视频信息
- 标题: 斯坦福：YC创业课 - 第06集：关于产品用户的增长问题
- BV号: BV1oWKpzoE1Z
- 时长: 47分28秒（2848秒）
- 作者: 常春藤中英字幕课
- 原始链接: B站视频
视频摘要
本视频来自斯坦福/Y Combinator创业课程第6集，Facebook增长团队前负责人分享了关于产品增长的核心方法论。演讲者从自身物理专业背景和SEO创业经历切入，核心观点是留存是增长中唯一最重要的事情——通过留存曲线判断产品市场契合度，渐近线平行于X轴代表业务可行。他强调公司需要设定北极星指标（如月活、发送数、间夜数），让全员聚焦同一目标。关于增长战术，演讲者详细分析了国际化（社区翻译实现104种语言）、病毒式传播（载荷×频率×转化率）、SEO（关键词研究+链接+站内结构）以及邮件/推送通知策略（送达性优先，触发式通知优于营销邮件）。核心结论：增长必须来自顶层推动，执行速度比完美计划更重要，我们赢是因为我们更想要它。
核心要点
留存是唯一核心：留存曲线决定产品市场契合度，渐近线平行于X轴代表可行业务；向下倾斜的曲线说明产品尚未达到PMF，不应过早追求增长黑客。
北极星指标：每家公司需定义单一核心指标（月活/发送数/间夜数/商品交易额），全员围绕该指标行动，CEO应是增长负责人而非单独成立增长团队。
神奇时刻：用户首次体验到产品核心价值的关键节点（Facebook是看到朋友的脸），增长策略应围绕快速让用户到达该时刻展开。
边际用户思维：增长应关注未达到神奇时刻的边际用户，而非已经高度活跃的超级用户；优化通知应针对流失者而非抱怨通知太多的超级用户。
国际化策略：Facebook因国际化滞后导致被各地克隆网站抢占市场，通过构建可扩展翻译基础设施（社区翻译+专业翻译）解决语言障碍。
病毒式传播框架：从载荷、频率、转化率三维度分析；Hotmail和PayPal案例表明高转化率可弥补低载荷，Facebook靠口碑而非邮件分享实现病毒增长。
SEO三要素：关键词研究（搜索量+竞争度+商业价值）、外链建设（高权威网站）、站内结构（目录/站点地图/头部标签）。
邮件/推送通知原则：送达性是基础（避免垃圾邮件IP被封），触发式通知优于营销邮件，发送用户需要但不会轰炸超级用户的内容。
视频全文转录（中英双语）
以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。
由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。
[段 1]
Thank you. Oversolved. Thank you. Cool. So you guys, this is awesome. I’ve been watching the lectures in this course. Isn’t it absolutely amazing, the content? And now you’re stuck with me today. We’ll see how that goes. So, unlike Paul when he was talking in the Q&A and you guys asked him what he’d do if he was at college today and he said physics, I actually indulged myself. I went and did physics, did physics at Cambridge. And I think physics is an amazing class to give you transferable skills that are really useful in other areas, but I guess that’s not why you’re listening to me today. Physics isn’t the class. So I paid for college doing online marketing, direct response marketing.
[译文 1]
谢谢。Oversolved。谢谢。酷。所以你们，这个太棒了。我一直在看这个课程的讲座。内容是不是绝对令人惊叹？现在你们今天要忍受我了。看看会怎样吧。所以，不像Paul在Q&A问答中说的，你们问他如果他现在在大学会学什么，他说物理，我实际上放纵了自己。我学了物理，在Cambridge学了物理。我认为物理是一门很棒的学科，能给你在其他领域非常有用的可转移技能，但我想这不是你们今天听我讲话的原因。物理不是那个课。所以我做在线营销、直复营销来付大学学费。
[段 2]
I started with SEO in the 1990s. I created a paper airplane site. I had a monopoly in the small niche market of paper airplanes globally, which when you want to start a startup, also see how big the market could be in the long term. It wasn’t great. But what that taught me was how to do SEO. And back in those days it was AltaVista, and the way to do SEO was to have white text on a white background, five pages below the fold, and you would rank top of AltaVista if you just said paper airplanes 20 or 30 times in that text. And that was how you won at SEO in the 1990s. It was a really easy, easy skill to learn.
[译文 2]
我在1990年代开始做SEO。我创建了一个纸飞机网站。我在全球纸飞机这个小众市场是垄断的，这也提醒你当你想要创业时，也要看看这个市场长期来看能有多大。那时候（市场）并不好。但那段经历教会了我怎么做SEO。而那时候（搜索引擎）是AltaVista，做SEO的方法是在白色背景上放白色文字，把内容埋在页面下方五屏的位置，只要你在这个文字里把"paper airplanes"重复二三十次，你就能排到AltaVista的顶部。这就是你在1990年代赢得SEO的方法。那真的是一项非常非常简单易学的技能。
[段 3]
When I went to college, being a physicist, I thought paper airplanes would make me cool, and I was actually the most nerdy person in the physics class, so I created a cocktail site, which was how I learned to program, and that grew to be the largest cocktail site in the UK. And that really got me into SEO properly. And that really got me into SEO properly when Google launched. So with Google you had to worry about page rank and you had to worry about getting links back to your site which basically at that stage meant one link from the Yahoo directory got you to the top listing in Google if you had white text and a white background below the fold as well.
[译文 3]
上大学时，作为一个物理学家，我以为纸飞机能让我变得很酷，而实际上我是物理课上最nerdy的人，所以我创建了一个cocktail网站，这正是我学习编程的方式，后来它发展成为英国最大的cocktail网站。这真的让我真正开始深入了解SEO。当Google推出时，这真的让我真正开始深入了解SEO。所以使用Google，你必须担心PageRank，必须担心获取外部链接指向你的网站，这在当时基本上意味着只要从Yahoo目录获得一个链接就能让你在Google上获得顶级排名，如果你还在折叠线下方使用了白色文字和白色背景的话。
[段 4]
When Google launched AdWords that’s when I really started to learn how to do online marketing and that was buying paid clicks from Google and reselling them to eBay for a small margin of like 20% using their affiliate program. And that was what really kicked me into overdrive into doing what everyone nowadays talks about as growth or growth hacking or growth marketing. And in my mind, it’s just internet marketing. Using whatever channel you can to get whatever output you want. And that’s how I paid for college and how I ended up going from being a physicist to a marketer and transitioning to the dark side of the force. So what do you think matters most for growth?
[译文 4]
当Google推出AdWords时，我才真正开始学习如何做在线营销，那就是从Google购买付费点击，然后通过他们的联盟计划以大约20%的微薄利润转售给eBay。那件事真正推动我全力以赴去做现在每个人都在谈论的增长或增长黑客或增长营销。在我看来，这其实就是互联网营销，利用任何你能用的渠道来获得你想要的任何结果。这就是我的大学学费来源，也是我从物理学家变成营销人员、转入“原力的黑暗面”的过程。那么你认为对增长来说最重要的是什么？
[段 5]
You’ve had loads of lectures and people have said it over and over. So what do you guys think matters most for growth? Someone give me an answer. Great product. Great product. I agree. Great product. What does great product lead to? Customers. Customers. And what do you need those customers to do? Spread the word. Someone said stay on your site. Someone said that. That’s it. Retention. Retention is the single most important thing for growth. Now, we have an awesome growth team at Facebook, and I’m super proud to work on it. But the truth of the matter is we have a fantastic product. But getting to work on growth at Facebook is a massive privilege because we’re promoting something that everyone in the world really wants to use, which is absolutely incredible.
[译文 5]
你们已经听过很多讲座，人们也反复说过这些。那你们觉得什么对增长最重要？有人给我一个答案。伟大的产品。伟大的产品。我同意。伟大的产品会带来什么？客户。客户。那你需要这些客户做什么？传播口碑。有人说留在你的网站上。有人这么说过。就是这个。留存。留存是增长唯一最重要的事情。现在，我们在 Facebook 有一个很棒的 growth team，我非常自豪能参与其中。但事实是我们有一个很棒的产品。但在 Facebook 从事增长工作是一种巨大的特权，因为我们在推广的东西是全世界每个人真正想要使用的，这真的很不可思议。
[段 6]
If we can get people on and get them ramped up, they stick on Facebook. So many times, like I’ve advised multiple startups, my favorite was working with Airbnb, but I’ve worked with Coursera, I’ve worked with other ones that haven’t done as well as those guys. But the one thing that is true over and over and over again is if you look at this curve, percent monthly active versus number of days from acquisition, if you end up with a retention curve that asymptotes to a line parallel to the x-axis, you have a viable business and you have product market fit for some subset of market. But most of the companies that you see fly up, who talk about growth hacking and virality and all of this other stuff, I’m going to try so hard not to swear, but it’ll happen, their retention curve slopes down towards the x-axis and in the end intercepts the x-axis.
[译文 6]
如果我们可以让用户注册并让他们上手熟悉，他们就会留在Facebook上。很多时候，就像我给多家初创公司提供过建议一样，我最喜欢的是与Airbnb合作，但也与Coursera合作过，也与其他没有像那两家公司做得那么好的公司合作过。但一次又一次反复验证的事实是，如果你看这条曲线——月活跃用户百分比与获取后天数的关系——如果你最终得到的留存曲线渐近于一条平行于x轴的直线，你就拥有了一项可行的业务，你就对市场的某个细分领域实现了产品市场契合。但大多数你看到飞涨的公司，他们谈论增长黑客和病毒式传播以及所有这些乱七八糟的东西——我会尽量不骂人，但肯定会骂——他们的留存曲线会向下倾斜趋向x轴，最终与x轴相交。
[段 7]
Now when I show this chart to most people, they say that’s all well and good. You had a million people a day in terms of growth when you started the growth team at Facebook, or you were at 50 million users. You had a lot of people joining the site, so you had a ton of data to do this. We use the same methodology for our B2B growth. Getting people to sign up as self service advertisers, we use this analysis to understand how much growth we were going to have in that market as well. And in that place, when I joined Facebook, the product was three days old. And within 90 days of the product launching, we were able to use this technique to be able to figure out what the one-year value of an advertiser was.
[译文 7]
现在当我把这张图表给大多数人看时，他们会说这确实不错。你在Facebook创建增长团队时，每天有百万级的增长，或者说你已经有5000万用户了。有很多人在加入这个网站，所以你有很多数据来做这件事。我们在B2B增长中使用了同样的方法论。让人们注册成为自助广告主，我们用这种分析来了解我们在那个市场将会有多少增长。而在那里，当我加入Facebook时，这个产品才上线三天。在产品上线90天内，我们就能够用这种技术来算出广告主的一年期价值。
[段 8]
And we predicted it for the first year to 97% of what the number turned out to be. So I think it’s very important to look at your retention curve, and this is how we did it. If you see here, this red line is number of users who have been on your product for a certain number of days. So a bunch of people, that should say zero, but a bunch of people will have been on the product, all of your users will have been on it at least one day, but if your product’s been around a year or whatever, you will have zero users who’ve been on it 366 days. Make sense? That curve’s sensible? Cool.
[译文 8]
我们第一年的预测达到了实际数字的97%。所以我认为查看你的留存曲线非常重要，这就是我们当时的方法。如果你看这里，这条红线是已经在你的产品上活跃了一定天数的用户数量。所以一群人…这应该是零，但一群人会使用这个产品，所有用户至少会活跃一天，但如果你的产品已经存在一年或更长时间，你将不会有任何用户已经活跃了366天。明白吗？那条曲线合理吗？酷。
[段 9]
So what you then do is look for all of your users who have been on your product one day, what percentage of them are monthly active? 100% for the first 30 days, obviously, because monthly active, they all signed up on one day. But then you look at 31. Every single user on their 31st day after registration, what percentage of them were monthly active? 32nd day, 33rd day, 34th day. And that allows you with only something like 10,000 customers or whatever to get a real idea of what this curve is going to look like for your product. And you’re going to be able to tell, does it asymptote? And it’ll get noisy out towards the right-hand side, like I’m not using real data.
[译文 9]
那么你接下来做的事情是找出所有在产品上活跃过一天的用户，其中有多少百分比是月活跃用户？前30天当然是100%，因为月活跃用户，他们都是在同一天注册的。但然后你观察第31天。每一个在注册后第31天的用户，有多少百分比是月活跃用户？第32天、第33天、第34天。这样你只需要大约10,000个客户或类似的规模，就能真正了解这条曲线在你的产品上会是什么样子。你就能够判断，它是否会渐近？而且越往右边它会变得越嘈杂，就像我没有使用真实数据一样。
[段 10]
It’ll get noisy out towards the right-hand side, but you’ll be able to tell. Real data, it’ll get noisy out towards the right-hand side, but you’ll be able to get a handle on does this curve flatten out or does it not? If it doesn’t flatten out, don’t go and do growth tactics, don’t go and do virality, don’t hire a growth hacker. Focus on getting product market fit. Because in the end, as Sam said at the beginning of this course, idea, product, team, execution. If you don’t have a great product, there’s no point executing well on growing it because it won’t grow. Number one problem I’ve seen inside Facebook for new products, number one problem I’ve seen for a startup I’ve advised, has been they don’t actually have product market fit when they think they do.
[译文 10]
右边的数据会变得很嘈杂，但你能判断出来。真实数据中，右边会变得很嘈杂，但你能搞清楚这条曲线是趋于平缓还是不会。如果它不会趋于平缓，就不要去做增长策略，不要去做病毒式营销，不要雇增长黑客。专注于实现产品市场契合。因为归根结底，就像 Sam 在这门课开始时说的，创意、产品、团队、执行。如果没有一个优秀的产品，就算执行得再好也无法让它增长，因为增长不起来。我在 Facebook 新产品和我辅导的初创公司中看到的最主要问题，就是当他们以为已经有了产品市场契合时，实际上并没有。
[段 11]
So the next obvious question that people ask over and over and over again is, okay, what does good retention look like? Sure, I can have 5% retention, but I’m guessing that Facebook had better than that, so that’s not going to be a successful business. And I get really pissed off when people ask me that question. Because I think you can figure it out. And I love this story, and this is like my one gratuitous story that I love that I’m throwing in here, so the rest of it may not be as gratuitous. But this is a picture that was published in Life magazine in 1950 of one of the Trinity nuclear bomb tests. And there’s a guy, Jeffrey Taylor.
[译文 11]
所以人们反复问的下一个显而易见的问题是，好的留存率是什么样的？当然，我可以有5%的留存率，但我猜Facebook的留存率比这好得多，所以那不会是一个成功的业务。当人们问我这个问题时，我真的很恼火。因为我认为你可以自己想明白。我很喜欢这个故事，这是我随意加进来的一个我喜爱的故事，所以剩下的可能就没那么随意了。但这是1950年发表在Life杂志上的一张照片，是关于一次Trinity核弹试验的。照片里有一个人，Jeffrey Taylor。
[段 12]
Who’s heard of Jeffrey Taylor? Awesome. Yes, someone’s heard of him. Jeffrey Taylor was a British physicist who ended up actually winning the Nobel Prize, and he was able to figure out from looking at this picture what the power of the atomic bomb was, the US atomic bomb. And Russians were publishing similar pictures just using dimensional reasoning. And dimensional reasoning is, I think one of the best skills that I learned during my time studying physics back in the UK. And what dimensional reasoning is, is you look at the dimensions that are involved in a problem. So you want to figure out energy, newtons, meters. Newtons are kilograms, meters, seconds to minus two. So you’ve got kilograms, meters squared, seconds to minus two.
[译文 12]
谁听说过杰弗里·泰勒？太棒了。是的，有人听说过他。杰弗里·泰勒是一位英国物理学家，最终获得了诺贝尔奖，他能够通过看这张照片计算出美国原子弹的威力。而俄罗斯人仅使用量纲分析就发表了类似的图片。量纲分析，我认为这是我回到英国学习物理期间学到的最好的技能之一。量纲分析就是，你观察问题中涉及的维度。所以你想计算能量，newtons，meters。Newton就是kilograms、meters、seconds to minus two。所以你得到kilograms、meters squared、seconds to minus two。
[段 13]
And then you try and figure out how you can get each of those numbers from what data you have. So the mass is the volume of this sphere. So that’s a meter cubed you throw in there. So you’ve got meters to the 5 over seconds to the minus 2. And he was able to use that to just figure out what the power of this atomic bomb was, what the ratios of the power were between the Russian and U.S. atomic bomb, and essentially reveal one of the top secrets that existed in the world at that time. That’s a hard problem. Figuring out what Facebook’s retention rate is is not a hard problem. How many people are there on the internet?
[译文 13]
然后你试着弄清楚如何从你所拥有的数据中得到这些数字。质量就是这个球体的体积。所以你往里面放一个立方米的物体。那么你得到的是米的5次方除以秒的负2次方。他能够利用这一点来计算这颗原子弹的当量是多少，俄罗斯和美国原子弹之间的功率比是多少，基本上揭开了当时世界上最重要的秘密之一。这是一个难题。弄清楚 Facebook 的留存率并不是一个难题。互联网上有多少人？
[段 14]
Give or take. Someone throw something out. 2.4 billion, 2.3 billion, something like that, right? Okay, Facebook’s banned in China. So what now? About 2 billion? 2 billion. So 2 billion people on the internet. Facebook in our last earnings call said something around 1.3 billion in terms of number of active users. You can divide those numbers by each other. And yeah, that won’t give you the right answer. Of course it’s not going to give you the right answer, but it’s going to give you close enough to a ballpark figure. The right answer, but it’s going to give you close enough to a ballpark figure. So similarly, if you look at WhatsApp, they’ve announced 600 million active users.
[译文 14]
大约吧。有人随便说个数字。24亿、23亿之类的，对吧？好的，Facebook在中国被禁了。那现在怎么算？大约20亿？20亿。所以互联网上有20亿人。Facebook在上次财报电话会议上说活跃用户数大约13亿。你可以用这些数字相互除一下。是的，这样算不出正确答案。当然算不出正确答案，但能给你一个差不多的大致数字。差不多的正确数字，但能给你一个大致范围。所以类似地，如果你看WhatsApp，他们宣布了6亿活跃用户。
[段 15]
How many people have smartphones? You can figure out that number. That number’s out knocking around. It can give you an idea of how many users there are. Amazon has had a pop at signing up almost everyone in the United States. You know how many people are online in the US and you’ve got a good idea of how many customers Amazon are from the numbers they throw out. Different verticals need different terminal retention rates for them to have successful businesses. If you’re in e-commerce and you’re retaining on a monthly active basis like 20-30% of your users, you’re probably going to do pretty well. If you’re in social media and your first batch of people signing up to your product are not like 80% retained, you’re not going to have a massive social media site.
[译文 15]
有多少人有智能手机？你可以算出那个数字。那个数字到处都有。它可以让你知道有多少用户。Amazon曾尝试让美国几乎每个人都注册。你知道美国有多少人上网，而且从Amazon公布的数字，你也能大致知道Amazon有多少客户。不同的垂直领域需要不同的最终留存率才能拥有成功的业务。如果你在电商领域，以月活跃用户计算，如果能保持20-30%的用户留存率，你可能会做得很好。如果你在社交媒体领域，你的第一批注册用户如果没有达到80%左右的留存率，你就不会有大型社交媒体网站。
[段 16]
And so it really depends on the vertical you’re in, what the retention rates are. What you need to do is have the tools to think about who out there is comparable and how you can look at it and say, am I anywhere close to what real success looks like in this vertical? So retention is the single most important thing for growth. And retention comes from having a great idea and a great product to back up that idea and great product market fit. The way we look at whether a product has great retention or not is whether or not the users who install it actually stay on it long term when you normalize it. Actually stay on it long term when you normalize on a cohort basis.
[译文 16]
所以这真的取决于你所在的垂直领域，以及留存率是多少。你需要做的是拥有工具来思考谁是可比的对象，以及你如何观察它并问自己，在这个垂直领域中，我是否接近真正的成功？所以留存是增长的唯一最重要的事情。而留存来自于有一个伟大的想法，以及一个伟大的产品来支撑那个想法，还有伟大的产品市场匹配。我们判断一个产品是否有良好留存的方式是，当你对它进行标准化时，安装它的用户是否长期留在上面。实际上当你在队列基础上进行标准化时，用户会长期留在上面。
[段 17]
And I think that’s a really good methodology for looking at your product and saying, OK, the first hundred, the first thousand, the first ten thousand people I get on this, will they be retained in the long run? So now how do you attack operating for growth? Let’s say you have awesome product market fit. You have built an e-commerce site and you have 60 percent of people coming back every single month and making a purchase from you, which would be absolutely fantastic. How do you then take that and say, now it’s time to scale? Now it’s time to execute was the last thing in your thought, right? And that’s where I think growth teams come in.
[译文 17]
我认为这是一个非常好的方法论，用来审视你的产品，然后问：好的，我获得的前100、前1000、前10000人，他们是否会长期留存？
那么现在你如何着手运营以实现增长？
比如说，你有了非常棒的产品市场契合度。你建立了一个电商网站，60%的人每个月都会回来从你这里购买，这绝对是非常出色的。
那么你如何在此基础上说，现在是时候扩大规模了？现在该执行了——这是你最后想到的事，对吧？
这就是我认为增长团队介入的地方。
[段 18]
Like my contrarian viewpoint or whatever is, if you’re a startup, you shouldn’t have a fucking growth team. Damn it! So close! Halfway through and I failed. You shouldn’t have a growth team. Startups should not have growth teams. The whole company should be the growth team. The CEO should be the head of growth. You need someone to set a North Star for you. Gratuitous shot of the NASA page. You need someone to set a North Star for you about where the company wants to go. And that person needs to be the person leading the company, in my opinion, from what I’ve seen. And Mark is a fantastic example of that. Back when Facebook started, lots of people were putting out their registered user numbers.
[译文 18]
就像我的反主流观点或者其他什么，如果你是一家创业公司，你不应该有个他妈的Growth团队。该死！太近了！到一半我就失败了。你不应该有Growth团队。创业公司不应该有Growth团队。整个公司应该是Growth团队。CEO应该是Growth的负责人。你需要有人为你设定一个North Star。无意义地展示了NASA页面。你需要有人为你设定一个关于公司想去哪里的North Star。而且根据我所看到的，那个人应该是领导公司的人，在我看来。Mark就是一个很好的例子。回到Facebook刚开始的时候，很多人都在公布他们的注册用户数量。
[段 19]
You’d see registered user numbers for MySpace. You’d see registered user numbers for contact. You’d see registered user numbers. Mark put out monthly active users as the number both internally he held everyone to and said we need everyone on Facebook, but that means everyone active on Facebook, not everyone signed up to Facebook. So monthly active people was the number internally and it was also the number he published externally. It was the number he made the whole world hold Facebook to as the number that we cared about. If you look at what Jan has done with WhatsApp, I think it’s another great example. He always published send numbers. If you’re a messaging application, sends is probably the single most important number.
[译文 19]
你会看到 MySpace 的注册用户数。你会看到 contact 的注册用户数。你会看到注册用户数。Mark 将月度活跃用户数作为内部指标，要求每个人都达到这个数字，并表示我们需要在 Facebook 上人人活跃，但这意味着是 Facebook 上的活跃用户，而非注册用户。所以月度活跃用户数既是内部数字，也是他对外公布的数字。这个数字让他让全世界用 Facebook 的活跃用户数来衡量我们所关心的指标。如果你看看 Jan 对 WhatsApp 做了什么，我认为这是另一个很好的例子。他始终公布发送量。如果你是一个消息应用，发送量可能是最重要的单一指标。
[段 20]
If people use you once a day, maybe that’s great, but they send one message. You’re not really their primary messaging mechanism. So Jan published the sends number. Inside Airbnb, they talk about nights booked, and they also publish that in all of the infographics that you see inside TechCrunch. They always benchmark themselves against how many nights booked they have compared to the largest hotel chains in the world. They have each of these companies a different North Star. The North Star doesn’t have to be monthly active users for every different vertical. For eBay, when I was there, it was gross merchandise volume. How much stuff did people actually buy through eBay? Everyone externally tends to judge eBay based on revenue.
[译文 20]
如果人们每天使用你一次，也许这很棒，但他们只发一条消息。你并不是他们真正的主要消息机制。所以Jan发布了发送数量。在Airbnb内部，他们谈论已预订的夜晚数，他们也在你在TechCrunch中看到的所有信息图表中发布这个数据。他们总是将自己与世界上最大的酒店连锁品牌相比已预订的夜晚数量。他们这些公司每个都有不同的北极星指标。北极星指标不一定是针对每个不同垂直领域的月活跃用户。对于eBay，当我在那里时，是总商品交易量。人们实际上通过eBay购买了多少东西？外部的人往往根据收入来评判eBay。
[段 21]
Actually, Benedict Evans has done this amazing breakdown of Amazon’s business, which is really interesting to look at their marketplace business versus their direct business. eBay is all marketplace business, right? So eBay is being judged by. All marketplace business, right? So eBay’s being judged by its revenue when it actually has 10 times or whatever more gross merchandised volume going through the site. And that was the number that eBay looked at when I was inside there and optimized for. So every different company, when it thinks about growth, needs a different North Star. But when you are operating for growth, it is critical that you have that North Star and you define it as a leader. The reason this matters is the second you have more than one person working on anything, you cannot control what everyone else is doing.
[译文 21]
实际上，Benedict Evans 对亚马逊的业务做了一个非常精彩的拆解，研究他们的 marketplace 业务与直营业务之间的差异真的很有意思。eBay 全部都是 marketplace 业务，对吧？所以 eBay 被用…全部都是 marketplace 业务，对吧？所以 eBay 被用营收来评判，但实际上通过该平台的商品成交总额是营收的 10 倍或更多。而这正是 eBay 在我任职期间所关注并优化的指标。所以每家不同的公司，在思考增长时，都需要一个不同的北极星指标。但当你在为增长而运营时，拥有那个北极星指标并由你来定义它是至关重要的。之所以这很重要，是因为一旦有超过一个人在做任何事情，你就无法控制其他人的行为。
[段 22]
Right? I promise you, having now hit 100 people I’m managing, I have no control. It’s all influence. Yes, I can say to one person, do this one thing, but then the other 99 are going to do whatever the hell they want. And the thing is, it’s not clear to everybody what the most important thing is for a company. It would be very easy inside eBay for people to say, you know what, we should focus on revenue. Or you know what, we should focus on the number of people buying from us. Or you know what, we should focus on how many people list items on eBay. And Pierre and Meg and John, those guys as various leaders always said no, it’s the amount of gross merchandise volume that goes through our site.
[译文 22]
对吧？我向你保证，我现在管的人已经达到了100个，我根本控制不了。一切都得靠影响力。是的，我可以对一个人说，做这件事，但剩下的99个人会想干什么就干什么。问题是，并不是每个人都清楚对公司来说最重要的是什么。在eBay内部，人们很容易说，你知道吗，我们应该专注于收入。或者，你知道吗，我们应该专注于从我们这里买东西的人数。或者，你知道吗，我们应该专注于在eBay上上架商品的人数。而Pierre、我和John，作为各个层级的领导者，一直在说，不，最重要的是通过我们网站的成交总额（gross merchandise volume）。
[段 23]
It’s the percentage of e-commerce that goes through our site. That is what really matters for this company. Which means when people are having a conversation, you’re not in a room, or when they’re sitting in front of their computer screen and thinking about how they build this particular product or this particular feature, they have that North Star in mind. In their head, it’s going to be clear to them that it’s not about revenue. It’s going to be clear to them that it’s not about revenue — it’s about gross merchandise volume, or it’s not about getting more registrations. Registrations don’t matter unless they become long-term active users. A great example of this was when I was at eBay in 2004, we changed the way we paid our affiliates for new users.
[译文 23]
这是指通过我们网站的电子商务百分比。这才是这家公司真正重要的东西。这意味着当人们在进行对话时，你不在房间里，或者当他们坐在电脑屏幕前思考如何构建这个特定产品或这个特定功能时，他们心里有那个北极星。在他们脑海中，他们会清楚知道这不是关于 revenue 的问题。他们会清楚知道这不是关于 revenue——而是关于 gross merchandise volume，或者这不是关于获得更多 registrations。Registrations 不重要，除非它们成为长期 active users。我 2004 年在 eBay 时就是一个很好的例子，我们改变了为新用户支付 affiliates 的方式。
[段 24]
And affiliate programs are a bit out of fashion these days, but the idea of an affiliate program is essentially you pay anyone on the internet a referral for sending traffic to your site, but it’s mostly about getting access to big marketers who do it on their own separately. And there’s some really good stories from this. We were paying for confirmed registered users. So all of our affiliates were aligned without getting confirmed registered users to the eBay site. We changed our payment model to pay for activated confirmed registered users. So you had to confirm your account and then bid on an item, or buy an item or list an item to become someone that we paid for.
[译文 24]
而且联盟项目现在有点过时了，但联盟项目的本质就是你向互联网上的任何人支付推荐费，让他们为你的网站带来流量，但这主要是为了接触到那些独立运营的大型营销人员。这其中有一些非常成功的案例。我们当时是按已确认的注册用户付费的，所以我们所有的联盟会员都围绕一个目标：获取已确认的注册用户到eBay网站。后来我们把付费模式改成了按已激活的已确认注册用户付费，所以你必须确认账户，然后出价竞拍一个商品，或者购买一个商品，或者发布一个商品，才能成为我们付费的对象。
[段 25]
Overnight, when we made that change, we lost something like 20% of confirmed registered users that were being driven by the affiliates. But the ACRUs only dropped by about 5%. The ratio of CRU to ACRU went up, and then the growth of ACRUs massively accelerated. The cause of this was if you want to drive CRUs, is if someone searches for a trampoline. If you want to drive CRUs, if someone searches for a trampoline, you land them on the registration page because they think they have to register and confirm before they get that trampoline. If you want to drive ACRUs, you land them on the search results page within eBay for trampolines so they can see the thing they want to buy, get excited about it, and register when they want to buy it.
[译文 25]
一夜之间，我们做出那个改变后，通过 affiliates 引流获得的确认注册用户损失了约20%。但 ACRUs 仅下降了约5%。CRU 与 ACRU 的比率上升了，随后 ACRUs 的增长大幅加速。原因是，如果你想驱动 CRUs，当有人搜索蹦床时，你会把他们引导到注册页面，因为他们认为必须先注册并确认才能获得那个蹦床。如果你想要驱动 ACRUs，你会把他们引导到 eBay 的蹦床搜索结果页面，这样他们就能看到想要买的东西并对它产生兴奋感，然后在想要购买时再注册。
[段 26]
And if you drive just CRUs, people don’t have an amazing magic moment on eBay when they visit the site. And that’s the next most important thing to think about. How do you drive towards the magic moment that gets people hooked on your service? So in the lecture notes for this course, I’ve stuck in a bunch of links to people I think are brilliant at all of this stuff. That retention curve I showed earlier, there’s a link to this guy, Danny Ferrante, who’s incredible talking about retention curves. The magic moment, there are two videos linked. One is Chamath talking about growth, who was the guy who set up the growth team at Facebook, and one is my friend Naomi and I talking at F8 four years ago about how we were thinking about growth back then.
[译文 26]
而且如果你只追求CRU，人们在访问eBay网站时就不会有很棒的神奇时刻。这是下一个最重要的事情需要考虑。你如何推动实现让人们沉迷于你的服务的神奇时刻？所以在这门课的课程讲义中，我插入了一些链接，指向我认为在这些方面非常出色的人。我之前展示的那个留存曲线，有一个链接到这个家伙Danny Ferrante，他在讲解留存曲线方面非常厉害。神奇时刻方面，有两个视频链接。一个是Chamath谈增长，他是在Facebook建立增长团队的那个人；还有一个是我的朋友Naomi和我在四年前的F8大会上谈我们当时如何思考增长的视频。
[段 27]
And in both of those videos, we talk about the magic moment. So what do you guys think the magic moment is for when you’re signing up to Facebook? You hit that big green button. What is the moment when users are like, aha? Mark even talked about it at the startup school a few years back. See your friends. See your friends. Simple as that. And usually it is very simple. I talk to so many companies, and they try and get incredibly complicated about what they’re doing, but it is as simple as just when you see that first picture of one of your friends. Just when you see that first picture of one of your friends on Facebook, you go, oh my God, this is what the site is about.
[译文 27]
在这两个视频中，我们都谈到了魔法时刻。所以你们认为注册 Facebook 时的魔法时刻是什么？你点击那个大大的绿色按钮的那一刻。什么时候用户会发出"啊哈"的感叹？Mark 几年前在 Startup School 也提到过这一点。看到你的朋友。看到你的朋友。就这样简单。通常这确实非常简单。我和很多公司聊过，他们试图把自己在做的事情搞得极其复杂，但实际上就是这么简单——就是当你看到你朋友的的第一张照片时。就是当你第一次在 Facebook 上看到朋友的照片时，你会说：天哪，这就是这个网站的意义所在。
[段 28]
And Zuck’s talked at Y Combinator about getting people to 10 friends in 14 days. That is why we focus on that metric. The number one most important thing in a social media site is connecting to your friends. Because without that, you have a completely empty news feed and clearly you’re not going to come back. You’ll never get any notifications. You’ll never have any friends telling you about things they’re missing on the site. So for Facebook, the magic moment is that moment when you see your friend’s face and everything we do on growth. And if you look at the LinkedIn registration flow, you look at the Twitter registration flow, or you look at what WhatsApp does when you sign up.
[译文 28]
Zuck在Y Combinator演讲时提到，要在14天内让用户结交10个朋友。这就是我们关注这个指标的原因。社交媒体网站最重要的事就是与朋友建立联系。因为如果没有这个，你的news feed就会完全空白，显然你也不会再回来了。你永远不会收到任何通知，永远不会有朋友告诉你他们在这个网站上发现了什么有趣的东西。所以对Facebook来说，magic moment就是看到朋友脸的那一刻，这也是我们在增长方面做所有事情的核心。如果你看一下LinkedIn的注册流程，或者Twitter的注册流程，或者WhatsApp在注册时的做法。
[段 29]
The number one thing all these services look to do is to show you the people you want to follow, connect to, send messages to as quickly as possible. Because in this vertical, that’s what matters. When you think about Airbnb or you think about eBay, it’s finding on eBay that unique item, that Pez dispenser or broken laser pointer that you really, really cared about and wanted to get hold of. Like when you see that collectible thing that you were missing, that is the real magic moment on eBay. When you look on Airbnb and you find that first listing that’s like a cool house that you can stay in, and when you go through the door, that’s a magic moment.
[译文 29]
这些服务的首要目标都是尽快向你展示你想关注、想联系、想发消息的人。因为在这个垂直领域，这才是最重要的。当你想到 Airbnb 或 eBay 时，在 eBay 上找到那个独特的物品，那个 Pez dispenser 或者坏掉的激光笔，你真的很想要、很想得到它。就像你看到那个一直在找的收藏品，那就是 eBay 上真正的神奇时刻。当你在 Airbnb 上找到第一个房源，就像一个很酷的房子可以住进去，当你推开门的那一刻，那就是一个神奇的时刻。
[段 30]
And similarly, on the other side, when you’re listing your house, the first time you get paid is an amazing moment. When you’re listing an item on eBay, the first time you get paid is a magic moment. You should ask Brian what he thinks, because they’ve done these amazing storyboards, which I think has been shared, of the journey through a user’s moment has been shared of like the journey through a user’s moment, a life on Airbnb and how excited it is. And he’s talking in like three lectures time. The guy’s awesome at talking about the magic moment and getting his users to feel love and joy and all this stuff. So think about what the magic moment is for your product and get people connected to it as fast as possible.
[译文 30]
同样地，反过来看，当你挂出你的房子时，第一次收到付款是一个很棒的时刻。当你在eBay上挂出一个物品时，第一次收到付款是一个很神奇的时刻。你应该问问Brian他怎么想，因为他们做了这些很棒的故事板，这些我已经分享过了，关于用户旅程的，用户在Airbnb上的生活体验，以及它有多令人兴奋。他大概花了三个讲座的时间来讲。这个家伙很擅长讲述神奇时刻，让他的用户感受到爱和快乐以及所有这些东西。所以想想你的产品的神奇时刻是什么，让人们尽可能快地与之建立联系。
[段 31]
Because then you can move up where that blue line has asymptoted. Then you can go from 50% retention to 60% retention to 70% retention easily if you can connect people with the thing that makes them stick on your site. The second thing to think about is everyone in the valley gets wrong that we optimize when we think about growth for ourselves. So my favorite example is notifications. Again, talk to lots of companies, advise lots of companies. Every single company, when they talk about notifications, goes, oh, I’m getting too many notifications. I think that’s what we need to optimize for on notifications. Okay, are your power users leaving your site because they’re getting too many notifications?
[译文 31]
因为这样你就可以沿着那条蓝色线已经渐近的位置往上移动。这样你就能轻松地让用户留存率从50%提升到60%再到70%，只要你能让用户与那个让他们留在你网站上的东西建立联系。第二个需要思考的问题是，谷里的每个人都会犯的错误——当我们在考虑自身增长时我们去优化。所以我最喜欢的例子是推送通知。再说一次，我与许多公司交流，给许多公司提供咨询。每一家公司，当他们谈论推送通知时，都会说：“哦，我收到了太多的推送通知。“我认为这就是我们在推送通知上需要优化的方向。好，你的核心用户是因为收到了太多推送通知而离开你的网站吗？
[段 32]
No. Then why would you optimize that? They’re probably grown-ups and they can use filters. What you need to focus on is the marginal user, the one person who doesn’t get a notification in a given day or month or year. Our experience of our products, and by the way, building an awesome product is all about thinking about the power user, right? Building an incredible product is definitely optimizing for the people who use your product the most, but driving growth, people who are already using your product all the time are not the ones you have to worry about. So in this Danny Ferrante video that’s linked from the lecture page, there’s also talk about our growth accounting framework that we use to think about for growth.
[译文 32]
不。那你为什么要优化那个？他们可能是成年人，他们可以使用过滤器。你需要关注的是边缘用户，那一个在特定的一天、一个月或一年中没有收到通知的人。我们对产品的体验，顺便说一句，打造一款出色的产品就是要考虑高级用户，对吧？打造一款出色的产品肯定是在优化那些最频繁使用你产品的人，但在推动增长方面，那些已经在一直使用你产品的人不是你需要担心的。所以在这个来自课程页面的链接视频中，Danny Ferrante 也谈到了我们用来思考增长的 growth accounting framework。
[段 33]
And we looked at new users, resurrected users, people who weren’t on Facebook for 30 days and came back, and churned users. And the resurrected and churned numbers for pretty much every product I’ve ever seen dominate the new user count once you reach a sensible point of growth a couple of years in, whatever. And all those users who were churning and resurrecting had low friend counts and didn’t find their friends and so weren’t connected to the great stuff that was going on on Facebook. And so the number one thing we needed to focus on was getting them to those 10 friends, getting them to whatever number of friends they needed. So think about the user on the margin.
[译文 33]
我们研究了新用户、复活用户（即30天未使用Facebook后又回来的用户）以及流失用户。几乎我见过的每个产品，一旦你进入合理的增长阶段一两年后，复活用户和流失用户的数据基本上都会超过新用户数量。那些流失和复活的用户的共同点是：好友数量很少，没有找到自己的朋友，因此没有连接到Facebook上那些很棒的内容。所以我们需要关注的头等大事就是帮助他们添加足够的好友，帮助他们达到所需的交友数量。所以要关注那些处于边缘的用户。
[段 34]
Don’t think about yourself when you’re thinking about growth. So operating for growth, what you really need to think about is what is the north star of your company? What is the one metric where if everyone in the company is thinking about it and driving their product towards that metric and their actions towards moving that metric up, you know in the long run your company will be successful. And by the way, they’re probably all correlated to each other, so it’s fine to pick almost any metric. Whichever one is the deepest that you feel the best about, That aligns with your mission and your values, probably go for that one. But realistically, daily active users fairly correlated to monthly active users.
[译文 34]
不要在考虑增长的时候想着自己。思考增长时，你真正需要想的是你公司的北极星是什么？哪个指标是最重要的？如果公司里的每个人都关注这个指标，朝着这个指标推动产品，用行动让这个指标增长，你就会知道从长远来看你的公司会成功。顺便说一下，这些指标之间往往是相互关联的，所以选择几乎任何指标都可以。你感觉最深入、最好的那个，它与你的使命和价值观一致，也许就选那个。但实际上，日活跃用户和月活跃用户基本上是高度相关的。
[段 35]
We could have gone with either one. Amount of content shared, also very correlated to how many users there are, because guess what? You add a user, they share content. So lots of things end up being correlated. Pick the one that fits with you and that you know you’re going to be able to stick with for a long time, but have a North Star. Have a North Star and know the magic moment that when a user experiences that, they will deliver on that metric for you on the North Star. And then think about the marginal user, don’t think about yourself. Those are I think the really important points when you’re operating for growth. Everything has to come from the top.
[译文 35]
我们本来可以选择两者中的任何一个。分享的内容量也与用户数量高度相关，因为你想啊？增加一个用户，他们就会分享内容。所以很多事情最终都是相关的。选择适合你的那个，而且你知道你能长期坚持的那个，但要有一个北极星指标。有一个北极星指标，并且知道那个魔法时刻——当用户体验到那个时，他们就会为你实现那个北极星指标。然后考虑边际用户，不要考虑你自己。我认为这些是在追求增长时真正重要的要点。一切都必须来自高层。
[段 36]
So the last area here is tactics, and my hope was that I could hit a few of these, and then I’ve got a list of tactics I want to go through that I’m better talking with a whiteboard and whatever on, but you can ask me questions as I’m going through on those about how they work and what goes better. But the important tactics that you need to think about are, this is a great guy by the way, Tom Fishburne, he lives in the Bay Area and he does these really cynical cartoons that I love. So let’s say you’ve found your niche market that you’re going to have a monopoly on inside the mousetrap market. It’s a silenced mousetrap for sitting under bed so that if the mice come to your bed overnight, like they can be killed without waking you up.
[译文 36]
所以最后一个领域是战术，我的希望是能够涵盖其中几个，然后我有一个战术清单想要过一遍，用白板之类的讲会更好，但我在讲的过程中你们可以问我问题，关于它们如何运作以及什么效果更好。但你需要思考的重要战术是——顺便说一句，这是一个很棒的家伙，Tom Fishburne，他住在湾区，画的这些讽刺漫画我很钟爱。所以假设你已经找到了你的细分市场，你将在捕鼠器市场中拥有垄断地位。这是一款静音捕鼠器，放在床底下，这样如果老鼠夜间跑到你床边，它们可以被杀死而不会吵醒你。
[段 37]
So that’s your niche market. And your mousetrap is better than anybody else for that market. What typically happens in Silicon Valley is everyone thinks marketers are useless. Like I thought marketers were useless when I was a physics student, so I’m sure as engineering students you must think we’re awful, awful people who aren’t useful to have around. Like, build it and they will come. That is something that is very much the mantra in the valley, and I don’t believe it’s true. I believe you actually have to work. There’s a good article, again, in the lecture page from interviewing Ben Silverman, where he talks about how the growth of Pinterest was driven by marketing. And it’s a really good article to read into.
[译文 37]
所以那就是你的细分市场。而且你的捕鼠器比任何人都更适合这个市场。在硅谷通常发生的情况是每个人都认为营销人员毫无用处。比如当我还是个物理系学生时我认为营销人员毫无用处，所以我相信作为工科学生，你们一定认为我们是可怕、可怕的人，待在身边毫无用处。比如，建好了他们就会来。这是硅谷非常流行的信条，但我不相信这是真的。我相信你实际上必须努力工作。又有一篇好文章，在讲义页面上，是采访 Ben Silverman 的，他谈到 Pinterest 的增长是如何由营销驱动的。这是一篇非常值得深入阅读的好文章。
[段 38]
I’m biased, of course. So the first tactic I want to talk about is internationalization. Facebook internationalized too late. Cheryl said it broadly in public, and I definitely agree with that. One of the biggest barriers to our long term growth and one of the biggest things we had to deal with was all the countries where there were clones. Famously, Studi Feltz had fakebook.css in their HTML, and there were a ton of sites like that out there. Whether it was Studi Feltz as a clear clone, Contactia, Mixi, Sciworld, Orkut. There were all these different social networks around the world that grew up while Facebook was focused on the U.S. And so internationalizing was an important barrier we needed to knock down.
[译文 38]
当然我有偏见。所以我想谈的第一个策略是国际化。Facebook 国际化太晚了。Cheryl 在公开场合大体上说过，我完全同意。我们长期增长的最大障碍之一，也是我们需要处理的最大问题之一，是所有那些有克隆网站的国家。著名的是，Studi Feltz 在他们的 HTML 里用了 fakebook.css，外面有大量的类似网站。不管是作为明显克隆的 Studi Feltz、Contactia、Mixi、Sciworld，还是 Orkut，当 Facebook 专注于美国时，全球各地涌现了各种不同的社交网络。因此，国际化是我们需要克服的重要障碍。
[段 39]
And knocking down barriers is often very important to think about for growth. Facebook started off as college only. So every college that it was launched in was knocking down a barrier. When Facebook expanded beyond colleges to high schools, I wasn’t at the company. But that was a company shaking moment where people questioned whether or not Facebook could actually survive, the culture of the site could survive. Then expanding from high schools to everyone, that was like just before I joined, and that was a shocking moment, and that spurred the growth on to 50 million. And then we hit a brick wall. And when we hit that brick wall, that was the point when a lot of existential questions were being asked inside Facebook about whether any social network could ever get to more than 100 million users, which sounds stupid now, but at the time no one had ever achieved it.
[译文 39]
打破壁垒对于增长来说通常是一个非常值得认真考虑的事项。Facebook最初只面向大学生。所以Facebook进入的每一所大学都是在打破一道壁垒。当Facebook从大学扩展到高中时，我还没加入这家公司。但那是一个震动公司的时刻，人们质疑Facebook是否真的能存活下去，网站的文化是否能存续。然后从高中扩展到所有人，这大约发生在我加入之前，那是一个令人震惊的时刻，推动用户增长到了5000万。然后我们撞上了一堵砖墙。当我们撞上那堵砖墙时，正是那个时候Facebook内部出现了很多关于存在性的问题——任何社交网络是否能够突破1亿用户，现在听起来很傻，但当时没有人做到过。
[段 40]
Everyone had kind of tapped out between 50 and 100 million users, and we were worried that it wasn’t possible. And that was the point at which the growth team got set up. Chamath brought a bunch of us together. He said very publicly that he wanted to find me on multiple occasions, and he probably should have done. But without Chamath, I think none of us would have stayed at the company. We were a really weird bunch of people, but it worked out. And the two things we did, I think, that really, really drove growth initially was, number one, we focused on that 10 friends in 14 days and getting users to the magic moment. And that was something Zuck drove, because we were all stuck in analysis paralysis saying, is it causation?
[译文 40]
每个人都陷入了50到100万用户之间的瓶颈，我们担心这根本不可能突破。就在那时，Growth团队成立了。Chamath把我们这些人召集在一起。他多次公开说过他想找到我，他可能早该那么做了。但如果没有Chamath，我觉得我们这帮人都不会留在公司。我们是一群非常奇怪的人，但最后还真成了。我们最初做的两件事，我认为真的真的推动了增长，第一，我们专注于10天内10个朋友，让用户达到魔法时刻。那是Zuck推动的，因为我们所有人都陷入了分析瘫痪，总在问，这有因果关系吗？
[段 41]
Is it correlation? Zach was like, you really think if no one gets a friend that they’ll be active on Facebook? Are you crazy? The second thing was internationalization. It was knocking down another barrier. And when we launched it, I think there were two things that we did really well. Number one was, even though we were late and we were stressed about being late, we took the time to build it in a scalable way. We moved slow to move fast. And you can actually hear the full story from Naomi in one of the videos linked from the lecture page. But what we did was we wrapped all the strings in the site in FBT, which is our translation script, or translation extraction script, and then we created the community translation platform so that we didn’t just have professional translators translating the site, we could have all of our users translating the site.
[译文 41]
是相关性吗？Zach就说，你真的认为如果没有人获得朋友，他们会在Facebook上活跃吗？你疯了吗？第二件事是国际化。这是打破另一个障碍。当我们发布它时，我认为我们做得很好的有两件事。第一件事是，即使我们迟了，而且因为迟到而压力很大，我们还是花时间以可扩展的方式构建它。我们放慢脚步是为了更快前进。你实际上可以从Naomi那里听到完整的故事，在讲座页面的链接视频中。但我们做的是，我们将网站上所有的字符串用FBT包装起来，这是我们的翻译脚本，或者说翻译提取脚本，然后我们创建了社区翻译平台，这样我们不仅仅是有专业翻译人员翻译网站，我们可以让所有用户翻译网站。
[段 42]
And we got French translated in 12 hours. But we managed to get, to this day, we’re now at 104 languages translated by Facebook, for Facebook. 70 of those are translated by the community. And we took the time to build something that would enable us to scale. The other thing is we prioritized the right languages. So back then, the right languages, the big four languages, were French, Italian, German, and Spanish. Figs. And Chinese, but we were blocked in China. So we focused on French, Italian, German, and Spanish. Now look at that list. That’s today’s distribution of languages. Italian isn’t on the list anymore. French and German are about to fall off. In the last year, we quadrupled the number of people on Facebook in Hindi.
[译文 42]
我们在12小时内完成了法语翻译。但我们做到了，到今天为止，Facebook已经翻译了104种语言供Facebook使用。其中70种是由社区翻译的。我们花时间建立了能够让我们规模化运作的系统。另一件事是我们优先选择了正确的语言。所以在那时候，正确的语言，也就是四大语言，是法语、意大利语、德语和西班牙语。图表。还有中文，但我们在China被屏蔽了。所以我们专注于法语、意大利语、德语和西班牙语。现在看看那个列表。那就是今天的语言分布情况。意大利语已经不在列表上了。法语和德语即将被淘汰。在过去一年里，我们在Hindi上Facebook的人数增加了四倍。
[段 43]
Quadrupled. And so building for where the world is today is an easy mistake to make, and it’s what a lot of the other social networks did. We built a scalable translation infrastructure that actually enabled us to attack all of the languages so we could be ready for where the future is going to be. And you’ll probably be able to see some stuff from our internet.org summit in India about where we want to go with language translations later today, because I think they’re talking about that stuff there. So these are the tactics I want to go through now, and I’ll stick with the whiteboard for that stuff. But I’d really encourage you guys, as I go through these, if you’ve got any questions about them, let me know.
[译文 43]
Quadrupled. 因此，为当下世界构建产品是一个容易犯的错误，这也是许多其他社交网络所做的。我们建立了一个可扩展的翻译基础设施，使我们能够应对所有语言，这样我们就能为未来的发展方向做好准备。今天晚些时候你们可能能够看到一些关于internet.org印度峰会的资料，关于我们在语言翻译方面的发展方向，因为我觉得他们会在那里讨论这些内容。所以这些是我现在要详细讲解的策略，我会继续用白板来讲这些内容。但我真的鼓励你们，在我讲解的过程中，如果你们有任何问题，请随时告诉我。
[段 44]
I think this should be like a more free-form time anyway. But I think some of these tactics are quite interesting. So virality. Yes. I think there are two ways to look at virality. There’s a great book. Whoops. The book on the right here by Adam Penenberg, Viral Loop, goes through a bunch of case studies of companies that have grown through viral marketing. And I strongly encourage you, if you’re interested in viral marketing, to get that book. I think Ogilvy and Advertising is great as well because Chapter 7, he’s like, if you can’t think of anything else, stick a car to a billboard with super glue and people will buy your super glue. And he’s got some really good creative tips in there.
[译文 44]
我想这本来就应该更自由灵活一些。但我认为其中一些策略相当有趣。说说病毒式传播。是的。我认为看待病毒式传播有两种方式。有一本很棒的书。哎呀。这里右边这本 Adam Penenberg 的书《Viral Loop》列举了大量通过病毒式营销成长的公司案例研究。如果你对病毒式营销感兴趣，我强烈建议你读读那本书。我觉得《Ogilvy and Advertising》也很棒，因为第7章，他写道，如果你想不出别的创意，就把一辆车用强力胶粘到广告牌上，人们就会来买你的强力胶。里面确实有一些非常棒的创意技巧。
[段 45]
The guy’s been dead 20 years, and I think he’s still… Everyone on my team gets both of these books when they start on my team. So virality. So Sean Park has this model that he taught… or he told us about when I joined Facebook, Which is to think about virality for a product in terms of three things. First is payload. So how many people can you hit with any given viral blast. Second, viral blast. Second, he had cooler words for these. I’m not quite as cool. Second is conversion rate and third is frequency. Payload, frequency and conversion rate. Whatever. That would have… So how many people can you hit at once is payload. How many times can you hit them per blast is frequency.
[译文 45]
这家伙已经死了20年了，但我觉得他仍然……我团队里的每个人入职时都会拿到这两本书。所以谈到病毒式传播，肖恩·帕克有一套模型……或者说是我加入Facebook时他告诉我们的。就是用三个维度来思考产品的病毒式传播。第一是Payload，也就是一次病毒传播能触达多少人。第二，病毒传播。他用的词更酷，我没他那么酷。第二是转化率，第三是频率。Payload、频率和转化率。就这样吧。那就是……一次能触达多少人就是Payload。一次传播中能触达他们多少次就是频率。
[段 46]
And what are they going to convert at? And that gives you a fundamental idea of how viral a product is. So Hotmail is the canonical example of brilliant viral marketing, right? Back when Hotmail launched, there were a bunch of mail companies that had been funded and that were throwing huge amounts of money at traditional advertising. How many people know the Hotmail story about virality? Awesome. Great. New audience. Sorry. Just two or three people will be bored. But Hotmail, back at that time, people couldn’t get free email clients, they had to be tied to their ISP. And Hotmail and a few other companies launched, and their clients were available wherever you went. You could log in via library internet or whatever, school internet, and be able to get access to that, which was a really big value proposition for everyone who wanted to access it.
[译文 46]
那么他们的转化率是多少？这让你对产品的病毒式传播程度有了基本了解。所以 Hotmail 是出色的病毒式营销的经典案例，对吧？早在 Hotmail 推出时，有很多邮件公司已经获得融资，并在传统广告上投入了大量资金。有多少人知道 Hotmail 的病毒式传播故事？太棒了。很好。新观众。抱歉，可能只有两三个人会觉得无聊。但在那个时期，人们无法获得免费的电子邮件客户端，他们必须绑定他们的 ISP。而 Hotmail 和其他几家公司推出了，他们的客户端在你去的任何地方都可以使用。你可以通过图书馆的互联网或学校互联网登录并访问，这对每个想要使用的人来说是非常大的价值主张。
[段 47]
Most of the companies went out there and did big TV campaigns and billboard campaigns and newspaper campaigns and things like that, bought a lot of advertising off Yahoo, all of those things. But the Hotmail team didn’t have as much funding, and so they had to scrabble around to figure out how to do it. So what they did was, they had to scrabble around to figure out how to do it. So what they did was add that little link at the bottom of every email that said, Sent from Hotmail, get your free email here. Now, the interesting thing is that meant the payload was low. You email one person at a time, not necessarily going to have a huge payload.
[译文 47]
大多数公司走出去做了大型电视广告活动、户外广告牌活动、报纸广告活动诸如此类的事情，在Yahoo上投入了大量广告，这些都是。但Hotmail团队没有那么多资金，所以他们不得不四处奔波想办法。所以他们的做法是，在每封邮件底部添加那个小小的链接，上面写着"Sent from Hotmail, get your free email here”。有趣的是，这意味着有效载荷很低。你一次给一个人发邮件，不一定会有巨大的有效载荷。
[段 48]
Maybe you send around some of those viral spam emails, but then I’m not sure I’ll click on your link. The frequency is high, though, because you’re emailing the same people over and over and over, which means you’re going to hit them once, twice, three times a day with that same link and really move up the impressions. And the conversion rate was also very high because people didn’t like being tied to their ISP email. And so Hotmail ended up being extremely viral because it had high frequency and high conversion rates. Another example is PayPal. PayPal is interesting because PayPal has two sides to it. PayPal has the buyer and the seller side. The other thing that’s interesting about PayPal is its mechanism for viral growth was eBay.
[译文 48]
也许你发送了一些那种病毒式垃圾邮件，但我不确定我会不会点击你的链接。不过频率很高，因为你反复反复地给同样的人发邮件，这意味着你每天会用同样的链接接触他们 once、twice、three times，真正提高印象数。而且转化率也非常高，因为人们不喜欢被绑定在他们的 ISP 邮件上。所以 Hotmail 最终变得极具病毒式传播，因为它有高频率和高转化率。另一个例子是 PayPal。PayPal 很有趣，因为 PayPal 有两边。PayPal 有买方和卖方两边。PayPal 另一个有趣的地方是它的病毒式增长机制是 eBay。
[段 49]
And so you can use all kinds of things for virality that may not look necessarily obviously viral. So PayPal, if you sent money, if you said to a seller, I am going to send you money, like, I can’t think of a higher conversion rate. Frequency was low. Payload was low. But PayPal did this thing where they gave away money when you got your friends to sign up for PayPal. And so that’s how they went viral on the consumer side. They didn’t have to do that for sellers. Because if I said, I am going to send you money via this, sellers, you will take that. And even on the consumer side, they went viral because someone said sign up for this thing and you’ll get 10 bucks.
[译文 49]
所以你可以用各种方式来实现病毒式传播，这些方式可能看起来不一定明显是病毒式的。所以 PayPal，如果你要汇款，如果你对卖家说"我要给你打钱了”，我想不出比这更高的转化率了。频率低。有效载荷低。但 PayPal 做了这样一件事：当你让朋友注册 PayPal 时，他们会送钱。这就是他们在消费者端实现病毒式传播的方式。他们在卖家端不需要这样做。因为如果我说"我要通过这个给你打钱"，卖家你会接受的。而在消费者端，他们实现病毒式传播是因为有人说"注册这个东西，你就会得到 10 块钱"。
[段 50]
Why wouldn’t you? So they were able to go viral. But in both cases, it was because their conversion rate was incredibly high on the buyer and the seller side, not because their payload and frequency was high. Make sense? So this is a really good way to look at virality if you want to say, is this product viral? Facebook was not viral via email sharing or anything like that. Facebook was purely viral by word of mouth. Because the interesting thing about PayPal and Hotmail is to use them, the first person had to send an email to someone who wasn’t on the service. With Facebook, there’s no native way to contact people who aren’t on the service.
[译文 50]
为什么不呢？所以他们才能实现病毒式传播。但在这两个案例中，这都是因为他们在买方和卖方的转化率非常高，而不是因为他们的有效载荷和频率很高。能理解吗？所以如果你想判断这个产品是否病毒式传播，这是一个很好的分析方式。Facebook不是通过邮件分享或其他类似方式实现病毒式传播的。Facebook纯粹是通过口碑实现病毒式传播的。因为PayPal和Hotmail的有趣之处在于，要使用它们，第一个用户必须向不在该服务上的人发送一封邮件。对于Facebook来说，没有原生方式可以联系不在该服务上的人。
[段 51]
And everyone thinks of Facebook as viral marketing success, and that’s actually not how it grew. It was word of mouth virality because it was an awesome product you wanted to tell your friends about. How’s everyone doing? Is this interesting? Great question, yes? So when you’re talking about this low payload in both those examples, in the later rounds as this sort of campaign or whatever you want to call it gets going, are you going to have a much higher payload as more and more people are sending Hotmails and more and more folks, and that way your payload grows and grows and grows? So the question is, in the first round it makes sense that it has a low payload, but in later rounds aren’t you going to have higher payloads as people send more and more and more emails.
[译文 51]
大家都认为Facebook是病毒式营销的成功案例，但实际上它并不是这样增长起来的。那是口碑式的病毒传播，因为它是一个很棒的产品，你想告诉你的朋友们。大家还好吗？这有趣吗？好问题，对吧？所以当你们谈论这两个例子中的低传播量时，在后面的轮次中，当这类活动或不管你想叫它什么开始运作时，随着越来越多的人发送Hotmail和越来越多的人，你们是否会有更高的传播量，这样你们的传播量是不是会不断增长？所以问题是，在第一轮时，低传播量是合理的，但在后面的轮次中，随着人们发送越来越多的邮件，你们不是会有更高的传播量吗
[段 52]
I guess in my head, well, first and foremost, I think you actually only send emails to a small number of people. So compared to like the massive viral engines that exist today, where you import someone’s entire contact book and send them all an email, or where you post to everyone’s friends on Facebook, the actual payloads are still very small, even if it’s everyone that you email on a frequent basis you hit. And I’m also thinking really per email sent out, how many people are on it. But it’s a fair point. Like, yeah, as more people get on Hotmail, they’ll send more emails, there’s more people who use email the product actually grows more and more successfully, so that’s a fair point, go for it.
[译文 52]
我想，首先也是最重要的是，我认为你实际上只给一小部分人发邮件。所以相比现在那些大规模病毒式传播引擎——比如导入某人的整个通讯录然后给他们所有人都发一封邮件，或者在 Facebook 上发布给所有人的朋友——实际的传播范围仍然很小，即使那是你频繁联系的所有人。而且我也在想，真的每发出一封邮件，上面有多少人。但这是个合理的观点。嗯，是的，随着越来越多的人使用 Hotmail，他们会发送更多的邮件，有更多的人使用 email，产品实际上会越来越成功，所以这是个合理的观点，继续吧。
[段 53]
Doesn’t point of conversion also matter so like once you click and you sign up, but if you see a billboard at it it’s more of a distance to signing up. Completely agree, that’s why, oh sorry. Doesn’t point of conversion matter as well, so on Hotmail you click to sign up, but on a billboard you have to remember the URL, go to the website, type it in, find the registration button, click register and sign up? Yes, yes, anything you can do to move friction out of the flow, and going from an offline ad to an online ad removes huge amounts of friction from the flow, obviously. Totally agree with that. One more at the back. Aren’t frequency and conversion rate related?
[译文 53]
转换节点不也很重要吗？比如你点击然后注册，但如果是看广告牌的话，注册就远多了。完全同意，这就是为什么，哦抱歉。转换节点不也很重要吗？在 Hotmail 上你点击就注册了，但在广告牌上你得记住网址，去网站，输入网址，找到注册按钮，点击注册然后注册？是的是的，任何能减少流程中阻力的做法，而从线下广告到线上广告显然是大大减少了流程中的阻力。完全同意。后面还有一位。频次和转化率不应该是相关的吗？
[段 54]
Absolutely. If you hit someone with the same promotion, I repeat, to that, aren’t frequency and conversion rate related. If you hit someone with the same email over and over and over again, or the same banner ad, this is one of the things that’s fundamental about online marketing. The same rules apply to every channel. If you hit someone with the same Facebook ad over and over and over, the more times you hit them with the same ad, the less they’ll click. That’s why we have creative exhaustion. You have to rotate creatives on Facebook. Same with banner ads. Same with newsfeed stories. The 50th time you see that IQ story in your newsfeed, you are not going to click on it.
[译文 54]
Absolutely. 如果你对同一个人使用同样的促销活动，我重复一遍，频率和转化率是相关的。如果你反复用同样的邮件，或者同样的横幅广告接触某个人，这是网络营销的基本原则之一。同样的规则适用于每个渠道。如果你反复用同样的 Facebook 广告接触某个人，同样的广告接触次数越多，他们点击的可能性就越小。这就是为什么会出现创意疲劳。你必须在 Facebook 上轮换创意素材。横幅广告也是如此。新闻推送故事也是如此。你第 50 次在你的新闻推送中看到那个 IQ 故事时，你不会点击它。
[段 55]
If you haven’t clicked on the 49 before, you’re not going to click on the 50th. The same is absolutely true with these emails. So if you send the same email over and over and over to people for an invite, or if you send the same little link at the bottom over and over and over to people for Hotmail. The PayPal one’s different because people just signed up. But yes, you will get lower conversion rate. And the more you hit someone with the same message, the less they convert. It’s fundamental across every online marketing channel. Every online marketing channel. Cool. Second way to look at virality, which I think is awesome, is by this guy, Ed.
[译文 55]
如果之前49次都没点击，第50次也不会点击。这些邮件情况完全相同。所以如果你一遍又一遍地向用户发送相同的邀请邮件，或者一遍又一遍地向用户发送相同的底部链接给Hotmail。PayPal的情况不同，因为用户刚注册。但确实，你会获得更低的转化率。你用相同信息轰炸用户的次数越多，他们转化的可能性就越低。这是每个在线营销渠道的基本原则。每个在线营销渠道。好的。第二种看待病毒式传播的方式，我认为这很棒，来自这个人Ed。
[段 56]
And Ed runs the growth team at Uber now. He was at the growth team at Facebook. He was a Stanford MBA student and did a class similar to this where they talked about virality, and they all went and built viral products, and there was a bunch of press about that, actually. And he’s brilliant at this stuff. The interesting thing about Uber is if you look at their growth team, They’re incredibly focused on drivers, because it’s a two-sided marketplace, they need drivers. That’s a huge, huge chunk of their focus as a team, even though they’ve got probably the best viral guy in the world at the company. So with virality, you get someone to contact import, let’s say.
[译文 56]
Ed现在负责Uber的增长团队。他曾在Facebook的增长团队工作。他是斯坦福大学MBA学生，曾上过一门类似的课程，讲的是病毒式营销，他们都去构建了病毒式产品，实际上那件事还引起了很多媒体报道。他在这方面非常出色。关于Uber有趣的是，如果你看他们的增长团队，他们非常专注于司机，因为这是一个双边市场，他们需要司机。作为团队，他们关注的很大一块，即使公司里可能有世界上最好的病毒式营销专家。所以，通过病毒式营销，你让某人导入联系人，比如说。
[段 57]
Then the question is, how many of those people then the question is how many of those people do you get to send imports? Then the question is to how many people? Then how many click? And you can put extra steps in this. You can put how many open, how many click, whatever. How many click? How many sign up? And then how many of those import? So essentially you want people who sign up to your site, to import their contacts. You want to then get them to send an invite to all of those contacts. You want to get it to all of those contacts, not just one of them. Then you want to get a percentage of those to click and a percentage of those to sign up.
[译文 57]
那么问题来了，这些人中有多少？然后问题是你让这些人中的多少发送导入？然后问题是发送给多少人？然后有多少点击？你可以在这里加入额外的步骤。你可以加入打开数、点击数等指标，随便加。有多少人点击？有多少注册？然后这些人中有多少导入？本质上你希望注册你网站的人导入他们的联系人。然后你希望他们向所有这些联系人发送邀请。你希望发送给所有这些联系人，而不仅仅是其中一个人。然后你希望让一定百分比的人点击，以及一定百分比的人注册。
[段 58]
If you multiply out the percents at every point in this, this is essentially where, well, this isn’t a percent, this is a number. If you multiply this out, that’s essentially the point where you get to the question of what is the K factor. So if you have when someone imports if on average they send invites to 100 people, sorry, doing that wrong, let’s say 100 people get an invite per person who imports, and then of those 10% click that gets you to 10, and then of those let’s say 50% sign up that gets you to 5, and then of those only 10 to 20% actually subsequently import, you’re going to be at a point where subsequently import, you’re going to be at a point where you’re at 0.5 to 1 as your K-factor, and you’re going to not be viral.
[译文 58]
如果你把每个节点的百分比都乘出来，这基本上就是…呃，这不是百分比，这是一个数字。如果你把它乘出来，这基本上就是引出K factor这个问题的时候。所以如果你有，当某人导入时，如果平均他们发送邀请给100个人，抱歉，我算错了，假设每个导入的人会收到100个人的邀请，然后其中10%点击，那就得到10，然后其中假设50%注册，那就得到5，然后其中只有10%到20%真正后续导入，你就会达到一个点，后续导入，你就会达到一个点，你的K-factor是0.5到1，而你将不会具有病毒性。
[段 59]
So a lot of things like Viddy are very good at pumping, or were very good at pumping out stories that got the K-factor over 1, and it’s perfectly doable to get the K-factor over 1. But if you have something that doesn’t have high retention on the back end, it doesn’t really matter. So you should look at your invite flow and say, okay, what is my equivalent of import, how many people per import are invites sent to, how many of those receive clicks, how many of those convert to my site, how many of those then import to get an idea of your K factor. But the really important thing is still to think about retention and not to think about virality and only do this after you have a large number of people retained on your product per person who signs up.
[译文 59]
所以很多产品，比如Viddy，非常擅长病毒传播，或者曾经非常擅长输出那些让K因子超过1的内容，而且让K因子超过1是完全可行的。但如果你做的事情在后端没有高留存率，那其实没什么意义。所以你应该审视你的邀请流程，问自己：我的导入量相当于什么？每次导入发送了多少邀请？其中有多少人收到了点击？有多少人转化到我的网站？又有多少人然后进行了导入？这样你就能对你的K因子有一个概念。但真正重要的是仍然要考虑留存率，而不是只考虑病毒传播，而且只有在你有大量的人均注册留存时才能这样做。
[段 60]
So a couple more things we were going to touch on: SEO, email, SMS, and push notifications. So on SEO, there are three things you need to think about. First one is keyword research. People do this badly all the time. So I launched this cocktail site that I talked to you about. I spent a year optimizing it to rank for the word cocktail making. Turns out in the UK, no one searches for cocktail making. About 500 people a month. I dominated that search term. It was awesome. Got 400 visitors a month. It was amazing. Everyone searches for cocktail recipes in the UK. And in the US, which is the biggest market, everyone searches for drink recipes.
[译文 60]
所以我们要讨论的几个其他方面：SEO、邮件、短信和推送通知。关于SEO，你需要考虑三个方面。第一个是关键词研究。人们一直在糟糕地做这件事。所以我推出了我之前跟你说的那个鸡尾酒网站。我花了一年的时间优化它，让它在cocktail making这个词上排名靠前。结果发现在英国，没有人搜索cocktail making。大约每月500人。我占据了这个搜索词的主导地位。太棒了。每月获得400访问者。太惊人了。在英国，每个人都搜索鸡尾酒食谱。而且在美国这个最大的市场，每个人都搜索饮品食谱。
[段 61]
So I optimized for the wrong word. Everyone searches for drink recipes. So I optimized for the wrong word. So you’ve got to do your research first about what you’re going to go after. So research consists of what do people search for that’s related to your site, how many people search for it, how many other people are ranking for it, and how valuable is it for you. Supply, demand, and value. Simple economics, I guess. So you do your keyword research. You figure out which keywords you want to rank for. There are great tools out there to enable you to do that. Honestly, the best is quite often the Google AdWords keyword planner tool, really. Once you’ve done that, the next most important thing is links.
[译文 61]
所以我针对的是错误的关键词。每个人都在搜索饮品配方。所以我针对的是错误的关键词。所以你必须先做调研，了解你要追求的是什么。调研包括：人们搜索哪些与你网站相关的内容，有多少人搜索，有多少其他人在做这个关键词的排名，以及它对你有多大价值。供给、需求和价值。简单的经济学，我想。所以你要做关键词调研。你找出想要排名的关键词。有很多很好的工具可以帮助你做到这一点。老实说，最棒的往往是 Google AdWords 关键词规划师工具，确实是这样。一旦你做到了，下一件最重要的事就是链接。
[段 62]
So page rank is how all of SEO essentially is driven, and Google is based on authority. Now, there’s a lot of other things in Google’s algorithm now, like do people search for your website? There’s a lot of stuff about the distribution of what the anchor text is that’s sent to your site so that if you abuse it and spam it, they can pop up with spam. White on a white background, five pages below the fold doesn’t work anymore. But the single most important thing is to get valuable links from high authority websites for you to rank in Google. Most important thing. Then you need to distribute that love inside your site by internally linking effectively.
[译文 62]
所以PageRank是SEO的根本驱动力，Google基于权威性。现在Google算法中还有很多其他因素，比如人们是否搜索你的网站。关于指向你网站的锚文本分布也有很多门道，所以如果你滥用它并发送垃圾信息，它们就会弹出垃圾内容。白底白字，放在折叠线以下五页的做法已经不管用了。但最重要的一件事是从高权威网站获取有价值的链接，让你在Google中排名。最重要的事。然后你需要通过有效的内部链接在你的网站内部分散这种价值。
[段 63]
And when I joined Facebook, we’d launched SEO in September 2007, which was before I joined. I joined November 2007. And we’d launched it and we were getting no traffic from the pages we’d launched, public user profiles. So when I went in and looked at it, the only way you could get to any public user profile was to click on the footer of the page for the about link, then click on one of the blog articles, then click on one of the authors, and then spider out through their friends to get to all their friends. Turns out that Google was like, they’ve buried these pages, they’re not very valuable, I’m not going to rank them. We made one change.
[译文 63]
当我加入 Facebook 时，我们在2007年9月就推出了SEO，这是在我加入之前。我于2007年11月加入。我们推出了它，但从我们发布的页面（公共用户个人资料）没有得到任何流量。所以当我进去查看时，你能够访问任何公共用户个人资料的唯一方式是点击页面底部的关于链接，然后点击一篇博客文章，再点击其中一个作者，然后通过他们的好友关系爬取来访问他们所有的好友。结果发现，Google 的态度是：他们埋没了这些页面，这些页面不是很有价值，我不会对它们进行排名。我们做了一个改变。
[段 64]
We added a directory so that Google could quickly get to every page on the site, and we 100xed SEO traffic. Very, very simple change. Drove a lot of upside about distributing the link club internally. And then the last thing is there’s a bunch of table stake stuff, XML sitemaps, making sure you have the right headers. It’s all covered really well online for what you want to do. I’m going to stop now and make sure, because we had a few questions, but what other questions are there? Go for it. Can we go into email? Let’s go into email. Okay, great. Email. Email is dead for people under 25, in my opinion. Young people don’t use email.
[译文 64]
我们添加了一个目录，以便谷歌能够快速访问网站上的每个页面，我们的SEO流量增长了100倍。这是一个非常简单却带来了很大收益的变化，内部大力推动链接俱乐部的分发。最后还有一些基础性工作，XML网站地图，确保你设置了正确的头部标签。这些在网上都有很好的教程介绍你该怎么做。我现在停下来，因为有几个问题，还有其他问题吗？请问吧。我们能聊一下邮件吗？让我们聊聊邮件吧。好的，很好。邮件。在我看来，25岁以下的人邮件已经死了。年轻人不使用电子邮件。
[段 65]
They use WhatsApp. They use SMS. They use Snapchat. They use Facebook. They don’t use email. If you are targeting an older audience, email is pretty successful. Email still works for distribution, but realistically, email is not that great for teenagers especially and even people at university. You know how much you use instant messaging apps and how little you use email. And you guys are probably on the high end of the scale for email because you’re in Silicon Valley. That being said, on email, the things to think about. Email, SMS, and push notifications all behave the same way. They all have questions of deliverability. So to finish first, first you have to finish. Your email has to get to someone’s inbox.
[译文 65]
他们使用WhatsApp。他们使用短信。他们使用Snapchat。他们使用Facebook。他们不使用电子邮件。如果你的目标受众是年龄较大的人群，电子邮件效果相当好。电子邮件对于分发仍然有效，但实际上，电子邮件对青少年尤其不好，对大学生也不好。你知道自己使用即时通讯应用有多少，而使用电子邮件有多少。而且你们在电子邮件使用上可能处于高端水平，因为你们在硅谷。话虽如此，关于电子邮件，需要考虑的事项。电子邮件、短信和推送通知的表现方式都相同。它们都有送达率的问题。所以要首先完成送达，首先你必须完成送达。你的电子邮件必须能够到达某人的收件箱。
[段 66]
So if you send a lot of spam and you end up with dirty IPs or you send spam from shared servers where other people are sending spam from, or you send email notifications from shared servers where other people are sending spam from, you are going to end up being put in the spam folder consistently and your email will fail completely. You may end up being blocked and have your email bounce. There’s a lot of stuff around email where you have to look. When you receive feedback from the servers you are sending email to, 500 series errors versus 400 series errors, you have to be respectful of how those are handled. If someone gives you a hard bounce, retry once or twice and then stop trying.
[译文 66]
所以如果你发送大量垃圾邮件，最终会得到肮脏的IP，或者你从共享服务器发送垃圾邮件，而其他人也在发送垃圾邮件，或者你从共享服务器发送邮件通知，而其他人也在发送垃圾邮件，你就会一直被放入垃圾邮件文件夹，你的邮件将完全失败。你可能最终被屏蔽，收到邮件退信。关于邮件有很多东西你需要注意。当你收到你发送邮件的服务器的反馈时，500系列错误与400系列错误，你必须尊重这些错误的处理方式。如果有人给你硬退信，重试一两次，然后停止尝试。
[段 67]
Because if you are someone who abuses people’s inboxes, the email companies spam folder you and it’s very hard to get out. If you get caught on a spam house link or anything like that, it’s very hard to get out. It’s really important with email that you are a high-class citizen, that you do good work with email because you want to have deliverability for the long run. That counts for push notifications and SMS too. With SMS, you can go and buy SMS traffic via grey routes with people where they’re having phones strung up, attached to a computer and pumping out SMSs. That works for a time, but it always gets shut down. And I’ve seen so many companies make these mistakes where they think they’re going to grow by using these kind of tactics.
[译文 67]
因为如果你是一个滥用别人收件箱的人，邮件公司会把你的邮件归入垃圾箱，而且很难脱身。如果你被发现使用垃圾邮件链接或类似的东西，也会很难脱身。邮件方面非常重要的一点是，你要做一个高素质的发送者，你要做好邮件工作，因为你想长期保持良好的送达率。这一点对推送通知和 SMS 同样适用。对于 SMS，你可以透过灰色渠道购买 SMS 流量，那些人把手机连接在电脑上大量发送 SMS。这在一段时间内有效，但总会被封停。我见过很多公司犯这些错误，他们以为透过使用这些策略可以实现增长。
[段 68]
If you can’t get your email. Your SMS, or your push delivered, you will never get any success from these. Push, you spam your power users. I know that’s slightly different to what I said earlier, but you actually spam your power users and give them notifications they don’t care about and make it really hard for them to opt out. So there’s no settings where they can opt out. And they start blocking you. You can never push them once they’ve opted out of your push notifications. And it’s very hard, actually, to prompt them to turn them on once they’ve turned them off. So number one thing to think about about email, SMS, and push notifications is you have to get them delivered.
[译文 68]
如果你无法让你的邮件、短信或推送通知送达，你就永远无法从中获得任何成功。推送的话，你会向你的核心用户发送垃圾信息。我知道这和我之前说的略有不同，但实际上你是在向你的核心用户发送垃圾信息，并给他们发送他们不在意的通知，并让他们非常难以退出订阅。所以没有设置选项可以让他们退出。然后他们开始屏蔽你。一旦他们退出了你的推送通知，你就永远无法再向他们推送了。而且实际上，一旦他们关闭了通知，就很难再促使他们重新开启。所以关于邮件、短信和推送通知，第一件需要考虑的事是你必须让它们送达。
[段 69]
Beyond that, it’s a question of open rate, click-through rate. So what is the compelling subject line you can put there so that people are going to open your email? And how can you get them to click when they visit? Everyone focuses towards doing marketing emails that are just spam in my opinion. Newsletters are stupid. Don’t do newsletters because you’ll send the same message to everyone on your site, someone who signed up to your site yesterday versus someone who’s been using your product for three years, do they need the same message? No. The most effective email you can do is notifications. So what are you sending? What should you be notifying people of? And this is a great place where we’re in the wrong mindset.
[译文 69]
除此之外，这是一个打开率和点击率的问题。所以你能写什么样的吸引人的主题行，让人们打开你的邮件？以及如何让他们在访问时点击？在我看来，每个人都专注于发送那些只是垃圾邮件的营销邮件。newsletter很愚蠢。不要做 newsletter，因为你向网站上的每个人发送同样的信息，昨天刚注册的人和已经使用你产品三年的人，他们需要同样的信息吗？不。你能做的最有效的邮件是通知。所以你在发送什么？你应该通知人们什么？这是一个我们心态错误的好地方。
[段 70]
As a Facebook user, I don’t want Facebook to email me about every like I receive because I receive a lot of likes, because I’ve got a bunch of Facebook friends. But as a new Facebook user, that first like you receive is a magic moment. Turning on that notification across all of our channels increased the click-through rate on our emails, SMS, and push notifications, but we only turned it on for low-engaged users who weren’t coming back to the site, so it wouldn’t be spamming them. So it was a great experience. So think about that. What notifications should you be sending is the first thing that you need to think about on email, SMS, and push. And then the second thing you need to be thinking about is how can you create great triggered marketing campaigns?
[译文 70]
作为Facebook用户，我不希望Facebook在我收到每一个点赞时都给我发邮件，因为我收到了很多点赞，因为我有很多Facebook好友。但作为一个新的Facebook用户，你收到的第一个点赞是一个神奇的时刻。在我们所有的渠道开启那个通知，提高了我们的邮件、SMS和push notifications的点击率，但我们只对那些没有回到网站的低活跃用户开启了这个功能，所以这不会对他们造成垃圾信息轰炸。所以这是一个很好的体验。所以想想这个。在邮件、SMS和push方面，你应该发送什么通知是你需要考虑的第一件事。然后第二件你需要考虑的事情是，你如何才能创建出色的触发式营销活动？
[段 71]
So when someone created their first cross-border trade transaction was one of the best email campaigns I was ever part of at eBay in terms of click-through rates. It was awesome because it was really timely, really in context, the right thing to do for the user. So I’d say make sure you have deliverability, most important thing, focus on notifications and trigger-based email, SMS and push notifications beyond that. So I think we’re out of time. There’s one thing I wanted to finish with, which is, and if you guys have any questions, I guess you can reach me, and if I get spammed, I just won’t reply. We have great spam filters. No. My only favorite quote is from General Patton, and it’s so cliched it’s crazy, but it’s awesome.
[译文 71]
所以当某人创建了他们的第一笔跨境交易时，这是我在eBay参与过的最好的电子邮件营销活动之一，就点击率而言。这很棒，因为它非常及时，非常贴合情境，对用户来说是正确的做法。所以我要说确保你有送达能力，最重要的事情，关注通知和触发式电子邮件、短信和推送通知，除此之外。我想我们的时间到了。还有一件事我想最后补充一下，如果你们有任何问题，我想你们可以联系我，如果我被垃圾邮件轰炸，我就不会回复。我们有很棒的垃圾邮件过滤器。不。我唯一喜欢的名言来自General Patton，这太老套了，但它很棒。
[段 72]
A good plan, violently executed today, is better than a perfect plan tomorrow. And one of the things Chamath instilled in us and Javi still instills in us and Mark instills across the whole of Facebook is this move fast and don’t be afraid to break stuff ethos. If you can run more experiments than the next guy, if you can be hungry for growth, if you fight and die for every extra user and you stay up late at night to get those extra users to run those experiments, to get the data and do it over and over and over again, you will grow faster. Mark has said he thinks we won because we wanted it more, and I really believe that.
[译文 72]
一个好的计划，今天果断执行，胜过明天的完美计划。Chamath灌输给我们的，Javi仍在灌输给我们的，以及Mark灌输给整个Facebook的核心理念之一，就是快速行动，不怕打破常规。如果你比竞争对手能做更多的实验，如果你对增长充满渴望，如果你为每一个新增用户拼尽全力，如果你熬夜去做那些实验、获取数据，一遍又一遍地重复，你会成长得更快。Mark说过，他认为我们获胜是因为我们更渴望胜利，我真的相信这一点。
[段 73]
We just worked really hard. It’s not like we’re crazy smart or we’ve all done these crazy things before. We just worked really, really hard and we executed fast. And I strongly encourage you to do that. Growth is optional. Thank you. Yeah. Thank you.
[译文 73]
我们真的非常努力。并不是说我们特别聪明，或者之前都做过什么疯狂的事。我们只是真的非常非常努力，执行得很快。我强烈鼓励你们也这样做。成长是可选的。谢谢。是的。谢谢。
Source: bilibili BV1oWKpzoE1Z