公开课

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第5集 战争的消耗 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p5 时长: 75分36秒（4536秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 5 集，主题为“战争的消耗”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕战争消耗模型展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 战争消耗模型：本集围绕“战争的消耗”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 承诺与成本：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 动态博弈：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 战略耐心：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（75分36秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] Last time we looked at how to apply our new idea, sub-game perfect equilibrium, to a whole bunch of games. And our general idea for how to solve for sub-game perfect equilibrium was as follows. We looked at each sub-game. We solved for the Nash equilibrium in the sub-game, something we learned to do long ago. And then we rolled back the payoffs. We rolled them back up the tree. and towards the end we learned something interesting I’m not going to go back to it today I just want to emphasize it we learned that strategic effects matter so in that investment game we looked at last time when you were considering whether to rent a new piece of machinery it made a very big difference whether you considered how this action would affect the actions of the other side in this case how it affects your competition and this is a very general idea very general point So just to give you a couple of more examples, when you’re designing tax systems, I mentioned this last time, when you’re designing a tax system, make some changes in the U.S. tax system, it’s not good enough to look at how people are behaving in the old tax system and just calculate in an accounting manner how much more money you’re going to raise or how much money it’s going to cost you. ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第6集 信息集和子博弈完美 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p6 时长: 75分58秒（4558秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 6 集，主题为“信息集和子博弈完美”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕信息集展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 信息集：本集围绕“信息集和子博弈完美”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 子博弈完美：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 逆向归纳：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 动态一致性：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（75分58秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] So today we have a lot of stuff to get through, but it’s all going to be fairly formal. We’re not going to have time to play a game today. Today’s going to be a day where we have to learn some new ideas. So the reason we need to go through some new formal ideas today is we’ve kind of exhausted what we can do with the ideas we’ve gathered so far. So just to bring us up to date where we are, in the first half of the semester, so before the midterm, we looked at simultaneous move games, and one way to think about those simultaneous move games were games where when I make my choice, I don’t know what you’ve done. And when you make your choice, you don’t know what I’ve done. And since the midterm, we’ve been looking at simple examples of sequential move games, sequential move games under perfect information, in which I typically do know what you did when I get to make my choice. And you know I’m going to know what you did when I get to make my choice. And what I want to be able to do moving forward is I want to be able to look at strategic situations that combine those two settings. I want to be able to analyze games which involve both sequential moves and simultaneous move games And in particular I want to see how we can extend the technique we been focusing on for the last few weeks which is backward induction I want us to see how we can extend the notion of backward induction to cope with games where some parts are sequential and some parts are simultaneous. ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第7集 合作与结局 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p7 时长: 75分19秒（4519秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 7 集，主题为“合作与结局”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕合作与重复博弈展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 合作与重复博弈：本集围绕“合作与结局”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 终局效应：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 信誉机制：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 长期互动：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（75分19秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] Okay, let’s make a start. So I hope everyone had a good break. We’re going to spend this week looking at repeated interaction. Now we already saw last time before the break that once we repeat games, once games go on for a while we can sustain behavior that’s quite interesting So for example before the break we saw that we could sustain fighting by players that were rational in a war of attrition alright and another thing we learned before the break was when we’re analyzing these potentially very long games it helps sometimes to break it break the analysis up into what we might call stage games each each period of the game and break the payoffs up into the payoffs that are associated with that stage payoffs that are associated with the past but they’re sunk they don’t really matter and payoffs that are going to come in the future from future equilibrium play so those are some ideas we going to pick up today but for the most part what we do today will be new Now whereas last time we focused on fighting for the whole of today I want to focus on the issue of cooperation In fact, for the whole of this week I want to focus on the issue of cooperation. And the question kind of behind everything this week is going to be, can repeated interaction among players both induce and sustain cooperative behavior, or if you like, good behavior. ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第8集 落后的感应-国际象棋，战略和可信的威胁 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p8 时长: 72分39秒（4359秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 8 集，主题为“落后的感应-国际象棋，战略和可信的威胁”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕逆向归纳展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 逆向归纳：本集围绕“落后的感应-国际象棋，战略和可信的威胁”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 国际象棋式推理：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 可信威胁：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 战略承诺：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（72分39秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] So last time we finished up by playing the game of NIMH. And you’ll remember, I hope, that the game of NIMH was a game where there was two piles of stones. We made do with lines on the board. And the winner was the person who picked up the last stone. Remember, you have to pick piles. And I want to use the game of NIMH to make a transition here. So what we pointed out about the game of NIMH game was it illustrated very nicely for us that games can have first mover advantages or they can have second mover advantages. A very small change in the game, essentially a very small change in where we started from could switch a game from a game with a first mover advantage to a game with a second mover advantage. Alright? Now today I want to make, just draw a slightly grander lesson out of that game. So not only was it the case that the game sometimes has first mover advantages and sometimes has second mover advantages. But moreover, we could tell when it had a first mover advantage and we could tell when it had a second mover advantage. Is that right? When we actually looked at the initial setup of those stones we knew immediately that a game in which player 1 is going to win or alternatively we knew immediately that a game in which player 2 is going to win Alright? ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第9集 进化稳定-合作，突变，与平衡 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p9 时长: 72分20秒（4340秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 9 集，主题为“进化稳定-合作，突变，与平衡”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕进化稳定策略展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 进化稳定策略：本集围绕“进化稳定-合作，突变，与平衡”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 合作与突变：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 均衡选择：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 演化博弈：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（72分20秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] So we’re going to do a new topic today. We’re going to talk about evolution. We’re going to talk about the connection between evolution and game theory. All right, now there’s going to be an extra, I already emailed you about this, there’s going to be an extra reading on this for the people who want it. I’m going to, there’s a reading packet that’s available to anybody who wants it. I emailed you all the websites where you can order that reading packet and find, and figure out where to pick it up. It’s not compulsory, you don’t have to look at that reading packet, it’s just it might help. In addition, as with last Wednesday, since some of the material here is new, I have written a handout that goes with this lecture, and that handout will appear magically this afternoon on the website All right So things today are fast Don worry There a handout that goes with it All right so why look at evolution in the context of game theory There are really two reasons. The first reason is because of the influence of game theory on biology. It turns out that in the last few decades, there’s been an enormous amount of work done in biology, in particular looking at animal behavior and using game theory to analyze that animal behavior. And just to give you a loose idea about how this works, the idea is to relate strategies with genes, or at least the phenotype of those genes, and to relate payoffs to genetic fitness. ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第10集 混合战略棒球，约会和支付您的税 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p10 时长: 73分45秒（4425秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 10 集，主题为“混合战略棒球，约会和支付您的税”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕混合策略展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 混合策略：本集围绕“混合战略棒球，约会和支付您的税”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 随机化：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 无差异条件：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 均衡计算：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（73分45秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] All right, so last time we did something I think substantially harder than anything we’ve done in the class so far. We looked at mixed strategies and in particular we looked at mixed strategy equilibrium. All right? And there was a big idea last time. The big idea was if a player is playing a mixed strategy in equilibrium, then every pure strategy in the mix, that’s to say every pure strategy on which they place some positive weight, must also be a best response to what the other side is doing. And then we used that trick, we used it in this game here, to help us find Nash equilibria. And the way it allowed us to find Nash equilibria is we knew that if, in this case, Venus Williams is mixing between left and right, it must be this case that her payoff is equal to that of right And we used that to find Serena mix And conversely since we knew that Serena is mixing again between little l and little r we knew she must be indifferent between little l and little r and we used that to find Venus’s mix. So I want to go back to this example just for a few moments, just to make one more point, and then we’ll move on. But we’ll still be talking about mix strategies throughout today. ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第11集 落后的感应-声誉和决斗 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p11 时长: 75分56秒（4556秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 11 集，主题为“落后的感应-声誉和决斗”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕不完全信息展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 不完全信息：本集围绕“落后的感应-声誉和决斗”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 贝叶斯推断：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 信念更新：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 策略选择：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（75分56秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] Tanya Cushman Reviewer’s Name Reviewer’s Name Okay, so this is what we did last time. We looked at a game involving an entrance and an incumbent in a market. And the entrance had to decide whether to enter that market or not, And if they stayed out, the incumbent remained a monopolist, and the monopolist made three million in profit. All right? And if the entrant goes in, then the incumbent can decide whether to accommodate the entrant and just settle for duopoly profits, making a million each, or the incumbent can fight, in which case the incumbent makes no money at all, and the entrant loses a million dollars. And we pointed out a number of things about this game. was that when we analyzed it in a matrix form, we quickly found that there were two Nash equilibria. Nash equilibria were in and not fight, and out and fight. But we argued that backward induction tells us that the sensible answer is in and not fight Once the incumbent knows the entrant is in they not going to fight because one is bigger than zero and the entrant anticipating this will enter And we talked a little bit more, we said this other equilibrium, this out-fight equilibrium, it is an equilibrium because if the entrant believes the incumbent is going to fight, then the entrant is going to stay out, and it’s costless for the incumbent to, quote, fight if in fact the entrant does stay out because they never get called upon to fight anyway. ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第12集 进化稳定-社会公约，侵略，和周期 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p12 时长: 66分20秒（3980秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 12 集，主题为“进化稳定-社会公约，侵略，和周期”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕协调问题展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 协调问题：本集围绕“进化稳定-社会公约，侵略，和周期”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 多重均衡：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 制度与预期：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 博弈论应用：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（66分20秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] All right, so this was the definition we saw at the end last time. I tried to write it a bit larger. I just repeat the second of those definitions. This is the definition that connects the notion of evolutionary stability, for now in pure strategies with Nash equilibrium. And basically it says this, to check whether a strategy is evolutionally stable in pure strategies, first check whether S hat, S hat is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. And if it is, if it’s a strict Nash equilibrium, we’re done. And if it’s not strict, that means there’s at least some other strategy that would tie with S hat against S hat. then compare how s-hat does against this mutation with how the mutation does against itself. And if s-hat does better than the mutation than the mutation does against itself, then we’re okay. And one virtue of this definition is it very easy to check so let try an example to see that And also to get us back into gear and reminding ourselves what we’re doing a bit. All right, so in this example, it’s a sort of trivial game, but still, the game looks like this. All right, and we’re asked, since we’re asked the question, what is evolutionarily stable in this game? So no prizes for finding the symmetric Nash equilibrium in this game. Shout it out. ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第13集 顺序游戏-道德风险，奖励和饥饿的狮子 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p13 时长: 70分47秒（4247秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 13 集，主题为“顺序游戏-道德风险，奖励和饥饿的狮子”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕顺序游戏-道德风险，奖励和饥饿的狮子展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 顺序游戏-道德风险，奖励和饥饿的狮子：本集围绕“顺序游戏-道德风险，奖励和饥饿的狮子”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 核心概念：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 课堂案例：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 策略推理：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（70分47秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] Okay, so I want to set up a new topic today, and to get us started I thought we’d play a game. So the game is going to be called Cash and a Hat, and we’ll see what this game is like in a minute. so the idea is this, there’s going to be two players I’m going to pick on two of you I hope I can find people who brought some money to class alright, so player one will have a choice player one can put nothing one dollar or three dollars into a hat the hat will then be given to player two and player two can look at what’s in the hat and either she can match what’s in the hat, i.e. add the same amount in, so one if it’s one or three if it’s three, or she can simply take the cash. All right, the payoff of this game will be as follows. Player one, if they put nothing in, they’re not going to get anything If they put one in and it matched then they double their money so they get two back If they put three in and it matched then they double their money so they get six back they’ll net three. However, if they put one in and player two takes it, they’ve just lost their dollar. And if they put three dollars in and player two takes it, they’ve lost three dollars. ...

视频信息 标题: 耶鲁大学博弈论公开课 - 第14集 落后的感应-承诺，间谍，和先行者优势 BV号: BV1u54y1k74g 分集: p14 时长: 67分21秒（4041秒） 作者/来源: 耶鲁大学公开课 原始链接: B站视频 转录方式: Groq Whisper 英文转录；英文在前，中文在后逐段对照。 视频摘要 本集是耶鲁大学博弈论公开课第 14 集，主题为“落后的感应-承诺，间谍，和先行者优势”。课程以英文课堂讲授和互动讨论为主体，围绕落后的感应-承诺，间谍，和先行者优势展开，逐步引入博弈论中关于策略、收益、信息、均衡和动态推理的分析框架。本文提供英文原文与中文译文逐段对照，便于跟读、检索和复习。 核心要点 落后的感应-承诺，间谍，和先行者优势：本集围绕“落后的感应-承诺，间谍，和先行者优势”展开，是理解后续博弈论模型和课堂案例的基础。 核心概念：讲授重点放在参与者如何根据目标、信息和他人行为选择策略。 课堂案例：课堂通过案例、提问或推导展示抽象模型如何落到具体决策情境。 策略推理：内容强调从结果反推策略条件，训练形式化的战略思维。 点击展开完整转录（67分21秒完整版，中英双语） 视频全文转录（中英双语） 以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。 由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。 [段 1] All right, so today I want to do something a little bit more mundane than we did on Monday. I want to go back and talk about quantity competition. so in the first half of the course we talked about price competition we talked about quantity competition we talked about competition with differentiated products I want to go back and revisit essentially the Cournot model so this was the Cournot model two firms are producing are choosing their quantities simultaneously firm 1 is choosing Q1 and firm 2 is choosing Q2 and all of this is just reviews so this is all stuff that’s in your notes already already, this is the demand curve. It tells us that prices depend on the total quantity being produced. So this is Q1 plus Q2, and this is prices. Then the demand curve is a straight line of slope B. All right that what this tells us It has slope minus B All right And we know that payoffs are just profits which are price times quantity revenues minus cost times quantity costs. We’ll get assuming constant marginal costs. And we did this model out in full in maybe the third week of class, and we figured out what the best response diagram looked like. ...