第1集：Ray Dalio 大师课——让市场为你工作（Make the Markets Work for You）

视频信息

• 标题：Ray Dalio 大师课 第1集：让市场为你工作
• BV号：BV1QA4m137u4
• 分集 Part：p2（第1集，44分29秒）
• 作者：要提前退休的小钢子
• 发布于：2024-02-20
• 原始链接：B站视频
• 同合集：本系列共 6 集，本篇为 第1集；其他集见博客标签 Ray Dalio 大师课 或目录
• 语言：英语（English speech）+ 中文字幕 / 本博客为中英双语转录（Chinese + English bilingual transcript）

转录说明

• 转录工具：
  • 英文转录：Groq Whisper large-v3（language=en）
  • 英文标点修复：LongCat-2.0-Preview
  • 中文翻译：LongCat-2.0-Preview（保留数字 / 公司名 / 品牌 / 人名）
  • 分集状态：✓ 完整（44分29秒）
• 质量说明：音频为纯英语，按"中英双语"规范发布；保留所有专有名词（人名 / 公司名 / 品牌 / 数字）。
• 段落切分：按 90s 音频切片 + 3s overlap 自动切分，每段先英文后中文逐段对照。

视频摘要

核心要点

1. 家庭影响塑造投资思维：父亲是爵士乐手（音乐 + 即兴 + 共鸣），母亲是家庭主妇，8 岁在报纸上发现股票报价数字，从此进入市场。
2. 1971 年 8 月 15 日是转折点：尼克松宣布美元与黄金脱钩，Ray 当晚意识到货币体系崩溃，开始追溯 1933 年罗斯福的同类型操作。
3. 1982 年预测失误是最大教训：他预测将爆发"债务危机"，结果市场反弹 22%，一夜破产，靠向父亲借 $4,000 交税。
4. 核心公式：pain + reflection = progress：痛苦 + 反省 = 进步。这是他 1982 年经历提炼出的最重要原则。
5. 决策 5 步流程：明确目标 → 发现问题 → 诊断原因 → 设计方案 → 执行落地。
6. 原则是算法，不是习惯：把决策规则写下来 → 写进电脑 → 算法在毫秒级执行决策 = Bridgewater 的"电子游戏系统"。
7. McDonald’s 鸡肉套保案例：通过买入玉米/豆粕期货对冲鸡肉价格，帮 McNuggets 锁定成本。
8. 5 个力量决定市场走向：债务增长 / 货币贬值 / 内部财富 / 价值观冲突 / 国际秩序。
9. “安全要素"是投资第一原则：先问"我需要多少钱才能承受失业/亏损”，留出 2 倍缓冲，再决定如何"玩游戏"。
10. “知道不知道"是 Alpha 真正来源：识别自己不懂什么，比证明自己懂什么更稀缺。

视频全文转录（中英双语）

以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。按 90s 音频切片 + 3s overlap 切分。

Segment 1

[English]

Investing is knowing how to value a business, research and timing, psychological endeavor. Investing without knowing what you’re looking for is like running through a dynamite factory with a burning match. There’s a very, very dangerous jungle out there. How do I successfully cross the jungle? There are thousands of different approaches to investing. There’s no formula anybody can give. It’s not like the Colonel’s secret recipe. If you’re a self-starter and you work really hard, you can make a difference. What knocks people out is the risk of ruin. In other words, it’s that one time that gets you. In the early 80s, I made one of the biggest bets of my career, and I couldn’t have been more wrong. I lost money for me. I lost money for my clients. I was so broke that I had to borrow $4,000 from my dad in order to pay for my family bills. And this was

[中文]

投资就是懂得如何评估一家企业，研究、把握时机，以及驾驭心理层面的挑战。不知道自己在寻找什么就去投资，就像拿着一根点燃的火柴跑过炸药厂一样危险。外面的世界是一片极其凶险的丛林。我该如何成功穿越这片丛林？投资有成千上万种不同的方法。没有人能给你一个现成的公式，这不像肯德基上校的秘制配方。如果你是一个自我驱动力很强的人，并且真的非常努力，你就能脱颖而出。真正击垮人们的是毁灭性风险。换句话说，就是那一次让你万劫不复的失误。在80年代初，我下了职业生涯中最大的一次赌注，结果我错得一塌糊涂。我赔了自己的钱，也赔了客户的钱。我当时穷困潦倒，不得不向我父亲借了$4,000来支付家庭账单。而这就是

Segment 2

[English]

For my family bills. And this was a very painful experience. And yet, it was probably one of the best experiences that happened to me, because it changed my way of thinking. There’s always a path. You don’t know what the path is. And then you will, along the way, run into obstacles. And you don’t know what those obstacles are, and you do not know how you’re going to get around those obstacles, your goal is to keep moving in the direction and you will find the best path. I don’t think that I’m in any way intrinsically better or more capable than most people. I think my approach to pain, mistakes, and weaknesses is a differentiating characteristic. To learn from the pain, to accept the realities, and to then engineer strategies that take me through it are things that I think almost anybody could adopt. But you discover along the way, you find the way. I’m Ray Dalio. I’m the founder of Bridgewater Associates, who took it from a two-bedroom apartment to being the largest hedge fund in the world. I’m a global macro investor. I’m a student of history, patterns, and change.

[中文]

为了支付家庭账单。那是一段非常痛苦的经历。然而，这大概也是发生在我身上的最好的经历之一，因为它改变了我的思维方式。总有一条路。你不知道这条路是什么。然后，沿途你会遇到障碍。你不知道那些障碍是什么，也不知道你将如何绕过那些障碍，你的目标就是继续朝着那个方向前进，你终会找到最好的道路。我不认为自己在任何方面天生就比大多数人更优秀或更有能力。我认为我对待痛苦、错误和弱点的方式是一个与众不同的特点。从痛苦中学习，接受现实，然后制定策略走出困境——我认为几乎任何人都可以采用这些方法。但你会在前行的过程中，找到那条路。我是瑞·达利欧。我是Bridgewater Associates的创始人，将它从一套两居室公寓发展成为全球最大的对冲基金。我是一名全球宏观投资者。我研究历史、规律与变化。

Segment 3

[English]

Of history, patterns, and change. Changes in the overall environment, typically brought about by monetary policy changes that affect everything. They affect the interest rates, and through the interest rates and the tightness of money, they affect asset prices, they affect growth rates, they affect everything. That’s macro investing. When it comes to investing, I think that there’s kind of a lateral creative thinking process that is going on in my mind. My mind works in a certain way. Now I don’t know how much of that’s genetic, how much of that it’s environmental, but my dad was a jazz musician. He played woodwinds, clarinet, flute, sax. There’s a certain vibe that comes from jazz, which has this improvisation to it, and I think that that played a role. Back then, I used to do jobs. I would deliver papers, shovel driveways from snow, and then I caddied. And so when I was caddying in the 1960s, the stock market was hot. Everybody was talking about stocks. And so the people I was caddying with would talk about stocks. I got into stocks. I took my caddying money. I would earn $6,000.

[中文]

历史、模式与变化。整体环境的变化通常由货币政策变动所引发，而货币政策会影响一切。它影响利率，并通过利率和货币的松紧程度，影响资产价格，影响增长率，影响一切。这就是宏观投资。谈到投资时，我认为我脑海中有一种横向的创造性思维方式在运作。我的大脑以某种方式工作。我不知道其中有多少是天生的，有多少是受环境影响，但我父亲是一位爵士音乐家。他演奏木管乐器——单簧管、长笛、萨克斯。爵士乐有一种独特的氛围，其中包含即兴创作的元素，我认为这对我产生了影响。那时候，我做过各种工作。我送过报纸，铲过车道上的雪，后来还当过球童。在20世纪60年代我当球童的时候，股市很热。所有人都在谈论股票。和我一起当球童的人也会聊股票。就这样，我开始接触股票。我用当球童赚的钱——当时能赚到6,000美元——买了股票。

Segment 4

[English]

I took my caddying money. I would earn $6 a bag. I’d carry two bags. And when I got 50 bucks, I would put it into the markets. Then I got hooked on the game. My first investment was the only company that I ever heard of that was selling for less than $5 a share. That was my investment criteria because I figured I could buy more shares, and if it went up, I’d make more money. Of course, that was a naive, stupid strategy, but I got lucky. The company was about to go broke, and some other company acquired it, and it tripled. And so I figured, this game is easy, and I like the game. But of course, you know, I learned with time, this game is anything but easy. So I graduated high school in 1967, and then 1968 the Beatles went to India to learn meditation, and then I decided that I was going to learn Transcendental Meditation in New York. Brought my little flowers and all that, and I learned meditation. And that was transformative because it has given me the equanimity, the centeredness, mental centeredness, so that whatever’s coming at me, I,

[中文]

我拿着当球童赚的钱。每背一个包能赚6美元，我会背两个包。等我攒到50块钱，就投进市场。然后我就迷上了这个游戏。我的第一笔投资是我听说过的唯一一家股价低于5美元的公司。那就是我的投资标准，因为我觉得这样可以买到更多股票，如果涨了，就能赚更多钱。当然，那是一个天真、愚蠢的策略，但我运气不错。那家公司当时快倒闭了，后来被另一家公司的收购了，股价涨了三倍。于是我就觉得，这游戏真简单，而且我喜欢这个游戏。但当然，你知道的，随着时间推移我渐渐明白，这游戏一点都不简单。1967年我高中毕业。到了1968年，The Beatles去了印度学习冥想，于是我决定去纽约学习Transcendental Meditation。带着我那些小花什么的，我学会了冥想。那是一次蜕变，因为它赋予了我平和的心态，一种内心的安定，无论遇到什么事，我都能——

Segment 5

[English]

So that whatever’s coming at me, I can calmly approach. For example, one of my first lessons in macro investing happened on August 15th, 1971. I was clerking on the floor of the stock exchange and I was following the markets. And then on Sunday night, Richard Nixon gets on the television and announces that no longer would he let you turn in your paper money for gold. “I have directed Secretary Connolly to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into gold or other reserve assets.” Back then, gold was considered money in the world, and that dollars, paper money, was considered like a check that you could turn in for gold. The United States started to print a lot of money to pay for the Vietnam War, social programs, and so on, and it started to run out of gold. In other words, on August 15, 1971, money as we knew it ceased to exist. And I walked onto the stock exchange floor the next morning, and I thought it was going to go down a lot because I understood what was happening. And it went up a lot, the most in decades. And so I was shocked. And so I did research and I found

[中文]

这样无论遇到什么事，我都能从容应对。例如，我在宏观投资领域最早的一堂课发生在1971年8月15日。当时我在股票交易所大厅做场内书记员，关注着市场动态。然后在那个周日晚上的电视上，理查德·尼克松宣布，美国不再允许人们用纸币兑换黄金。我已指示康纳利部长暂时中止美元兑换黄金或其他储备资产。在当时，黄金被视为世界上的货币，而美元这种纸币，被认为就像一张可以兑换成黄金的支票。美国开始大量印钞来支付越战、社会福利项目等开支，结果黄金储备开始告急。换句话说，在1971年8月15日，我们此前所认知的货币不复存在了。第二天早上我走进股票交易所大厅，心想股市肯定会大跌，因为我理解正在发生什么。结果股市却大涨，涨幅创下了几十年之最。我因此大为震惊。于是我做了研究，发现

Segment 6

[English]

And so I did research, and I found that the exact same thing happened on March 5, 1933 with Roosevelt, and that that printing of money and the making money loosely available was then the reason the stock market went up, because really the value of money went down. And so that was an epiphany. It made me a macro investor. And I had a realization. The same thing happens over and over again throughout history. And so one has to understand the cause-effect relationships. So I needed to go back and study periods like the Great Depression and so on to really understand history beyond my lifetime, before my lifetime, in order to understand what I was dealing with. And out of that, I formed one of my first investing principles. Reality works as reality works, and you have to know how it really works, and so by knowing those cause-effect relationships, I could see it as a perpetual motion machine, and I don’t mean it just a physical machine, you know, but I mean every dimension: what a person is like, what they think, what their strengths and weaknesses is, how they work together with other people, how changes in monetary policy or changes in inventiveness, and all of those things.

[中文]

于是我做了研究，我发现同样的事情在1933年3月5日罗斯福身上也发生过，当时印钞和让资金宽松地流通正是股市上涨的原因，因为实际上是货币的价值下降了。这对我来说是一个顿悟。它让我成为了一名宏观投资者。我有了一个认识：同样的事情在历史上一遍又一遍地发生。因此，一个人必须理解因果关系。所以我需要回去研究像大萧条这样的时期，真正了解超出我生命跨度之前的那些历史，以便理解我所面对的是什么。从中，我形成了自己最早的投资原则之一。现实就是按照现实本身的方式运作的，你必须了解它究竟是如何运作的，而通过了解这些因果关系，我能够把它看作一台永动机——我指的不仅仅是物理意义上的机器，而是指每一个维度：一个人是什么样的，他们怎么想，他们的优点和缺点是什么，他们如何与其他人协作，货币政策的变化或创造力的变化，以及所有这一切。

Segment 7

[English]

Or changes in inventiveness and all of those things. They are all cause-effect relationships that create a fairly complex machine. And I realized that the only way that I could succeed was understanding how reality works as a machine. And that way of thinking made my career and my life work a whole lot better. I went from clerking on the floor of the Stock Exchange to Harvard Business School. I graduated in 1973, the year of the oil shock. 1973 dramatized U.S. dependence on foreign oil. Stock market went down a lot. Commodities went up a lot. And in my summer job, I had worked as an assistant to the director of commodities, worrying about prices of things like fuel, corn, soybeans, and just about everything. And then I went to another firm, Shearson Hayden Stone. I was in charge of institutional commodities, which basically meant hedging. I was rowdy at the time, and I, New Year’s Eve, got into a fight with my boss. We had too much to drink and it ended up where I decked him and I also

[中文]

或者创造力的变化以及所有那些东西。它们都是因果关系，共同构成了一台相当复杂的机器。而我意识到，我唯一能够成功的方式，就是理解现实是如何像一台机器那样运作的。这种思维方式让我的事业和生活都变得好得多。我从在证券交易所大厅做文书工作一路走到了哈佛商学院。我于1973年毕业，那一年正好赶上石油危机。1973年的石油危机戏剧性地暴露了美国对外国石油的依赖。股市大幅下跌。大宗商品价格大幅上涨。在我暑期实习期间，我曾担任大宗商品总监的助理，整天为燃料、玉米、大豆等几乎所有商品的价格忧心忡然。之后我去了另一家公司——Shearson Hayden Stone。我负责机构大宗商品业务，基本上就是对冲交易。那时候我很莽撞，有一年除夕夜，我和老板打了起来。我们都喝多了，最后我给了他一拳，而且

Segment 8

[English]

I ended up where I decked him, and I also did some other rowdy things, and it was clear to them that I wasn’t necessarily the best employee and the model employee in the way that they wanted, and clear to me that, you know, doing things on my own might be a better path. So I got fired, and then I found that clients of this firm, they wanted to continue to get my input, and so I provided my input and I played markets, and that was the beginning of Bridgewater. As I said, I was dealing with commodity hedging, and then in the 70s, McDonald’s became a client of ours, and I also had the largest chicken producer in the country as a client of ours. McDonald’s wanted to make chicken McNuggets, but was worried because of the volatility in the markets that if they set a price for those chicken McNuggets and the price changed, that they would have to change the menu price and there would be a problem. I’m dealing with the mechanics of how do you make a chicken, and then at the same time we have the printing of a lot of money because they go off the gold standard, and then you have the oil shock of 1973. Oil prices rise, inflation prices rise, and that swamps everything.

[中文]

最后我揍了他，还干了一些其他出格的事，他们显然看得出来，我并不是他们想要的那种好员工、模范员工，而我也清楚地意识到，走自己的路或许才是更好的选择。于是我被解雇了，后来我发现这家公司的客户还想继续听取我的意见，我就继续提供建议，做市场交易，这就是 Bridgewater 的开端。正如我之前所说，我当时做的是大宗商品对冲，到了70年代，McDonald’s 成了我们的客户，全国最大的鸡肉生产商也成了我们的客户。McDonald’s 想要推出麦乐鸡，但又担心市场波动——如果他们给麦乐鸡定了价，而价格又变了，就得改菜单价格，那就会出问题。我当时在研究鸡肉生产的机制，与此同时，由于脱离金本位制，大量货币被印发出来，接着又遭遇了1973年的石油危机。油价上涨，通胀飙升，一切都被淹没了。

Segment 9

[English]

And that swamps everything, changes interest rates, changes everything. And that’s why I had to go to macro as well as micro in order to be able to deal with that. And it’s a good example of how mechanics work. Okay, so they want a stable price. And then the mechanics of a chicken is that there’s the price of the chick, but most of the cost of the chicken is in the feed, the corn and the meal, soybean meal that you feed to the chicken. And it grows. And I realized that what we could do is buy those ingredients forward in the futures market by buying the corn and the feed. And therefore, this chicken producer, by being able to hedge in that way, could offer McDonald’s the fixed price so that they would then be able to not have the risk of the menu price. And so that’s what I did. And that’s how Chicken McNuggets first got its pricing and came into existence in the volatile markets. And I think it’s again, it’s a good example of the mechanics. Cause effect, you understand how it works and you can put things together to achieve results. Back then I started to realize as the company grew that I needed to communicate effectively what I was doing. So I got in the habit of writing down my principles. It wasn’t a habit, it was a necessity.

[中文]

这就压倒一切，改变利率，改变所有东西。这就是为什么我不得不既研究宏观又研究微观，才能应对那种情况。这也是机制如何运作的一个好例子。那么，他们想要一个稳定的价格。而鸡肉的机制在于，虽然有小鸡的价格，但鸡肉的大部分成本在于饲料——也就是喂鸡的玉米和豆粕。鸡就这样生长。我意识到，我们能做的就是通过期货市场买入这些原料，买入玉米和饲料。这样一来，这家鸡肉生产商通过对冲的方式，就能向麦当劳提供固定价格，使他们不必承担菜单价格波动的风险。这就是我做的。这也是麦乐鸡最初如何定价并在波动的市场中诞生的过程。我认为这同样是一个机制的好例子。因果关系，你理解了它如何运作，就能把各种要素组合起来达成成果。那时我开始意识到，随着公司的发展，我需要有效地传达我在做什么。于是我养成了写下自己原则的习惯。其实那不是习惯，而是必需。

Segment 10

[English]

Of writing down my principles. It wasn’t a habit, it was a necessity because I need a game plan. In other words, I needed decision rules to be clear. So if I’m going to make a decision in the markets, okay, here I am, let me write that down and let me see if it would have worked in the past. And then I wrote down a bunch of those rules and then I realized it was true of every aspect of my life. Rather than to just make decisions, I was then looking at how I made decisions. And then I found that I could take those principles which were written in now, and I could put them into equations. So algorithms, as we call them now. And then with that, I know how my decision-making process would have worked through, literally, I’d do it through hundreds of years. Then I was able to build analytical systems, very much like a computer chess system. We’d reflect off of each other. So let me give you an example of a couple of variables plugged into the system. There was a commodity index, which was a good short-term indicator of inflation, and initial claims for unemployment, which was a good short-term indicator of economic strength. And when I would put those two together in a certain way, I could get a weekly pulse of economic growth and inflation, and I knew that that affected monetary policy. So you could see each one of these was a barometer.

[中文]

写下我的原则。这并非一种习惯，而是一种必需，因为我需要一套行动方案。换句话说，我需要让决策规则变得清晰。所以，如果我要在市场中做出一个决策，好吧，就是这样，让我把它写下来，让我看看它在过去是否管用。然后我写下了一堆这样的规则，接着我意识到，这在我生活的方方面面都是如此。我不再只是做出决策，而是在审视自己是如何做出决策的。然后我发现，我可以把那些已经写下来的原则转化为方程式。也就是我们如今所说的算法。有了这些，我就能够知道我的决策过程在几百年间究竟是如何运作的。确切地说，我可以回溯数百年的历史来验证。然后我得以构建分析系统，非常类似于计算机国际象棋系统。它们会相互印证。让我举一个例子，说明输入系统的几个变量。有一个商品指数，它是衡量通胀的良好短期指标；还有首次申请失业救济人数，它是衡量经济实力的良好短期指标。当我把这两者以某种方式结合起来时，我就能获得经济增长和通胀的每周脉搏，而我知道这会影响货币政策。所以你可以看到，每一个变量都像是一个晴雨表。

Segment 11

[English]

Each one of these was a barometer that was a pulse to be able then to put those together so that I would get a picture and then convert that into a decision rule. And then, of course, I built those out over a period of time and it became very big and complex because it covered all different countries, all different markets. And that was one of the really early primitive ones that began the process. I love to play the markets. People like my input on the markets. They’ll pay me for doing that. And it looked to me like it was working well. I had no idea what was to come. So between starting Bridgewater in 1975 and 1982, you know, I started to build a family and things grew. In 1979 and 1980, when there was really tight money policy, I had calculated that American banks had lent a lot more money to foreign countries, that those countries were going to be able to pay back and that there was going to be a big debt crisis. And then in August 1982, Mexico defaulted on its debts. And that began a series of defaults. And at that time, I got a lot

[中文]

每一个这样的指标都是一个晴雨表，一种脉搏，能够把这些信号拼凑在一起，从而让我获得一幅完整的图景，然后将其转化为一条决策规则。当然，随着时间推移，我逐步将这些系统扩展得越来越大、越来越复杂，因为它们覆盖了所有不同的国家、所有不同的市场。而这正是那个真正早期的、启动了整个过程的原始版本。我热爱参与市场。人们喜欢我对市场的看法，他们愿意为此向我付费。而且在我看来，一切运转良好。我完全不知道接下来会发生什么。所以，在1975年创立Bridgewater到1982年之间，你知道，我开始建立家庭，事业也在成长。到了1979年和1980年，当时货币政策非常紧缩，我通过计算发现，美国银行向其他国家发放了大量贷款，而这些国家将无法偿还，将会爆发一场严重的债务危机。随后在1982年8月，墨西哥宣布债务违约。这引发了一连串的违约事件。在那时，我获得了大量的

Segment 12

[English]

And at that time, I got a lot of attention for anticipating this, and I was asked to testify to Congress. And I thought that there was going to be an economic crisis that was going to result from this big debt crisis. And I couldn’t have been more wrong. August 1982, when Mexico defaulted, was the exact bottom in the stock market. And I lost money for me. I lost money for my clients. I was so broke that I had to borrow $4,000 from my dad in order to pay for my family bills. And it was a moment there where, you know, I didn’t know whether I was going to have to go back, put on a tie, get on the train, commute to Wall Street and do a Wall Street job or not. And this was a very painful experience. And yet it really taught me something. And it taught me a principle, gave me a principle. And the principle is pain plus reflection equals progress. I think that sometimes we don’t realize that pain is a great teacher. And we just say, I don’t want pain. But sometimes we learn through pain. And so to reflect on those painful moments, because they tell me how the world works, I then started to ask myself, how do I know I’m right? And it changed my whole approach to decision-making.

[中文]

当时，我因为预判到了这一点而备受关注，还被要求去国会作证。我当时认为，这场大规模债务危机将引发一场经济危机。结果我大错特错。1982年8月，墨西哥违约，那恰恰是股市的最低点。我亏了自己的钱，也亏了客户的钱。我穷得不得不向我爸借了$4,000来支付家里的账单。在那一刻，你知道，我不知道自己是不是得回去，系上领带，坐火车去华尔街，找一份华尔街的工作。那是一段非常痛苦的经历。但它确实教会了我一些东西。它给了我一个原则，那就是：痛苦加反思等于进步。我认为有时候我们并没有意识到痛苦是一位很好的老师。我们只会说，我不要痛苦。但有时候我们正是通过痛苦来学习的。所以去反思那些痛苦的时刻，因为它们告诉我这个世界是如何运作的，然后我开始问自己，我怎么知道自己是对的？这彻底改变了我的整个决策方式。

Segment 13

[English]

And it changed my whole approach to decision-making. So in that moment in 1982, I calmly reflected on my circumstances to find the way to have the greatest life possible without those unacceptable risks of crashing. Seemed like there’s a jungle out there and I could be on the safe side, or I can choose to cross this jungle that is a very, very dangerous jungle to then achieve great success. And then I figure, how do I successfully cross the jungle? And I realized that the way to do it was to find people who were on the mission with me who could see things differently from me. Because back in 1982, I made a mistake of betting too much on my own opinions, and I realized I needed to open my mind up to other people’s perspectives to make better decisions and make it safely through the jungle. I’m a professional mistake maker, meaning I would say probably one third of the decisions that I make in the markets is probably wrong. And I find it very odd, but very typical, that…

[中文]

这彻底改变了我的整个决策方式。所以在1982年那一刻，我冷静地审视了自身的处境，试图找到一条路，在不承担那些不可接受的崩盘风险的前提下，尽可能过上最好的生活。感觉外面就像一片丛林，我可以选择待在安全的一边，也可以选择穿越这片极其危险的丛林，去实现巨大的成功。然后我就想，怎样才能成功地穿越这片丛林？我意识到，方法是找到和我有着共同使命、但能看到和我不同事物的人。因为在1982年，我犯了一个错误——过于相信自己的判断。我意识到，我需要打开心态，接纳其他人的观点，才能做出更好的决策，安全地穿越丛林。我是一个专业的犯错者，也就是说，我在市场中做的决策里，大概有三分之一可能是错的。但我觉得这很奇特，却也非常典型……

Segment 14

[English]

Odd but very typical that people emphasize arguing that they are right more than the curiosity of whether they could be wrong, which could make their decisions so much better. So the smartest people I’ve ever met in my life, and I’ve had the opportunity to meet the smartest people in the world, the most successful people in the world, are the people who think that way, are the curiosity and looking at how do they learn, how do they get another perspective, how do they challenge their thinking. You have to be humble. Success is achieved when you get smart to a certain level and then you gain humility so that you can take it in and then you can move on to that other level. And so, out of this realization, I decided to build Bridgewater into an idea meritocracy. Idea meritocracy means the best ideas win out from wherever they come from. In which the goals are meaningful work and meaningful relationships. You know, and a passion to be on the mission to succeed and then have meaningful relationships like you’re in it together. And to do that through radical truthfulness and radical transparency. In other words, not political correctness.

[中文]

奇怪的是，但也很典型，人们往往更强调证明自己是对的，而不是好奇自己是否可能是错的——而这种好奇心本可以让他们的决策变得更好。因此，我一生中见过的最聪明的人——我有机会见过世界上最聪明的人、最成功的人——就是那些以这种方式思考的人，他们充满好奇心，关注自己如何学习，如何获得另一个视角，如何挑战自己的思维。你必须保持谦逊。成功是当你达到一定的智慧水平，然后获得谦逊，这样你才能吸收新的东西，然后迈向更高的层次。因此，基于这一认识，我决定把 Bridgewater 打造成一个"创意择优”（idea meritocracy）的机构。创意择优意味着最好的想法胜出，无论它来自哪里。其目标是有意义的工作和有意义的人际关系。你知道，以及对完成使命的热情，然后拥有有意义的人际关系，就像你们在一起共同奋斗。而这一切要通过彻底的诚实和彻底的透明来实现。换句话说，不是政治正确。

Segment 15

[English]

Transparency. In other words, not political correctness. To be able to talk about anything and challenge each other in a non-hierarchical way. For example, if you find out that you’re not good at something, is that a good thing or is that a bad thing? It’s a good thing because if you’re not good at something, you could also work with somebody who’s good at that thing you’re not so good at, and you’re going to be better together. You can deal with it. If you don’t recognize that you’re not good at something, then you’re going to continue to have that problem. And I would say that probably for a third of the people who’ve come, maybe more, 40%, it’s not for them. It’s too difficult. Or they may have bruised egos. And for the others, they can’t work anywhere else because of the ability to challenge anything, to say anything, to see everything, and to have that idea meritocracy, which means that not everybody makes the cut. Not everybody gets a trophy. It’s like an intellectual Navy SEALs or something. It is that kind of culture. And so that culture is not for everyone, but it’s been essential to our success. So that experience was an enlightening experience. And really from that point until now, I mean, you know, here we are, I don’t know, 40 years later, everything has gone by and large well. So I reimagined

[中文]

透明。换句话说，不是政治正确。能够谈论任何事情，并以非层级的方式相互挑战。例如，如果你发现自己不擅长某件事，这是好事还是坏事？这是好事，因为如果你不擅长某事，你可以和擅长那件事的人合作，你们在一起会变得更好。你可以解决这个问题。如果你没有意识到自己不擅长某事，那么这个问题就会一直存在。我想说，对于大约三分之一来的人，也许更多，40%，这不适合他们。这太难了。或者他们可能自尊心受挫。而对于其他人来说，他们因为这种能够挑战一切、说出一切、看到一切的能力，以及拥有这种"idea meritocracy"的理念，而无法在其他地方工作。这意味着不是每个人都能过关。不是每个人都能拿到奖杯。这就像知识界的Navy SEALs之类的。就是那种文化。所以这种文化并不适合所有人，但它对我们的成功至关重要。所以那段经历是一段启发性的经历。而从那时起直到现在，我的意思是，你知道，我们在这里，我不知道，40年过去了，总体而言一切都很顺利。所以我重新构想了

Segment 16

[English]

Well, so I reimagined our culture, and the next step was to reimagine our investment strategy. A few months ago, I was cleaning out my office, and I came across an artifact from an earlier time at Bridgewater when the epiphany hit me. And I saw that back then I had made a note to myself, and it said, “Diversification, the Holy Grail.” I realized that I had to deal with risk. Somehow, I wanted the upside of great results, and I didn’t want the downside, and I had to figure it out. And that was the realization I could have the upside with a whole lot less downside by diversifying well, which is basically the realization that I can’t be confident in any one day. I realized that, I drew that, and then I wrote on top of that, you know, the Holy Grail. Meaning, okay, pursue that, do that. If I can get that, I will achieve success. Since early in my career, I wrote down and examined the criteria I used for making virtually all of my decisions.

[中文]

嗯。于是我重新构想了我们的文化，下一步就是重新构想我们的投资策略。几个月前，我在清理办公室时，偶然发现了一件来自Bridgewater早期的物件，就在那一刻我突然顿悟了。我看到那时候我给自己写了一张便条，上面写着：分散投资，圣杯。我意识到我必须面对风险。不知怎么的，我想要好结果的上行空间，却不想要下行的风险，而我必须找到解决之道。那个顿悟就是，我可以通过良好的分散投资来获得上行空间，同时大幅降低下行风险——这本质上就是意识到，我对任何单独一天都没有十足的信心。我意识到了这一点，画下了那张图，然后在上面写下了"圣杯"。意思是，去追求它，去做它。如果我能做到这一点，我就会取得成功。从职业生涯早期开始，我就记录并审视了用于做出几乎所有决策的标准。

Segment 17

[English]

For making virtually all of my decisions. Over time, these turned into decision rules that helped me understand cause-effect relationships in the markets. So to engineer this diversification, I developed another set of systems based on these decision rules. As I was building all these decision rules and seeing how each of those decision rules worked, I would get what I call profit curves from those decision rules. A decision rule is how to deal with the market. If you buy stocks or you buy the S&P 500, then you get the movement of the stock market. That’s its return stream. If you then make a decision to sell and to buy and so on, that active decision is a separate return stream that is different. And you can separate those return streams. And so I had collected, you know, like hundreds of these return streams, and I realized that I didn’t need hundreds of these return streams. I just needed the best 15 or 50. So I went through all of those, and I then decided I wanted the top 5% of those return streams. And I wanted to separate alpha from beta. So I should explain alpha from beta. You can think of beta as the performance of an image.

[中文]

这些系统几乎为我做出所有决策提供了依据。随着时间推移，这些系统逐渐演变为决策规则，帮助我理解市场中的因果关系。为了实现这种多元化，我基于这些决策规则开发了另一套系统。在构建所有这些决策规则并观察每条规则如何运作的过程中，我从这些决策规则中获得了我称之为"利润曲线"的东西。决策规则就是应对市场的方式。如果你买入股票或买入标普500指数，那么你获得的就是股票市场的走势，这就是它的收益流。如果你随后做出卖出和买入等决策，那么这个主动决策就是一个独立的、不同的收益流。你可以将这些收益流分离开来。就这样，我收集了数百个这样的收益流，然后我意识到我并不需要数百个收益流，我只需要最好的15个或50个。于是我逐一审视了所有这些收益流，决定选取排名前5%的收益流。而且我想要将阿尔法与贝塔分离开来。我应该解释一下阿尔法和贝塔。你可以把贝塔理解为某个基准的表现。

Segment 18

[English]

Think of beta as the performance of an index of the market as a whole, such as the NASDAQ or the S&P 500, whereas alpha is the performance that comes from making active decisions to buy or sell to try to do better than the market. So I took my decades of notes and looked back through time at the cause-effect relationships and wanted to put together the best portfolio of alphas and betas. So imagine this. I’m using stock market because it’s the common thing. Investors in the stock market, who then would pick better stocks and worse stocks. Because I was in all these different markets, I could take the alphas from all those different markets and package them as a pure alpha position. A pure alpha portfolio is simply a bunch of uncorrelated bets so that the bets diversify each other to produce the holy grail, to produce the reduction of risk without the reduction of returns. What that means is it has 15 return streams, so think of it like 15 investments, and it has risk, the standard deviation on the return, and it just shows on that scribble that if you go from one, two, three, four, five, well,

[中文]

把贝塔（beta）理解为某个整体市场指数的表现，比如纳斯达克或标普500指数的表现，而阿尔法（alpha）则是通过主动买卖决策所获得的超越市场的表现。因此，我翻阅了自己几十年的笔记，回顾了时间维度上的因果关系，希望将最好的阿尔法和贝塔组合成一个投资组合。想象一下这个场景。我用股票市场来举例，因为它是最常见的东西。股票市场的投资者会选择买入看好的股票和卖出看跌的股票。因为我涉足了所有这些不同的市场，所以我可以从所有这些不同的市场中提取阿尔法，并将其打包成一个纯阿尔法头寸。一个纯阿尔法投资组合本质上就是一系列互不相关的押注，这些押注之间相互分散风险，从而产生圣杯——即在不降低收益的前提下降低风险。这意味着它有15个收益流，你可以把它想象成15项投资，它有风险，即收益率的标准差。从图中可以看到，如果你从1个、2个、3个、4个、5个开始，嗯，

Segment 19

[English]

That if you go from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, all the way out to 15, and they have 60% correlation, you don’t reduce much risk. And then it goes from 60 to 40 to 20 to 0% correlation. And you see on that graph how that it eliminates 80% of the risk. So the holy grail of investing is to have 15 good uncorrelated return streams, uncorrelated investments. If you can do that, you will reduce the risk by about 80% while keeping that returns the same. Then you can engineer that. You can inject some amount of leverage in that to be able to have a very good return relative to the risk. So that was one of the keys, the diversification, then the writing down decision rules that were then converted in algorithms that are doing the backtesting, learning from mistakes. All of that, those were the ingredients, diversification, systemization, all of that was essential for that improvement. So over the period of Pure Alpha, we’ve made more money for our clients than any other hedge fund in existence from the time I started till the time I passed along Bridgewater. We made positive returns for our clients in 28 out of the last,

[中文]

如果你从1、2、3、4、5一直分散到15个资产，而它们之间的相关性为60%，你并不能降低太多风险。然后相关性从60%降到40%，再降到20%，最后降到0%。从那张图上可以看到，这样做可以消除80%的风险。所以投资的圣杯就是拥有15个优质的、互不相关的收益流，互不相关的投资。如果你能做到这一点，你可以在保持收益不变的同时将风险降低大约80%。然后你可以对此进行工程化处理，注入一定量的杠杆，从而获得相对于风险而言非常出色的回报。所以关键之一就是分散化，然后是将决策规则写下来，再将其转化为算法进行回测，从错误中学习。所有这些——分散化、系统化——都是实现这种进步的关键要素。所以在Pure Alpha的整个运作期间，我们为客户赚的钱比自成立以来到我将Bridgewater交给继任者为止的任何其他对冲基金都多。在过去28年中，我们有……年为客户实现了正收益。

Segment 20

[English]

Returns for our clients in 28 out of the last 32 years with no big bad years. And then as I started to then personally accumulate more money and think about, well, what would happen beyond me in terms of the generations and so on, I started to realize that, you know, alpha is a talent war. It’s like you go down to a poker table and somebody’s going to walk away with more chips from somebody else who’s going to lose the chips. It’s a zero-sum game. And I can’t necessarily know who will be producing the best alphas. I remember very clearly thinking, how do I structure a timeless and universal portfolio that is going to maintain wealth, increase wealth, and do it without any guidance from me or anyone else for generations to come? In 1991, I created the portfolio of pure alpha. And in 1996, I created the portfolio of pure beta, which I call all weather, because it’s not subject to the environmental risk. If I go back 100 years or more, I can tell you that if the environment changes in a certain way, growth and inflation change in a certain way, that those markets will change in months.

[中文]

在过去32年中的28年里，我们的客户都获得了回报，而且没有出现大的亏损年份。后来，随着我个人积累的财富越来越多，我开始思考，嗯，在我之后，在几代人传承等方面会发生什么，我开始意识到，你知道的，阿尔法是一场人才博弈。就像你坐到牌桌上，总有人会从别人那里赢走更多的筹码，也有人会输掉筹码。这是一场零和博弈。而我未必能知道谁会产生最好的阿尔法。我记得我当时非常清楚地思考过，如何构建一个永恒且普适的投资组合，能够在未来几代人的时间里，在没有我或任何人的指导下，保持财富并实现增长。1991年，我创造了纯阿尔法投资组合。1996年，我创造了纯贝塔投资组合，我称之为全天候，因为它不受环境风险的影响。如果回溯100年甚至更久，我可以告诉你，如果环境以某种方式变化，增长和通胀以某种方式变化，那些市场将在几个月内发生变化。

Segment 21

[English]

That those markets will change in ways that I understand in relationship to those things. Therefore, I can construct a portfolio of betas that’s going to be balanced and not dependent on alphas. A portfolio that would work through time for the next hundred years based on the intrinsic characteristics. Like, for example, if you know that inflation and economic growth accelerates, you know interest rates are going to rise and you don’t want to be in bonds and so on. And so to be operating, to know those intrinsic characteristics and create a portfolio led me to create the all-weather portfolio, which is a portfolio of betas. You have to look at the intrinsic determinants of those markets. So for example, when there’s a lot of inflation volatility relative to growth, then what you’re going to see is negative correlations between stocks and bonds. When there’s a lot of growth volatility relative to inflation, then you’re going to see positive correlations. So for all weather, we broke the market environments into four types based on its big influences, growth and inflation, which could go up or down. And if I have 25% of my risk in each of those four quadrants, I’ll have a balanced portfolio. For example, recently, a lot of tech companies

[中文]

那些市场会以我所理解的方式、相对于那些因素发生变化。因此，我可以构建一个由贝塔组成的投资组合，这个组合将是平衡的，且不依赖于阿尔法。一个基于内在特征、在未来一百年里都能持续运作的投资组合。比如说，如果你知道通胀和经济增长在加速，你就会知道利率将会上升，而你不想持有债券，诸如此类。因此，要运作起来，要了解那些内在特征并据此构建一个投资组合，这促使我创造了全天候投资组合，也就是一个由贝塔组成的投资组合。你必须去观察那些市场的内在决定因素。因此举例来说，当通胀波动相对于增长较大时，你将看到股票和债券之间呈现负相关。当增长波动相对于通胀较大时，你将看到正相关。所以对于全天候策略，我们将市场环境根据其两大主要影响因素——增长和通胀——划分为四种类型，增长和通胀各自可升可降。如果我在那四个象限中各配置25%的风险，我就会得到一个平衡的投资组合。比如说，最近，很多科技公司

Segment 22

[English]

Recently, a lot of tech companies didn’t have much in the way of current earnings. They had high growth expectations. And with those high growth expectations and no earnings, because of the structure of those, we call those long duration assets because they will pay off in the long run. They’re not going to pay off in the short run. When interest rates went up, because of that, they were very sensitive to interest rate changes. And so you see that reflected in all of the markets now, right? The things that went down a lot are of that nature. The promise of future earnings through future inventiveness. No, no, no, that doesn’t count right now as much as it did in the past. So you could see that dynamic, that’s a timeless and universal dynamic that happens through time. By building it all weather, not based on the correlations that existed in the past, but instead based on the intrinsic balance that is achieved by having some assets that do well in an inflationary period and an equal number of assets that do well in a disinflationary period, or some assets that do well in a high-growth environment and some assets that do well in a low-growth environment, structurally, by having that four quantified

[中文]

最近，很多科技公司并没有多少当期收益，它们的增长预期很高。而由于这种高增长预期加上没有盈利，基于其结构特征，我们称这类资产为长久期资产，因为它们的回报要等到长期才能兑现，短期内不会产生回报。当利率上升时，这类资产对利率变化极为敏感。所以现在你在所有市场中都能看到这一点的体现，对吧？那些大幅下跌的资产都具有这种性质——即通过未来创新来实现未来收益的承诺。不不不，这种承诺现在的重要性远不如过去。所以你能看到这种动态，这是一种跨越时空的永恒而普遍的动态。通过构建全天候组合，不是基于过去存在的相关性，而是基于一种内在的平衡——即持有一部分在通胀时期表现良好的资产，同时持有等量在通缩时期表现良好的资产；或者持有一部分在高增长环境下表现良好的资产，同时持有一部分在低增长环境下表现良好的资产——从结构上，通过这种量化的四

Segment 23

[English]

Structurally, by having that four quadrant perspective, there is structural diversification that comes from that. So if you wanna know the key to our success over such a long period of time, is that we survived. Thinking about, if you lose 50% of your money, you have to make 100% to get back. And then so many firms along the way have had that time where they have gotten whacked and lost. People come to me all the time asking, you know, what should I invest in, or what does the future hold? And my answer to the question often surprises them. Sometimes they like it and sometimes they don’t. I think of the saying, I would rather give a man the ability to fish than to give him the fish. And for that reason, I want to show the cause-effect relationships and I want to show the principles that I use to fish, so to speak, so that people could make their own decisions independently.

[中文]

从结构上讲，有了这种四象限的视角，就自然而然地带来了结构性的分散化。所以，如果你想知道我们能够长期取得成功的关键是什么，那就是我们活下来了。想想看，如果你亏了50%的钱，你得赚100%才能回本。一路上，有很多公司都曾遭遇过重创、亏损惨重。人们总是来问我，你知道，我该投资什么？未来会怎样？而我的回答常常让他们感到意外。有时候他们喜欢我的回答，有时候则不然。我想起一句老话，与其授人以鱼，不如授人以渔。正因如此，我想展示因果关系，我想展示我所使用的"捕鱼"原则，好让人们能够独立地做出自己的判断。

Segment 24

[English]

I’d like to give a little bit of advice to the average investor or investors out there. And I want to say that it all comes down to the basics. Like most things in life, they all come down to the basics. You need to think of it as having a few different portfolios that each protect you against different levels of risk. So the first layer of your portfolio is how do you get that element of security? How much money do I have to meet my needs if I was to lose my job? And I would want to make sure that that was secure. You have to cover your fundamentals for a long period of time. And don’t worry about the upside so much. Worry about the downside that you’ve got that covered. You lose your job, whatever it is, I’m financially fine. How many days, weeks, months, years do you have that that allows you to build that portfolio? And then you have to think what amount is that because you’ve got to put it somewhere. You have to put it in an investment. And so you start thinking, what are those best investments? And basically, assume the worst. Assume that that, after inflation and taxes and everything, fell in half. So have twice as much money, I think, as you need, and when you’ve got that, you’ve got freedom, and you’ve got

[中文]

我想给普通投资者提一点建议。我想说的是，一切都回归基本原则。就像生活中的大多数事情一样，最终都要回归基本原则。你需要把它想象成拥有几个不同的投资组合，每个组合帮你防范不同层次的风险。那么，你投资组合的第一层就是如何获得安全感？如果我失业了，我需要多少钱来满足自身需求？我要确保这部分资金是安全的。你必须在很长一段时间内覆盖你的基本需求。不要太在意收益有多高，要担心的是下行风险是否已经覆盖到位。你失业了，不管怎样，我在财务上是没问题的。你有多少天、多少周、多少月、多少年的时间来建立这个投资组合？然后你必须考虑具体金额，因为你得把钱放在某个地方。你必须把钱用于投资。于是你开始思考，哪些是最好的投资？基本上，要做最坏的打算。假设在扣除通胀和税收等一切之后，资产缩水一半。所以我认为你需要准备两倍于你所需的资金，当你做到这一点，你就拥有了自由，你就

Segment 25

[English]

When you’ve got that, you’ve got freedom and you’ve got power. And then you say, how do I play that game? And the way that you play the game is first to know what you know and know what you don’t know. Be humble about that. To succeed in the markets is more difficult than to succeed in the Olympics. There are more people who are trying to do it. They’ve got more money in terms of their resources. But would you say, I’m going to go compete against the Olympics? So you start with that humility and then realize the most common mistake of investing, to think that the investments that did well in the past are good investments rather than more expensive investments. So what you always see is that the common investor will buy at the highs and then sell at the lows because they’ll think, oh, I’m scared and that’s a bad investment because it didn’t do well. And so that’s the common mistake. And then seek that diversification. That’s the most important thing. Be careful. If you’re going to bet, bet. But don’t bet in amounts that are going to blow through the amount of money that you’re going to need. And see, how do you bet? Once you start that, then you’re on the journey. Then I recommend that you write down your criteria. Have a journey like I’ve had the journey of you think about. What would that rule have been? How would that have worked in the past? And then build a strategy for investment.

[中文]

当你拥有了这些，你就拥有了自由，也拥有了力量。然后你会问，我该怎么玩这场游戏？而玩这场游戏的方式，首先是知道自己知道什么、不知道什么。对此要保持谦逊。在市场中取得成功比在奥运会中取得成功要难得多。试图这样做的人更多，他们拥有更多的资源。但你会说，我要去和奥运会竞争吗？所以你要从这种谦逊开始，然后认识到投资中最常见的错误——把过去表现好的投资误认为是好投资，而实际上它们只是变得更贵了。所以你经常看到的是，普通投资者在高点买入、在低点卖出，因为他们会想，哦，我害怕了，那是个坏投资，因为它之前表现不好。这就是最常见的错误。然后要寻求多元化。这是最重要的事情。要谨慎。如果你要下注，那就下。但不要下那种会把你将来需要的资金全部赔光的那种注。那么，你怎么下注呢？一旦你开始了，你就踏上了这段旅程。然后我建议你写下自己的标准。去经历一段旅程，就像我所经历的那样。思考一下，那条规则会是什么？它在过去会如何运作？然后制定一个投资策略。

Segment 26

[English]

Build a strategy for investing that you know how it would have worked in the past, and then you build that knowledge in that way. But how do you figure out what did and didn’t work in the past? Let me show you. In investing, looking back at history is one of the most valuable tools we have. It’s like Mark Twain said, “History rhymes.” It doesn’t necessarily repeat itself, but it rhymes. And what he really means by that, or the mechanics of that, is there are things that happen over and over again through history, and there are even cycles that make them happen. And then there is an evolutionary development of understanding, so that you can look at these cycles happening around this uptrend. By understanding these cause-effect relationships, one can be one step ahead of what’s going to happen. Three things that caught my attention that are now happening that never happened in our lifetimes before, but happened many times through history, are, first, the production of a lot of debt, because we want to spend more than we’re earning. And where do we get that money from? We print the money. In other words, central banks print it and they buy that debt.

[中文]

首先，你要构建一种投资策略，并且你清楚它在过去会有怎样的表现，然后以这种方式积累你的认知。但你怎么才能弄清楚过去哪些方法有效、哪些无效呢？让我来告诉你。在投资领域，回顾历史是我们拥有的最有价值的工具之一。正如马克·吐温所说，历史会押韵。它不一定会原样重复，但会押韵。他这句话的真正含义，或者说其中的机制，就是历史上有些事情会反复发生，甚至存在周期性的规律推动这些事情发生。然后，随着认知的不断演进，你就能在上升趋势中观察到这些周期。通过理解这些因果关系，你就能比即将发生的事情领先一步。有三件事引起了我的注意，它们正在发生，但在我们一生中从未发生过，却在历史上多次出现。第一，大量债务的产生，因为我们的支出超过了收入。那么我们从哪里获得这些钱呢？我们印钞。换句话说，中央银行印钞，然后买入这些债务。

Segment 27

[English]

Central banks print it and they buy that debt. These credit and debt cycles that drive spending, drive economic activity, and drive market movements, they’ve happened over and over again for basically the same reasons. You go back through history and it happened really for thousands of years. The idea in the Old Testament, there’s a cycle of about 50 years and then there’s the year of Jubilee where it’s forgiven, is the same basic dynamics of what a bank is. They don’t have as much money in the bank as they promise, and then you have a bank collapse. So history has shown you can’t do too much of that without having a disaster. I call item number two internal conflict. There is a great conflict now that’s becoming almost dysfunctional in terms of how we are with each other. That doesn’t mean we don’t have good qualities or good places in this country. But that notion of populism of the left and populism of the right and fighting, people will fight over their opinions. It’s a win-at-all-cost type of environment, not a how do we compromise in the way that democracy is supposed to work in order to achieve the common good. There’s a threat to that. The closest period that you can find in the world was the 1930s period for the same reason. You have an economic problem, and with that economic problem and large wealth gaps, then there’s fighting between

[中文]

中央银行印钞，然后买入这些债务。这些推动支出、推动经济活动、推动市场走势的信贷与债务周期，基本上出于相同的原因，已经反复发生过无数次了。回顾历史，这种现象实际上已经持续了几千年。《旧约》中就有一个大约50年为一个周期的概念，随后是豁免年，债务被免除——这与银行的本质运作逻辑是一样的。银行里实际的钱并没有它们承诺的那么多，然后银行就会崩溃。所以历史已经表明，如果不加节制地这样做，灾难就在所难免。我把第二点称为内部冲突。现在存在一种严重的冲突，它在我们彼此相处的方式上几乎已经变得功能失调。这并不意味着这个国家没有好的品质或好的地方。但是左翼民粹主义和右翼民粹主义的对立与争斗，人们会为了各自的观点而争执不休。这是一种不惜一切代价也要赢的环境，而不是民主制度本应运作的那种——通过妥协来实现共同利益。这对民主构成了威胁。世界上与此最接近的时期，出于同样的原因，就是20世纪30年代。你面临一个经济问题，而伴随这个经济问题和巨大的财富差距，就会出现各方之间的争斗。

Segment 28

[English]

And large wealth gaps, then there’s fighting between the groups and you have that. And you see that four democracies in the 1930s chose to be autocracies because of that populism and so on. So you never experienced it in my lifetime. I’m 73 years old. We haven’t experienced that. At number three is external conflict caused by struggles to control the world order. There is a great powers conflict in the world where two comparable powers, the United States and China, are in this competition or almost warlike setting. There are five kinds of wars. There’s a trade war, a technology war, a geopolitical influence war, a capital and economic war, and a military war. We are in the first four. We are in those other wars. We’re not yet in a military war. But there is a military war also going on with Russia, contained to be within the Ukraine. And there are greater risks. More countries have nuclear weapons and so on and so forth. So the risk is greater. The United States is not as dominant as it was by any of the measures before. And so that creates this particular struggle. I can’t tell you whether we’re going to go over the brink or not. But I would say that the odds of some kind of irreconcilable

[中文]

以及巨大的贫富差距，然后各群体之间就会发生争斗，你也看到了这一点。你看到20世纪30年代有四个民主国家因为民粹主义等因素而选择了专制政体。所以我们在我这一辈子里从未经历过这些。我今年73岁。我们没有经历过那种情况。排在第三位的是由争夺世界秩序控制权所引发的外部冲突。世界上存在大国冲突，两个实力相当的大国——美国和中国——正处于这种竞争或近乎战争的状态。战争有五种类型：贸易战、科技战、地缘政治影响力战、资本与经济战，以及军事战争。我们正处于前四种之中。我们正处于那些其他类型的战争之中。我们尚未进入军事战争。但俄罗斯也正在进行一场被限制在乌克兰境内的军事战争。而且风险更大了。越来越多的国家拥有核武器等等。所以风险更大了。美国不再像以前那样在任何指标上都占据主导地位。这就造成了这种特殊的斗争。我无法告诉你我们是否会越过悬崖边缘。但我要说的是，出现某种不可调和的情况的概率——

Segment 29

[English]

Of irreconcilable differences internally or irreconcilable differences externally are higher than they have been in our lifetimes before. So we’re entering a period that is most analogous to the 1930 to 45 period in terms of financially levels of debt, internal conflicts, external conflicts. When these three forces come together, it can lead to terrible times with bad economic conditions and often a new world order. And the last time that happened was 1945. We began a new world order, an American world order, where the United States is the dominant power. And then you have a period of peace and prosperity because no one wants to fight the dominant world power and so on. And then power shifts. And then there’s a great power conflict. While it’s scary, nothing is predestined. So tracking how these trends continue or shift will give you the tools on your journey. The same basic mechanics, cause-effect relationship, applies to macro, micro, all dimensions of life. We have our personal experiences. We have all of those

[中文]

内部不可调和的矛盾或外部不可调和的矛盾，其激烈程度已经超出了我们一生中所见过的水平。因此，我们正在进入一个与1930年至1945年期间最为相似的时期，无论是从债务水平、内部冲突还是外部冲突来看都是如此。当这三股力量汇聚在一起时，可能会导致糟糕的经济形势，甚至催生一个新的世界秩序。上一次出现这种情况是在1945年。我们由此开启了一个新的世界秩序——一个以美国为主导力量的美国式世界秩序。随后迎来了一段和平与繁荣的时期，因为没有人愿意去挑战这个主导世界的超级大国，诸如此类。然后权力发生转移，接着便出现了大国之间的冲突。虽然这一切令人感到恐惧，但没有任何事情是命中注定的。因此，追踪这些趋势的延续或转变，将为你提供前行路上的基本工具。同样的基本原理——因果关系——适用于宏观层面、微观层面，以及生活的方方面面。我们有我们个人的经历。我们拥有所有这些。

Segment 30

[English]

We have our personal experiences. We have all of those challenges, things we don’t wish for, things that we wish never happened, but they are a function of how reality works, and we have to accept those and know how to deal with them well. I think my approach to pain, mistakes, and weaknesses is a differentiating characteristic, so that to learn from the pain, to accept the realities, and to then engineer strategies that take me through it, are things that just about anybody could adopt. I’ve had some very painful experiences that I never could have imagined happening. What came to mind is the serenity prayer, which is, God give me the serenity to accept that which I cannot change, the courage to change that which I can and the wisdom to know the difference. There’s a life arc that we all go through which has such obstacles, and it pays to reflect on it. I just put out a journal, and one of the guided journal exercises is to look how a typical life cycle works and know where you are in that life cycle. And if you go through it, you can check off. Like we all do the same things.

[中文]

我们都有自己的个人经历。我们都会遇到那些挑战，那些我们不希望的、希望从未发生过的事情，但这些都是现实运作的必然结果，我们必须学会接受它们，并懂得如何妥善应对。我认为自己对待痛苦、错误和弱点的方式是一种与众不同的特质——从痛苦中学习，接受现实，然后制定策略走出困境，这些是几乎任何人都可以采纳的方法。我曾经历过一些极其痛苦的经历，那些是我根本无法想到的。我脑海中浮现的是《宁静祷文》——“上帝啊，请赐我宁静，去接受我无法改变的事；赐我勇气，去改变我能改变的事；赐我智慧，去分辨两者的区别。“每个人的人生都会经历这样一个充满障碍的人生轨迹，反思这些经历是有价值的。我刚发布了一本日志，其中一项引导式日志练习就是去了解典型的人生周期是如何运作的，并清楚自己正处于这个人生周期的哪个阶段。如果你去梳理它，就可以逐项对照。就像我们每个人都会经历同样的事情一样。

Segment 31

[English]

Check off, like we all do, the same things practically. You’re born, a sage certain age, you graduate school, then you develop a relationship, maybe you get married, maybe you have kids, and to know where you are in that life cycle realistically, and then start to imagine where you will be in 10 years and where the people that you care about the most, maybe it’s your parents, maybe it’s your children, where will they be in 10 years? And to start to put that in perspective and how it works. It’s all mechanics. Everything has these cause-effect relationships. And just to look at reality that way, to adapt, to be wise, and to navigate it well. And there’s no getting around the fact that you have to be strong, because the key to success is knowing how to struggle well. You

[中文]

就像我们所有人都在做着差不多同样的事情——实际上，你出生，到了一定年龄，你毕业，然后你发展一段感情，也许你结婚，也许你有了孩子。要现实地了解自己在这个人生周期中所处的位置，然后开始想象十年后你会在哪里，你最关心的人——也许是你的父母，也许是你的孩子——十年后他们又会在哪里？然后开始从更宏观的视角来看待这一切，以及它是如何运作的。这一切都是机制。万事万物之间都存在着因果关系。只需以这种方式看待现实，去适应，去变得明智，去驾驭它。而有一点是无法绕开的，那就是你必须坚强，因为成功的关键在于懂得如何与困境抗争。

来源：要提前退休的小钢子-Ray Dalio 大师课 第1集（via bilibili-auto-transcript skill）

Source: MasterClass - Ray Dalio (via bilibili-auto-transcript skill)