视频信息
- 标题: 斯坦福：YC创业课 - 第07集：注意细节为日常（替代源：BV1c84y1R7DU）
- BV号: BV1oWKpzoE1Z
- 时长: 48分03秒（2883秒）
- 作者: 九金财经
- 原始链接: B站视频（替代源）
- 替代说明: 原 BV1oWKpzoE1Z 第7集视频源缺失，本集采用替代源 BV1c84y1R7DU（UP主：九金财经，20集合集中的第7集「7-注意细节为日常」）
视频摘要
本集来自斯坦福YC创业课，由Wufoo联合创始人分享如何打造用户喜爱的产品。演讲者认为，增长的本质是转化率与流失率的差值，但降低流失率比提升转化率更易实现且成本更低。他强调创业的核心是创造让用户想要热爱、与之建立关系的产品，而非只是好用的工具。通过Wufoo仅10人团队、融资11.8万美元却创造29000%投资回报的真实案例，说明关注细节策略的有效性。演讲提出支持驱动开发理念——让工程师直接做客户支持以形成反馈循环，同时借鉴日本atatame hinshitsu与midiokiteki hinshitsu的质量概念，倡导在登录页、错误页、帮助文档等每个接触点创造令人难忘的第一印象。最终结论是：市场主导地位的三条路径中，**最佳整体解决方案（客户亲密度）**是任何阶段都可实践且几乎零成本的方式。
核心要点
- 增长公式：增长 = 转化率 - 流失率，降低流失率比提升转化率更容易、更便宜，但人们往往忽视
- 产品哲学：打造人们想要热爱、想要与之建立关系的软件，而非只是功能性的工具
- 第一印象：用户首次交互决定是否继续使用，就像约会时的挖鼻孔测试——初期门槛极低
- 质量二分法：atatame hinshitsu（功能性质量）与 midiokiteki hinshitsu（迷人质量）——先做好基础再追求魅力
- 支持驱动开发：让构建产品的人直接做客户支持，工程师听到同一问题第三次就会修复bug，形成闭合反馈循环
- 四骑士预警：批评、蔑视、防卫、冷战——不回复用户（冷战）是创业公司早期流失的最大原因
- 仪式与文化：手写感谢卡、Wufoo警报系统、周五卡片——小行动创造大情感连接，人性是会扩展的
- 市场主导路径：最佳产品（聚焦研发）、最佳价格（聚焦物流）、最佳整体解决方案（聚焦客户亲密度）——后者无需资金但需要谦逊与礼貌
视频全文转录（中英双语）
以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。
由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。
[段 1]
All right. So when I talk about making products users love, what I mean specifically is like, how do we make things that have a passionate user base that our users are unconditionally wanting to be successful, both on the products that we build but also the companies behind them. We’re going to go over tons of information, try not to take too many notes, mostly just try to listen. I’ll post a link to the slides on my Twitter account, and on that link there will be ways for you to annotate the slides, and you can ask me questions. And if we don’t get to them, I’ll answer them after the talk. So you guys have been listening to and hearing a lot about growth over the last several weeks, and to me, I feel like growth is usually fairly simple. It’s the interaction between two sort of concepts or variables, conversion rate and churn, right? And the gap between those two things pretty much indicates how fast you’re going to grow.
[译文 1]
好的，当我谈到打造用户喜爱的产品时，我具体指的是，我们如何创造出让用户热情追随的产品，用户会无条件地希望我们的产品和我们背后的公司取得成功。我们会讨论大量的信息，尽量不要做太多笔记，大多数时候只需要倾听。我会在我的 Twitter 账号上发布幻灯片链接，在那个链接里你们可以对幻灯片做标注，也可以向我提问。如果我们在演讲中没能回答，我会之后回复。所以你们在过去几周里听了很多关于增长的内容，对我来说，增长通常相当简单。它是两个概念或变量的互动，即转化率和流失率，对吧？这两者之间的差距基本上决定了你增长的速度。
[段 2]
And most people, especially business type people, tend to look at this interaction in terms of a very calculated and mathematical sort of way. And today I sort of want to talk about these things at a more human scale, right? Because at a startup, when you’re interacting with your users, you have a fairly intimate interaction that you have in the early stages. And so I think there’s a different way of looking at this stuff in terms of how we build our products. And we’ll look at a lot of different examples of that and how it’s executed well. My philosophy behind a lot of things that I teach startups is, the best way to get to sort of a billion dollars is to focus on the values that help you get that first dollar, to acquire that first user. If you sort of get that right, everything else will sort of take care of itself. It’s a sort of faith thing.
[译文 2]
大多数人，尤其是商业类型的人，往往以一种非常计算化、数学化的方式来看待这种互动。今天我想在更人性化的层面上谈谈这些东西，对吧？因为在创业公司里，当你和用户互动时，在早期阶段你会有相当亲密的互动。所以我认为在如何构建产品方面，有一种不同的方式来思考这些问题。我们会看很多不同的例子以及它们是如何被良好执行的。我教创业者的很多事情的哲学是，赚到十亿美元的最佳方式是专注于那些帮助你赚到第一美元、获得第一个用户的价值观。如果你做对了这一点，其他一切都会自然而然地得到解决。这是一种信念。
[段 3]
So I came to be a partner at YC by way of being an alumni. I went to the program in winter of 2006. It was the second ever program. And I built a product called Wufoo. Wufoo is an online form builder, helps you create contact forms and online surveys and simple payment forms. It’s basically a database app that looks like it’s designed by Fisher Price. What’s interesting, though, is that because it was fairly easy to use, we had customers for every industry, market, and vertical you can think of, including a majority of the Fortune 500 companies out there. Ran that company for five years, and then we were acquired by SurveyMonkey in 2013. At the time, we were a very interesting acquisition. We were only a team of 10 people at the time, and while we acquired funding out here in Silicon Valley through Y Combinator, we actually ran the company from Florida. We had no office.
[译文 3]
我通过成为校友的方式成为了 YC 的合伙人。我在 2006 年冬季参加了这个项目，那是第二届项目。我做了一个叫 Wufoo 的产品。Wufoo 是一个在线表单构建器，帮助你创建联系表单、在线调查和简单的支付表单。它本质上是一个看起来像费雪牌（Fisher Price）设计的数据库应用。有趣的是，因为它相当容易使用，我们的客户遍布你能想到的每个行业、市场和垂直领域，包括大多数财富 500 强公司。经营了五年后，我们在 2013 年被 SurveyMonkey 收购。当时，我们是一个非常有趣的收购案例。我们当时只有 10 个人的团队，虽然我们通过 Y Combinator 在硅谷获得了融资，但实际上公司是从佛罗里达州运营的。我们没有办公室。
[段 4]
Everyone worked from home, and we’re an interesting outlier. So each dot here represents a startup that was, that exited through IPO or acquisition, and we’re this outlier to the left. The bottom is the funding amount they took, and the vertical axis is the valuation of the company at the time. To sum it up, the average startup raises about $25 million, and their return to their investors is about 676%. Wufoo raised about $118,000 total, and our return to our investors is about 29,000%. So a lot of people were very interested in sort of like, what makes Wufoo a little bit different, or how do we run the company very differently? And a lot of it was focused on product. We weren’t interested in building software that, I guess, that just people wanted to use, right? That reminded you that you worked in a cubicle, because it was a database app at its sort of core. We wanted a product that people wanted to love, that people wanted to have a relationship with, and we were actually very fanatical about how we approached this idea at the point where it was almost sort of science-y sort of way.
[译文 4]
每个人都在家工作，我们是一个有趣的异常值。图上的每个点代表一家通过 IPO 或收购退出的创业公司，而我们就是左边这个异常值。底部是他们获得的融资额，垂直轴是当时公司的估值。总结一下，普通的创业公司大约融资 2500 万美元，他们给投资者的回报大约是 676%。Wufoo 总共融资约 118,000 美元，我们给投资者的回报大约是 29,000%。所以很多人对 Wufoo 的不同之处非常感兴趣，或者我们是如何以非常不同的方式运营公司的？很多都集中在产品上。我们对构建那些人们只是想用的软件不感兴趣，对吧？那些让你想起你在格子间工作的软件，因为它本质上是一个数据库应用。我们想要一个人们想要热爱、想要与之建立关系的产品，我们实际上在如何处理这个想法上非常狂热，以至于它几乎变成了一种科学化的方式。
[段 5]
So what we said was like, okay, what’s interesting about startups in terms of us wanting to create things that people love is that love and unconditional sort of feelings are things that are difficult for us to do in sort of real life. And at startups, we have to do it sort of at scale. So we decided to start off by just looking at like, okay, how does real relationship work in the real world, and how can we apply them to sort of how we run our business and sort of build our product that way. So we’ll go over basically these two metaphors. Quying new users as if we’re trying to date them, and existing users as if they’re as if we’re trying to date them, and existing users as if it was a successful marriage. So when it comes to dating, a lot of the stuff that we uncovered had to do with first impressions.
[译文 5]
所以我们说，好的，关于创业公司我们想要创造人们喜爱的东西，有趣的是，爱和无条件的情感这些事情在现实生活中对我们来说是困难的。而在创业公司，我们必须以某种规模来做这件事。所以我们决定先从思考现实世界中的真正关系是如何运作的开始，然后我们如何将它们应用到我们运营业务和构建产品的方式上。所以我们会讨论这两个隐喻。追求新用户就像我们试图与他们约会，现有用户就像一段成功的婚姻。所以在约会方面，我们发现的很多东西都与第一印象有关。
[段 6]
All of you often talk about your relationships in terms of the origin story. If I ask you to tell me about the first kiss, how you sort of met, how you proposed, these are the things that we say over and over and over again. They’re basically the word of mouth stories of our relationships. And they’re the same kinds of things that we do with companies. Human beings are relationship manufacturing creatures. We cannot help but create and anthropomorphize the things we interact with over and over again. So whether it’s the cars we drive, the clothes we wear, the tools and softwares we use, we eventually describe characteristics to it, a personality, and we expect it to behave a certain way, and that’s how we sort of interact with it. Now, first impressions are important for the starting of any relationship because it’s the one we tell over and over again, and there’s something special about how we regard that origin story.
[译文 6]
你们所有人经常用起源故事来谈论你们的关系。如果我让你告诉我关于初吻、你们如何相遇、如何求婚的，这些是我们一遍又一遍说的事情。它们基本上就是我们关系中的口碑故事。它们与我们对公司的做法是相同类型的东西。人类是关系制造生物。我们情不自禁地会创造和拟人化我们反复互动的事物。所以无论是我们驾驶的汽车、穿的衣服、使用的工具和软件，我们最终都会赋予它特征、个性，我们期望它以某种方式行事，这就是我们与它互动的方式。现在，第一印象对于任何关系的开始都很重要，因为这是我们反复讲述的故事，对于我们如何看待那个起源故事有一些特别之处。
[段 7]
I’ll give you an example, if you’re on a first date with somebody and you’re having a nice dinner and you catch them picking their nose, you are probably not going to have another date with them. But if you’re married to someone for about 20 to 30 years and you catch them on the barking larger digging for gold, you don’t immediately call your lawyer and then say, we have a problem here, I need to start drawing up papers for divorce. You shrug your shoulders and say, eh, at least he has a heart of gold. So it’s something about, at least he has a heart of gold. So something about first time interactions means that the threshold is so much lower in terms of pass fail. So in software and for most products in internet software that we use, like first impressions are pretty obvious. And they’re the things that you see a lot of companies sort of pay attention to in terms of what they send their marketing people to work on.
[译文 7]
我给你们一个例子，如果你在第一次约会中与某人共进晚餐，你发现他们在挖鼻孔，你可能不会再和他们约会了。但如果你和某人结婚 20 到 30 年，你发现他们在挖鼻孔，你不会立即打电话给你的律师说，我们这里有问题，我需要开始准备离婚文件了。你耸耸肩说，呃，至少他有一颗金子般的心。所以这是关于第一次互动的事情，这意味着通过或失败的门槛要低得多。所以在软件和我们使用的大多数互联网软件产品中，第一印象是很明显的。它们是你们看到很多公司注意到的那些事情，他们派营销人员去做的工作。
[段 8]
My argument for people who are very good at product is they discover so many other first moments and they make those something memorable. The very first email you ever get from a piece of software, what happens when you first log in, the links, the advertising, the very first time you interact with customer support. All of those are opportunities to seduce. So how did we think about making first moments on there? And we actually took this concept from the Japanese. They actually have two words for how to describe things when you’re finished with them, in terms of saying, is this a quality item? And the two words of quality are atatame hinshitsu and midiokiteki hinshitsu. And the first one means taken for granted quality, basically functionality, and the last one sort of means enchanting quality, right? Take for example a pen, right? Something has midiokiteki, right? If the weight of the pen, the way the ink flows out of it, the way it’s viewed by the people reading the handwriting from the pen is pleasurable both to the user of the pen and the people who are going to experience the byproducts of it, right?
[译文 8]
对于非常擅长产品的人来说，我的论点是，他们发现了更多其他的第一时刻，并让那些时刻变得令人难忘。你从一个软件收到的第一封电子邮件，当你第一次登录时会发生什么，链接、广告、你第一次与客户支持互动。所有这些都是诱惑的机会。我们如何看待在那里创造第一时刻？我们实际上从日本人那里借鉴了这个概念。他们实际上有两个词来描述当你完成某件事时的感受，就这东西是不是一个质量物品而言。质量的两个词是atatame hinshitsu和midiokiteki hinshitsu。第一个意思是理所当然的质量，基本上就是功能性，最后一个意思是迷人的质量，对吧？以钢笔为例，某样东西有midiokiteki，如果钢笔的重量、墨水流出的方式、阅读钢笔书写的人对它的看法对钢笔使用者和体验其副产品的人来说都是愉快的，对吧？
[段 9]
Taking it to the sort of next level. Taking it to the next level. Start with some examples. So this is Wufoo’s login link, and it has a dinosaur on it, which I think is awesome. But if you hover over it, the spec has the added benefit of having a tooltip that doesn’t explain how to log in and what it does, but basically, rawr! And what we notice about this, in early usability studies, Is this put a smile on people’s faces, like hands down, universally? And I think a lot of times when we are assessing products, we never think about, like, hey, what is the emotion on the person’s face when they interact with this? This is Vimeo’s login page. This is actually a couple iterations ago. It’s the one I find to be the most beautiful. But it lets you know that when you’re starting out on this journey with Vimeo that this is going to be something different.
[译文 9]
把它带到下一个水平。把它带到下一个水平。从一些例子开始。这是 Wufoo 的登录链接，上面有一只恐龙，我认为这很棒。但如果你悬停在上面，规格上有一个额外的好处，有一个工具提示，它不解释如何登录和它是做什么的，而是基本上是，roar！（译者注：恐龙叫声）我们在早期可用性研究中注意到，这会让人脸上露出笑容，毫不夸张地说，是普遍的。我认为很多时候当我们评估产品时，我们从未想过，比如，嘿，当他们与这个互动时，脸上的情绪是什么？这是 Vimeo 的登录页面。这实际上是几个迭代之前的版本。这是我觉得最漂亮的一个。但它让你知道，当你开始在 Vimeo 的旅程时，这将是一种不同的体验。
[段 10]
They do this all over the app. If you search for the word fart, as you scroll up and down, it makes fart noises as you do this, right? There’s something different. Like this site interacts with you. It’s a little bit magical. It’s a little bit different. And it’s something that you want to talk about. You don’t have to always do it with design. This is the sign-up form for Cork, which used to be a social network for people who love to drink wine. On it, it says: Email address. It’s also your sign-in. It has to be legit. First name: what your mom calls you. Last name: what your army buddies call you. Password: something you remember but hard to guess. Password confirmation: type it again. Think of it as a test. It’s literally a poem as you fill out the form. And this is a kind of thing where you’re like, oh, I like the people behind this.
[译文 10]
他们在整个应用中都会这样做。如果你搜索"fart"这个词，当你上下滚动时，它会发出放屁的声音，对吧？有一些不同的东西。像这个网站在与你互动。它有一点神奇。它有一点不同。这是你想要谈论的东西。你不必总是用设计来做这件事。这是 Cork 的注册表单，Cork 曾经是一个为热爱饮酒的人打造的社交网络。上面写着：邮箱地址。这也是你的登录名。它必须是合法的。名字：你妈妈叫你的名字。姓氏：你军队哥们叫你的名字。密码：你能记住但难以猜测的东西。密码确认：再输一遍。把它当作一个测试。当你填写表单时，它实际上是一首诗。这是一种让你觉得，嗯，我喜欢这背后的人。
[段 11]
I’m going to enjoy this experience. Now what does it say when you fill out a form like this on Yahoo about what the personality of this site is going to be? And what’s disappointing to me is Yahoo forces every product and service under them to use this exact same login form. Flickr, I had thought, had one of the sort of call to actions. It was, get in there! Right? This is Heroku’s sign-up page. I think this is an older version. But what’s remarkable about it is that what you start getting a feel for is like, oh, scaling up my sort of server and back-end services is as easy as just sort of dragging up and down different sort of knobs and levers. It’s going to be beautifully used and looks fairly easy to scale. This is for a room full of computer science people, I think you’ll appreciate this. This is a code editor and they only have one call to action.
[译文 11]
我会喜欢这种体验。现在当你在 Yahoo 上填写这样的表单时，它说明了关于这个网站的人格是什么？让我失望的是，Yahoo 强迫他们旗下的每个产品和服务都使用这个完全相同的登录表单。Flickr，我原以为有一个最棒的行动号召（call to action）。那是，“进去吧！“这是 Heroku 的注册页面。我认为这是一个较老的版本。但值得注意的是，你开始感受到的是，哦，扩展我的服务器和后端服务就像简单地向上和向下拖动不同的旋钮和杠杆一样容易。它会被用得很漂亮，看起来相当容易扩展。这对于满屋子的计算机科学人员，我认为你们会欣赏这个。这是一个代码编辑器，他们只有一个行动号召。
[段 12]
When the time limit is up, they say everything in terms of all the features are exactly the same except we changed the font to Comic Sans. And what they’re basically saying is like, hey, we know who our users are, who our real customers are. And they’re going to be the people who care about them. This is Hurl. This is a website for checking HTTP requests. And sometimes the places where you get errors are opportunities for first moments. If you hit a 404, this is what you get. When we need help, oftentimes what we do is we create like really beautiful marketing materials, but when you actually need documentation, we sort of skimp out on design features. And this is a point that you see happen over and over again. A company that gets this right is MailChimp, and what they did was they redesigned all of their help guides so that they looked like magazine covers.
[译文 12]
当时间限制到期时，他们说一切都完全一样，只是我们把字体改成了 Comic Sans。他们基本上在说，嘿，我们知道我们的用户是谁，我们真正的客户是谁。而他们将是那些关心这些的人。这是 Hurl。这是一个用于检查 HTTP 请求的网站。有时候你出错的地方是第一时间的机会。如果你碰到 404，你会看到这个。当我们需要帮助时，我们经常做的是创建非常漂亮的营销材料，但当你真正需要文档时，我们却在设计功能上偷工减料。这是一个你看到一遍又一遍发生的事情。一家做得对的公司是 MailChimp，他们做的是重新设计他们所有的帮助指南，让它们看起来像杂志封面。
[段 13]
And overnight, basically, readership goes up on all these features, and customer support for these things that sort of help people optimize emails goes down. Speaking of documentation, Stripe, what’s interesting about an API company is that there is no UX. The UX is actually just documentation. And there’s opportunities even in documentation, sort of the enchant and amaze. So one of the things that I love about them is their examples are wonderful, but if you’re actually sort of logged into the app, one of the things that is a super pain for most people when you’re dealing with most people’s APIs is grabbing your API credentials and keys. And what Stripe does is it says, oh, if you’re logged into the app, we automatically put your API credentials into the examples. So you only have to copy-paste once when trying to learn their API. When Wufoo wanted to launch the third version of our API, we realized that finally this is good enough that we want people to sort of build on top of it.
[译文 13]
一夜之间，基本上，所有这些功能的阅读量都上升了，而对于帮助人们优化邮件这些事情客户支持减少了。说到文档，Stripe，有趣的是对于一家 API 公司来说，没有 UX。UX 实际上就是文档。即使在文档中，也有魅力和惊叹的机会。所以我喜欢他们的事情之一是他们的例子很棒，但如果你实际登录了应用程序，当你和大多数人的 API 打交道时，对大多数人来说一个非常痛苦的事情是获取你的 API 凭证和密钥。Stripe 做的是，它说，哦，如果你登录了应用程序，我们会自动把你的 API 凭证放到例子中。所以当你学习他们的 API 时，你只需要复制粘贴一次。当 Wufoo 想要推出我们 API 的第三个版本时，我们意识到终于这足够好了，我们希望人们在上面构建。
[段 14]
We were trying to figure out like, how do we launch this out to the world that sort of has our personality behind it? Because a lot of people, they usually do things like a programming API contest and they give out iPads and iPhones and it makes you look like everyone else. And so in our company, one weird value they have, it’s a quirk of us, is that the co-founders are big medieval nuts and we would take everyone out to Medieval Times every single year on the anniversary of the founding of the company. And so we said, we have to do something in that flavor. And so we contacted the guys at Armored.com and we said, can you forge us a custom battle axe? And what we said was, if you win our programming contest, you would win one. And the result is, like, people wanted to talk about this. It was something that people wanted to work on because they wanted to be able to say, like, I’m programming for a weapon.
[译文 14]
我们在想，如何向世界推出这个带有我们个性的东西？因为很多人通常会做编程 API 竞赛之类的事情，他们送出 iPad 和 iPhone，这让你看起来和其他人一样。在我们公司，他们有一个奇怪的价值观，这是一个我们的怪癖，就是联合创始人都是中世纪迷，我们每年在公司成立纪念日都会带大家去中世纪餐厅（Medieval Times）。所以我们说，我们必须做一些那种风格的事情。所以我们联系了 Armored.com 的人，我们说，你们能给我们锻造一把定制战斧吗？我们说的是，如果你赢得我们的编程竞赛，你就会赢得一把。其结果是，人们想要谈论这个。这是人们想要参与的事情，因为他们想要能够说，我在为一件武器编程。
[段 15]
And what’s cool is we had over 25 different applications created for us of quality and quantity that we could not have paid for on the budget and the sort of time that we had for this. We got things like an iPhone app, an Android app, and WordPress plugins. And all because what we did was we changed how people want to talk about the origin story of how they’re interacting with one of our services. We can go all day long going over these examples, but I’m going to shortcut this by saying you should just subscribe to Little Big Details. It’s just basically tons of screenshots of software that’s just doing it right, that shows that they’re being conscientious of the user and the customers. When it comes to long-term relationships or marriages, the only research that we ended up having to read is the stuff that was done by John Gottman. He’s been featured in This American Life and Malcolm Gladwell’s books.
[译文 15]
酷的是，我们收到了超过 25 个不同质量的应用，数量是我们在那段时间和预算内无法支付购买的。我们得到了 iPhone 应用、Android 应用和 WordPress 插件。所有这些都是因为我们做的是改变人们想要谈论他们如何与我们的服务之一互动的起源故事。我们可以一整天都讨论这些例子，但我要捷径一下，你应该订阅 Little Big Details。它基本上是大量软件做对了的截图，表明他们在为用户和客户着想。在长期关系或婚姻方面，我们最终需要阅读的唯一研究是 John Gottman 做的事情。他在 This American Life 和 Malcolm Gladwell 的书中都有介绍。
[段 16]
He’s a marriage researcher up in Seattle, and he has an interesting parlor trick that he can do. He can watch a videotape of a couple fighting about some issue for 15 minutes and predict with an 85% accuracy rate whether that couple will be together or not or divorced in four years. If he increases that video up to an hour and asks them to also talk about their hopes and dreams, that prediction rating goes up to 94%. They show these same videotapes to marriage counselors, successfully married couples, sociologists, psychiatrists, priests, etc. And they can’t predict with random chance whether people are going to be together or not. So John Gottman understands something fundamental about how relationships work in the long term, and that basically how we fight, even in a short-term period, can indicate sort of the whole system and what it’s going to look like. And one of the surprising things he discovered is not that successfully married people don’t fight at all.
[译文 16]
他是西雅图的一位婚姻研究者，他有一个有趣的戏法。他可以看一对夫妇讨论某个问题 15 分钟的录像，以 85% 的准确率预测那对夫妇四年后会在一起还是离婚。如果他把录像延长到一个小时，并让他们也谈论他们的希望和梦想，那个预测率会上升到 94%。他们把这些同样的录像给婚姻顾问、成功已婚夫妇、社会学家、精神病学家、牧师等看。他们无法以随机概率预测人们是否会在一起。所以 John Gottman 理解了一些关于长期关系如何运作的根本性东西，基本上就是即使在短期内，我们如何争吵，也可以表明整个系统以及它会是什么样子。他发现的一个令人惊讶的事情并不是成功已婚的人根本不争吵。
[段 17]
It turns out everybody fights. And we all fight about the exact same things: money, kids, sex, time, and others. And others are things like jealousy and the in-laws. To bring this around, you can actually attribute every single one of these to problems that you see in customer support when you’re building out your products. So, this costs too much. I’m having problems with the credit card. If you’re building a service that helps people deal with their clients, they’re very sensitive about anything happening with that performance, how long you’re up and how fast. Others are, I said jealousy and in-laws, so that’s competition and partnerships. Anything weird happening there, people are going to write to you about. And the reason I like to think about this in terms of customer support is that in everyone’s processing of a conversion funnel, customer support is the thing that happens in between every one of these steps. It’s the reason why people don’t make it further down there.
[译文 17]
原来每个人都会争吵。我们都为一模一样的事情争吵：金钱、孩子、性生活、时间和其他。其他的事情是嫉妒和姻亲。说到这一点，你可以把这些问题中的每一个都归因于你在构建产品时在客户支持中看到的问题。所以，这个太贵了。我的信用卡有问题。如果你在构建一个帮助人们处理客户的服务，他们对任何影响那个性能的事情非常敏感，比如你上线多长时间和速度有多快。其他的是，我说的是嫉妒和姻亲，所以那是竞争和合作关系。任何奇怪的事情发生在那里，人们都会写信给你。我喜欢在客户支持方面思考这件事的原因是，在每个人的转化漏斗处理中，客户支持是发生在每一步之间的事情。这就是为什么人们没有进一步走下去的原因。
[段 18]
It’s the thing that prevents conversion from happening. Now, As we were thinking through all these ideas, and as we were building up the company, we realized that there’s a big problem about how everyone sort of starts their company or builds up their sort of engineering teams. And that is: there’s a broken feedback loop there. People are divorced from the consequences of their actions. And this is a result of actually the natural evolution of how most companies get founded, especially by technical co-founders. Before launch, it is a time of bliss, nirvana, and opportunity. Nothing that you do is wrong. By your hand, which you feel is like God, everything that you write, every line of code feels perfect and is a genius to you. The thing that happens is after launch, reality sort of sets in, and then all these other tasks sort of come into place that we have to deal with. Now, what technical co-founders want to do is get back to that initial state.
[译文 18]
它就是阻止转化发生的事情。现在，当我们思考所有这些想法，当我们建立公司时，我们意识到每个人都如何启动他们的公司或建立他们的工程团队有一个大问题。那就是：那里有一个断裂的反馈循环。人们与他们的行为后果脱节了。这实际上是大多数公司如何成立的自然演变，特别是由技术联合创始人成立的。在发布之前，那是一段幸福、涅槃和机遇的时期。你做的任何事情都不是错的。按照你的手，你觉得像上帝一样，你写的每一行代码对你来说都是完美的，是天才。发生的事情是发布之后，现实开始降临，然后我们必须处理的所有其他任务都出现了。现在，技术联合创始人想要做的是回到那个初始状态。
[段 19]
And so what we often do, and what we often see, is that companies start siloing off all these other things that actually is what makes a startup or a company sort of real, right? And have other people do them. In our minds, these other tasks are inferior, right? And we have other people in the company do them. And so for us, what we’re trying to figure out is: how do we change software development so that we inject some values that we don’t talk about enough? Responsibility, accountability, humility, modesty. And we call this, like a lot of other people, we had an acronym: support-driven development. It’s basically very similar to TDD or other agile practice. It’s a way of creating high-quality software, but it’s super simple. You don’t need a scrum, you don’t need a bunch of post-it notes. All you have to do is make everyone do customer support. And what you end up having is you fix the feedback loop, right?
[译文 19]
所以我们经常做，我们经常看到的是，公司开始把所有这些实际上使创业公司或公司变得真实的东西隔离起来，对吧？让别人做。在我们看来，这些其他任务是低劣的，对吧？我们让公司里的其他人来做。所以对我们来说，我们要弄清楚的是：我们如何改变软件开发，以便注入一些我们谈得不够多的价值观？责任、问责、谦逊、朴素。我们和其他很多人一样，称之为支持驱动开发。它本质上非常类似于 TDD 或其他敏捷实践。这是一种创造高质量软件的方式，但它超级简单。你不需要 scrum，你不需要一堆便利贴。你要做的就是让每个人都做客户支持。最终你会修复反馈循环，对吧？
[段 20]
The people who build the software are the ones supporting it, and you get all these sort of nice benefits as a result. So one of them is: support responsible developers and designers and people who build the stuff, they give the very best support. Now, we’re not the first person to think of this. Paul English was a big reporter of this at Kayak, and what he did was install a red customer support phone line in the middle of the engineering floor, and it would just ring customer support calls. And people would ask him often times: why would you pay engineers $120,000 or more to do something that you can pay other people a fraction of? They handle it in like a call center. And he says: well, after the second or third time that that phone rings and the engineer gets the same problem, they stop what they’re doing, they fix the bug, and we stop getting phone calls about it.
[译文 20]
构建软件的人就是支持它的人，你会得到所有这些很好的好处。所以其中一个就是：支持负责任的开发人员、设计师和构建东西的人，他们提供最优质的支持。现在，我们不是第一个想到这个的。Paul English 在 Kayak 是这个的大力倡导者，他做的是在工程楼层中间安装一条红色的客户支持电话线，它只会响客户支持电话。人们经常问他：你为什么要付给工程师 12 万美元或更多来做一些你可以以一部分价格让其他人做的事情？他们像在呼叫中心一样处理它。他说：好吧，当电话响了第二或第三次，工程师得到同样的问题，他们停止他们正在做的事情，修复 bug，我们就停止收到关于它的电话。
[段 21]
It’s a way of having QA, and a sort of nice elegant solution. Now, John Gottman talks about the reason that we often break up with one another as due to four major causes and their warning signs he calls them four horsemen, right? Criticism, contempt, defensiveness, and stonewalling. Now, criticism is basically people starting to focus not just on the specific issue at hand, but on the overarching issues, like you never listen to users, or you never think about us all the time, right? Contempt is when someone is purposely trying to insult somebody. Defensiveness is not trying to take accountability, trying to make excuses for their actions. And stonewalling is basically shutting down. Stonewalling, to John Gottman, is one of the worst things that we can do in a relationship. And often times, you know, we don’t worry much about this in customers: our criticism and contempt, right? Defensiveness, you see this all the time in companies, especially as they get older.
[译文 21]
这是一种 QA 的方式，一个非常优雅的解决方案。现在，John Gottman 谈到我们经常因为四个主要原因及其警告信号而彼此分手，他称它们为四骑士，对吧？批评、蔑视、防卫和冷战。批评基本上是人们开始不仅关注手头的具体问题，还关注总体问题，比如你从不倾听用户，或者你从不为我们着想，对吧？蔑视是当有人故意试图侮辱某人时。防卫是不愿承担责任，试图为他们的行为找借口。冷战基本上就是关闭。冷战，对 John Gottman 来说，是我们在一段关系中能做的最糟糕的事情之一。而且很多时候，你知道，我们不太担心客户：我们的批评和蔑视，对吧？防卫，你在公司里经常看到这种情况，特别是随着公司变老。
[段 22]
But stonewalling, this is something I see happen with startups all the time. You get a bunch of customers of support sort of coming in, and you just think, I don’t need to answer it. I don’t need to respond, right? And that act of just not even getting back to them is one of the worst things you can do. And it’s probably some of the biggest causes of churn in the early stages of startups. This is how support worked at Wufoo. When we were acquired, we had about 500,000 users on the system. Five million people used Wufoo forms and reports, whether they knew it or not, and all those people got support from the same ten people. And usually it was only one person dedicated support a day or any shift. It resulted in about 400 issues a week. That’s about 800 emails. But our response time from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. was between 7 to 12 minutes.
[译文 22]
但冷战，这是我看到创业公司经常发生的事情。你收到一堆客户支持请求，你只是想，我不必要回答它。我不需要回复，对吧？而不回复他们这种行为是你能做的最糟糕的事情之一。这可能是创业公司早期流失的最大原因之一。这是 Wufoo 支持工作的方式。当我们被收购时，系统上大约有 50 万用户。五百万人使用了 Wufoo 表单和报告，不管他们知不知道，所有这些人都是从同样的十个人那里获得支持的。而且通常每天或任何班次只有一个人专职支持。它每周产生大约 400 个问题。那大约是 800 封邮件。但我们从早上 9 点到晚上 9 点的响应时间是 7 到 12 分钟之间。
[段 23]
And from 9 p.m. to midnight, it was an hour. And then on the weekend, it would be no longer than 24 hours. And we carried this up all the way to scale. But a lot of people forget about, and often talk about with Airbnb, is how, like, oh, they did this interesting thing where they went up to New York and offered, like, professional photographers, and the founders would go out there and actually take pictures of people’s apartments to help them sell more, focusing on the stories around conversion. What most people don’t realize is a lot of times, when I saw Joe in the early days of Airbnb, he had a phone sort of headset stuck to his head all the time because he was doing phone support nonstop. Churn is a story that we don’t like to talk about all the time. Airbnb’s sort of growth really started picking up once they figured out how to match capacity to the demand or the phone calls they were getting into their support system.
[译文 23]
从晚上 9 点到午夜，是一个小时。然后在周末，不超过 24 小时。我们一直保持到规模。但很多人忘记的是，和 Airbnb 经常谈论的，是，比如，哦，他们做了这件有趣的事情，他们去了纽约，提供了专业摄影师，创始人会出去实际拍摄人们的公寓照片，帮助他们卖出更多，专注于转化周围的故事。大多数人没有意识到的是，很多次，当我看到 Joe 在 Airbnb 早期，他头上总是戴着一个电话耳机，因为他一直在做电话支持。流失是一个我们不喜欢一直谈论的故事。 Airbnb 的增长真正开始提速是在他们弄清楚如何将产能与需求或他们进入支持系统的电话相匹配之后。
[段 24]
At Wufoo, we actually constantly did experiments around support because we were so obsessed with it. One experiment we did was we heard Kathy Sierra do a talk about there’s a disconnect between the emotions that we have when we need help and sort of the content and the reactions we get from people, and when we get help from them, especially online, because they just don’t see all those nonverbal cues. So she said: unless there’s face recognition on the web, we’re just always going to be disconnected from our users. Our feeling was like: well, we’re not face recognition experts, but I think there’s another way of getting empathy. So as form builders, we added a drop-down. And what we said was like: hey, what’s your emotional state? And our hypothesis was that no one was going to fill this out. We basically thought: oh, okay, you know what, this is going to be pretty… this is going to be pretty a lame experiment, but we’ll see how it sort of goes.
[译文 24]
在 Wufoo，我们实际上经常围绕支持做实验，因为我们对此非常着迷。我们做的一个实验是我们听说 Kathy Sierra 做了一个演讲，关于当我们需要帮助时我们的情绪与我们从人们那里获得的反馈之间存在脱节，特别是在线的时候，因为他们只是看不到所有那些非语言线索。所以她说：除非网络上有人脸识别，否则我们总是会与用户脱节。我们的感觉是：好吧，我们不是人脸识别专家，但我认为还有另一种方式获得同理心。所以作为表单构建者，我们添加了一个下拉菜单。我们说的是：嘿，你的情绪状态是什么？我们的假设是没有人会填写这个。我们基本上认为：哦，好吧，你知道吗，这将是相当…这将是一个相当糟糕的实验，但我们看看它会怎样。
[段 25]
And it turned out the emotional state drop-down field was filled out 75.8% of the time. The browser type drop-down field, just in comparison, was filled out 78.1% of the time. So people were basically telling us: for my technical support issue, how I feel about this problem is just as important as all the technical details you need to sort of figure out how to debug it. Now, we didn’t prioritize things or triage things by emotion. And for the most part, people didn’t game the system. One of the interesting byproducts of it was that we noticed that people started being nicer to us. It was something sort of subconscious, we just were thinking like: our users are so much better now, what’s going on? And we went back and looked at the data, and we did some text analysis, and what we realized is that when it comes to only communicating with people over written words like email, there’s only three ways that you show strong emotions, right?
[译文 25]
结果是情绪状态下拉字段有 75.8% 的时间被填写。只是为了比较，浏览器类型下拉字段被填写的比例是 78.1%。所以人们基本上是在告诉我们：对于我的技术支持问题，我对这个问题的感受和你需要弄清楚如何调试的所有技术细节一样重要。现在，我们没有按情绪来优先排序或分流。在大多数情况下，人们没有利用这个系统。其中一个有趣的副产品是，我们注意到人们开始对我们更好了。这是一种下意识的，我们只是想着：我们的用户现在好多了，发生什么了？我们回头看了看数据，我们做了一些文本分析，我们意识到的是，当只通过书面文字如电子邮件与人交流时，你有三种方式表达强烈的情绪，对吧？
[段 26]
Exclamation marks, curse words, and all caps. And sure enough, on all three of those metrics, they’ve gone down in sort of the way people were talking to us in the customer support. Once people had a simple outlet for their emotions, right, people would be a lot more rational, and it made our jobs a lot more pleasant as a result. The other byproduct that is awesome is that you actually build better software when you do this. Far better software. This is actually backed up by tons of research. Jared Spool. A user interface engineer, which is sort of the big players in this space, says there’s a direct correlation to how much time we spend directly exposed to users and how good our designs sort of get. He says it has to come in a specific way. It has to be direct exposure. It can’t be something where someone generates a report or through a graph. You have to be interacting with them somewhat real time.
[译文 26]
感叹号、脏话和全大写。确实，在这三个指标上，人们在客户支持中与我们交谈的方式都下降了。一旦人们有一个简单的情绪出口，对吧，人们会变得更加理性，这使得我们的工作作为结果是愉快得多。另一个很棒的副产品是，当你这样做时，你实际上会构建更好的软件。更好的软件。这实际上有大量研究支持。Jared Spool。是一位用户界面工程师，这是这个领域的大玩家，他说，我们直接接触用户的时间与我们设计变得有多好之间有直接相关性。他说它必须以特定方式出现。它必须是直接接触。不能是有人生成报告或通过图表的方式。你必须与他们实时互动。
[段 27]
It has to be a minimum of every six weeks. It has to be for at least two hours. Otherwise, your software will get worse over time. Our developers, our people who are on Wufoo, we’re getting exposed to our users four to eight hours every single week. And what it does is it changes the way you sort of build software. Jared Spool has another way of talking about how we build products. Let’s imagine that this represents all the knowledge needed to sort of user app on a spectrum. This is like no knowledge, this is all the knowledge needed. And these two lines are pretty much your interaction with users, what you’re trying to get them to. This is currently where their knowledge point is, and this is the target knowledge point that you’re trying to get them to, to understand and use your app. The gap between those is called the knowledge gap, Jared Spool calls.
[译文 27]
它必须至少每六周一次。必须至少两个小时。否则，你的软件会随着时间变差。我们的开发人员，我们在 Wufoo 的人，我们每周都会暴露给用户四到八个小时。它改变了你构建软件的方式。Jared Spool 还有另一种谈论我们如何构建产品的方式。让我们想象这代表了用户应用程序所需的所有知识的光谱。这边是零知识，这边是所需的所有知识。这两条线基本上是你与用户的互动，你试图让他们达到的。这是他们当前的知识水平，这是你试图让他们达到的目标知识水平，以理解和使用你的应用程序。其中的差距叫做知识差距，Jared Spool 称之为。
[段 28]
And what’s interesting about this is there’s only two ways to sort of fix this. That gap represents how intuitive your app is. You either get the user to increase their knowledge, or you decrease the amount of knowledge that’s needed to use your application. And often times, as engineers and people who build and work on products, we think, let’s add new features. And new features only means let’s increase the knowledge gap. So, for us, we actually focus a lot on the other sort of direction. And so what that meant is we spent a lot of time, 30% of our engineering time, was spent on internal tools to help with our customer support stuff. But Oftentimes, it was spent helping people help themselves. Things like frequently asked questions, tool tips, things like if you just click the help link, right? Instead of taking you to the generic help documentation page, you go to the specific page where you’re looking at that’s going to be most appropriate for what you’re working on.
[译文 28]
有趣的是，这只有两种方法可以解决。这个差距代表你的应用程序有多直观。你要么让用户增加他们的知识，要么减少使用你的应用程序所需的知识量。通常情况下，作为工程师和产品工作者，我们认为，让我们添加新功能。新功能只意味着让我们增加知识差距。所以，对我们来说，我们实际上在另一个方向上投入了很多。所以这意味着我们花了大量时间，30% 的工程时间，用于内部工具来帮助我们的客户支持工作。但通常情况下，它用于帮助人们自助。比如常见问题解答、工具提示，比如如果你点击帮助链接，对吧？而不是带你到通用的帮助文档页面，你进入你正在查看的具体页面，这是最适合你正在做的事情的。
[段 29]
We redesigned our documentation over and over again. A.B. tested it constantly. One iteration of our documentation reduced customer support by 30% overnight. It’s one of those things where overnight, all the people that work on the product immediately had 30% less work to do. Now what happens if you have everyone work on customer support constantly and thinking about it in terms of a remarkable way? Well, I talked a lot about in the very beginning growth is a function of conversion and churn. This is we’ve used growth curve for the first five years, right? What’s interesting is we’ve paid no money on advertising on marketing, all of it was done by word of mouth growth. And the interaction between new users and downgrades are this. It’s so slight what it takes, that gap, making that sort of work. And what a lot of people keep forgetting is that there’s almost no difference between an increase in conversion rate, 1% increase, and a 1% decrease in churn.
[译文 29]
我们一遍又一遍地重新设计我们的文档。不断地进行 A/B 测试。我们文档的一个版本一夜之间将客户支持减少了 30%。这是一夜之间的事情，所有做产品的人立即减少了 30% 的工作。现在如果你让每个人都持续做客户支持，并以一种非凡的方式思考它，会发生什么？好吧，我在最开始谈了很多，增长是转化和流失的函数。这是我们前五年的增长曲线，对吧？有趣的是，我们没有在广告和营销上花一分钱，所有这些都是通过口碑增长完成的。新用户和降级之间的互动是这样的。它只需要那么一点点，那个差距，让那个工作起来。很多人们一直忘记的是，转化率提高 1% 和流失率降低 1% 之间几乎没有区别。
[段 30]
They do exactly the same thing to your growth. However, the latter is actually much easier to do. It’s much cheaper to do in your apps. And a lot of times we neglect this to way far along. And we usually have our B team works on these sort of products and services. This is actually not the graph that we track most of the time at Wufoo. It’s not even the one I’m proud of. This is the one I’m proud of. Because even though we had this sort of nice, awesome curve of growth, this is what allowed us to scale. Keep the company small, have an awesome culture. And that required doing a lot of these things to help people sort of do what they need. So John Gottman noticed there was a different type of behavior for relationships and why people divorce. Basically, there would be some subset of people who would stay together 10, 15 years and then all of a sudden they divorce.
[译文 30]
它们对你的增长做完全相同的事情。然而，后者实际上更容易做到。在你的应用程序中做它更便宜。很多时候我们远远忽视了这个。而我们通常让我们的 B 团队处理这些产品和服务。这实际上不是我们大多数时候在 Wufoo 追踪的图表。这甚至不是让我自豪的那个。这是让我自豪的那个。因为即使我们有这条漂亮的、很棒的增长曲线，这是让我们能够扩展的东西。保持公司小规模，有一个很棒的文化。而这需要做很多事情来帮助人们做他们需要做的事情。所以 John Gottman 注意到有一种不同类型的行为用于关系和人们为什么离婚。基本上，有一部分人会在一起 10 年、15 年，然后突然离婚。
[段 31]
And there was none of the other indicators which sort of show that this is what was going to happen. And he was looking through the data, and he realized, oh, there’s no power to this. Looking through the data and they realized, oh, there’s no passion, there’s no fire between these people. When it comes to relationships, they kind of follow the second law of thermodynamics. In a closed energy system, things tend to run down. So you have to constantly be putting energy and effort back into it. Now the way a lot of people sort of think about showing people that I care about you in products and in companies is to do things like, let’s have a blog. Let’s have a newsletter. The thing is we’d look at these rates and basically it was such a small percentage of our active users that it was like most of our users had no idea all the awesome stuff that we’re doing for them.
[译文 31]
而且没有其他指标表明这将要发生。他在看数据，他意识到，哦，这里面没有力量。看数据他们意识到，哦，这里面没有激情，没有火焰。关于关系，它们基本上遵循热力学第二定律。在封闭的能量系统中，事物往往会衰退。所以你必须不断地把能量和努力放回其中。现在很多人在产品和公司中表达我关心你的方式是想一些事情，比如，让我们有一个博客。让我们有一个通讯。事情是当我们看这些比率时，基本上它在我们活跃用户中只占很小的百分比，大多数我们的用户根本不知道我们为他们做的所有很棒的事情。
[段 32]
So we built a new tool and we called it the Wufoo Alert System, and what it allowed us to do was just timestamp every new feature that we were building for users, and then every time they would log in we would look at the difference between their login time or last login time and the new features that were implemented, and we had this message show up, hey, since you’ve been gone here’s all the awesome stuff that we did for you. Hands down, this was the most talked about feature I’ve ever had. Every time I went out to talk to users, they’d say, dude, I love this since you’ve been gone thing. Even though I pay the same amount every single month, you guys are doing something for me almost every week. And it’s totally awesome. It makes me feel like I’m getting maximum value. The other thing that we did, in addition to having everyone support the people that paid their paycheck, is have them say thank you.
[译文 32]
所以我们构建了一个新工具，我们称之为 Wufoo 警报系统，它允许我们为我们为用户构建的每个新功能加上时间戳，然后每次他们登录时我们会看他们的登录时间或上次登录时间与实现的新功能之间的差异，我们会显示这条消息，嘿，自从你离开后，以下是我们为你做的所有很棒的事情。毫无疑问，这是我曾经有过的被谈论最多的功能。每次我出去与用户交谈，他们都会说，伙计，我喜欢这个"自从你离开后"的东西。即使我每个月支付相同的金额，你们几乎每周都在为我做些什么。这太棒了。它让我觉得我在获得最大价值。我们做的另一件事，除了让每个人支持那些支付他们薪水的人，是让他们说谢谢。
[段 33]
And this was a large part due to us injecting sort of humility and modesty into sort of the equation. Every single Friday, we would get together and we’d just write simple handwritten thank you cards to our users. And I know there’s tons of people who would not be sort of excited about doing this, but it was a ritual that made sort of all the difference in terms of like having a team that was very tightly knit also and working on stuff that they really cared about. They always constantly knew what the mission was for and why we sort of did what we did. These aren’t fancy thank you cards, right? They’re just simple, like, handwritten stuff on an index card. We threw in a sticker and slapped on a dinosaur on the front of it. And what’s interesting is we started this practice as a result of the early days of starting Wufoo. So Chris, Ryan, and I were talking, and we’re trying to figure out what are we going to do to sort of show our users that we appreciate them around Christmas.
[译文 33]
这在很大程度上是因为我们在等式中注入了谦逊和朴素。每个星期五，我们会聚在一起，我们只会写简单的亲笔手写感谢卡给我们的用户。我知道有很多人会对此不太兴奋，但这是一种仪式，在拥有一个非常紧密联系、从事他们真正关心的工作的团队方面产生了所有不同。他们总是不断地知道使命是什么，以及为什么我们做我们所做的事情。这些不是花哨的感谢卡，对吧？它们只是简单的，比如，在索引卡上手写的东西。我们放入一张贴纸，在正面贴上一只恐龙。有趣的是，我们开始这个做法是因为早期创立 Wufoo 的日子。所以 Chris、Ryan 和我在聊天，我们试图弄清楚我们要做什么来向我们的用户表达我们在圣诞节左右感谢他们。
[段 34]
And Chris came up with this idea where he said, hey, guys, so a couple years ago, my mom made me write thank you notes to all my relatives for my Christmas gifts. And I didn’t really like to do it, but the following year, all my presents were super good. So I think we should try this for our business and see how it goes. So that first year we wrote handwritten Christmas cards to all of our users. That first year, second year rolls around and we have too many customers and it’s still just the three founders, and we were going like we’re kind of screwed. I don’t know what we’re going to do. And we read a book called The Ultimate Question. And in it, he talks about, hey, just focus on your most profitable users. If you just send them and take care of them, things will work out. So we’re like, all right, that makes sense.
[译文 34]
Chris 想出了这个主意，他说，嘿，伙计们，几年前，我妈妈让我为我所有的亲戚的圣诞礼物写感谢信。我真的不喜欢做，但第二年，我所有的礼物都特别好。所以我认为我们应该为我们的业务尝试这个，看看会怎样。所以第一年我们给所有用户写了手写圣诞卡。第一年，第二年到来，我们有太多客户，而且仍然是三个创始人，我们当时就像我们要完蛋了。我不知道我们要做什么。我们读了一本叫《终极问题》的书。在里面，他谈到，嘿，只关注你最有利可图的用户。如果你只给他们发消息并照顾他们，事情就会解决的。所以我们说，好吧，这说得通。
[段 35]
That’s scalable. So that year, we only write to our highest paying customers. And the January rolls around that second year. And one of our longtime loyal users writes us. And he’s basically like, thank you so much for writing me this note. I really appreciate it. I want you to know that even though I’m a very small customer, I’m going to upgrade to your highest plan. And I just want to contribute more because you clearly care about me. And the thing is, I had never met this person before. And they sent me an email and I had no idea who they were. So I wrote back and said, hey, I just want to let you know, we actually don’t write to you because you’re small, we write to our highest paying customers. So I’m not sure if you’re upgraded or not, but we actually didn’t write to you because we thought you were small. And they wrote back and said, well, I just want you to know, I don’t care what you think of me.
[译文 35]
这是可扩展的。所以那一年，我们只写给我们付费最高的客户。第二年的一月份到来了。我们一个长期的忠实用户给我们写信。他基本上是说，非常感谢你给我写这张纸条。我真的很感激。我想让你知道，即使我是一个很小的客户，我也要升级到你们的最高计划。我只是想贡献更多，因为你们明显关心我。事情是，我以前从未见过这个人。他们给我发了邮件，我根本不知道他们是谁。所以我回信说，嘿，我只想让你知道，我们实际上不是因为你小才给你写信的，我们写给我们付费最高的客户。所以我不确定你是否升级了，但我们实际上不是因为我们认为你小才给你写信的。他们回信说，好吧，我只想让你知道，我不在乎你怎么看我。
[段 36]
I care what you think of me. And I upgraded anyway, because I thought it was the nicest thing anyone’s ever done for me. And the thing is, this happens all the time. And the reason why I bring this up is because I think a lot of times we think about scaling and we think about building things that can scale. And what we forget is that humanity scales. And it scales in a way that the things that we do for people, even the smallest things, sometimes can mean the absolute world to them. And so what we ended up doing was we actually started writing to all of our customers again. But we made it into a ritual. And what I mean by that is we made it a ritual that all of us participate in. Every single Friday, we would get together, and we’d just write these simple handwritten thank you cards. And I know there’s tons of people who would not be sort of excited about doing this, but it was a ritual that made sort of all the difference in terms of like having a team that was very tightly knit also and working on stuff that they really cared about.
[译文 36]
我在乎你怎么看我。而且我还是升级了，因为我认为这是有人为我做过的最贴心的事情。事情是，这种情况一直在发生。我提这个的原因是，因为我认为很多时候我们思考扩展，我们思考构建可以扩展的东西。我们忘记的是，人性是会扩展的。它以这样的方式扩展，我们为人们做的事情，即使是最小的事情，有时对他们来说意味着整个世界。所以我们最终做的是，我们实际上又开始给所有客户写信了。但我们把它变成了一种仪式。我的意思是，我们把它变成了一种我们所有人都参与的仪式。
[段 37]
They always constantly knew what the mission was for and why we sort of did what we did. These aren’t fancy thank you cards, right? They’re just simple, like, handwritten stuff on an index card. We threw in a sticker and slapped on a dinosaur on the front of it. And what’s interesting is we started this practice as a result of the early days of starting Wufoo. So Chris, Ryan, and I were talking, and we’re trying to figure out what are we going to do to sort of show our users that we appreciate them around Christmas. And Chris came up with this idea where he said, hey, guys, so a couple years ago, my mom made me write thank you notes to all my relatives for my Christmas gifts. And I didn’t really like to do it, but the following year, all my presents were super good. So I think we should try this for our business and see how it goes.
[译文 37]
嘿，伙计们，我真的很喜欢你们第一年寄给我的圣诞卡，我只是想让你们知道，我还没有收到我的第二张卡，我只是期待着它。我知道你们没有忘记我。非常感谢。所以我们当时想，去他的。因为 exceed expectations 的最好方式不是一开始就发送任何东西。所以我们有点陷入了这个困境。我们在思考了一段时间后决定，我们需要停止只在一年一次做这个。
[段 38]
So that first year we wrote handwritten Christmas cards to all of our users. That first year, second year rolls around and we have too many customers and it’s still just the three founders, and we were going like we’re kind of screwed. I don’t know what we’re going to do. And we read a book called The Ultimate Question. And in it, he talks about, hey, just focus on your most profitable users. If you just send them and take care of them, things will work out. So we’re like, all right, that makes sense. That’s scalable. So that year, we only write to our highest paying customers. And the January rolls around that second year. And one of our longtime loyal users writes us. And he’s basically like, thank you so much for writing me this note. I really appreciate it. I want you to know that even though I’m a very small customer, I’m going to upgrade to your highest plan.
[译文 38]
它需要成为文化的一部分。它每周都会发生。即使我们永远赶不上所有客户，只是做这件事的实践就会产生所有不同。我谈了很多关于甜蜜的事情和我认为很多工程师不太喜欢思考的感性东西。所以我会以一些硬性的业务数据或研究结束。几年前《哈佛商业评论》上有一篇 Michael Treacy 和 Fred Wazirma 的文章，在里面他们谈论市场领导者的纪律。他们说只有三种方式可以实现市场主导地位。他们说只有三种方式让你实现市场主导地位，根据你想如何实现市场主导地位，你必须以非常具体的方式组织你的公司：最佳价格、最佳产品和最佳整体解决方案。
[段 39]
And I just want to contribute more because you clearly care about me. And the thing is, I had never met this person before. And they sent me an email and I had no idea who they were. So I wrote back and said, hey, I just want to let you know, we actually don’t write to you because you’re small, we write to our highest paying customers. So I’m not sure if you’re upgraded or not, but we actually didn’t write to you because we thought you were small. And they wrote back and said, well, I just want you to know, I don’t care what you think of me. I care what you think of me. And I upgraded anyway, because I thought it was the nicest thing anyone’s ever done for me. And the thing is, this happens all the time. And the reason why I bring this up is because I think a lot of times we think about scaling and we think about building things that can scale.
[译文 39]
如果你想成为最低价，你专注于物流，沃尔玛、亚马逊。如果你想成为最佳产品，你专注于研发。苹果通常是一个典型的例子。最佳整体解决方案，它是关于客户亲密度的。这是奢侈品牌和酒店业所遵循的路径。我喜欢这条通往市场主导地位的道路，因为第三种方式是每个人在公司任何阶段都可以做的。它几乎不需要钱就可以开始。它通常只需要一点点谦逊和一些礼貌。因此，你可以和你的市场上任何其他人一样取得成功。我要说的就这些，非常感谢。
[段 40]
And what we forget is that humanity scales. And it scales in a way that the things that we do for people, even the smallest things, sometimes can mean the absolute world to them. And so what we ended up doing was we actually started writing to all of our customers again. But we made it into a ritual. And what I mean by that is we made it a ritual that all of us participate in. Hey, guys, I really love that Christmas card you sent me the first year, and I just wanted you to know I haven’t received my second card yet, and I’m just looking forward to it. I know you didn’t forget about me. Thanks a lot. So we’re like, fuck. Because the best way to sort of exceed expectations is not to send anything to begin with. So we were like sort of in this conundrum. And what we decided after thinking about it for a while is that we need to stop doing it just one time a year.
[译文 40]
是的，让我们回答一些问题，如果你们有什么问题的话，就在那后面。有人问：当你的产品有多种不同类型的用户时，有些用户会喜欢一个东西，而另一种用户会喜欢另一个东西，你们怎么处理？我同意，有一个有趣的细微界限。我总是告诉人们的是，专注于那些最热情的人，特别是在早期阶段，对吧？无论是什么细分市场，那就是我完全专注于的人。Pinterest 的 Ben Sullivan 做的很多事情。我认为是 design bloggers，对吧？为他们调整你的东西，最终你会弄清楚会吸引很多其他人的普遍价值观。所以一次只从一个开始。你在那上面看到的很多例子，很多人犯的错误是，哦，我就让我的应用程序变得有趣。但幽默真的很难做到。当你想追求机智的东西，老实说，你必须先把功能性做对。
[段 41]
It needs to be something that’s part of the culture. It happens every sort of week, even. And even though we’ll never catch up to all of our customers, just the practice of doing it will make all the difference. I talked a lot about a bunch of lovey-dovey stuff and sort of touchy-feely things that I think a lot of engineers don’t like to think about too often. And so I’ll end on some sort of hard business data or research. There’s an article that was put out by the Harvard Business Review several years ago by Michael Treacy and Fred Wazirma, and in it they talk about the discipline of market leaders. They say there’s only three ways to achieve market dominance. They say there’s only three ways that you achieve market dominance, and depending on how you want to achieve that market dominance, you have to organize your company in a very specific way: best price, best product, and best overall solution.
[译文 41]
所以就像日本的质量，如果你没有一个 tatame，不要试图做任何机智的事情，因为它会适得其反。所以毫无疑问，我们的第一重点是让 Wufoo 尽可能易于使用，其上的任何其他东西都是锦上添花。所以我在那里再补充一下，平衡产品和增长的关系。我之前提到的那三个核心策略在这里仍然适用。找到你的核心用户群，理解他们的需求，然后通过他们传播口碑。确保你的产品易于使用，这是基础。在那之后，你可以考虑如何让你的产品更加引人注目和有趣。
[段 42]
If you want to be the best price out there, you focus on logistics, a Walmart, an Amazon. If you want to be the best product out there, you focus on R&D. Apple is usually a quintessential example of that. Best overall solution, it’s about being customer intimate. And this is the path that you see followed by luxury brands and hospitality industry. What I love about this path towards market dominance is that the third one is the only one that everyone can do at any stage of their company. It requires almost no money to get started with. It usually just requires a little bit of humility and some manners. And as a result, you can achieve the success as any other people in sort of your market. That’s all I got, thank you very much. Yeah, let’s take some questions if you guys have any, right in the back there. So what do you do when you have a product with lots of different types of users, right?
[译文 42]
关于如何在不同用户群体间找到平衡，关键是要识别出最具热情的那批用户。在产品早期，应该全力投入服务这些核心用户。随着时间推移，你会逐渐发现哪些特性是普遍适用的，能够吸引更广泛的用户群。但在那之前，不要试图取悦所有人。
[段 43]
Some users will love one thing and another type of users, right? Some users will love one thing and another will, well, another. And I agree, there’s an interesting fine line for that. What I always usually tell people is focus on the people who are the most passionate, especially in the early stages, right? Whoever, whatever niche it’s going to be, that’s who I focus on completely. Things that a lot of different products did. I think Ben Sullivan of Pinterest started off with design bloggers, right? Curtail your thing for them, and eventually you’ll figure out sort of universal values that will appeal to a lot of other people. So just start one at a time. And a lot of the examples that you see up there, a lot of people make the mistake, it’s like, oh, I’ll just make my app funny. But humor is really difficult to do. When you want to shoot for something sort of witty, and quite honestly, you have to get functionality right.
[译文 43]
在考虑添加幽默或其他特色功能之前，必须先确保基本功能完美无缺。这就像日本的工匠精神——如果基础不牢固，任何花哨的装饰都会显得华而不实。对于 Wufoo，我们始终把可用性放在第一位，其他的只是加分项。
[段 44]
So like the Japanese quality, if you don’t have a tatame on there, don’t try to do anything witty, because it will backfire on you. So hands down, our number one focus is to make it as easy to use as possible for Wufoo, and anything else on top was polish. Right here. So I’m a co-founder of Rechampel’s audio. So everybody says that focus on your product. I’m also their guy. I love to do product, and I love to make it the best. But we are at a certain point that we are focused on our product, but we don’t get like customers, right? So the second thing, so how much we should focus on product, but because we should do now marketing, we should like get some other customers and like start talking to customers. But when you are too focused on your product, like, good. When you are too focused on your product, like, this is what I’m having, right?
[译文 44]
面对产品方向的选择，我建议从小处着手。先做出最小可行的版本，用一周或两周的时间快速验证。然后根据用户的实际反馈来决定下一步。这样可以避免投入太多资源在不确定的方向上。
[段 45]
So what exactly do you guys mean when you are saying, like, focus fully on your product and give the best product? Okay, so the question sort of is, how do we balance this sort of thing where we want to be obsessed with working on product, but all the other skills and sort of tasks that are needed by a company like marketing and branding and all that stuff, and how do we sort of balance that? And the thing is like, when it starts, you’re juggling like tons of things constantly in the air. The thing is, if you’re working on products, like you should also always have this flip side is when you’re talking to users, right? And for us inside of Wufoo, the way we got people to talk to users is they just did customer support, and they got to see firsthand right away whether their feature sucked or not. And it also impacted everyone else in the company because everyone had a customer support shift.
[译文 45]
当产品遇到问题时，最好的方法就是直接与用户沟通。在 Wufoo，我们让每个员工都参与客户支持工作，这样就能立刻看到功能的好坏。这种即时反馈帮助我们不断改进产品。
[段 46]
So you had this sort of social incentive to sort of make everything work. And so, like I said, there should be no point where you’re only focused on product. You should always have time where you work on product, and then you see sort of what users say to you. And you should always have this virtual feedback loop on there. So be careful when you don’t have that. Usually what ends up happening, if you’re lucky, in terms of marketing and sales, usually my feeling is you having to spend money on marketing and advertising and all that stuff, it’s usually a tax you pay because you haven’t made your product remarkable. Word of mouth growth is the easiest kind of growth, and it’s how a lot of the great companies sort of grow. So figure out how to have a story that people want to tell. How do we have a story that people want to tell about your product where they’re the most interesting person at the dinner table, right?
[译文 46]
虽然产品很重要，但也不能忽视其他方面。最好的营销其实是做出用户真正喜欢的产品，让他们自愿向朋友推荐。这比花钱做广告更有效，也更能持久。
[段 47]
And then that person is your salesperson, right? That person is your sales force for you. Right here. Right here. At the end of the day, how to make a decision where to go. So how do you make a decision on product and communicate that with your sort of engineering team when there’s like lots of different directions to go? My feeling is that so for us, we just looked at support, and it was really easy because you often just saw what are the things that people are having the most amount of problems with. People asking all the time. You cannot help but get feature requests from people. No matter like whatever opening or office you have in your product or app, people will jam feature requests in there. So you’re easily going to know what they want. Your job as a product person and engineer is to not just do what they say, because that way you’ll just be a slave.
[译文 47]
做产品决策时，我会先看支持数据。了解用户最常遇到的问题是什么，这些就是最重要的功能需求。但不能只做用户说要的，要深入理解他们为什么需要，这样才能解决根本问题。
[段 48]
It’s to figure out deeply what are the reasons why, underline those things, and solve that deep underlying reason. The thing is that if everyone wants to have a different way to go, then ultimately it comes down to someone’s going to figure something out. But also, make the smallest version of each little idea, no longer than a week or two weeks, to build it out there, and then you can try them out and see sort of what works or don’t work. I think it’s dangerous to have multiple different product directions that require lots of time to sort of figure out. Sam? Related to that, can you tell the story of how the King for a Day thing? Yeah, okay, so I don’t like hackathons. I think they sort of suck in terms of what’s done inside of companies, because you spend like 48 hours working on something really hard that you’re sort of passionate about, and 99% of them never make it to production.
[译文 48]
关于 King for a Day 这个实验，我们不是举办传统的黑客马拉松，而是让每位员工都有机会成为"国王”，决定团队在接下来一周的工作重点。这样既能收集创意，又能提高团队士气。
[段 49]
And it’s sort of super sad. So for us, we slipped it on its head, and we came up with an idea that we called King for a Day. And it actually worked over the weekend. But how it worked is someone randomly in the company got drawn, and they got to be the king. And the king got to tell everyone else what to do on the product. So everything that was bothering them about Wufoo, About the customer support stuff, or some feature they really wanted to have built, they got the engineering resources, the marketing resources, the advertising resources of everyone inside of the company to make it sort of happen. And, of course, we’d work with them to figure out like what can be actually done in 48 hours. But we would do this one to two times a year, and it was like a huge hit, and it was a boost to morale because what people most love is like working on things where it’s like, Oh, I made a difference to the app, right?
[译文 49]
我们没有采用常规的黑客马拉松形式，因为大多数项目最终都无法进入实际应用。相反，我们推出了"一日之王"的活动——每周随机选出一人，让他全权决定团队应该优先处理的事项。这样既民主又高效。
[段 50]
And so for us, that’s one way that we would like sort of divide time for like product direction. It’s like sometimes the people that work for you, they have a strong opinion about where it should go. And that’s a good way to sort of democratize it a little bit by rotating it around. Yes? You said you guys all work from home. It usually seems like a nightmare. Did that happen? How did you make that work? Okay, so we all work from home. So we’ll tell you this. We all still work within the Tampa Bay area. We would allow anybody to work from anywhere, but usually as we try to recruit them, they sort of meet our team and they just decide, okay, we just want to come and move here anyway. Remote working is especially tricky. A lot of people like to romanticize it, especially people who are like employees. But the thing is, an office gives you a lot of sort of benefits, right, and efficiencies that you now have to compensate for when you have remote working.
[译文 50]
我们采用全员远程工作模式。虽然一开始看起来有挑战，但通过明确的规则和高度自律，我们成功建立了高效的运作方式。
[段 51]
But remote working also has these other sort of efficiencies in place. For example, I don’t have to worry about my employees losing two hours of their day to commuting, for instance. So the biggest thing that we had to do for remote working is to respect people’s time. And so the way we had it set up is we actually had a four and a half day work week at Wufoo. Half day on Friday was for all the meetings and stuff. We said no biz dev meetings, no talking with other outside parties. They all have to be done on Friday, on that half day. It couldn’t be done in the middle of the week. And then also one day of everyone was already dedicated to customer support. So everyone in our company effectively only had three days each week to actually build or work on whatever they were doing. But I actually firmly believe that if you have three solid days, right, eight to ten hours, where you’re only working on what you need to build, you can get a ton of shit done.
[译文 51]
关键是尊重每个人的时间。我们采用四天半工作周，其中半天专门用于会议。这样既保证了核心工作时间，又留出充足的时间进行沟通和协作。
[段 52]
And so what we said was, you have to respect everyone’s time during that three-day period, if they’re in that three-day period. And what we came up with was a 15-minute rule. And the way it worked is, you can have a discussion, like a chat or a phone call or whatever with someone, but it could go no longer than 15 minutes. So if you have some complicated issue that you couldn’t figure out, we’d say at 15 minutes you are to immediately table that item and have us discuss it on Friday, and you need to move on to the next item on your list. And the enhanced productivity. More often than not, I would say 90% of the time the item never got brought up on Friday because usually what would happen is people would sleep on it and then they would magically say like, Hey, I found a solution, or like, Hey, that’s not a big problem whatsoever.
[译文 52]
我们制定了15分钟规则来管理讨论。任何问题如果15分钟内无法解决，就放到周五再讨论。这种方法让人们学会独立思考，大多数问题实际上不需要即时处理。
[段 53]
Because most problems inside of a company don’t need to be solved in real time or right away. The only things are when the site is down or payments aren’t working. Everything outside of that is basically kind of luxury. So focus on your priorities as much as possible. And as a result, our 10 person team did far more than many, many other companies as a result. But it takes extra work to make remote working happen. We are an extremely disciplined sort of team, and I would have to say there’s almost not many YC companies that actually have been able to replicate sort of what we do. I think there’s only two other companies in YC that sort of have the same sort of disciplined working style. It takes more work in a very different fashion, right? An office allows you to be a little bit lazier, right, in terms of all these things around productivity. Okay.
[译文 53]
这种方式确实需要更高的自律性，不是每个团队都能复制。我们可能是 YC 公司中极少数能做到这一点的。关键是建立明确的规则并坚持执行。
[段 54]
Over here. Just to build off that question, as the leader of the team, how did you manage to instill a company culture and also that have accountability for employees, especially because they’re in the same working space? Okay. How do we set up accountability for employees as a manager? All right. So at Wufoo, we were profitable nine months after launch, so we had profit sharing, right? And so it makes sense. It’s pretty simple and clear. It would be a multiple of whatever bonus pool that we sort of had, and the performance measures would be based on sort of how they did in customer support, right, on their duties there and sort of what they said they were wanting to accomplish or do. I don’t like process, and I don’t like lots of tools to help get people to be productive. So the only thing that we had for helping people manage sort of their projects is to-do lists.
[译文 54]
在 Wufoo，我们很早就实现了盈利，所以能够通过利润分享来激励团队。这种方式让每个人都有明确的动力去关注客户需求。
[段 55]
And that is like simple text files that we shared in a Dropbox account. Each person had their name on it, and you got to see every time someone updated their to-do list. What we said is every single night you just said everything that you did that day. And then on Friday we would just go over, okay, this is what you said last week that you were going to do. This is what you actually got done, or just sort of the problems at hand. And it’s super simple, right? It creates this nice written trail for how to sort of handle stuff, right? And I don’t have to worry about managing them, right? They sort of set the tone for how they want to be sort of assessed. And it makes it really simple. And for people who are excellent at what they do, right, it works very, very well. And then when you actually have problems, it’s very easy to fire people.
[译文 55]
我们用简单的 Dropbox 文本文件管理任务。每晚汇报当天完成的工作，周五回顾一周的计划与实际进展。这种透明的方式让团队成员自我管理，同时也便于追踪每个人的贡献。
[段 56]
I was fortunate that I never had to fire anyone at Wufoo, right? But we were able to correct a lot of people’s behavior very, very quickly because we just kind of look at this and it’s like, look, this is your pattern of behavior. You finish a fraction of the items on your list. You do most of the items at the last second right before Friday. That’s a problem. You’ve got to manage your time better. And this is evidence that you’ve provided to us. All we have to do is describe it back to you. And because everyone in the company sort of sees it, there’s social pressure that’s put into place that helps make it all sort of happen. Right here. How did you hire people that you felt would be able to work remotely in this kind of environment that’s not standard? So how do you hire people that can work remotely and then sort of work in this sort of fashion?
[译文 56]
招聘时，我们会让候选人完成一个月的远程项目。这样能真实评估他们的自我管理能力和工作态度。仅仅依靠面试是不够的。
[段 57]
So pretty easily you have them work on a side project for you. So you contract them out, and they have to work remotely as such. Usually the project I like to have them work on is about a month long. I could do things much faster for a week, but usually get a good sense of how well people sort of manage themselves and work on things from a project like that. So that was always the first assessment. We never did anything just by interviews. The other thing we had to sort of screen them for is their ability to do customer support because not every engineer sort of has the empathy skills to handle that stress. So sometimes I would have people write breakup letters to me, right, in an interview, and just like, hey, pretend like you have to break up with me. You have 15 minutes to write it down there. You can only write it by hand.
[译文 57]
还要评估候选人的同理心，因为不是每个工程师都擅长处理客户的情绪问题。我会让他们写一封分手信，以此判断他们的人际沟通能力。
[段 58]
What are you going to say? And so you get a good sense of sort of their writing skills because like 90% of what you do in customer support is tell them bad news. like we don’t support that feature, sorry, that’s not going to work, or it’s not going to be available. And so people have to have sort of tact at that. I have one more question. One question. Right here, the glasses. So it seems like you have all these tricks and experiments that really helped the company. Do you have any stories of ones that didn’t work out? You have all these tricks and experiments that helped the company. Are there any ones that didn’t work out? All right, I’ll talk about one. So one of the things that we did early on to try to motivate ourselves was try to get, like we understood this idea of like crunch mode and that it’s really bad for people.
[译文 58]
关于那些失败的实验，我愿意分享一些。并不是每个创意都能成功，关键是能从中学到什么。
[段 59]
Like if you’re doing a subscription business, you need people to last for the long term. And video games, a lot of times they crunch people all the time for like a specific deadline or have multiple sprints every two weeks and you have to shoot up to this deadline and it’s like exhausting. And so because what ends up happening is you might get an increase in productivity but the recovery period that you need for people is always greater than the productivity you gain. And in a company where you need everyone doing customer support and being on their game and constantly pushing out features, you don’t have time for recovery. So we were thinking about, okay, we want to build like a company vacation into how Wufoo sort of works to reward our users every single year. And we said, okay, if the vacation is sort of built in there for the recovery, we can have one crunch period, right, before that vacation set up, and we’ll just only do customer support that will sort of scale with people.
[译文 59]
我们曾尝试在发布前设置冲刺期，希望通过紧迫感来提高效率。但这种方法往往适得其反，因为团队成员需要时间恢复和调整。
[段 60]
So the way we did the very first crunch mode is that it was just between the three founders, and we had each of us draw up a ten item to-do list that would be fairly aggressive. And the first person to get through seven of their items would win, and the last person to get through seven of their items would become what we called trip bitch. And trip bitch meant that you carried the other person’s luggage and got people drinks when you’re on the company vacation. So we did that, and during that period everyone was like pretty excited about it and motivated, and in the winter we got to choose the next company vacation the following year. And then all of a sudden Ryan had basically poorly estimated the items on his list, and he realized very quickly, I’m going to fucking lose, and so he was just like, I give up, and he just sort of stopped.
[译文 60]
第一次这样做时，我们三个创始人各自准备了十项任务。第一个完成七项的人获胜，最后完成的人要负责度假时的所有杂务。结果有人因为估算失误而失去动力，整个活动反而打击了团队士气。
[段 61]
So crunch mode turned out to be blah mode for him, because he knew he was going to lose and became pretty demoralized. So as a result of doing that, we decided not to do it in that similar fashion anymore. Good idea that we like to talk about, but it’s one that we never did. Good idea that we like to talk about, but it’s one that we never did again. All right, guys, thanks a lot. You can email me at kevin at ycom.com.
[译文 61]
这个实验失败了，所以我们决定不再重复类似的做法。好的想法需要合适的执行方式。感谢大家的聆听，有问题可以发邮件到 kevin@ycom.com。
来源（替代源）：https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1c84y1R7DU/ (替代 BV1oWKpzoE1Z p7 缺失源) Source: bilibili BV1c84y1R7DU