盈率是不是就算便宜了？但我总是会进一步深挖。我不只是想确认某个东西便宜、是笔划算的交易，我更想知道为什么便宜。分析过程的一部分就是要深入挖掘，不能光问，我能信任这些现金流吗？这家企业的商业模式让现金流特别安全，还是特别有风险？但你也可以说，我觉得那只股票之所以定价出错，是因为几年前出了什么问题，或者管理层因为某些原因口碑不佳，这些都可以作为分析的切入点。所以你有多种途径来评估价值，这有助于你校准自己：我确定自己捡到便宜了吗？价值投资另一个非常重要的方面是安全边际。我想我们多少都明白，当你拥有一定数量的资金时，让这笔钱翻倍可能不会对你的生活方式产生多大影响。但把这笔钱全部亏光，那将是毁灭性的打击。安全边际的理念在于，你之所以感到安心，是因为以折价买入后，即使出了问题也没关系。你可能运气不好，可能判断不够精确，也可能遇到生意场上的起伏波折。

Segment 7

[English]

You can have just the vicissitudes of the business cycle, and those things can go against you, and you still may not lose anything. And if you buy it at a big enough discount, the margin of safety means things won’t go terribly wrong because you’ve already baked some room for things going wrong into your price. I think Warren Buffett likes to say that when you build a bridge, you build it so it can drive 30,000-pound trucks across it, but you don’t actually drive those trucks. You drive 10,000 pound trucks. And so that’s a similar margin of safety. And I think that approach works obviously in investing, but it actually is a sensible approach for other things in our lives. So I think the idea of a margin of safety protects you. And in a way, it also is, it fuels future gains because by not losing an unimaginable amount in a bad period, you’re actually able to play offense in that bad period when other people maybe are having to sell unable to buy. Speculation is the opposite of value investing. A speculation I think of as something that doesn’t have an intrinsic value, does not throw off cash flow, does not have a reliable exit value the way a bond has a maturity. So a rare coin, a a piece of art a NFT is a speculation and it’s because

[中文]

你可能只是经历了商业周期的起伏，那些事情可能对你不利，但你仍然可能什么都不会损失。而如果你以足够大的折扣买入，安全边际意味着事情不会变得太糟，因为你已经在价格中预留了一些出错的余地。我想沃伦·巴菲特喜欢说，当你建一座桥的时候，你把它建成能承载3万磅重的卡车通过，但你实际上不会真的开那些卡车过去。你开的是1万磅重的卡车。所以这也是一种类似的安全边际。我认为这种方法显然在投资中是有效的，但它实际上对我们生活中其他方面也是一种明智的做法。所以我认为安全边际这个概念能保护你。在某种程度上，它还能推动未来的收益，因为通过在糟糕的时期不遭受难以想象的损失，你实际上能够在那个糟糕的时期采取进攻策略，而其他人可能被迫卖出，无法买入。投机是价值投资的反面。我认为投机是指没有内在价值的东西，它不产生现金流，也没有像债券到期那样可靠的退出价值。所以一枚稀世硬币、一件艺术品、一个NFT都是一种投机，原因就在于此。

Segment 8

[English]

Is a speculation, and it’s because its value is totally determined by what somebody will pay for it in the future. Whereas an investment has an intrinsic value that is related to how much dividend does it pay, or how much interest does it pay, or what are the underlying earnings that will build value and be potentially distributable back to shareholders. An investor, therefore, or as somebody who puts capital to work to earn a return, implicitly, they take a longer-term time horizon. They’re not trying to make money quickly. And a speculator, I think, is somebody who’s willing to buy whatever with the idea that they’re gonna make money fast. I think we all know that people, maybe at a cocktail party, will talk about that great new investment that they made that they’re very excited about. The goal is not your personal excitement. The goal is to make money safely and predictably over a period of time. The strategy of going after the hot new thing has some serious disadvantages. First of all, the hot new thing, because everybody can see it’s the hot new thing, tends to be priced a little bit for perfection, that people have already built lofty expectations into it. So sometimes even the slightest disappointment will cause a rather severe loss. The place that the difference between investing and speculation becomes clear is when you think about downside, that speculations tend to be focused all on upside, how much it

[中文]

这是一种投机行为，因为它的价值完全取决于未来有人愿意为它支付什么样的价格。而投资具有内在价值，这种价值与它支付多少股息、支付多少利息，以及能够创造价值并可能分配给股东的底层收益相关。因此，一个投资者，或者说一个投入资本以获取回报的人，隐含地会采取更长远的视角。他们并不试图快速赚钱。而投机者，在我看来，是那些愿意买入任何东西，心里想着自己能快速赚钱的人。我想我们都知道，人们可能在鸡尾酒会上谈论自己刚做的那笔了不起的新投资，说得兴奋不已。但目标不是让你个人感到兴奋。目标是在一段时期内安全、可预测地赚钱。追逐热门新事物这种策略有一些严重的缺陷。首先，既然是热门新事物，每个人都能看到它的热度，所以它的价格往往已经包含了完美的预期，人们已经把极高的期望计入了价格。因此，有时候哪怕是最轻微的失望，也会导致相当严重的损失。投资和投机之间的区别变得清晰的地方，在于你如何看待下行风险——投机往往只关注上行空间，它能涨多少。

Segment 9

[English]

Speculations tend to be focused all on upside, how much can I make? But investment is focused both on upside and on downside. And so the challenge that if you look to the market as a source of advice, you’re getting drawn into short-term thinking. But if you look to the market as a source of opportunity, you’re on the track to being a value investor. And that’s my mindset, that the market gyrates a lot. And sometimes it gyrates for good reason, but because you can apply discipline and analysis and logic, you might be able to find times when the market has irrationally reacted, and that creates opportunity. But only if you’re willing to go outside the box and against the grain. When I was at Harvard Business School, in the middle of my second year, one of my professors surprised me and said, some friends and I are in the process of building the equivalent of a family investment office to manage our money. I’m in the middle of selling a valuable asset. I’m going to have $9 or $10 million, and my friends each have a similar amount, and we’re going to form something, and you could be part of that. I kind of could look out 10 years or 15 years into the future and say, I’m going to every day come in and have a puzzle to solve, that I don’t know what the answer will be, and I will always be stretched out.

[中文]

人们做投机时往往只关注上行空间——我能赚多少？但投资既要关注上行，也要关注下行。因此，如果你把市场当作建议的源泉，你就会陷入短期思维。但如果你把市场当作机会的源泉，你就走上了价值投资的道路。而我的心态正是如此：市场波动剧烈。有时波动是事出有因的，但正因为你可以运用纪律、分析和逻辑，你或许能够发现市场做出非理性反应的时刻，而这恰恰创造了机会。但前提是你必须愿意打破常规、逆流而上。

我在哈佛商学院读二年级的时候，有一位教授让我吃了一惊。他说，我和几个朋友正在筹建一个类似家族办公室的机构来管理我们的资金。我正在出售一项资产，价值不菲。届时我会有900万到1000万美元，我的朋友们每人也有差不多的金额，我们要组建一个机构，而你可以参与其中。我当时展望了一下未来10年或15年的景象，对自己说：我每天走进办公室，都会面对一个不知道答案的谜题，而我始终会被推到能力的极限。

Segment 10

[English]

And I will always be stretched and expanding my knowledge into new industries, into new securities, into new geographies. And while it was their money and they were much older than I was, I was 25 or so and they were probably 50, it was a chance to be part of building something which would come to be known as Bowpost. There are people who’ve asked me over time, was that a big risk? For a risk-averse guy, why would you take that risk? When I look back, I wonder what they were thinking, taking a bet on a kid. And in some ways, I wonder what I was thinking. So here I was, 25 years old, my whole life ahead of me and considering the biggest decision I’d ever faced. I had job offers to go to New York and be an investment banker, to be an investor, to go back to mutual shares. But the opportunity to manage money for Bowpost as it was being formed excited me the most. It was the chance to get on the ground floor. It was a chance to guide the direction from the beginning. And I was 25. Obviously, that’s an age where you don’t have a ton of experience. On day one, I was just getting a salary and a promise that if we did well, I’d participate in the upside, but I trusted that. And then came the real test. Baupost has evolved.

[中文]

我总是不断拓展自己的知识边界，涉足新的行业、新的证券、新的地理领域。虽然那是他们的资金，而且他们比我年长许多——我当时大概25岁左右，他们可能已经50岁了——但这是一个参与创建后来被称为Bowpost的机会。有人曾不止一次地问过我，那是不是一个很大的风险？对于一个厌恶风险的人来说，你为什么要冒这个险？回过头来看，我很好奇他们当时是怎么想的，竟然把赌注押在一个年轻人身上。从某种程度上说，我也在想自己当时到底是怎么想的。就这样，我25岁，整个人生摆在面前，面临着人生中最重大的抉择。我收到了去纽约做投资银行家的录用通知，也收到了去做投资者、回到共同基金公司的机会。但最让我兴奋的是，在Bowpost创立之初就获得管理其资金的机会。这是一个从最底层参与的机会，一个从一开始就能引导其发展方向的机会。而我当时才25岁。显然，在那个年龄段，你不会有太多的经验。第一天上班，我只拿到了一份薪水，以及一个承诺——如果我们做得好，我能分享上行收益，但我相信了那个承诺。然后，真正的考验来了。Baupost已经今非昔比了。

Segment 11

[English]

Baupost has evolved in parallel with one person’s evolution and journey, which is me. I work closely with the four founders, including Howard Stevenson, whose initials were the ST of Baupost. Baupost being an acronym of four last names. And Howard oversaw the operations, and he and I were talking through investments and putting things in the portfolio. Over time, I gradually took on more and more responsibility and took over control of the firm in the early 90s. It was to me to decide an investment philosophy and then implement and execute on it. I thought a value investing strategy was the right one. And I thought it was the right one because it’s risk averse. And the principals were gentlemen in their 50s and had made a lot of money and didn’t know if they’d make another fortune. It also was convenient because that’s the strategy I knew how to do from my time at Mutual Shares. And a value investment approach turned out to be the key to four decades of investment success. To generate attractive returns over time, every investor needs to identify areas of edge. These are any combination of their approach, their firm structure, or their expertise that make it possible to outperform the market. If you ask me about what bow posts

[中文]

Baupost的发展与一个人的成长历程并行，这个人就是我。我与四位创始人密切合作，其中包括霍华德·史蒂文森（Howard Stevenson），他的姓氏首字母ST正是Baupost名称的由来。Baupost是四位创始人姓氏的首字母缩写。霍华德负责公司的运营，他和我一起讨论投资决策，将项目纳入投资组合。随着时间推移，我逐渐承担了越来越多的责任，并在90年代初接管了公司的控制权。投资哲学的制定、实施和执行都由我来决定。我认为价值投资策略是正确的选择。我之所以这样认为，是因为这种策略厌恶风险。当时的几位创始人都是五十多岁的绅士，已经赚了很多钱，不确定是否还能再创财富。这一策略对我来说也很顺手，因为我在Mutual Shares工作期间就已经掌握了价值投资的方法。事实证明，价值投资方法是四十年投资成功的关键。为了在长期内创造有吸引力的回报，每个投资者都需要找到自己的优势领域。这些优势可能来自投资方法、公司结构或专业能力的某种组合，使跑赢市场成为可能。如果你问我关于Baupost的……

Segment 12

[English]

Me about what Baupost edges are, I would tell you there are two that particularly stand out. One is a flexible mandate. A flexible investment mandate is the idea that you can invest in just about anything. Many investors are siloed. They’re forced to invest in a particularly narrow area, maybe companies only in a certain industry or with a certain market capitalization. And I think about investing as something that offers up opportunities that move around. If you are constrained and you can only own it one way, it means you can’t be upsizing into the very best opportunities. Our other main edge is a long-term orientation. A long-term orientation basically means that you’re not looking quarter by quarter. You’re not looking for something that’s going to work out right away. You’re able to hold a stock through a valley until you get back to the other side of the slope and you go in with the idea that you’re willing to hold it several years, but then it reaches your price target sooner and you sell. You don’t care where it trades in the short run. We had begun working on a stock called eBay, which everybody knows is the purchasing platform. We had first looked at eBay when it had been separated from a parent company or a different subsidiary PayPal, and those two became separately traded entities. When PayPal was in the same company, eBay was bound to use PayPal for financing.

[中文]

关于Baupost的优势，我会告诉你有两个特别突出。一个是灵活的投资授权。灵活的投资授权是指你几乎可以投资任何东西。许多投资者被局限在特定领域，他们被迫只投资于某个非常狭窄的范围，可能只限于某个特定行业或某个特定市值的公司。而我认为投资所提供的机会是在不断变化的。如果你受到限制，只能以某一种方式持有，那就意味着你无法在最佳机会上加码。我们的另一个主要优势是长期导向。长期导向基本上意味着你不是按季度来看问题，你不是在寻找马上就能看到成效的东西。你能够持有股票度过低谷期，直到你回到山坡的另一边，你进场的态度是你愿意持有几年，但如果它提前达到了你的目标价，你就会卖出。你不关心它在短期的走势。我们曾经开始研究一只叫eBay的股票，大家都知道它是一个购物平台。我们第一次关注eBay是在它从母公司或另一家子公司PayPal拆分出来的时候，那之后两家公司分别独立上市交易。当PayPal还在同一家公司时，eBay被迫使用PayPal作为支付工具。

Segment 13

[English]

To use PayPal for financing, PayPal would be the way that they were able to have customers pay. After the split up, both stocks traded publicly. We didn’t think they were all that interesting. But then we did some more work and realized that in their original spinoff agreement, I think it was five years in, they would no longer be bound to work with PayPal. They could go and cut their own deal with anybody. So in the short term, we were prepared for the stock price to stay the same or even decline. But our analysis of the long-term led us to a pretty exciting thesis that the possibility of a new purchasing platform, which was still years down the road, could create immense value. While this definitely wasn’t the only factor that contributed to the success of the investment, our long-term view played a role. And the math of that was we believed that the earnings would immediately grow by 50 cents a share. On a $27 stock earning around 250, that was very material. Over the last five years, the earnings have gone from around 250, as I said, to well over $4 a share. And the stock has gone from 27, where we bought it, to 40 and to 50, 60, and briefly hit 70 and $80. But that was, I think, our biggest dollar profit ever on an investment. And it was simply a straightforward company that by good sleuthing, by due diligence, you’re able to find the opportunity. That hidden value could be realized.

[中文]

在使用PayPal进行融资时，PayPal是他们让客户付款的方式。拆分之后，两家公司的股票都公开上市交易。起初我们觉得它们并没有那么有意思。但后来我们做了进一步研究，发现根据最初的拆分协议，我想是在五年之后，它们将不再受约束必须与PayPal合作。它们可以自己去跟任何人谈一笔新的交易。所以在短期内，我们已经做好了股价保持平稳甚至下跌的心理准备。但我们的长期分析得出了一个相当令人兴奋的结论——一个全新的购物平台，虽然还要好几年才会出现，但有可能创造巨大的价值。虽然这肯定不是投资成功的唯一因素，但我们的长期视角确实发挥了作用。从数字上看，我们认为每股收益会立即增长50美分。对于一只股价27美元、每股收益大约250美分的股票来说，这个增长幅度是非常显著的。在过去五年里，每股收益从大约250美分，就像我说的，一路攀升到远超4美元。而股价也从我们买入时的27美元，涨到了40美元、50美元、60美元，还一度触及70美元和80美元。但我想，这是我们在一笔投资上赚到的最大一笔美元利润。而这不过是一家很普通的公司，通过仔细的调查、尽职研究，你就能发现其中的机会。那种隐藏的价值是可以被释放出来的。

Segment 14

[English]

Find the opportunity that hidden value could be realized and earnings per share could increase meaningfully with little change in customer behavior or sales trends. eBay, when we bought it, was not a small cap stock. It was well known. A lot of firms covered it. But people weren’t willing to look past short term mundane performance to a future where they had some built in increases coming. But they were a little bit down the road. You had to imagine that they would come and when they would come. And that led to a very successful investment where the thesis largely played out and we did very well. On any given investment, even with the best strategy, your thesis may not always pan out. And so every investment we make, whether we’ve held it for a month or a year, we’re always reflecting, is that still our thesis? Does our thesis make sense? If our thesis starts to change, which is human that you, you know, you have some kind of news that wasn’t what you expected. We just evaluate that news and say, if we didn’t own it, will we still like it? We’d like it more. We’d like it less. We like it the same price. And we forget about what we paid and we forget about what the old thesis was. Even when investment seems like it’s performing reasonably well when the story has changed when the thesis no longer applies sometimes it’s time to move on we had a chance to buy land in New York City it was

[中文]

寻找那些隐藏价值得以实现、每股收益能够显著提升的机会，而客户行为或销售趋势几乎不需要发生什么变化。eBay，当我们买入它的时候，它并不是一只小盘股。它广为人知。很多机构都在跟踪研究它。但人们不愿意把目光从短期的平淡表现移开，去展望未来——在那个未来里，一些内生的增长将会到来。但这些增长还需要一点时间才能实现。你需要去想象它们会到来，以及什么时候会到来。而这最终带来了一笔非常成功的投资，投资逻辑在很大程度上得到了验证，我们获得了丰厚的回报。在任何一笔投资上，即使拥有最好的策略，你的投资逻辑也未必总能兑现。因此，我们所做的每一笔投资，无论我们已经持有一个月还是一年，我们始终在反思：这还是我们的投资逻辑吗？我们的投资逻辑还说得通吗？如果我们的投资逻辑开始发生变化——这是人之常情，你获得了一些出乎预期的消息——我们只是评估这些消息，然后问自己：如果我们现在没有持有它，我们还会喜欢它吗？我们会更喜欢它？不那么喜欢它？还是觉得价格合适？我们会忘掉我们的买入成本，也会忘掉原来的投资逻辑。即使一笔投资看起来表现还算不错，但当故事已经改变、投资逻辑不再适用的时候，有时候就该继续前进了。我们曾经有机会在纽约市购买一块土地。那是

Segment 15

[English]

Chance to buy land in New York City. It was a former substation of electric utility, a large piece of land in a residential area, and we thought that clearly would be developed for residential use. We saw a chance to build a very large complex in a sub-market of New York that didn’t have enough supply, very close to a hospital, clearly needed more housing. We designed and executed and built within budget, a beautiful apartment complex. They were fully occupied and that was going great. Then a new law passed and the new law limited one’s ability to sell such an asset. There are always things that happen in the market, some of which are always beneficial and others of which aren’t, whether it’s rent control or permitting delays or whatever. But in this particular case, while the asset was ripe for sale, it was fully developed and occupied and rents were fine, it seemed as though the value was not obviously ever going to come back to what we’d expected. And we asked ourselves, as we always do, whether we should hang on or whether something had fundamentally changed. So we ended up saying, we think we can take whatever capital we have in that and redeploy it elsewhere more fruitfully without this.

[中文]

有机会在纽约市买下一块土地。这是一处电力公司以前的变电站，位于住宅区的一大块土地，我们当时认为这块地显然会被开发用于住宅用途。我们看到了一个机会，可以在纽约一个供应不足的子市场建造一个非常大的综合体，那里离一家医院很近，显然需要更多的住房。我们在预算内完成了设计、执行和建造，建成了一座漂亮的公寓大楼。入住率满员，一切进展顺利。后来一项新法律获得通过，该法律限制了出售此类资产的能力。市场上总会发生一些事情，其中有些总是有利的，有些则不然，无论是租金管制、审批延迟还是其他什么情况。但在这个特定案例中，虽然该资产已经成熟可以出售，已经完全开发完毕且满租，租金也还可以，但价值似乎显然不会回到我们预期的水平。于是我们扪心自问，就像我们一直在做的那样，是应该继续持有，还是发生了根本性的变化。所以我们最终决定，我们认为可以把投入其中的资金抽出来，重新部署到其他地方，在没有这种限制的情况下获得更好的回报。

Segment 16

[English]

Fruitfully without this obstacle to a better exit. And so we sold it. We lost a material amount, but it felt better than just sitting there. That’s part of the flexibility that an investor needs to have. And our judgment was that we got a decent price, but it was a price that was less than we put in, and it was because the facts had changed. Every investor needs a flow of promising investment ideas and a way to filter through them. Every investor has two constraints, capital and time. And time is really hard because you can squander it. If you spend your time looking at fully priced companies all day, you will have nothing to show for it. And so we believe that your best finding opportunity, one investment at a time, bottom up based on its valuation in the market compared to the underlying value you ascribe to it. Our search sometimes will focus on things that are getting killed. So we’ll literally focus on the new low list. What’s down a lot? Who just disappointed investors a great deal? But we also look for categories of things maybe organized by the reason they’re mispriced. So if companies who do spinoffs, companies who take a division, put it into a separate subsidiary and hand shares to shareholders, it might have a small market cap. It might not currently be.

[中文]

如果没有这个障碍，本可以更好地退出。于是我们把它卖掉了。我们损失了一笔不小的金额，但感觉比干坐着强。这是投资者需要具备的灵活性的一部分。我们的判断是，我们拿到了一个合理的价格，但这个价格低于我们的投入，因为事实已经发生了变化。每个投资者都需要源源不断的投资构想，以及一套筛选这些构想的方法。每个投资者都面临两个约束：资金和时间。时间真的很难把握，因为你可能会浪费掉它。如果你整天盯着那些价格已经充分反映价值的公司，最终将一无所获。因此我们相信，你最好的发现机会的方式，就是一次聚焦一项投资，自下而上地，基于它在市场中的估值与你赋予它的内在价值之间的比较。我们的搜索有时会聚焦于那些正在被疯狂抛售的标的。所以我们真的会去关注创新低的名单。哪些跌得很多？哪些刚刚让投资者大失所望？但我们也会按错误定价的原因来分类寻找机会。比如进行分拆的公司，那些把某个业务部门剥离出来，成立独立子公司并将股份分给股东的公司，它们的市值可能很小。目前可能确实不大。

Segment 17

[English]

It might have a small market cap. It might not currently be profitable, but might have future value or might have a private market value. Spinoffs are one category of potential opportunity that we track. There are numerous others, bankrupt bonds, stocks delisted from an exchange. Those are just a couple of examples. I want my inbox filled with the most off-the-beaten-path, idiosyncratic, privately negotiated stocks, bonds, whatever, and I want them being sold for a reason that isn’t everybody looks at it and everybody hates it. That might mean they’re wrong. But what I really like is this person has to sell by Friday because they have to get it off the books by quarter end. Or this person’s dumping this because they’re not able to foreclose and the foreclosure is going to go through over the weekend or whatever it might be. And so by finding categories of assets that are likely to be mispriced, we fill our inbox the most fruitful way possible. In the early days of Baupost, it was already clear to me how much markets had evolved over time. There were a handful of hedge funds. Baupost was even at $25 or $50 million under management was one of the larger. And in a short number of years, there were billion-dollar funds all over the place. Americans had greater wealth, more savings, and money piled into investing. The

[中文]

它可能市值很小，当前可能还不盈利，但可能具有未来价值，或者可能拥有私募市场价值。分拆上市是我们追踪的一类潜在机会，还有许多其他类别，比如破产债券、从交易所退市的股票。这些只是举几个例子。我希望我的收件箱里塞满最冷门、最独特的、私下协商交易的股票、债券等等，我希望它们被出售的原因不是因为所有人都看过了、所有人都讨厌它。那可能意味着他们错了。但我真正喜欢的是，这个人必须在周五前卖掉，因为他们要在季末把这笔资产从账上清掉。或者这个人正在抛售，是因为他们无法取消赎回权，而取消赎回权的手续会在周末完成，诸如此类的情况。因此，通过寻找那些很可能被错误定价的资产类别，我们以最有成效的方式填满我们的收件箱。在Baupost早期，我早已清楚市场随着时间发生了多大的演变。当时只有少数几家对冲基金。Baupost在管理规模只有2500万或5000万美元的时候，已经算是规模较大的了。短短几年间，到处都是管理规模达十亿美元的基金。美国人拥有了更多财富、更多储蓄，资金大量涌入投资领域。

Segment 18

[English]

And money piled into investing. The hedge fund industry eventually expanded into thousands of funds. Hedge funds were no longer idiosyncratic participants in the markets. They sometimes moved the markets. And some had become huge, trading frenetically and using large amounts of leverage. This made those funds vulnerable to the unexpected. Every stock down, even the biggest winners are down. This is obviously something that people could have foreseen, and it was foreseen. And the thing is that the patient had cancer for many years and nobody was doing a thing about it. I wish I could tell you that we saw something other people didn’t. I wish I could tell you that Baopo’s knew the market was going to collapse in 2008. And the truth is, we didn’t. But what we did do is we stuck to our knitting. We stuck to our discipline. And our discipline said, markets are very, very expensive. Valuations were high. Companies were performing exceptionally well, maybe better than they ever historically. And that caused us to reduce our investedness, caused us to hold some cash. And once the crash hit, it caught investors by surprise and many sold their shares amidst the sudden panic. But we held on. That’s one of the earliest lessons in the value investing playbook. That day saw the world…

[中文]

资金大量涌入投资领域。对冲基金行业最终扩展到数千只基金。对冲基金不再是市场中特立独行的参与者。它们有时甚至能左右市场。其中一些基金规模变得极其庞大，疯狂交易并大量使用杠杆。这使得这些基金在面对突发事件时极为脆弱。每只股票都在下跌，即使是那些最赚钱的股票也不例外。这显然是人们本可以预见的事情，而且确实有人预见到了。问题在于，这个病人患癌多年，却没有人采取任何措施。我希望我能告诉你，我们看到了别人没有看到的东西。我希望我能告诉你，Baopo’s预见到了2008年市场会崩溃。但事实是，我们没有。但我们确实做的是，我们坚守自己的原则。我们坚守我们的纪律。而我们的纪律告诉我们，市场非常非常昂贵。估值很高。企业的表现异常出色，甚至可能比历史上任何时候都好。这促使我们降低投资仓位，持有部分现金。当崩盘来袭时，投资者措手不及，许多人在突如其来的恐慌中抛售了手中的股票。但我们坚持了下来。这是价值投资手册中最早的教训之一。那一天，整个世界……

Segment 19

[English]

In the value investing playbook, that day saw the Wall Street crash. The idea of value investing was first written about by a guy named Benjamin Graham. Graham taught at Columbia, and in 1934, he teamed up with another professor, David Dodd, and they wrote a book called Security Analysis. Now remember, 1934 is five years into the Great Depression. It’s five years after the stock market crash in 1929. And they wrote Security Analysis, I think, with the bold idea that they were going to write about something not based on that moment in time, but based on what strategies might one follow all the time. I think that’s one of the hardest things in investing, is to stay focused that the moment you’re in isn’t the moment you’ll always be in. And so the challenge is for investors to understand not just their own investments, but also the bigger picture. It’s why history is so important. It’s why I have to think about where you might be in a cycle. In 2007, you could see that there were cracks already in the foundation, that the housing market had really started to stumble. Housing had become a major fuel in the economy. People were building an enormous number of homes, probably more than we really needed. Financing was very inexpensive and available. People didn’t need to show an ability to pay the interest in principle at all. People would put in to buy a condo.

[中文]

在价值投资的历史剧本中，那一天见证了华尔街的崩盘。价值投资的理念最早是由一位名叫本杰明·格雷厄姆的人提出的。格雷厄姆在哥伦比亚大学任教，1934年，他与另一位教授大卫·多德合作，合著了一本名为Security Analysis的书。请记住，1934年已经是大萧条的第五年了。距离1929年股市崩盘也已经过去了五年。他们撰写了Security Analysis，我认为，其大胆的想法在于，他们要写的不是基于那个特定时刻的东西，而是基于人们在任何时候都可以遵循的策略。我认为投资中最难做到的一点，就是保持专注，明白你所处的时刻不会永远持续下去。因此，挑战在于投资者不仅要了解自己的投资，还要了解更宏观的格局。这就是为什么历史如此重要。这就是为什么我必须思考你可能处于周期的哪个阶段。在2007年，你就能看到根基已经出现了裂缝，房地产市场确实已经开始步履蹒跚。住房已经成为经济的主要燃料。人们建造了数量庞大的房屋，可能远远超出了我们实际的需求。融资成本非常低廉，而且很容易获得。人们根本不需要证明自己有能力偿还利息。人们只需提交申请就能买下一套公寓。

Segment 20

[English]

Principle at all. People would put in to buy a condo before it was built, not with the expectation of living there, but with the expectation that they’d sell it for a gain. And so when housing started to go down, it seemed pretty clear that one of the foundations of the boom maybe was leaving, and yet the market didn’t teeter. People say, well, if it’s grown well for three or four years, why won’t that continue? Almost just naively looking past the historical precedent that things don’t grow forever. While we knew there was a growing mania in financial assets and even in home prices, we stayed disciplined, willing to miss out on some possible upside to avoid the reckoning that seemed likely to come. One of the ways you get a margin of safety is not just investment by investment, but it’s also how you behave, how you run the whole portfolio. You know, one of the ironies of Benjamin Graham’s career is that even though he was an incredible value investor and taught the world about the subject, occasionally he got impatient, and I think he leveraged up twice in his life and almost went broke. I have too much of an aversion to that. So I set guardrails for myself and my firm. One guardrail that we have is portfolio diversification, that you might have an exceptionally attractive investment, but humans can be wrong, and you always have to have the knowledge you could be wrong. So we’re always…

[中文]

原则至上。人们在房子还没建好之前就掏钱买房，不是为了自住，而是期望转手赚一笔。所以当房地产市场开始下滑时，很明显，繁荣的根基之一可能正在动摇，但市场并没有摇摇欲坠。人们会说，既然已经连续三四年涨得很好，为什么不会继续涨下去呢？这几乎就是天真地忽视了历史教训——没有什么是永远上涨的。虽然我们知道金融资产甚至房价中正在滋生越来越大的泡沫，但我们始终保持纪律，宁可错过一些可能的上涨空间，也不愿承受似乎即将到来的清算。获得安全边际的方法不仅仅是每一笔投资本身，还在于你的行为方式，在于你如何管理整个投资组合。你知道，本杰明·格雷厄姆职业生涯中有一个讽刺之处：尽管他是一位杰出的价值投资者，并且教会了世人价值投资的理念，但他偶尔也会失去耐心，我想他一生中加了两次杠杆，差点破产。我对那种情况有着太深的厌恶。所以我和我的公司给自己设定了护栏。我们的一条护栏就是投资组合分散化——你可能遇到一笔极具吸引力的投资，但人都会犯错，你必须始终认识到自己可能会犯错。所以我们总是……

Segment 21

[English]

Always have to have the knowledge you could be wrong. So we’re always balancing the pull to own more of great ideas with the risk of owning too concentrated a portfolio. And not only is concentration name by name, but it’s sector by sector. If bottom up, you find that financials are extremely compelling. You probably still don’t want a third or half of your money in bank stocks because they’re too concentrated. When things happen at the sector, they all tend to move somewhat in tandem. And that would be a source of introducing risk into the portfolio. We navigated through the financial crisis of 2008 without major losses because we went into it with a diversified portfolio that included stocks, bonds, private investments, and cash, and we were able to play offense as prices fell and fell. Another guardrail is not using recourse leverage on the portfolio. That is whether an investor would ever use borrowed money. An investor that takes out margin loans that, in effect, are leveraging the portfolio, that investor will have the benefit of leverage. You’ll make more if you’re right because that’s what leverage does. But leverage also magnifies the downside if you’re wrong. And so one way to lose your margin of safety is to get greedy. It’s like you can still drown in a pond that on average is one foot deep because you might step off the wrong point. And the leverage gets you just at the wrong moment, just when the market is terrible, when something unexpected has happened in the world. And if you’re forced to sell things that are down a lot,

[中文]

始终要怀有"自己可能会犯错"的认知。因此，我们始终在两种力量之间寻求平衡：一方面是想要多持有优秀投资标的的冲动，另一方面则是持仓过于集中的风险。这种集中不仅体现在个股层面，也体现在行业层面。如果你自下而上地研究，发现金融股极具吸引力，你可能仍然不希望把三分之一甚至一半的资金都投入银行股，因为那样太集中了。当某个行业层面发生事件时，该行业的所有股票往往都会在一定程度上同步波动。这就会成为投资组合中引入风险的来源。我们在2008年金融危机中安然度过、没有遭受重大损失，是因为危机到来时我们的投资组合已经实现了多元化，涵盖了股票、债券、私募投资和现金，而且我们能够在价格不断下跌时采取进攻性操作。

另一条护栏是不对投资组合使用追索杠杆。也就是说，投资者是否应该使用借来的资金。投资者如果取出保证金贷款，实际上就是在给投资组合加杠杆，这样的投资者会享受到杠杆带来的好处——如果你判断正确，你会赚得更多，因为杠杆的作用就在于此。但如果你判断错误，杠杆也会放大亏损。因此，丧失安全边际的一种方式就是贪婪。这就好比，一个平均只有一英尺深的池塘仍然可以淹死人，因为你可能会踩到最深的那个点。而杠杆恰恰在最糟糕的时刻发挥作用——市场极度低迷、世界上发生了意想不到的事情。如果你被迫大量抛售已经大幅下跌的资产，

Segment 22

[English]

If you’re forced to sell things that are down a lot at a terrible time, at a minimum, you might go broke. But even if you don’t, you’re giving up great opportunities at bargain prices. The key in investing, I think, is to always be in a position when things are really attractive in the market that you have an ability to buy into that and take advantage of even more egregious mispricings than might be there most of the time. Because we’d remained disciplined during the boom, we’re able to safely navigate the crash. And we could deploy capital at great prices going into what became extreme selling and extreme bargain levels for some securities in the worst of 2008, 2009. Human tendency is people tend to project based on lived experience. If you’re the turkey and you’re two years and 11 months old, you don’t realize that Thanksgiving is next month. Anybody that came into investing in the last 12 years has never really seen stocks go down. We’ve had these extreme bull market conditions. The Federal Reserve lowered interest rates to virtually zero and kept them there really since 2009 all the way through 2021. They’ve never been that low for that long. And anybody that came into investing in the last 12 years didn’t understand that that was not normal, that rates someday would normalize. And there are deep fundamental reasons why interest rates can’t be at 0% forever. In the current cycle,

[中文]

如果你被迫在糟糕的时机大幅抛售已经严重贬值的资产，最坏的情况是你可能会破产。但即使你没有破产，你也正在放弃以极低价格买入的绝佳机会。我认为投资的关键在于，当市场上出现真正具有吸引力的机会时，你始终处于能够买入并利用那些比平时更加严重的错误定价的有利位置。因为我们在繁荣时期保持了纪律性，所以我们能够安全度过崩盘。而且我们能够在2008年、2009年最糟糕的时候，以极佳的价位配置资金，当时一些证券出现了极端抛售和极低的折价水平。人性的倾向是人们往往会根据自身经验来推演未来。如果你是一只火鸡，你已经活了两年零十一个月，你不会意识到感恩节就在下个月。任何在过去十二年中进入投资市场的人，从未真正见过股市下跌。我们经历了这些极端的牛市环境。美联储将利率降至几乎零水平，并且从2009年一直到2021年都维持在极低水平。利率从未在如此长的时间内处于如此低的水平。任何在过去十二年中进入投资市场的人都不理解那是不正常的，利率终有一天会回归正常。而且利率不可能永远维持在零水平，这有着深层次的根本原因。在当前周期中，

Segment 23

[English]

Can’t be at zero percent forever. In the current cycle, you have a sudden emergence of inflation after a really long period, several decades, without much inflation. Why? I think you can make the case that rates were just held too low, and that led to an incredible amount of speculative activity. And then, with mailed out money to people after the pandemic, you fueled an economic boom, and the low rates furthered that boom but that, in this case, triggered a really significant upsurge in inflation. And the way to deal with that was to raise rates pretty abruptly. And doing that ended the bull market of 2021. And if you’re an investor that’s never seen anything bad, you may not understand it. You can read about it in books. And if you have a good imagination, you can at least start to ask, wow, I wonder if we’re in a period like the lead up to 1929 or the lead up to other bubbly eras and whether we might be in for a bit of a reckoning. What might happen if things simply normalize? And what might happen if things actually don’t just normalize but overshoot, which is the tendency? And so I think understanding financial history and U.S. and world history have been absolutely fundamental to my growth as an investor and my ability to navigate differing conditions. But history won’t give you all the answers. Sometimes you need to take a step back and look inward.

[中文]

不可能永远维持在零利率。在当前这个周期中，经历了相当长一段时期——几十年——通胀一直很低，之后却突然出现了通胀。为什么呢？我认为你可以提出这样的论点：利率被压得太低了，这导致了海量的投机活动。然后，疫情之后向民众直接发放资金，又助长了经济繁荣，而低利率进一步推动了这场繁荣，但在这种情况下，却引发了通胀的大幅飙升。应对之道就是相当急剧地加息。这样做终结了2021年的牛市。如果你是一个从未见过任何糟糕局面的投资者，你可能无法理解这一切。你可以在书中读到相关内容。如果你有丰富的想象力，至少可以开始思考，哇，我想知道我们是否正处在类似1929年之前的时期，或者其他泡沫时代的前奏，以及我们是否会面临某种清算。如果一切只是回归常态，会发生什么？而如果事情不仅仅是回归常态，而是像惯常那样矫枉过正，又会发生什么？所以我认为，理解金融史和美国及世界历史，对我的投资者成长以及我在不同环境中把握方向的能力，绝对是至关重要的基础。但历史并不能给你所有的答案。有时候你需要退后一步，向内审视自己。

Segment 24

[English]

And look inward. Some people have asked me, do you ever think you’ve got investing all figured out? I don’t think that’s possible, that I never think I have investing figured out, that I feel lucky if I figure it out one thing at a time. If you ever start thinking you’ve got it solved, you know it all, you’re really asking for trouble. The way I think about investing, and especially because I see it as significantly a psychological endeavor, there are a lot of dualities that come to play. So one is the duality between confidence and doubt. To buy anything, you need to develop a degree of confidence that you’re going to be right. And you need to temper that with the requisite doubt that, but I still know I might be wrong. What would make me wrong? Why might I be wrong? How is it going to feel if I’m wrong? How much am I going to lose if I’m wrong? And I think similar with arrogance and humility. Investing, as I see it, is an arrogant act. You’re saying, I know more than the other participants in the market at this moment. They’re all trying to make money. They’re all applying computer models and financial models and work and discipline. They’re all smart. They’re all hardworking. That’s table stakes in investing. And so it’s arrogant to say, I figured something out that no one else really has seen. I can’t tell you how many times over the years, over months,

[中文]

向内审视。有人问过你，你是否曾觉得自己已经完全搞懂了投资？我觉得那是不可能的，我从来不觉得自己已经搞懂了投资，如果我能一次搞明白一件事，就觉得非常幸运了。如果你开始觉得自己已经全部搞明白了，什么都知道了，那你真的是在自找麻烦。我看待投资的方式——尤其是因为我认为投资在很大程度上是一种心理活动——有很多对立的矛盾在起作用。其中一个矛盾就是自信与怀疑之间的对立。要买任何东西，你需要建立一定程度的自信，相信自己会是对的。同时你又需要用必要的怀疑来调和这种自信，但我仍然知道我可能会错。什么会让我错？我为什么会错？如果我错了会是什么感觉？如果我错了会损失多少？我觉得傲慢与谦逊之间也是如此。在我看来，投资是一种傲慢的行为。你在说，此刻我比市场上的其他参与者懂得更多。他们都在努力赚钱，都在运用计算机模型和金融模型，都在努力和自律。他们都很聪明，都很勤奋。这些都是投资的基本门槛。所以说，声称自己发现了别人没有真正看到的东西，是一种傲慢。这么多年来，这么多个年头，多少个岁月，

Segment 25

[English]

I can’t tell you how many times over the years, over many years, people have said to me, you know, Seth, we’re convinced that this company or this country are about to become insolvent. They’re about to file for bankruptcy. And I can’t tell you how many times, which is nearly all of them, when that didn’t happen. People have a way of muddling through. Circumstances have a way of changing. Managements have a lot of levers at their control. Maybe it looks like they’re going to file for bankruptcy, but then they get an injection of private capital, or they’re able to convince the bondholders to extend to maturity, and all of a sudden there is no bankruptcy. And so the humility is the ability to keep asking yourself the question, but what don’t I see? What do they see that I don’t see? What might it be missing? How might it be wrong? So I think one of the challenges of an investor all the time is to avoid the conceit that you know things that can’t be known, or you know more than you know. Technological disruption was an idea by Harvard Business School professor Clay Christensen, and the idea was simply, once a change was possible, once a new technology existed, you might as well implement it, even if it meant cannibalizing your existing business, because if you didn’t do it, someone else would. The technology itself caused an existing business model.

[中文]

这些年来，真的记不清有多少次了，人们跟我说，你知道的，Seth，我们确信这家公司或者这个国家快要资不抵债了。他们快要申请破产了。而我也记不清有多少次——几乎是所有这些情况——最终并没有走到那一步。人们总有办法勉强渡过难关。形势总会发生变化。管理层手中其实有很多调控手段。也许当时看起来他们似乎要申请破产了，但后来他们获得了一笔私人资本的注入，或者他们成功说服了债券持有人延长债务期限，突然间，破产就消失了。所以，谦逊就是不断地问自己这样一个问题：但我没看到的是什么？他们看到了什么是我没看到的？我可能遗漏了什么？我可能在哪里犯了错？所以我认为，投资者始终面临的一个挑战就是避免这样一种自负——去相信你能知道那些根本无法知道的事情，或者以为自己知道的比实际知道的更多。“Technological disruption”（技术颠覆）这个概念是由哈佛商学院教授Clay Christensen提出的，其核心思想很简单：一旦某种变革成为可能，一旦新技术已经存在，你就不妨去实施它，即便这意味着蚕食你现有的业务，因为如果你不这么做，别人也会。技术本身就会颠覆现有的商业模式。

Segment 26

[English]

Itself caused an existing business model to no longer make sense. When I think about Benjamin Graham writing in the 1930s, he was talking largely about economies that had reversion to the mean, that you went through cyclical forces. The Depression obviously was an extreme downward movement. But when he was writing, he talked about the confidence he had that that was temporary and that you’d once again have a growing economy. And that makes sense. But Benjamin Graham was writing at a time of steam railroads crisscrossing the landscape, delivering goods and crops. And today you have a much different idea of people sitting at their desks exchanging information. Business is in some ways much more complicated now. It’s become global. Whatever principles you wrote down in the 1930s obviously don’t fully apply. And so a big part of investing is, I think, finding a way for value investing to be a living organism. And in this era of technological disruption, a lot of companies are under tremendous pressure, are obsoleting faster than before. I like to say melting ice cubes are melting faster than they used to, kind of like a financial climate change. And that means that the economy is no longer just about cyclical change.

[中文]

这本身就使得一种既有商业模式不再合情合理。当我想到本杰明·格雷厄姆在20世纪30年代的著作时，他讨论的主要是那些具有均值回归特征的经济体，即经济会经历周期性的力量。大萧条显然是一次极端的下行运动。但在他写作的时候，他曾谈到自己有信心认为那只是暂时的，经济终将再次增长。这说得通。但本杰明·格雷厄姆写作的那个时代，蒸汽铁路纵横交错地穿越大地，运送着货物和农作物。而今天，人们对商业的理解已经大不相同——人们坐在办公桌前交换信息。商业在很多方面变得比过去复杂得多，已经走向全球化。你在20世纪30年代写下的那些原则，显然已经不能完全适用了。因此，投资的很大一部分，我认为，就是找到一种方式让价值投资成为一个有机的、不断演进的生命体。在这个技术颠覆的时代，许多公司正承受着巨大的压力，被淘汰的速度比以往更快。我喜欢打个比方说，冰块融化得比以前更快了，有点像金融领域的气候变化。这意味着经济不再仅仅是周期性的变化。

Segment 27

[English]

That the economy is no longer just about cyclical change. Ben Graham wrote knowing that, that there was no single thing that would produce great results, but rather a way of thinking. So the key is to always be bottom-up evaluating companies, understanding their business models, but also the pressures on them from external forces like competition and like the technological change. The way I think about it, a company either produces technology, it uses technology or it is vulnerable to the technology that someone else will adopt that will eat its lunch. You need to be thinking about what is going on that is going to make your business either stronger and has it might have a deeper moat that you can build or might be more vulnerable than ever and you want to be really careful whether to be involved at all. I’m convinced that if machines took over and if all you had was computer programmed trading and AI dominating the markets, I still think an individual applying value principles might be able to work their way around all of that and actually find possibly even greater mispricings. Maybe that will prove to be wrong, but that’s my perspective is that because it’s evolving, because it’s responsive to changes in the ecosystem, that I think value investing will always have a place. In 1916,

[中文]

经济不再仅仅是周期性的变化。本·格雷厄姆在写作时就深知这一点——没有任何单一的东西能够带来卓越的成果，而是一种思维方式。因此，关键是要始终自下而上地评估公司，理解它们的商业模式，同时也要了解它们面临的来自外部力量的压力，比如竞争和技术变革。在我看来，一家公司要么生产技术，要么使用技术，要么容易受到他人所采用的技术的冲击，从而丢掉自己的饭碗。你需要思考正在发生什么，什么会让你的业务变得更强大、可能拥有更深的护城河可以构建，或者可能比以往任何时候都更脆弱，你需要非常谨慎地考虑是否要参与其中。我深信，即使机器接管了一切，即使市场上只剩下计算机程序化交易和人工智能主导，我仍然认为，个人运用价值投资原则或许能够绕过这一切，甚至可能发现更大的错误定价。也许这会被证明是错误的，但我的观点是，正因为它在不断进化，正因为它对生态系统的变化做出反应，我认为价值投资将永远有一席之地。1916年，

Segment 28

[English]

In 1991, I published a book about investing called Margin of Safety. I’d spent a couple of years in spare time, nights and weekends, writing what I already was employing as my philosophy and sold some copies, although it pretty quickly went out of print. And it somehow lingers with a bit of a cult following. I’m kind of proud of that because I tried to write a book that would be timeless, kind of like Benjamin Graham, that you wouldn’t always be in an era where what you’re doing that moment made sense, but your general principles make sense. If I were to rewrite Margin of Safety or expand on it, there’d be a number of things I’d want to cover. I was 10 years into my career then. I’m 40 years into my career now, so hopefully I know a lot more. And markets have changed a lot. I would focus on global investing and not just on investing in the U.S. I’d have more extensive information, which I think isn’t really covered at all, on private investments, on real estate, on private equity. But I think possibly a crucial addition would be the importance of keeping your composure at the worst moments, which essentially means behaving a certain way all the time so that you know that if the world suddenly got a little bit unmoored, that it wouldn’t throw you off keel and you’d be able to take advantage. Think about the baseball relief pitcher who comes into the game and the team is up and they give up the game-winning home run and their team loses. If

[中文]

1991年，我出版了一本关于投资的书，叫做《安全边际》。我花了几年的业余时间，利用晚上和周末来写这本书，内容是我当时已经在实践的投资理念。书卖了一些副本，但很快就绝版了。不过不知为何，这本书还是留下了一批忠实读者。我对此颇为自豪，因为我试图写一本经得起时间考验的书，就像本杰明·格雷厄姆那样——你不会总是处于一个让你当下的做法看起来合情合理的时代，但你的总体原则是站得住脚的。如果让我重写或扩展《安全边际》，我会加入很多内容。当时我从业才十年，而现在已经从业四十年了，所以希望我懂得更多了。而且市场也发生了很大变化。我会关注全球投资，而不仅仅是美国投资。我会加入更详尽的信息，我认为现有内容完全没有涵盖的，比如私人投资、房地产、私募股权。但我认为可能一个至关重要的补充是：在最糟糕的时刻保持冷静的重要性，这本质上意味着你要始终以某种方式行事，这样你就知道，如果世界突然变得有些失控，它不会让你偏离航向，而你能够从中获益。想想棒球比赛中的后援投手，他上场时球队领先，结果被击出再见本垒打，球队输了。如果

Segment 29

[English]

Home run and their team loses. If you’re that pitcher, how do you go about pitching tomorrow? Obviously you think about is there anything different you could do executing, but you need to put that out of your head. If you’re still thinking about that when you’re on the mound tomorrow in another game-winning situation and it’s getting to you, you’re probably going to screw up again. You’re going to let the past mistake affect your future and therefore make you maybe make more mistakes. And that’s humbling and it’s a great experience that life is humbling, that inevitably you make investments and they go down a lot the day after you buy them. But the key to adversity is picking yourself back up and knowing that your knowledge and expertise has gotten deeper and your discipline and hard work will pay off.

[中文]

打出全垒打，而你的球队输了。如果你是那个投手，明天你该怎么投球？你首先想到的显然是自己执行上是不是有什么地方可以做得不同，但你必须把这些想法抛到脑后。如果明天你站在投手丘上，又一次面临决定胜负的局面，而你还在想着昨天的事、被它所困扰，你很可能又会搞砸。你会让过去的错误影响未来，结果可能犯下更多的错误。这让人学会谦卑，也是一次很棒的经历——生活本来就是谦卑的，你不可避免地会买入投资标的，结果第二天就大幅下跌。但面对逆境的关键在于重新振作起来，要明白你的知识和经验已经变得更加深厚，你的纪律和努力终将得到回报。

来源：要提前退休的小钢子-Ray Dalio 大师课 第4集（via bilibili-auto-transcript skill）

Source: MasterClass - Ray Dalio on Winning the Long Game by Managing Risk (via bilibili-auto-transcript skill)