视频信息
- 标题: 斯坦福：YC创业课 - 第14集：如何运营一家公司
- BV号: BV1oWKpzoE1Z
- 时长: 46分39秒（2799秒）
- 作者: 常春藤中英字幕课
- 原始链接: B站视频
视频摘要
本视频探讨了如何从锻造产品过渡到锻造公司的核心挑战。核心观点是：运营公司比开发产品更难，因为人是非理性的，领导者需要学会编辑的思维方式——简化、澄清问题、分配资源、确保一致的声音。讲师强调授权的艺术，提出任务相关成熟度概念，以及木桶和弹药的人才分类法：木桶是能独立将想法从概念带到发布的人，弹药是辅助角色。此外，视频深入讨论了透明性、配对指标、细节决定成败等管理哲学。讲师认为优秀领导者应该像Bill Walsh一样，从教前台接电话这样的细节开始，逐步构建一台傻瓜也能运行的高性能机器。最终，创业需要大量努力，领导者必须以身作则。
核心要点
- 公司即引擎：从胶带粘合的初创状态逐步构建成高性能机器，目标是让公司即使在无人监督时也能高效运转
- 编辑思维：领导者的核心工作是简化一切——用140个字符改变世界，用极简概念建立公司，强制团队删减复杂性
- 任务相关成熟度：根据员工做过某事的经验程度决定授权程度，对有经验的人充分放权，对新人持续指导监督
- 木桶与弹药：木桶是能将想法从概念带到发布、带动他人跟随的稀缺人才；弹药是辅助角色，需用木桶数量衡量公司速度
- 配对指标：只衡量单一指标会导致系统失衡，如降低欺诈率会损害客户满意度，必须同时衡量相互制衡的指标
- 透明性实践：让全员访问董事会材料、会议纪要，使用玻璃墙会议室，甚至考虑薪酬透明，建立信任文化
- 细节即文化：Bill Walsh教前台接电话、乔布斯坚持完美电路板设计——不面向用户的细节同样决定组织绩效
- 努力与示范：创业成功需要每周80-100小时的努力，领导者必须以身作则，通过日历审计确保时间分配与优先级一致
视频全文转录（中英双语）
以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。
由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。
[段 1]
So I’m going to talk about how to operate. So I’ve watched some of the prior classes, and I’m going to assume that you’ve already sort of hired a bunch of relentlessly resourceful people, that you’ve built a product that at least some people love, that you’ve probably raised some capital, and now you’re trying to build a company. So you’ve been forging a product, and now you’ve got to forge a company. And I’d actually argue forging a company is much more difficult than forging a product. The basic reason is people are irrational. So you probably all know this. Either your parents, your significant other, your brother or sister, your teacher, somebody in your life is irrational. Building a company is basically taking all the irrational people you know, put them in one building, and then living with them 12 hours a day at least.
[译文 1]
所以我要讲的是如何运营。我看了之前的一些课程，我会假设你们已经聘请了一群极其足智多谋的人，你们已经开发出了至少有人喜欢的产品，你们可能已经筹集了一些资金，而现在你们正在努力建立一家公司。所以你们一直在打造产品，现在你们必须打造公司。而我实际上认为打造一家公司比打造一款产品要困难得多。基本原因是人是非理性的。所以你们可能都知道这一点。不管是你的父母、你的另一半、你的兄弟姐妹、你的老师，你生活中的某个人是非理性的。建立一家公司基本上就是把你认识的所有非理性的人放到一栋楼里，然后每天至少和他们一起生活12个小时。
[段 2]
So it’s very challenging. Now there’s techniques for coping with that, and some people get good at it and some people don’t, but that’s really what operating is about. So basically what you’re doing when you build a company is you’re building an engine. And at first you have a drawing, literally on a whiteboard, and you’re architecting it. And it looks very conceptually clean and beautiful and pretty. But when you start actually translating it to practice, it actually looks more like this, and you’re holding it together with duct tape. And it takes a lot of heroic efforts of people to actually hold it together. That’s why people work 80, 100 hours a week, is that heroic efforts is actually necessary to keep this thing together because you don’t actually yet have polished metal in place.
[译文 2]
所以这确实非常具有挑战性。现在有一些应对技巧，有些人很擅长，有些人不擅长，但这其实就是运营的本质。所以当你创办一家公司时，你实际上是在建造一台引擎。最初你有一张图纸，literally就在白板上，你在设计架构。它看起来在概念上非常干净、优美、漂亮。但当你开始 actually 把它付诸实践时，它实际上看起来更像这样，你在用 duct tape 把它们粘在一起。需要很多人 heroic 的努力才能真正把它们粘在一起。这就是为什么人们每周工作80、100个小时，因为 heroic 的努力实际上是保持这个东西运转的必要条件，因为你还没有用抛光的金属把它真正固定到位。
[段 3]
Eventually, you want to construct a high-performance machine, a machine that actually almost nobody really has to worry about every hour, every minute. And, you know, as we used to joke about eBay, that if Martians took over eBay, it would take like six months for the world to notice. That’s what eventually what you want to get to. Or as Warren Buffett says, build a company that idiots can run. Or as Warren Buffett says, build a company that idiots can run because eventually they will. So this is what you want. Basically a performance machine that idiots can run. Now as a leader, what is your real job? What’s your role? Strictly speaking, there’s only one book ever written that actually explains how to do this.
[译文 3]
最终，你想要构建一台高性能机器，一台实际上几乎没有人真的需要每小时、每分钟都担心它的机器。而且，你知道，我们以前经常拿eBay开玩笑，说如果火星人接管了eBay，世界需要大约六个月才会注意到。这就是你最终想要达到的状态。或者像沃伦·巴菲特说的那样，建立一家白痴都能经营的公司。或者像沃伦·巴菲特说的那样，建立一家白痴都能经营的公司，因为最终他们会的。所以这就是你想要的。基本上就是一台白痴都能运行的高性能机器。那么作为领导者，你真正的工作是什么？你的角色是什么？严格来说，史上只有一本书真正解释了如何做到这一点。
[段 4]
It’s a little old. It’s written in 1982 by Andy Grove. It’s quite famous and quite successful. And his definition of what your job is, is to maximize the output of an organization, your organization that you’re responsible for, CEOs, everything, and a VP would be a part of the organization and the organizations around you. So if you’re a VPE, you actually are responsible for the performance of the product team too or the marketing team because you have influence there. So this is how you measure people. And you want to focus on the output, not the input. The old adage about not measuring motion and confusing that with progress, you’re measuring only progress. And this is going to sound like a fancy and glamorous thing to do.
[译文 4]
它有点老了。1982年由Andy Grove写的。非常有名，也非常成功。他对工作职责的定义是：最大化你负责的组织（CEO及所有人）的产出。VP是组织的一部分，也包括你周围的组织。所以如果你是VPE，你实际上也要对产品团队或营销团队的绩效负责，因为你在那里有影响力。这就是你衡量人的方式。你要关注产出，而不是投入。那句老话说的，不要衡量动作并把它和进步混淆——你要衡量的只是进步。而这听起来会是一件很酷、很有吸引力的事情。
[段 5]
Maybe people get excited about managing a whole large organization and being responsible for the output. But in practice, what you’re going to learn today, hopefully, is that it’s more about things like ordering smoothies, teaching your receptionist how to answer the phone properly, and serving as a $10 an hour task rabbit for your employees. So let’s talk about that. So at first, when you start a company, everything’s going to feel like a mess. And it really should. If you have too much process, too much predictability, you’re probably not innovating fast enough and creatively enough. So it should feel like every day there’s a new problem. And what you’re doing is fundamentally triaging. So some things will look like a problem, and they’re actually a cold.
[译文 5]
也许人们对管理一整个大组织、为一群人负责感到兴奋。但实际上，今天要告诉你们的是，这更像是订购冰沙、教前台如何正确接电话，以及给你的员工当 $10/小时的 TaskRabbit（任务兔子）。所以我们来聊聊这些。
首先，当你创办一家公司时，一切都会感觉一团糟。而且理应如此。如果你有太多的流程、太多的可预测性，你可能创新得不够快、不够有创意。所以每天出现一个新问题才是正常的，而你做的一切本质上都是在 triage（分诊处理）。有些东西看起来像是问题，但实际上只是感冒。
[段 6]
They’re just going to go away. So somebody’s annoyed about this or that. That may be a cold and you shouldn’t stress about it and you certainly shouldn’t allocate a lot of your time to it. And some things are going to present themselves as colds, but just like in the emergency room, if they’re not diagnosed properly, they actually can become fatal. So what I’m going to try to do is help give you frameworks for thinking about which things are colds and which things are potentially fatal. So one of the most important things I learned at Square is actually a concept of editing. And this is, I think, the best metaphor I’ve ever seen in like 14 years of running stuff, of how to think about your job.
[译文 6]
他们会自己消失的。所以有人对这个或那个感到烦恼。这可能只是个小问题，你不应该为此感到压力，当然也不应该在这上面花费大量时间。有些事情会表现得像小问题，但就像在急诊室一样，如果诊断不当，它们实际上可能会变得致命。所以我要做的是帮助你们建立思考框架，来区分哪些是小事，哪些可能会变得致命。所以我在Square学到的最重要的事情之一实际上是一个编辑的概念。我认为，这是我14年来在运营工作中见过的关于如何思考你工作的最好的比喻。
[段 7]
It’s natural. It’s a natural metaphor, so it’s easy to take with you every day. And actually, it’s easy to transmit to each of your employees, so that they can figure out whether they’re editing or writing. It’s a natural construct. You generally know when someone asks you to do something, am I more writing or am I more editing? So an editor is the best metaphor for your job. And we’re going to talk about the specific things you’re doing in editing. The first thing an editor does, and you’ve probably all had this experience in school, is you submit a paper to a TA, a draft to your friend, and the first thing an editor does is they take out a red pen, or nowadays online, and they start striking things, basically eliminating things.
[译文 7]
这很自然。这是个自然的比喻，所以你可以每天都带着它走。而且实际上，它很容易传达给你手下的每一个员工，让他们能够弄清楚自己是在编辑还是在写作。这是一个自然的建构。当有人让你做某件事时，你通常知道自己是在写作还是在编辑。所以编辑是描述你工作的最佳比喻。我们接下来要聊聊你在编辑工作中所做的具体事情。编辑要做的第一件事，你们在学校大概都有过这样的经历，就是你把论文交给助教，把草稿交给朋友，而编辑要做的第一件事就是拿出一支红笔，或者现在用在线工具，然后开始划掉内容，基本上就是在删除东西。
[段 8]
The most important task of an editor is to simplify, simplify, simplify, and that usually means omitting things. So that’s your job, too, is to clarify and simplify for everybody on your team. The more you simplify, the better people will perform. People cannot understand and keep track of a complicated set of initiatives. So you’ve got to distill it down to one, two, or three things and use a framework that they can repeat. They can repeat without thinking about. They can repeat to their friends. They can repeat at night. Don’t accept the excuse of complexity. A lot of people will tell you that, well, this is too challenging. This is too complicated. Well, yeah, I know other people simplify, but that’s not for me.
[译文 8]
编辑最重要的工作是简化、简化、再简化，而这通常意味着删除内容。所以这也是你的工作，为团队中的每个人澄清和简化。你简化得越多，人们的表现就越好。人们无法理解也无法跟踪一组复杂的计划。所以你必须把它提炼成一两件或三件事，并使用一个他们可以复述的框架。他们不用思考就能复述。他们可以向朋友复述。他们晚上也能复述。不要接受复杂的借口。很多人都跟你说，这个太难了，这个太复杂了。嗯，是的，我知道其他人都在简化，但这不适合我。
[段 9]
This is a complicated business. They’re wrong. You can change the world in 140 characters. You can build the most important companies in history in a very simple to describe concept. You can market products in less than about 50 characters. There’s no reason why you can’t build your company the same way. So force yourself to simplify every initiative, every product, every marketing, everything you do, and basically take out that red and start eliminating stuff. Second thing is what editors do is they ask you clarifying questions. So when you present a paper to somebody, what do they usually do? They find some ambiguity somewhere, and they say, well, do you really mean this? Do you mean that?
[译文 9]
这是一项复杂的业务。他们错了。你可以用140个字符改变世界。你可以用一个非常简单的概念建立历史上最重要的公司。你可以用大约50个字符以内来营销产品。你没有理由不能用同样的方式建立你的公司。所以强迫自己简化每一个计划、每一个产品、每一次营销、你所做的一切，基本上就是删除那些红色的东西，开始做减法。第二件事是编辑所做的就是向你提出澄清性问题。所以当你向别人提交一篇论文时，他们通常会怎么做？他们会在某处发现一些歧义，然后说，嗯，你真的是这个意思吗？你的意思是那个吗？
[段 10]
Do you have an example of this? That’s what your job is. So you’re in a meeting and people are going to look to you. And the real thing you do is you actually ask a lot of questions. And they can be simple, basic questions like, should we try this seven days a week or six days? They can be fundamental questions like, where’s our competitive advantage here? We try to do this actually as investors too. Some investors will ask you a billion questions about a billion things and they’ll have you do diligence forever. We try to narrow down to what are the one, two, or three, four things that actually matter for this company and only focus on those things.
[译文 10]
你有这方面的例子吗？这就是你的工作。所以你参加会议时，人们会指望你。而你真正做的事情就是问很多问题。这些问题可以简单、基本，比如，我们应该尝试每周 seven 天还是 six 天？问题也可以是根本性的，比如，我们的竞争优势在哪里？实际上，作为投资者我们也会这样做。有些投资者会问 a billion 个关于 a billion 件事的问题，他们会让你做无穷无尽的尽职调查。我们努力缩小范围，找出真正影响这家公司的 one、two、three 或 four 件关键事情，然后只关注那些事情。
[段 11]
So it allows us to be more decisive, and we can make decisions rapidly. It allows us not to distract you from your day job, which is actually building a company. And yet, I think we still get to the highest fidelity answer because we don’t have all these extra extraneous pieces of details and data. Now, it’s hard. It’s something you have to practice. But when you’re good at it, every step you eliminate, Andy Grove estimated that you can improve performance by 30 to 50%. The next thing you do is allocate resources. So the editing construct. This is what editors do all the time. They take editors from the Mideast who are covering the Mideast and move them to Silicon Valley, because Silicon Valley is now more interesting.
[译文 11]
所以它让我们更加果断，能够快速做出决策。它让我们不会分散你对日常工作的注意力，你的日常工作实际上是建立一家公司。然而，我认为我们仍然能够得到最高保真度的答案，因为我们没有这些额外的无关细节和数据。现在，这很难。这是需要练习的事情。但是当你熟练掌握它时，你消除的每一个步骤，Andy Grove估计可以提高30%到50%的性能。接下来你要做的是分配资源。所以编辑结构。这就是编辑一直在做的事情。他们把从中东地区派驻中东的编辑调到硅谷，因为硅谷现在更有意思。
[段 12]
Or they move them to a sports section, because they want to compete on the basis of sports with other journals and other publications. So that can be top-down, where I take a bunch of resources and people and say, We’re now going over here, we’re going to compete on this basis, and then next month, next quarter, next year, I’m like, Well, that Middle East coverage is getting boring and bland. We don’t want to do that anymore. Let’s go chase after something else. Or it can be bottom-up. Just like journalists mostly come up with their own stories, the people who work with you generally should be coming up with their own initiatives. So a reporter who covers Google will generally come up with the interesting stories that they’re hearing in the ether and propose one or two to their editor for approval, but it’s not like the editor is saying, Go cover Google and this is the angle I want.
[译文 12]
或者他们把记者调到体育部门，因为他们想凭借体育报道与其他期刊和其他出版物竞争。这可以是自上而下的，我整合一批资源和人手，然后说，我们现在开始做这块，我们要凭借这个参与竞争，然后下个月、下个季度、下一年，我就会说，那个中东报道越来越无聊和乏味了。我们不想再做那个了。让我们去追别的热点吧。或者它可以是自下而上的。就像记者大多数时候自己想出报道选题一样，与你共事的人通常也应该自己想出创新举措。所以一个报道Google的记者通常会自己想出一些从各种渠道听到的有趣选题，然后向编辑推荐一两个以获得批准，但并不是编辑在说，去报道Google，用我想要的角度。
[段 13]
Once in a while they do that, but that’s not the day-to-day meat and potatoes of what a journalist does every day. Your goal over time is to use less red ink every day. So one way of measuring how well you’re doing and communicating to your colleagues about what’s important and what’s not, why some things are important and some things are not, is how much red ink you’re pulling out every day. It’s okay if you have a bad day and the red ink’s all over the place, but it’s not okay if the red ink next month is more than it was last month, or the next quarter is more than this. So measure yourself on how much red ink you’re creating.
[译文 13]
偶尔他们会那样做，但那不是记者每天的日常工作。你的目标是随着时间的推移每天减少使用红笔。所以衡量你做得如何、与同事沟通什么是重要的什么是不重要的、为什么有些事情重要有些事情不重要的一个方式，就是你每天标记出多少红笔。如果你某一天状态不好，红笔批改到处都是，这没关系；但如果下个月的红笔比上个月多，或者下个季度比这个季度多，这就不行了。所以用你产生了多少红笔来衡量自己。
[段 14]
The other thing that’s very important, that actually isn’t as intuitive to a lot of people, is the job of an editor is to ensure a consistent voice. So if any of you read The Economist, you can tell that there’s one consistent voice. You can pick up any article, any post in The Economist, and it feels like it was written by the same person. Ideally, your company should feel like, on your website, on your PR release, on your packaging, if it’s a physical product, anywhere on your recruiting pages, it should feel like it was written by one person. That’s extremely difficult to do. And at first, you’re going to be tempted to do that yourself, which is okay for a founder to do, him or herself, initially.
[译文 14]
另一件非常重要的事情，实际上对很多人来说并不是那么直观，那就是编辑的工作是确保一致的声音。所以如果你们中的任何人读过 The Economist，你会发现有一种一致的声音。你可以拿起 The Economist 里的任何文章、任何帖子，感觉它就像同一个人写的。理想情况下，你的公司应该在你的网站、你的新闻稿、你的包装（如果是实物产品）、你的招聘页面的任何地方，都感觉像是同一个人写的。这非常难以做到。而最初，你会想要自己去做这件事，这对于创始人来说，最初自己做也是可以的。
[段 15]
Over time, you do not want to be doing all of the consistent voice editing by yourself. You want to train people so they can recognize the differences in voice. So if you see this website page, it looks very different than the recruiting page, you start asking questions: Why is that? Is the reporting messed up? Is one of the leaders over here not really understanding the voice of the company? So you have to fix that over time, but you want to start with the objective that everything should feel exactly the same. It’s quite difficult in practice. Almost every company has at least one piece of the organization that isn’t exactly on the same voice. At Apple, even under Steve’s regime, which was notorious for getting this right, if you ask someone who worked at Apple, ask them about the internal tools about recruiting, they will tell you, Do they really feel like Apple products?
[译文 15]
随着时间推移，你不会想一直自己做所有的一致性声音编辑工作。你想培训员工，让他们能够识别声音的差异。所以如果你看到网站页面看起来和招聘页面差异很大，你就会开始问问题：为什么会这样？报告出问题了吗？还是某个领导没有真正理解公司的声音？所以你必须随着时间推移解决这个问题，但你一开始的目标应该是让一切感觉完全一致。在实际操作中这相当困难。几乎每个公司都至少有一个部门的声音不完全一致。在Apple，即使在Steve的领导下——他以正确把握这一点而闻名——如果你问曾在Apple工作的人，问他们关于内部招聘工具的问题，他们会告诉你，它们真的感觉像Apple产品吗？
[段 16]
All of them will tell you no. So you’re never 100%, but you definitely want to get as close to that as you can. The next complicated topic is delegating. So just like the other thing I like about the metaphor of editing is: writers do most of the work in the world. Editors are not actually writing most of the content in any publication. So that’s actually true of your company. You are not going to do most of the work. You shouldn’t be doing most of the work. And the way you get out of doing most of the work is you actually delegate. Now, the problem with delegating is that actually you’re responsible for everything. So a CEO, founder, there is no excuse.
[译文 16]
他们都会拒绝你。所以你永远无法达到100%，但你绝对要尽可能接近它。下一个复杂的话题是授权。就像我之前提到的关于编辑这个比喻的另一件事：世界上大部分的工作其实是作者完成的。在任何出版物中，编辑其实并不是在写大部分的内容。所以对你的公司来说也是如此。你不会去做大部分的工作。你不应该去做大部分的工作。而你摆脱做大部分工作的方法就是真正地授权。但授权的问题在于，你要为一切负责。所以作为CEO、创始人，没有任何借口。
[段 17]
There’s no like, That’s that department over there, this person over there screwed up. You’re always responsible for every single thing, especially when things go wrong. So how do you both delegate but not abdicate? It’s a pretty tricky challenge, and both are sins. Like if you over-delegate and you abdicate, or you micromanage, those are both sins. So I’m going to give you a couple of techniques for solving this. First, and this actually comes from High Output Management in Andy Grove, is what’s known as task-relevant maturity. It’s kind of a fancy phrase for basically, has this person ever done this before? It’s really simple. How mature is this person in doing something? And the more they’ve done the exact same task before, the more sort of rope you’re going to give them.
[译文 17]
没有什么"那是那个部门的事，那个人搞砸了"的说法。你始终对每一件事负责，尤其是在事情出问题的时候。那么你如何既能做到授权，又不推卸责任呢？这是一个相当棘手的挑战，两者都是错误。比如如果你过度授权而推卸责任，或者你事无巨细地管理，这些都是错误。所以我要教你几个解决这个问题的技巧。首先，这实际上来自安迪·格鲁夫的《高绩效管理》，那就是所谓的"任务相关成熟度"。这其实是个花哨的说法，简单来说就是：这个人之前做过这件事吗？就这么简单。这个人在做某件事上有多成熟？这个人越是做过完全相同的任务，你就越要给他们更多的自主空间。
[段 18]
And the less, and the more they’re trying something new, the more you’re going to actually instruct them and consistently, constantly, regularly monitor. So that’s kind of a basic concept, but it’s worth keeping in the back of your brain. The interesting implication, and this is pretty radical, is that any executive, any CEO should not have one management style. Your management style actually needs to be dictated by your employee. So with one particular person, you may be very much a micromanager because they’re quite low on this scale. And with another person, you may be delegating a lot because they’re actually quite mature on this scale. So it’s actually a good thing if you do reference checks on somebody and half the people you call say they’re a micromanager and the other half say they actually give me a lot of responsibility.
[译文 18]
而且，他们越缺乏经验、越是在尝试新事物，你就越要去指导他们，持续地、不断地、定期地进行监控。所以这是一个基本概念，但值得记住在脑子里。有趣的推论，而且这相当激进，即任何高管、任何CEO不应该只有一种管理风格。你的管理风格实际上需要由你的员工来决定。所以对某一个人，你可能是一个事无巨细的管理者，因为他们在这个维度上比较低。而对另一个人，你可能大量放权，因为他们在这个维度上相当成熟。所以实际上，如果你做背景调查时，有一半的人说他是事无巨细的管理者，而另一半说他实际上给我很多责任，这其实是一件好事。
[段 19]
That’s actually not a bug, that’s a feature. I didn’t understand that at first at all. Like I used to be befuddled when people would do reference checks on me and come back with this like complicated mosaic, and basically finally figured out that maybe I was actually doing my job correctly. And so then, of course, tell other people that this is the way to do it. A more nuanced answer, though, that I’ve sort of came up with is: how do you make decisions about delegating versus doing it yourself? You don’t want to do it yourself too often. So what I’ve basically borrowed from Peter — this is my first two-by-two matrix ever in my life, but he taught me something at least — is you basically sort your own level of conviction about a decision on a grid.
[译文 19]
这其实不是bug，这是功能。我一开始完全不明白这个。比如以前人们对我做背景调查时，带着这种复杂的拼图式结果回来，我总是很困惑，最后终于明白，也许我其实是把工作做对了。然后当然就告诉别人，这就是该做的事。不过我后来想出了一个更微妙的答案：如何在授权和亲力亲为之间做出决策？你不想太过频繁地亲力亲为。所以我基本上是从Peter那里借鉴来的——这是我人生中第一个two-by-two矩阵，但至少他教会了我一些东西——你基本上是把自己对某个决定的信念程度放在一个矩阵上进行分类。
[段 20]
Extremely high, extremely low. There’s times when you know something’s a mistake, and there’s times where you wouldn’t do it that way, but you have no real idea whether it’s the right or wrong answer. And then there’s a consequence dimension. There are things that if you make the wrong decision are actually catastrophic to your company, and you will fail. There are things that are pretty low impact that really, at the end of the day, aren’t going to make a big difference, at least initially. So what I basically believe is that where there’s low consequences and you have very low confidence in your own opinion, you should absolutely delegate, and delegate completely. Let people make mistakes and learn.
[译文 20]
极高，极低。有时候你会知道某件事是个错误，有时候你不会用那种方式去做，但你其实根本不知道这是正确答案还是错误答案。然后还有一个后果维度。有些事情如果你做出错误的决定，对你的公司来说实际上是灾难性的，你会失败。有些事情影响相当低，说到底，不会产生很大的不同，至少最初是这样。所以我基本上相信，在后果很小且你对自己的意见非常没有信心的情况下，你应该完全授权，完全放权。让人们犯错并学习。
[段 21]
On the other side, obviously, where the consequences are extremely dramatic and you have extremely high conviction that you’re right, you actually can’t let your junior colleague make a mistake. You’re ultimately responsible for that mistake, and if it’s really important, you just can’t allow that to happen. Now, the best way to do that is to actually explain your thinking, the why. It’s easy to shortcut when you get busy explaining the whys of the world, but it’s very important to try. When I was at LinkedIn, I had a colleague who’s quite, quite talented, but occasionally would get annoyed if I didn’t exactly agree with his opinion on something. And so I’d spend a lot of time trying to persuade him of why I was making a decision a certain way.
[译文 21]
另一方面，显然，当后果极其重大，而你又有极高的确信认为自己是正确的时候，你实际上不能让资历较浅的同事犯错。你最终会为那个错误负责，如果真的非常重要，你就是不能让那种情况发生。现在，做到这一点的最好方式实际上是解释你的思考过程，也就是为什么。当你忙于解释世界的各种为什么时，很容易走捷径跳过这一步，但尝试这样做是非常重要的。当我在LinkedIn时，我有一个相当、相当有才华的同事，但偶尔如果我没有完全同意他对某件事的看法，他就会感到烦恼。所以我会花很多时间试图说服他，为什么我以某种方式做出决定。
[段 22]
And his wild card, The card he would ultimately call out if I didn’t quite persuade him was, He’s like, okay, you’re the boss. And that meant to me like I was burning a lot of social capital. Every time he said that, I knew I was like really creating a thin line, and that ultimately that was going to backfire if I did that too often. So you want to track the times that you’re doing that. An example of this is Squares—one of my favorite practices. An example of this is Square. It’s one of my favorite people in the world. And my second hire, first marketing hire, had this program he wanted to run called Inner Square, which basically allowed people to give out Square merchants to give out 10 other squares to their—imagine a food truck outside, put like 10 squares on the counter, and people could just grab them.
[译文 22]
他有一张“万能牌”，如果我没能说服他，他最终会打出这张牌……他的意思是，好吧，你是老板。这对我来说意味着我在消耗大量的社交资本。每次他这么说，我就知道我在踩一条很细的线，如果我经常这样做，最终会适得其反。所以你要记录你这样做的次数。这方面的一个例子是Squares——我最喜欢的做法之一。这方面的一个例子是Square。他是我在世界上最欣赏的人之一。我的第二个招聘，第一个营销人员招聘，他想运行一个叫Inner Square的项目，这个项目基本上是让Square商家向顾客分发10个其他的Squares——想象一下外面有一辆餐车，在柜台上放10个Squares，人们可以直接拿取。
[段 23]
And Kyle had this great idea: this would be an awesome marketing program, Square would spread squares to other people. And to some extent it was on brand, so it didn’t have catastrophic consequences. Each of these 10 squares didn’t cost that much money, so financially we could afford to do it. But at that time my 10 years of experience said there’s just no way this is going to work at a meaningful enough scale to move our metrics enough, and I actually would prefer we not do this. But Kyle was so excited about this that I decided to just let him do it. He learned that actually when you measure this thing, it’s not massive. It doesn’t create massive value for the company.
[译文 23]
And Kyle had this great idea: this would be an awesome marketing program, Square would spread squares to other people. And to some extent it was on brand, so it didn’t have catastrophic consequences. Each of these 10 squares didn’t cost that much money, so financially we could afford to do it. But at that time my 10 years of experience said there’s just no way this is going to work at a meaningful enough scale to move our metrics enough, and I actually would prefer we not do this. But Kyle was so excited about this that I decided to just let him do it. He learned that actually when you measure this thing, it’s not massive. It doesn’t create massive value for the company.
[段 24]
It did require a fair amount of operational complexity to ship all these squares to people and figure out how to get them squares, etc. But it allowed him to be excited about his job and to learn how to filter future ideas. So it was totally worth letting him make the quote-unquote mistake. The next and possibly most important thing you do is actually edit the team. So these are the people that you work with. And nobody’s going to have a perfect team, and you’re certainly not going to start that way. So what I’m going to try to do is maximize the probability for success in editing the team. So I’m ability for success in editing the team.
[译文 24]
这确实需要相当多的运营复杂性才能把这些方块寄送给人们，并弄清楚如何让他们获得这些方块等等。但这让他对自己的工作感到兴奋，并学会了如何过滤未来的想法。所以让他犯这个所谓的错误是完全值得的。接下来，你可能要做的最重要的事情之一就是调整团队。这些就是和你一起工作的人。没有人会有一个完美的团队，而你当然也不会一开始就这样。所以我要尝试做的是最大化调整团队的成功概率。所以我在调整团队方面取得成功的能力。
[段 25]
So I like this idea of barrels and ammunition. So most companies, once they get into hiring mode—as Sam pointed out, you should defer that for a while—but once you do, they just hire a lot of people. And you expect that as you add people, your throughput, your horsepower, your velocity of shipping things is going to increase. It turns out it doesn’t work that way. Usually when you hire more engineers, you actually don’t get that much more done. You actually sometimes get less done. You hire more designers, you definitely don’t get more done. You get less done per—We can talk about why. But the reason why is that most people, most great people even, are actually ammunition.
[译文 25]
所以我喜欢这个关于桶和弹药的比喻。所以大多数公司，一旦进入招聘模式——正如Sam指出的，你应该推迟一段时间——但一旦开始招聘，他们就会大量招人。你会预期，随着你增加人手，你的产出、你的马力、你交付东西的速度都会增加。事实证明，事情并不是这样运作的。通常当你招聘更多工程师时，你实际上并不会多完成那么多事情。你实际上有时候完成的事情反而更少。你招聘更多设计师，你肯定不会多完成事情。你每……完成的事情反而更少——我们可以讨论原因。但原因是，大多数人，甚至大多数优秀的人，实际上都是弹药。
[段 26]
But what you need in your company are barrels. And you can only shoot through the number of unique barrels you have. So that’s how the velocity of your company improves—by adding barrels. And then you stock them with ammunition. And then you can do a lot. So if you go from one barrel company—which is mostly how you start—to a two barrel company, suddenly you get twice as many things done per day, per week, per quarter. If you go to three barrels, great. If you go to four barrels, awesome. Barrels are incredibly difficult to find. But when you have them, give them lots of equity, promote them, take them to dinner every week, because they’re virtually irreplaceable.
[译文 26]
但你在公司真正需要的是“枪管”(barrels)。你能射击的次数取决于你拥有的独特“枪管”数量。所以公司效率的提升方式就是——增加“枪管”。然后你给它们装上“弹药”(ammunition)，然后你就能完成很多事。所以如果你从一家只有一个“枪管”的公司——大多数公司的起点都是这样——变成两个“枪管”的公司，突然之间你每天、每周、每季度完成的事情就翻倍了。如果增加到三个“枪管”，很好。如果增加到四个“枪管”，太棒了。“枪管”极难找到。但当你找到这样的人时，给他们大量股权，给他们升职，每周带他们吃饭，因为他们几乎无可替代。
[段 27]
Because they’re also very culturally specific. So a barrel at one company may not be a barrel at another company. Because one of the ways—and the definition of a barrel—is they can take an idea from conception all the way through shipping and bring people with them. And that’s a very culturally specific—specific skill set rather. Two questions probably are a skill set rather. So two questions probably are occurring to you: How do you figure out who’s a barrel and who’s not? One is you start actually with a very small set of responsibilities. It can be fairly trivial. It can be something like: I want to reward the engineers that are in my office at nine o’clock at night every night with a nice cold fresh smoothie.
[译文 27]
因为它们也非常具有文化特定性。所以在一家公司被称为"barrels"的人，在另一家公司可能不是"barrels"。因为"barrels"的定义方式之一是，他们可以将一个想法从构思一直贯穿到产品发布，并带领人们一起前进。而这是一种非常具有文化特定性的——应该说是一种特殊的技能组合。两个问题应该是一种技能组合。所以你可能会想到两个问题：如何判断谁是"barrels"，谁不是？一个方法是，你实际上从一个非常小的责任范围开始。这可以相当简单。这可以是这样的：我想每天晚上9点钟奖励那些在我办公室的工程师们一杯冰镇新鲜奶昔。
[段 28]
This is actually a real example. I was frustrated. Our engineers were working really hard at Square, and you know maybe 20% to 30% would stay very late into the evening. And we already had served them dinner, but I wanted to give them something cool to reward them. You could think about alcohol, but that’s a little complicated. So smoothies were probably a little bit better than the pizza, which drains you of energy. But nobody could get smoothies in my office to show up at 9 o’clock sharp that were cold, that tasted good, and delivered in the right place so that engineers would find them. You’d think this is simple, but in fact, it took months to get this right.
[译文 28]
这实际上是一个真实的例子。我当时很沮丧。我们的工程师在Square真的很努力工作，你知道可能20%到30%的工程师会工作到深夜。我们已经为他们提供了晚餐，但我想给他们一些很酷的东西来奖励他们。你可能会想到酒精，但这有点复杂。所以冰沙可能比披萨好一点，披萨会让人昏昏欲睡。但没有人能在我的办公室里把冰沙准时在9点送到，既要冰的，又要味道好，还要送到正确的地方让工程师们能找到。你可能觉得这很简单，但实际上花了几个月才做好。
[段 29]
So we had an intern start, and I think on his second day, I was explaining this problem, and he said, Well, I’ll do it. And I was looking at him like, There’s no way. I’ve seen my office manager fail, my assistant fail—all who were actually pretty good. This isn’t going to happen. And then, lo and behold, that night, they show up on time, cold, delivered to the right place. And my first instinct was, Great, nothing about the smoothies, but, okay, now I can actually give them something more important and consequential and complicated to do. And that’s what you actually want to do with every single employee every single day: is expand the scope of their responsibilities until it breaks.
[译文 29]
所以我们有个实习生入职了，我觉得是在他入职的第二天，我在解释这个问题，然后他说，好吧，我来试试。然后我看着他，心想，这不可能。我见过我的 office manager 失败，我的 assistant 也失败过——他们其实都挺不错的。这不可能成功的。然后，事实证明，那天晚上，冰沙准时送达，冰的，送到了正确的地点。我的第一反应是，太好了，冰沙没问题，但是好吧，现在我实际上可以给他们更重要、更有影响、更复杂的事情去做了。这就是你实际上想要对每个员工每天做的事情：扩大他们的职责范围，直到它出问题。
[段 30]
And it will break. Everybody—like I couldn’t run the world—everybody break. Everybody, like I couldn’t run the world, like everybody has like some level of complexity that they can handle. And what you want to do is keep expanding it until you see where it breaks. And that’s the role that they should stay in—that level of sophistication. But some people will surprise you. There will be people who you don’t expect, without, with different backgrounds, without a lot of experience, that just can handle enormously complicated tasks. And so keep testing that and pushing the envelope. The other signal to look for is once you’ve hired someone: with an open office, just watch who goes up to other people’s desks, particularly people that they don’t report to.
[译文 30]
然后它会崩溃。每个人——就像我无法管理这个世界——每个人都会崩溃。每个人都有某种程度的复杂性是他们能够处理的，而你想做的是不断扩展它，直到你看到它在哪里崩溃。那就是他们应该保持的复杂度水平。但有些人会给你惊喜。会有你意想不到的人，有着不同背景、经验不多的人，他们就是能够处理极其复杂的任务。所以不断测试并突破极限。另一个需要注意的信号是：一旦你雇用了某人，在开放式办公室里，观察谁会走到别人的办公桌前，特别是那些不向他们汇报的人。
[段 31]
If people start going to your desk, someone, individual employee’s desk, and they don’t report to them, it’s a sign that they believe that that person can help them. So if you see that consistently, those are your barrels. Just promote them, give them more opportunity as fast as you can. The other question everybody asks about people is: When do you hire somebody above somebody, and when do you sort of mentor somebody, or when do you need to replace somebody? And the way to think about this is: Every company has its own growth rate, and every individual has their own growth rate. So some companies that are very successful—let’s say LinkedIn—LinkedIn was always a very linear company.
[译文 31]
如果人们开始去你的工位，某个人，某个员工的工位，而他们不向这个人汇报，这就是一个信号，说明他们相信那个人能帮助他们。所以如果你持续看到这种情况，那些就是你的barrels。尽快提拔他们，尽可能快地给他们更多机会。另一个每个人都会问的人员问题是：什么时候该雇佣一个比某人职位高的人，什么时候该指导某个人，或者什么时候你需要替换某人？思考这个问题的方式是：每家公司都有自己的增长率，每个人也都有自己的增长率。所以有些非常成功的公司——比如说LinkedIn——LinkedIn一直都是一家非常线性的公司。
[段 32]
It never went like this. So, for example, I joined LinkedIn 18 months after we launched, and we had only 1.5 million users, which in a social product is a very small number. And when I joined, I was the 27th employee. When I left two and a half years later, we only had 57 employees. In contrast, when I joined Square as the 20th employee, two and a half years later, we had like 250, 300 employees. So it—Years later, we had like 250, 300 employees. So each company has its own velocity on this curve. And if the company’s going like this, you can only keep people in the roles that their own personal learning curve is going like this.
[译文 32]
这从未如此（顺利过）。比如，我加入 LinkedIn 时，公司已上线 18 个月，我们只有 150 万用户，在社交产品中这是非常小的数字。我加入时，我是第 27 号员工。两年半后我离开时，我们只有 57 名员工。相比之下，我加入 Square 时是第 20 号员工，两年半后，我们有大约 250、300 名员工。所以——多年后，我们有大约 250、300 名员工。所以每家公司在这条曲线上都有自己的速度。如果公司的发展是这样的，你只能让人们停留在他们的个人学习曲线也是这样的岗位上。
[段 33]
On the other hand, if the company’s growing like this, anybody whose learning curve is faster than that, you can keep giving them the same role to do. So always track the individual slope of an employee and the company’s growth rate. Now that you have your barrels identified, so you’re going to pick out the people that can really take an idea that you have in the back of your head, scope it out, Run with it, make it happen, ship it, and it’s perfect. Where do you aim these barrels? So I’m going to argue that you really need to spend a lot of time focusing people. This is something I learned from Peter Thiel, actually. He used to insist at PayPal that every single person could only do exactly one thing, and we all rebelled.
[译文 33]
另一方面，如果公司增长率是这样，任何学习曲线比它快的人，你可以继续让他们做同样的工作。所以要持续追踪每个人的成长斜率和公司增长率。现在你已经识别出你的"精英桶"了，你要挑选出那些真正能把你脑海中的想法变成现实的人：规划它、执行它、让它发生、交付它，而且完美无缺。你应该把这些精英用在什么地方？所以我要说，你真的需要花大量时间聚焦人才。这实际上是我从 Peter Thiel 那里学到的。他以前在 PayPal 坚持每个人都只能做一件事，我们都反抗了。
[段 34]
Every single person in the company rebelled to this idea because it’s so unnatural, it’s so different than every other company where people want to do multiple things, especially as you get more senior. You definitely want to do multiple things, and you feel like it’s insulting to be asked to do just one thing. And Peter would enforce this pretty strictly. He’d basically say, I will not talk to you about anything else except this one thing I’ve assigned to you. I don’t want to hear about how great you’re doing over here. Just shut up. And Peter would run away. And then focus until you conquer this one problem. And the insight behind this is that most people will solve problems that they understand how to solve.
[译文 34]
公司里的每个人都反对这个想法，因为这太不自然了，它与其他公司完全不同——在其他公司，人们想做多件事，尤其是当你职位更高的时候。你肯定想同时做多件事，如果被要求只做一件事，你会觉得受到了冒犯。而Peter会相当严格地执行这一点。他基本上会说，我不会和你讨论任何其他事情，只讨论我分配给你的这一件事。我不想听你说你在这里做得多么好。闭嘴。然后Peter就会走开。然后专注于这件事，直到你攻克这一个问题。这背后的洞察是：大多数人会解决那些他们知道如何解决的问题。
[段 35]
Roughly speaking, they will solve B-plus problems instead of A-plus problems. A-plus problems are high-impact problems for your company, but they’re difficult. You don’t wake up in the morning with a solution, so you tend to procrastinate them. So imagine you wake up in the morning and you create a list of things to do today. There’s usually the A-plus one at the top of the list, but you never get around to it, and so you solve the second and third. And over an entire company of hundreds of people, that just cascades. So you have a company that’s always solving B-plus things, which does mean you grow, it does mean you add value, but you never really create that breakthrough idea because no one is spending 100% of their time banging their head against the wall every day until they solve it.
[译文 35]
粗略地说，他们将会解决B-plus问题，而不是A-plus问题。A-plus问题是对于你的公司影响重大的问题，但它们很难。你早上醒来时不会就有解决方案，所以你倾向于拖延它们。所以想象一下，你早上醒来后列出今天要做的事情。通常A-plus的那一项排在列表最上面，但你从不会去做它，所以你解决第二和第三项。然后在整个有数百人的公司里，这会层层传递。所以你有一个公司总是在解决B-plus问题，这确实意味着你会成长，确实意味着你创造了价值，但你永远无法真正创造出突破性的想法，因为没有人每天花100%的时间反复钻研一个问题直到解决它。
[段 36]
So I highly recommend some version of that. You can be less stringent. You can be like, you can get three things to work on. But I would still track at least the concept of what would happen if you only gave everybody one thing to prioritize. Now, because you can’t make decisions, you don’t want to be making all these decisions yourself. You have to create tools that enable people to make decisions at the same level, ideally, of fidelity that you would make them yourself. So how do you create scale and leverage? First thing I’d recommend is building a dashboard. This is an old Square dashboard. It actually looks pretty presentable even today. The construct of a dashboard, first of all, should be drafted by the founder.
[译文 36]
所以我强烈推荐这个方法的某个版本。你可以不那么严格。比如让每个人同时做三件事。但我仍然会追踪这个概念——如果只让每个人专注做一件事，结果会怎样。现在，因为你自己无法做出所有决策，你也不想让自己去做所有的决策。你必须创建工具，让人们能够以与你本人决策同等的精确度做出决策。那么如何实现规模化和杠杆效应？我建议的第一件事是构建一个 dashboard。这是一个旧的 Square dashboard。实际上即使在今天看来也相当体面。dashboard 的结构，首先应该由创始人起草。
[段 37]
You need to basically simplify the value proposition in the company’s metrics for success on a whiteboard. You can have other people build the dashboard. I don’t actually care about that, but you need to draw it out. What does business success look to us, and what are the key inputs to those? And then have someone create something that is very intuitive for every single person in the company, including customer support, to use. And then the key metric of whether you’ve succeeded is what fraction of your employees use that dashboard every day. If it’s actually useful, it should be close to 100%. It’s not going to be probably 100%, but you want to measure that. Just like you have quality scores for all your other KPIs with users, the dashboard needs to be as intuitive as it is, as your product is for users.
[译文 37]
你需要基本上在白板上简化公司的成功指标价值主张。你可以让别人来构建仪表盘。我实际上不在乎那个，但你需要把它画出来。对我们来说商业成功是什么样的，哪些是关键输入？然后让某人创建一个对公司每个人都非常直观易用的东西，包括客服。然后衡量你是否成功的关键指标是你的员工中有多少比例每天使用那个仪表盘。如果它真的有用，应该接近100%。不太可能达到100%，但你需要测量这个。就像你为所有其他KPI设置了质量分数一样，仪表盘需要像你的产品对用户那样直观易用。
[段 38]
Other things… Wait, hold on. Yeah, let’s go back one second. Another concept is transparency. And people will often… That’s weird. Okay. Transparency people talk a lot about. It’s kind of a goal that everybody ascribes to. But when push comes to shove, very few people actually adhere to it. So let me walk through a little bit of transparency and different stages of transparency. Metrics are the first step. So everybody in your company absolutely should have access to every single thing that’s going on. Other things that I like to do are take your board decks, and as you get more formal, the board decks will get more complicated, and actually review every single slide with every single employee after the board meeting.
[译文 38]
其他事情……等一下，等一下。好的，让我们回到上一秒。另一个概念是透明度。人们经常……这有点奇怪。好吧。透明度人们谈得很多。这有点像每个人都追求的目标。但当真正需要落实的时候，很少有人真正坚持。所以让我来介绍一下透明度的概念，以及透明度的不同阶段。指标是第一步。所以公司里的每个人都应该能够获取正在发生的每一件事。我喜欢的其他做法是展示你的董事会简报，随着你变得更加规范化，董事会简报会变得更加复杂，然后在每次董事会会议后，真正与每一位员工一起审阅每一张幻灯片。
[段 39]
You can strip out the compensation information if you really want to, but every other slide you should go through with the entire employee base and explain it. And if you can remember some of the feedback you got from your board, that’s really cool to pass on. Another thing we did at Square: as your company scales, everybody’s not going to get invited to every meeting, but they’re going to want to go to every meeting. The way you scale that is you create notes for every meeting, and you send it to the entire company. So we created a notes alias for every single meeting involving more than two people. Someone would write notes and send it to the entire company.
[译文 39]
如果你真的想这么做的话，可以把薪酬信息删掉，但其他每一页幻灯片都应该和全体员工一起过一遍并做出解释。如果你还能记得董事会给你的一些反馈，把这些反馈传递下去会非常棒。我们在Square做的另一件事是：随着公司规模扩大，不是每个人都会被邀请参加每次会议，但他们会想要参加每次会议。你解决这个问题的方式是，为每次会议创建会议记录，然后发送给整个公司。所以我们为每个涉及超过两个人的会议创建了一个会议记录别名。有人会负责撰写会议记录并发送给整个公司。
[段 40]
So people felt like as the company added employees, they could continue to monitor and track what was interesting, what was going on, and they never felt excluded, hopefully. The other thing is even the details around conference rooms. Every conference room at Square has glass walls, because as soon as you have regular walls, people wonder what’s going on. It’s amazing. If they can see who’s actually in the meeting and who’s meeting with who when, they don’t worry nearly as much as what’s going on behind those closed doors. Stripe, you may have seen a blog post, but I think Patrick wrote it about email transparency, about actually allowing everybody to have access to email. That’s pretty far out there, but it’s actually got interesting certain merits to it.
[译文 40]
所以人们觉得，随着公司不断扩大规模，他们仍然能够继续监控和追踪有趣的事情、正在发生的事情，他们永远不会被排除在外，希望如此。另一些细节涉及会议室。Square的每个会议室都有玻璃墙，因为一旦使用普通墙壁，人们就会好奇里面在发生什么。很神奇。如果他们能看到谁实际在开会、和谁在什么时间开会，他们就不会像面对那些紧闭的门后发生的事情那样担心。Stripe，你可能看过一篇博客文章，但我记得是Patrick写的关于邮件透明度的文章，实际上是让每个人都能访问邮件。这种做法相当激进，但实际上确实有一些有趣的优点。
[段 41]
I would call the tactics that you read about and hear about as sort of minimal viable transparency. I actually think you could push the envelope a lot more. Steve Jobs tried this at Next. He actually tried transparent compensation. I actually think, although Next didn’t do extremely well, the real reason wasn’t because of the experiment around compensation transparency, and that there’s a lot of merit to that. And the critique of compensation transparency is often, well, we want people to be teammates and work together and collaborate. And if you look in the sports world, though, where people are actually teammates and they do have to collaborate, all of their compensation is completely public. In fact, each of us can look up anybody’s compensation in the sports world and get it exactly accurate, and somehow it seems to work.
[译文 41]
我会把你读到和听到的策略称为最小可行透明度。实际上，我认为你可以更大胆地突破边界。Steve Jobs在Next尝试过这一点。他实际上尝试了薪酬透明化。我真的认为，虽然Next的表现并不出色，但真正的原因并非薪酬透明化实验，而且这其中有很多值得肯定的地方。对薪酬透明化的批评通常是：好吧，我们希望人们成为队友，一起工作并协作。然而，如果你看看体育界，那里的人们实际上是队友，他们确实需要协作，而他们所有的薪酬都是完全公开的。事实上，我们每个人都可以在体育界查到任何人的薪酬，而且能获得完全准确的数据，但这样做似乎也没什么问题。
[段 42]
So I’m not totally bought into the idea that you need to keep compensation non-transparent. Then finally, metrics. So you want to measure things. You want to measure outputs, not inputs. And again, you should dictate this yourself. You should draft the dashboard to tie this all together. One important concept or order known as pairing metrics or pairing indicators, which is if you measure one thing and only one thing, the company tends to optimize to that, and often at the expense of something else that’s important. A classic example in payments and financial services is around risk. It’s really easy to give the risk team the objective and say, we want to lower our fraud rate. It sounds great.
[译文 42]
所以我并不是完全认同你需要保持薪酬不透明这个想法。然后最后，指标。所以你想要衡量事物。你要衡量产出，而不是投入。而且再次强调，你应该自己来决定这一点。你应该起草仪表板来把这些整合在一起。一个重要的概念或原则，被称为配对指标或配对指标，是如果你只衡量一件事，公司往往会优化那件事，而且通常以牺牲其他重要的事情为代价。支付和金融服务领域的一个经典例子是关于风险。给风险团队设定目标和说我们想要降低欺诈率真的很容易。听起来很棒。
[段 43]
Until they start treating every single user in this audience as a suspect user because they want to lower their fraud rate. So they require each of you to call them up on the phone and give them more supplemental information and facts and things. And you have the lowest fraud rate in the world, you also have the worst sort of customer satisfaction score. So what you want to measure at the same time as your fraud rate is your false positive rate. That forces the team to actually innovate. Similarly, you can give recruiters metrics around hiring. And guess what? You’ll have a lot of people come in through interviews. But if you’re not tracking the quality of hires, you may be very unhappy with the quality of people you’re interviewing or the people you’re giving offers to.
[译文 43]
直到他们开始把这个受众群体中的每一位用户都当作可疑用户来对待，因为他们想降低欺诈率。所以他们要求你们每个人都打电话给他们，提供更多的补充信息和事实之类的东西。即使你的欺诈率是世界上最低的，你的客户满意度评分也会是最差的。因此，你在衡量欺诈率的同时，也要衡量你的误报率。这会迫使团队真正去创新。同样，你也可以给招聘人员提供招聘相关的指标。但你猜怎么着？会有很多人通过面试进来。但如果你不追踪招聘质量，你可能会对你面试的人或你发放offer的人的质量非常不满意。
[段 44]
So you always want to create the opposite as an indication and measure both, and the people who are responsible for that team need to be measured on both. Finally, around metrics, one insight I’ve had over my career is what you kind of want to look for the anomalies. You don’t actually want to look for the expected behavior. So a famous example was at PayPal. None of the top 10 markets that the company was planning to go after included eBay. But one day, someone noticed that 54 power sellers had actually handwritten into their eBay listings, please pay me with PayPal, and brought this to the attention of the executive team at the time. The first reaction of the executive team was, what the hell’s going on?
[译文 44]
所以你总是想要创造相反的作为指标并同时测量，而负责那个团队的人需要在两个方面都被测量。最后，关于指标，我在职业生涯中有一个洞察，就是你有点想要寻找异常情况。你实际上不想寻找预期的行为。所以一个著名的例子是在PayPal。公司计划进入的前10大市场中没有包括eBay。但有一天，有人注意到有54个Power sellers实际上在他们eBay的 listings中手写了"请用PayPal支付给我"，并将这件事引起了当时执行团队的注意。执行团队的第一反应是，这到底是怎么回事？
[段 45]
Let’s kick them out of the system. That’s not our focus. Fortunately, I think David Sacks came back the next day and said, I think we found our market. Let’s actually build tools for these power sellers. Instead of forcing them to write into their listing Pay Me With PayPal, why don’t we have an HTML button that they can just insert? Well, that started to work. And then he said, well, actually, why should we make them insert it all the time? Why don’t we just automagically insert it for them so they can insert it once and then every single listing they have forever, it’ll just automagically appear there. So that became the success for PayPal. Similarly, I was at LinkedIn, and I saw this stat that made no sense to me.
[译文 45]
让我们把他们踢出系统。那不是我们的重点。幸运的是，我想David Sacks第二天回来说，我觉得我们找到了我们的市场。让我们真正为这些大卖家打造工具。与其强迫他们在商品描述里写“用PayPal付款给我”，为什么不做一个HTML按钮让他们直接插入？嗯，那开始奏效了。然后他说，嗯，实际上，为什么我们要让他们一直重复插入？为什么不帮他们自动插入？这样他们只需要插入一次，然后以后所有的商品列表都会自动显示在那里。所以这成为了PayPal的成功之道。同样地，我在LinkedIn的时候，看到了这个让我无法理解的统计数据。
[段 46]
The UI of the site was a little bit different back then, but 25% of all clicks, maybe 30% of all clicks from the homepage were people going to their own profile. And that made no sense whatsoever. I mean, it was the settings. Like, you had to literally go to the right margin, find a link. And it was 25% to 30% of every single click at scale. I mean, so this is statistically valid stuff. And it made no sense whatsoever. I’ve never seen a UI perform that way. And I kind of went around for weeks trying to figure this out. And then someone very smart, actually it was Max Levchin, said something to me. And I was like, he’s like, it’s vanity.
[译文 46]
当时网站的UI和现在有点不同，但从主页产生的所有点击中，有25%，也许是30%，都是用户进入自己的个人主页。这完全说不通。我的意思是，那是设置功能。就像，你必须真的走到右边距，找到一个链接。而这占了所有点击的25%到30%。我是说，这是统计学上有效的数据。但完全说不通。我从没见过一个UI这样表现。我好几周都在四处想办法弄清楚这件事。然后一个非常聪明的人——实际上是Max Levchin——对我说了一些话。然后我说，他说，那是虚荣心。
[段 47]
And I’m like, aha. People are looking at themselves in the mirror. That’s a pretty good answer. Because they weren’t editing their profile. Nobody has something to edit every day in their profile. But they actually were just looking at themselves in the mirror every day because it made them feel good. And then you could actually test that hypothesis and say, well, if I have more content, do I look at myself in the mirror more often? Turns out you did. If you had more endorsements, did you look at yourself in the mirror more often? And it turns out you did. So you actually figured out what was actually underneath the utilitarian product that the product team thought they were building was actually a lot of emotional vanity.
[译文 47]
然后我就明白了，啊哈。人们在照镜子审视自己。这是一个相当好的答案。因为他们并没有在编辑自己的个人资料。没有人的个人资料需要每天都编辑。但他们实际上每天都在照镜子审视自己，因为这让他们感觉良好。然后你就可以验证这个假设，说，如果我有更多的内容，我会不会更频繁地照镜子审视自己？结果确实如此。如果我有更多的认可/背书，我会更频繁地照镜子审视自己吗？结果确实如此。所以你实际上发现了产品团队认为他们正在构建的实用主义产品背后，实际上隐藏着大量的情感虚荣。
[段 48]
It didn’t exactly translate to the best possible feature like the PayPal example, which you couldn’t easily put a button that said, Be more vain today on the homepage. That would probably not work perfectly. So it never really took off the way the PayPal example did. But it really clarified what users of the product really wanted. And we wouldn’t have found that without looking for anomalous data. The final topic I want to talk about is details. And in my assigned reading, there’s a great book I really like by Bill Walsh called The Score Takes Care of Itself. And the basic point of the book is that if you get all the details right, you don’t worry about how to build a billion-dollar business, how to have $100 million in revenue, how to have a billion users.
[译文 48]
它并没有像PayPal案例那样转化为最佳功能，因为你不可能在首页上轻易放一个按钮写着"Be more vain today"。那样可能效果不会很好。所以它从来没有像PayPal案例那样真正流行起来。但它确实让我们明确了产品用户真正想要的是什么。如果没有寻找异常数据，我们不可能发现这一点。我想讨论的最后一个话题是细节。在我的指定阅读材料中，有一本我很喜欢的书，作者是Bill Walsh，书名叫《The Score Takes Care of Itself》。这本书的基本观点是，如果你把所有细节都做对了，你就不用担心如何建立一个十亿美元的企业、如何实现一亿美元的收入、如何获得十亿用户。
[段 49]
That’s a byproduct of getting all the details of what you do every day to be excellent. So the example he talks about in the book that really resonated with me was he took over the 49ers in 1979. They were the worst team in football. I believe they were 2-14 the year before, which is really bad for those of you who don’t know football. In the next 10 years, he managed to transform the team into the NFL’s best, won three Super Bowls. And what’s the first thing he did to start going from a terrible team to the best team ever in many ways? He actually taught the receptionists how to answer the phone properly. He wrote a three-page memo about how to actually answer the phone.
[译文 49]
这是做到日常工作中每个细节都卓越的副产品。所以他在书中提到的例子真的引起了我的共鸣，他在1979年接管了49人队。那支球队当时是联盟最差的。我记得前一年他们的战绩是2胜14负，对于那些不懂橄榄球的人来说，这个战绩真的很糟糕。在接下来的10年里，他成功地将这支球队打造成了NFL最强的球队，拿下了三次超级碗。那么他从一支糟糕的球队变成多方面史上最伟大的球队，第一件事是什么呢？他实际上是教会了接待员如何正确接听电话。他写了一份三页的备忘录，关于如何真正接听电话。
[段 50]
Now, that may sound absurd, but his point was if the organization as a whole does everything exactly the right way, then receivers, for example, will start running their routes at seven and a half yards, not seven yards, not eight yards, and that actually will matter. And if everybody on the team executes exactly up to the same standard of performance, you will have an organization that is performing at the highest possible level, and then with enough random variation, the highest possible performance team will do the best. So the way you translate this to a company are to a lot of details that may not matter. They may not seem that they matter superficially. Most people would agree that details matter when it faces the user.
[译文 50]
现在，这听起来可能很荒谬，但他的观点是，如果整个组织都以完全正确的方式做每一件事，那么例如接球手会开始在7.5码的距离跑路线，而不是7码，也不是8码，而这实际上会产生影响。如果团队中的每个人都能按照完全相同的绩效标准执行，你将拥有一个以最高水平运作的组织，然后在足够多的随机变化下，表现最佳的团队将做得最好。所以你将这个道理转化到公司身上，就是很多可能无关紧要的细节。这些细节表面上看起来可能并不重要。大多数人会同意，当细节面对用户时，它们是重要的。
[段 51]
But where the real debate is on things that don’t face the user. So Steve Jobs famously in the Mac insisted upon an immaculate circuit design board. You can read about this in various books. The Mac, for those of you who don’t remember the Mac, probably everybody here, but some of you may have seen it, actually couldn’t be opened. So the circuit board design couldn’t be seen by any single person in the world. There was no way to open the Mac except the people who worked at Apple. And Steve insisted that it be absolutely perfect and beautiful. That’s the kind of detail obsession that this sort of philosophy of building a company requires. Examples that may be more practical for you, instead of circuit boards, are things like, what food do you serve people?
[译文 51]
但真正的争议在于那些用户看不到的地方。所以Steve Jobs famously在Mac上坚持完美的电路板设计。你可以在各种书籍中读到相关记载。Mac，对于你们中不记得Mac的人来说，也许在座各位都是，但你们中可能有人见过，Mac实际上无法打开。所以电路板设计不可能被世界上任何人看到。除了Apple员工之外，没有任何方法可以打开Mac。而Steve坚持要求它绝对完美和美观。这种对细节的执着正是构建公司这种理念所需要的。对你们来说可能更实际的例子，不是电路板，而是像你们为人们提供什么食物这样的事情？
[段 52]
This actually matters more than you might guess. When people don’t like the food you serve them, what do they do? They go gossip. They go complain to their friends. They go walk over to someone’s desk. And all of a sudden, at lunch, what they’re complaining about is, they’re mostly spending time gossiping and complaining instead of brainstorming. So you don’t have this serendipitous idea, matching another serendipitous idea that creates a spark. Instead, they’re all wandering and willowling around. So the best thing you can do is actually give people the food they want or food that’s good for them that makes them more productive. So it may seem a lot like this glorious job you thought you had is actually more like running around being a task rabbit for people, but it’s to take the things off their plate that are a distraction so that they can be high-performance machines.
[译文 52]
这实际上比你想象的更重要。当人们不喜欢你提供的食物时，他们会怎么做？他们会去八卦。他们会去跟朋友抱怨。他们会走到别人的办公桌前。然后突然，在午餐时间，他们抱怨的事情变成了——他们大部分时间都在八卦和抱怨，而不是头脑风暴。所以你无法让这种偶然的灵感与另一个偶然的灵感碰撞产生火花。相反，他们都在四处游荡、闲逛。所以你能做的最好的事情就是给人们他们想要的食物，或者对他们有益、能让他们更高效的食物。所以你原本以为的光鲜工作实际上更像是到处跑来跑去，做人们眼中的任务兔子，但这其实是为了帮他们去除那些让他们分心的事情，让他们成为高性能的机器。
[段 53]
And if you take enough things away from people that distract them and give them the tools to be successful, all of a sudden your organization produces a lot more. Similarly, another example that’s often got wrong is office space. So one natural instinct is when you need an office, you have an office manager or someone on your team go out and find offices. And they’ll go on tours with agents and they’ll come back with photos and ideas. You need to do that yourself. The office environment that people live in and work in every day dictates your culture and how people make decisions. It dictates how hard people work. There’s almost no more important decision other than what company you’re going to be, then what’s the office and then what’s the office environment you’re actually in?
[译文 53]
如果你拿走足够多干扰人们的东西，并给他们成功的工具，突然之间你的组织会产出更多。同样，另一个常被搞错的例子是办公室空间。一个很自然的本能是，当你需要办公室时，你会派办公室经理或团队中的某个人出去找办公室。他们会和经纪人一起参观，回来时带着照片和想法。你需要亲自去做这件事。人们每天生活和工作的办公环境决定了你的公司文化以及人们如何做决策。它决定了人们工作的努力程度。除了你将成为什么公司之外，几乎没有比办公室和办公环境更重要的决定了。
[段 54]
And most people don’t do that. And then the final thing, and then I’ll take some questions, is around effort. Ultimately, I don’t believe that you can build a company without a lot of effort, and that you need to lead by example. So Bill Walsh, the first chapter of his book, gets asked this question of how do you know whether you’re doing your job? And this is the answer he gives coaches that used to ask him that question. So if this is what you feel like every day, you’re probably on the right track. And if that doesn’t sound appetizing, you probably shouldn’t start a company, truthfully. All right, with that, I’m done with the prepared part.
[译文 54]
大多数人做不到这一点。最后一点，然后我会回答一些问题，是关于努力的。最终，我不相信你可以不付出大量努力就建立一个公司，而且你需要以身作则。所以 Bill Walsh，在他书的第一章，被问到这个问题：你怎么知道你是否在做好你的工作？这是他给曾经问他这个问题的教练们的回答。所以如果你每天的感觉是这样的，你可能就走在了正确的道路上。如果这听起来不吸引人，说实话，你可能就不应该创业。好了，关于这一点，准备好的部分我就讲完了。
[段 55]
Let me see if anybody has questions I can try to be helpful with. Any questions? Yes? So you talked about making compensation transparent. How would you do that, especially when people equate themselves to the values of how much the salary is? I would do it in probably bands. You can do it either just everybody in the company gets paid the same, or you can have all discipline, all engineers, or you can do it by experience like extremely the way Steve did it actually at Next was there was a high band and a low band and you either had a lot of experience or low experience and that was it. So low band back then, now would probably be like $85,000, everybody just flatly gets paid $85,000, and if you’re super experienced, everybody gets paid like $130,000, and that’s just it.
[译文 55]
让我看看是否有人有问题我可以尝试帮忙解答。有问题吗？有吗？那么你谈到要让薪酬透明化。你会怎么做，特别是当人们把自己的价值等同于工资金额时？我可能会用薪资等级来做。你可以要么公司里所有人都拿同样的薪资，或者你可以按所有专业、所有工程师来分，或者你可以按经验来分，就像Steve在Next实际上做的那样，有一个高薪等级和一个低薪等级，你要么有很多经验，要么经验很少，就这样。所以低薪等级在那个时候，现在大概会是85,000美元，所有人都一律拿85,000美元，如果你经验丰富，每个人都拿130,000美元，就这样。
[段 56]
Like it’s sort of the Next translated for inflation. Okay. Like, instead of the Western, I mean, like, instead of food, what’s the like top three details that people care about? You’d be amazed. Well, yeah, so the question was, besides food, what other kind of details do people care about? The laptops they use. I mean, this is now the default that everybody has. But five years ago, it was a benefit to give people high-quality machines as opposed to optimizing our costs and having dull machines and ugly monitors, just as an example. So if you think about all these people that are relentlessly resourceful, incredibly talented in a massively competitive ecosystem competing for talent, you want to give people the best possible tools to do the best possible job.
[译文 56]
就像这差不多是通胀版的Next。好吧，比如除了食物之外，人们最在乎的三个细节是什么？你会很惊讶。嗯，所以问题是，除了食物之外，人们还关心什么样的细节？他们使用的笔记本电脑。我是说，这现在已经是每个人的标配了。但五年前，给人们高质量的机器是一个福利，而不是去优化成本、用沉闷的机器和丑陋的显示器，这只是举个例子。所以如果你想想所有这些无限足智多谋的人，他们极具才华，在竞争激烈的生态系统中争夺人才，你就会想给人们最好的工具来做最好的工作。
[段 57]
And so rigorously thinking through how do I make people more successful? What things do they not need to be working on that are distracting? And what things can I actually give them that make them more valuable per day? And then just break that down every day and solve that stuff yourself. So when you’re in a startup environment, how do you optimize for those things because resources are scarce? It’s a good question. I actually think that you should start, first of all, you must have your own office. I don’t believe ever in shared office spaces. Peter talks a little bit about this, that every startup, every good startup is a cult. And it’s really hard to create a cult if you’re sharing space with people because a cult means that you think you’re better than everybody else in the world and you have a special way of doing things that’s different than everybody else in the world.
[译文 57]
认真思考如何让 people 更成功？他们不需要做什么分散注意力的事？我能给他们什么让他们每天更有价值？然后每天分解这些问题，自己解决。所以当你在 startup 环境中时，由于资源有限，你如何优化这些事情？这是个好问题。实际上我认为你应该首先开始，必须有自己的办公室。我不相信共享办公空间。Peter 稍微谈到了这一点，每个 startup，每个好的 startup 都是一种信仰团体。如果和其他人共享空间，真的很难建立这种信仰团体，因为信仰团体意味着你认为你比世界上所有人都好，你有 一种特殊的做事方式，与世界上其他人不同。
[段 58]
And if you’re sharing physical space with people, it’s very hard to inculcate that. So I would start there. But it is a prioritization question. Every company has scarce resources, just a question of magnitude, like how many zeros are you paying attention to? Probably not $10 expenditures, but $100, then $1,000, then $10,000, then $1 million, then $10 million. It starts being a rounding error. So what I would do is figure out what’s most important in a high-quality office that creates a good vibe, that allows you to recruit people, because recruits are very savvy about this. They walk into your office, and they can tell a lot about the culture instantly. I walk into a company office, and I can tell often whether I’m going to invest as soon as I walk in.
[译文 58]
而且如果你和他人共享实体空间，这很难灌输这种观念。所以我会从这里开始。但这本质上是一个优先级问题。每个公司都有稀缺资源，只是程度不同，比如你在关注几位数的问题？可能不是$10的支出，而是$100，然后$1,000，然后$10,000，然后$1百万，然后$10百万。当金额达到一定规模时，就开始变成四舍五入的误差。所以我会做的是找出在高品质办公室中最重要的东西是什么，能创造好的氛围，让你能够招聘人才，因为求职者对此非常敏锐。他们走进你的办公室，就能立刻感受到很多关于企业文化的信息。我走进一家公司的办公室，我常常在走进来的那一刻就能判断我是否要投资。
[段 59]
Like, I could absolutely rule things out that I just don’t want to invest in as soon as I walk in. And there’s times I walk in the office, it’s like, wow, this is really impressive. You can tell how people work together, how hard they’re working, how distracted they are. Roloff Bote at Sequoia made a point to me about YouTube. So when I invested in YouTube at the very, very beginning, it wasn’t obviously going to be successful. And then Roloff led the series A investment for Sequoia and YouTube. And we were on a board meeting together, and he said, you know, I think YouTube is really going to work. And I said, why? And he said, well, every time I go to one of my portfolio companies, half the office is watching YouTube at lunch.
[译文 59]
就像，我一走进门就能完全排除那些我根本不想投资的对象。有时候我走进办公室，会觉得，哇，这真的很令人印象深刻。你能看出人们如何合作，他们工作有多努力，他们有多分心。Sequoia的Roloff Bote跟我聊过关于YouTube的事。所以当我在非常早期投资YouTube时，它显然还不一定会成功。然后Roloff为Sequoia和YouTube领投了A轮投资。我们一起参加董事会会议，他说，我觉得YouTube真的会成功。我说，为什么？他说，每次我去我投资组合里的公司，半个办公室的人午餐时间都在看YouTube。
[段 60]
And I was like, pretty good sign. So you pick up on these little things, and you can predict a lot. Yeah? What do you think is the best way to gain street cred for a new manager? Oh, boy. Yeah, so the question is, how is the best way to gain street cred for a new manager? Almost all good managers in Silicon Valley are promoted because of their individual performance. In cultures that are meritocratic, the percentage is even higher. So we tried at PayPal to only promote people that were basically kicking ass at their discipline. So Peter didn’t believe in general managers. In fact, I remember going for a jog around campus with him my first week at PayPal, and he was asking me, you know, how are things going, the usual kind of CEO questions.
[译文 60]
我当时想，这是个好兆头。所以你会注意到这些小细节，然后能预测很多事情，对吧？你觉得新经理获得业界认可的最好方式是什么？哦，天哪。是的，所以问题是，新经理获得业界认可的最好方式是什么？硅谷几乎所有优秀经理都是因为个人业绩而获得晋升的。在精英管理的文化中，这个比例甚至更高。所以我们在 PayPal 尝试只晋升那些在各自领域表现出色的人。Peter 不相信通才型经理。事实上，我记得在 PayPal 的第一周和他一起在园区慢跑，他问我事情进展如何，这是 CEO 常问的问题。
[段 61]
And then we got this debate about whether the company needed any managers, and he’s like, nope, no managers. We’re only going to promote people. So the VP of engineering is going to be the single best engineer. The VP of design is going to be the single best designer. The VP of product is going to be a single best product person, and they’re going to learn to manage later. And the advantage of that is you don’t demoralize people because everybody knows that their boss actually is better at their job than they are and they can learn stuff. And you can learn a little bit of the management techniques later as opposed to promoting people who are just good people managers that don’t actually have the discipline and skill, and that does demoralize people.
[译文 61]
然后我们就这个问题展开了讨论：公司是否需要管理者，他说，不，不需要管理者。我们只提拔人。所以工程VP会是最优秀的工程师，设计VP会是最优秀的设计师，产品VP会是最优秀的产品人员，他们之后会学习管理。这样做的优势是不会打击员工的积极性，因为每个人都知道自己的老板在工作中确实比自己更强，他们能学到东西。你可以之后学习一些管理技巧，而不是提拔那些只是擅长管人、实际上并没有相关专业技能和素养的人，那样才会真正打击员工的积极性。
[段 62]
So I think just being excellent at something and then getting excellent at getting a bunch of people to do something is the next task. But people, you just have to learn some things. You have to learn by doing. You can’t learn to play the guitar by reading a book. You’ve actually got to try to manage a bit and you won’t do it well. I have another set of tactics and classes on what you actually do when you transition from an individual contributor to a manager, and it’s hard. One of the first things people don’t get right is their time allocation, and so actually I would recommend doing what I call a calendar audit and tracking for a month what do you spend your time on and how much is managing and editing, how much is writing, et cetera, and then optimize that over time.
[译文 62]
所以我认为首先要精通某件事，然后学会让很多人一起做这件事，这是下一步的课题。但是，人们，你必须学一些东西。你必须通过实践来学习。你不可能通过看书来学会弹吉他。你实际上必须尝试去管理，而且你不会做得好。我还有另一套策略和课程，关于当你从个人贡献者转变为管理者时你实际应该做什么，这很难。人们最先做不对的事情之一是时间分配，所以我实际上会建议做我所谓的日程审计，记录一个月内你把时间花在什么上面，有多少花在管理和编辑上，多少花在写作上，等等，然后随着时间推移去优化它。
[段 63]
You can get a mentor. Find somebody who’s been a manager before that will work with you, not your boss, because your boss has a set of complicated objectives, including how much are we shipping. A mentor can just focus on you and making you more successful. Could you give some more examples of things you can do to ensure a consistent voice of the company, especially when the company is growing? Yeah. So I would look at every piece of copy in every department. So like another area that almost never is done. So look at your recruiting website. Almost never done to the same quality as your conversion funnel. I’d look at customer support, another classic area that isn’t up to the same quality.
[译文 63]
你可以找一位导师。找一个以前当过经理的人，让他来指导你，而不是你的老板，因为你的老板有一系列复杂的目标，包括我们要发多少货。导师可以只专注于你，让你更成功。你能再举一些例子，说明你可以做什么来确保公司声音的一致性吗？尤其是当公司正在成长的时候？好的。所以我会审视每个部门的每一份文案。另一个几乎从未被注意到的领域。看看你的招聘网站。几乎从未做到与转化漏斗相同的质量。我会看客户支持，这是另一个质量通常不达标的重要领域。
[段 64]
And treat customer support like a product so that you actually have an engineering team and a design team over time that actually focuses on making that world class. Usually where you have different executives at a scaled company, most executives were trained differently at different companies, and they bring some of that with them. So you’ve got to cross-train that. So if you’ve hired a VP of engineering from Google, for example, they were trained at Google to have a very specific way of doing things. And if you hire a VP of design from Apple, same thing. And you get these collisions and you have to be very intentional about bridging those differences. And I think the CEO has to do that.
[译文 64]
把客服当作产品来对待，这样随着时间的推移，你会有一个工程团队和一个设计团队真正专注于将其打造成世界级的水平。通常在一家规模化公司中，你会拥有不同的高管，大多数高管曾在不同公司接受过不同的培训，他们会带来一些原有的做法。所以你必须进行交叉培训。比如，如果你从Google招聘了一位VP of engineering，他们曾在Google接受过培训，形成了一套非常特定的工作方式。如果你从Apple招聘了一位VP of design，情况也是如此。然后你会遇到这些冲突，你必须非常刻意地去弥合这些差异。我认为CEO必须承担这个责任。
[段 65]
The CEO is really the chief culture officer. You can’t delegate that. And one of the most powerful things you can do is to have a company-wide meeting where you explicitly talk about the values, the mission, the culture, how things get done, and why, so that people that have been at other companies can be calibrated to the new way. Because otherwise you just end up with a hodgepodge. It’s very different than a design leader came from Apple. They don’t actually learn how to do anything the same way. So you’re going to have to stitch that together somehow. Either one or the other is going to have to learn in the other style, or you’re going to have to create your own style and really teach that to your executives.
[译文 65]
CEO实际上是首席文化官，这一点你无法委托他人。你能做的最有力量的事情之一，就是召开一次全公司会议，明确谈论价值观、使命、文化、事情如何运作以及为什么这样做，让那些曾在其他公司工作的人能够适应新的方式。因为否则你最终只会得到一团混乱。这和一位设计主管来自Apple的情况非常不同，他们实际上不会以相同的方式学习做任何事情。所以你必须以某种方式把这一切整合在一起。非要让一方或另一方去学习对方的风格不可，或者你必须创造自己的风格，并真正把它教给你的高管们。
[段 66]
So it shows up all the time, but all you need to do is just pick up the company’s products and look for things that have a different voice, and you can see it. Visual voice, word choice, all over the map. Sam? Could you talk a little about the tactics of how you manage people? How often do you meet with them? How often do you give them calls? How often do you talk in the email? So the canonical advice, and this now sounds obvious, but it actually was pretty radical in 1982 when Andy Grove wrote his book, is you should have a one-on-one roughly every two weeks. Some people say every week, and I don’t think you want to go longer than two weeks.
[译文 66]
所以它一直都会出现，但你需要做的就是拿起公司的产品，寻找那些声音不同的地方，你就能看到它。视觉声音、用词选择，全都不一致。Sam？能否谈谈你管理人员的策略？你多久和他们见一次面？多久给他们打一次电话？多久用邮件交流一次？所以这是一个经典建议，现在听起来很明显，但在1982年Andy Grove写他的书时，这实际上是相当激进的建议，你应该大约每两周进行一次一对一交流。有人说每周一次，我不认为你应该间隔超过两周。
[段 67]
One week can be ideal, actually, in many companies. The reason why, in fact, there’s another adage, which is you should only have five to seven direct reports, that actually derives from the concept of a one-on-one every week, so that the direct reports, so that you can fit enough one-on-ones in your calendar and still get other things done. So I think one-on-ones per week are a good idea. The agenda should be crafted by the employee who reports to the manager, not the manager. The one-on-one is mostly for the benefit of the employee. So they should walk in with, Here’s the three or four things I want to talk about. Ideally, they circulate that. It can be even bullet points in advance by email.
[译文 67]
实际上，在很多公司，每周一次可能是一个理想的选择。这背后还有另一个管理箴言：你应该只管理五到七个直接下属，这实际上源于每周一对一会议的概念，这样可以直接下属，确保你能把足够的一对一会议安排进日程，同时还能完成其他工作。所以我认为每周进行一次一对一会议是个好主意。议程应该由汇报给经理的员工来制定，而不是由经理制定。一对一会议主要是为了员工的利益。所以他们应该在会议开始时就提出，这是我想要讨论的三四件事项。理想情况下，他们应该提前分发这个议程。甚至可以提前通过邮件发送要点。
[段 68]
But in advance you have time to chew on it, and you’re not on the fly winging your responses. But that’s probably the best structure. Now, if someone’s really good and really talented and has been doing something for a long time with a lot of internal credibility, you might push out the one every week and relax that to one every two weeks, possibly once a month. I don’t know that I would go beyond once a month ever. When is it acceptable to compromise and hire someone who’s ammunition rather than a barrel? Yeah, so the question is, when do you compromise and hire more ammunition instead of a barrel? Truthfully, you’re going to hire more ammunitions by definition than you are barrels.
[译文 68]
但提前你有时间仔细思考，你不必当场即兴发挥。但这可能是最好的结构。现在，如果某人真的非常优秀、非常有才华，而且长期从事某项工作并拥有很高的内部可信度，你可能会把每周一次放宽到每两周一次，甚至每月一次。我不认为我会超过每月一次的频率。什么时候可以妥协，雇佣一个弹药而不是枪管？是的，所以问题是，你什么时候会妥协，雇佣更多的弹药而不是枪管？说实话，按照定义，你会雇佣更多的弹药而不是枪管。
[段 69]
So there’s a ratio between the two. The question is the ratio. So at some point, the ratio is going to get out of whack. So if you’re the only barrel in the company and you have 50 engineers, you might as well only have 10 engineers because you’re not going to get any more done. So you’re just wasting resources. You’re going to frustrate engineers because everybody’s going to need your approval, your sign-off, your editing. It’s just going to stack and frustrate people. So it’s really different disciplines. In engineering, I actually think roughly 1 to 10 to 20 is probably about the right range. You don’t need more engineers until you have more barrels. Design is a little different, but it’s always going to be hiring more ammunitions.
[译文 69]
所以两者之间有一个比例关系。问题在于这个比例。在某个点，这个比例会失衡。所以如果你是公司里唯一一个需要审批的人，而你手下有50个工程师，你还不如只有10个工程师，因为你不可能完成更多的事情。这样你就是在浪费资源。你会让工程师们感到沮丧，因为每个人都需要你的批准、你的签字、你的修改。这样事情就会堆积起来，让人们感到沮丧。所以这确实是不同的学科。在工程领域，我实际上认为大约1对10到20的比例可能是合适的范围。在你有更多审批者之前，你不需要更多的工程师。设计稍有不同，但总是需要雇佣更多的人员。
[段 70]
A good leader, a good barrel will kind of have a feel for that. One way to correct for this, natural tendency is to increase your headcount on your team, like sort of an empire building tendency. Like, Oh, so I managed there’s 20 people, and Sam only manages 10, and you manage three, so I’m more important than Sam, and you’re more important than you. One way to do that is you put an X here of the number of people that, the output, sorry, specify how many things they’ve done successfully, then divide by the number of people on their team, and tell them that this is going to be their grade and their performance review. Shockingly, this doesn’t start increasing on that team.
[译文 70]
一个好的领导者，一个好的 barrel 会对此有一种感觉。纠正这种自然倾向的一种方法是增加团队的 headcount，有点像帝国建设的倾向。比如，“哦，我管理了 20 个人，而 Sam 只管理 10 个人，你管理 3 个，所以我的重要性高于 Sam，而你的重要性高于你。”一种做法是，你在这里放一个 X，表示完成了多少事，抱歉，是指定他们成功完成的事情数量，然后除以他们团队的人数，告诉他们这将是他们的评分和绩效评估。令人惊讶的是，这样做之后团队的产出并不会开始增加。
[段 71]
It’s amazing how this works, and be really explicit about it. So as a venture capitalist, how often do you intervene with a portfolio company and what’s your philosophy in context? So how often do I meet with them? Yeah. So the question is, as a venture capitalist, how often do I interact with my companies, meet with them? Generally, when we invest in – we do do some seed investments where we invest less money. But when we invest a fair amount of money and lead a round, like a Series A or Series B round, we join the board. And roughly, I meet with the founder CEO every two weeks. That’s the default. Now, there can be – obviously, there’s inflection moments and things go right, go well or wrong.
[译文 71]
这很神奇，它是如何运作的，而且要非常明确地说明它。作为风险投资人，你多久会介入一家投资组合公司，在这种情况下你的理念是什么？所以我多久和他们见面？是的。问题是，作为风险投资人，我多久和我的公司互动、见面？一般来说，当我们投资时——我们确实会做一些种子投资，投的钱较少。但当我们投入相当多的资金并领投一轮时，比如Series A或Series B轮，我们会加入董事会。大致上，我每隔两周与创始人CEO会面。这是默认的。现在，当然会有——显然，会有转折点，事情进展顺利或不顺利。
[段 72]
And that’s on an ad hoc basis. These days, actually, surprisingly, I do a lot by text message. I even have one CEO who Snapchats me all the time. I’d actually rather him not. But the world has changed a lot. But I try in-person meetings every two weeks. But you don’t even make this the operation, right? No. I mean, really, it’s like being a venture capitalist is more to me like being a psychologist. So if you come to my office, you’ll see, actually, we have two chairs kind of arrayed like this with a little table in the middle. And we sit down, and I’m basically like, So tell me your problems. It’s like a question. And then my response is usually, Well, have you thought about this?
[译文 72]
这些都是临时处理的。事实上说起来有点意外，如今我大量通过短信沟通。我甚至有一位CEO一直在给我发Snapchat。说实话，我宁愿他别这样。但世界已经改变了很多。我尽量每两周进行一次面对面会议。但你甚至不让这成为运营的一部分，对吧？
不。我的意思是，说真的，当风险投资人对我来说更像是当心理咨询师。所以如果你来我办公室，你会发现，我们有两把椅子这样摆放，中间有一张小桌子。我们坐下来，我基本上就是问：“说说你的问题吧？”像是一个问题一样。然后我的回应通常是：“嗯，你有没有想过这样？”
[段 73]
Have you talked to this person? Have you tried this? Et cetera. And it’s just asking a lot of questions and going back that way. But that’s 90% of what I do. So I see when you’ve got these barrels, right? Let’s say you’re a startup company. You’ve got two really good engineers and you’re working on this product. I’ve heard that you should always use proof. Yes. How do you balance that? Well, it depends on where your priorities are. So Sam talked a little bit about this in his lecture, but every company will move recruiting first, second, or third, somewhere in that sort of spectrum. If it’s your number one priority, then about 25% is probably a pretty good allocation.
[译文 73]
你和这个人谈过了吗？你试过这个吗？诸如此类。这就是在问很多问题，然后回头再问。但这是我90%的工作内容。
所以我看到当你有这些桶的时候，对吧？假设你是一家初创公司。你有两个非常优秀的工程师，你正在开发这个产品。我听说你应该始终使用proof。是啊。你如何平衡这个？
嗯，这取决于你的优先级在哪里。Sam在他的讲座中稍微提到了这个，但每家公司都会把recruiting放在第一、第二或第三的位置，在那个频谱的某个地方。如果这是你的number one priority，那么大约25%可能是一个不错的allocation。
[段 74]
Actually, I like the calendar audit for CEOs even more so than for new managers. So when I work with CEOs, sometimes who aren’t thriving in that role for the first time, I actually force them to show me their calendar. And before I do that, and now I’m going to ruin this trick because I’m going to tell it to you, I actually ask them to rank their priorities, write them down on a piece of paper, and just specify whatever they are. Then we go pull up their calendar and see if it matches, and it never matches. Like, never. Like, recruiting is the one that’s most often awry. So, you know, let’s say half the CEOs you meet with will say recruiting is the number one priority.
[译文 74]
实际上，比起新经理，我更喜欢对CEO进行日历审计。所以当我与CEO合作时，有时他们第一次担任这个角色时表现不佳，我会强迫他们把日历给我看。在我这么做之前，现在我要破坏这个技巧了，因为我要告诉你们，我会让他们把优先级排序，写在一张纸上，然后说明具体是什么。然后我们调出他们的日历，看看是否匹配，结果从来没有匹配过。比如说，从来没有。比如说，招聘是最常出问题的。所以，你知道，假设你遇到的一半CEO会说招聘是第一优先事项。
[段 75]
It’s almost never the biggest block of time on anybody’s calendar. And so that’s what you’re trying to do is match resources and inputs against priorities and a calendar audit. And unfortunately, there’s no software that does this really well. It would be great. Like, actually, we literally pull up someone’s Google Calendar and kind of manually add up the hours, which is somewhat insane. But that’s the best way is just, Well, what are your priorities? If your priorities are raising money, you don’t want to allocate 100% of your time to recruiting. You want to allocate a fair amount of time to raising money for that block of time until you’re successful at it. One more question. Anybody?
[译文 75]
这几乎从来都不是任何人日程表上最大的时间块。所以你要做的就是将资源和投入与优先级和日程审计相匹配。不幸的是，目前没有软件能真正很好地完成这项工作。那就太棒了。比如，实际上，我们会直接调出某人的 Google Calendar，然后手动计算小时数，这有点疯狂。但最好的方法就是：你的优先级是什么？如果你的优先级是融资，你不会想把 100% 的时间分配给招聘。你希望在这段时间内合理分配时间用于融资，直到你成功完成它。还有一个问题。有人要问吗？
[段 76]
Okay, go ahead. On the surface, some of this advice seems contradictory because you emphasized focusing on A-plus tasks and delegating less important things, but then you’ve said it’s good to write a three-page script for your receptionist and focus on all the details. How do you harmonize those goals? That’s a good question. I think the way to harmonize, the question is really how do you harmonize things where details can really matter, but you only get one thing to do and you’ve got to allocate to the top one, two, or three things. How do you put those two things together? And actually there is some tension. And even in a healthy organization, there’s some tension of why are we actually focused on writing the script as opposed to something a user may see.
[译文 76]
好的，继续。在表面上，有些建议看起来是矛盾的，因为你强调要专注于A+级别的任务，把不太重要的事情委托出去，但随后你又说为接待员写三页的脚本并关注所有细节是好的。你如何协调这些目标？这是一个好问题。我认为协调的方式是，真正的问题是你如何在细节确实很重要，但你只能做一件事，而且你必须把时间分配给最重要的一、二、三件事之间找到平衡。你如何把这两件事结合起来？实际上确实存在一些矛盾。即使在一个健康的组织里，也存在一些矛盾：为什么我们实际上要专注于写脚本，而不是用户可能看到的东西。
[段 77]
I think the underlying philosophy of getting the details right is pretty important to install in the very, very, very beginning of a company because people will start acting that way and making decisions that way themselves. So you won’t have to actually literally do that. And if you have to do that, it actually shows that the foundation isn’t actually that solid. So when you first start the company, it’s about getting the details right, that everybody is precise, everybody on every task is always thinking that way. And then that scales, and then the people you bring in, it’s a little self-fulfilling. People who can think that way will tend to get hired. People who can’t won’t get hired.
[译文 77]
我认为，在公司的最初最初最初阶段就植入“把细节做好”这一核心理念是非常重要的，因为人们会开始自发地以这种方式行事，以这种方式做决定。所以你就不需要真正地去事必躬亲。如果你还必须那样做，那实际上说明基础其实并不是那么牢固。所以在公司初创阶段，关键是把细节做好，每个人都要严谨，每个人在每个任务上始终都以这种方式思考。然后这会形成规模效应，你招进来的人也会如此，这有一点自我实现的味道。能够以这种方式思考的人往往会被录用，不能的人则不会被录用。
[段 78]
Each team and each leader will tend to enforce that themselves. So the CEO is almost never doing it. So it’s partially like how do you start. And then cultures like that, I mean, the key to culture is it’s a rule, it’s a framework for making decisions. And if you have a culture baked, people learn how to make decisions across that culture, and you’re never saying anything. You never have to really do anything except just watch and promote and move people around. Watch and promote and move people around. Cool. Well, I guess that’s it. Thank you. Thank you.
[译文 78]
每个团队和每个领导都会倾向于自己执行它。所以CEO几乎从来不做这件事。所以这在某种程度上取决于你如何开始。像这样的文化，我的意思是，文化的关键是它是一个规则，是做出决策的框架。如果你已经建立了文化，人们会学会如何在这种文化中做决策，而你从来不需要说什么。你真的不需要做任何事情，只要观察、提拔和调动人员就可以了。观察、提拔和调动人员。酷。好吧，我想就这样了。谢谢。谢谢。
Source: bilibili BV1oWKpzoE1Z