斯坦福：YC创业课 - 第13集：如何成为一个伟大的创业者

视频信息

• 标题: 斯坦福：YC创业课 - 第13集：如何成为一个伟大的创业者
• BV号: BV1oWKpzoE1Z
• 时长: 49分47秒（2987秒）
• 作者: 常春藤中英字幕课
• 原始链接: B站视频

视频摘要

本视频是LinkedIn联合创始人Reid Hoffman在Y Combinator创业课程中的分享，主题是如何成为一个伟大的创业者。Reid首先破除了超人创始人的迷思，指出伟大的创始人并非全知全能，而是拥有几项独特的superpowers，并能组建技能互补的2-3人团队。他强调，创始人在位置选择时应寻找对自身问题最具优势的网络，而非盲目涌入硅谷。在逆向思维方面，Reid认为真正有价值的contrarian thinking需要建立在我知道而他人不知道的独特洞察之上，而非简单的标新立异。演讲核心在于探讨创始人如何在坚持与灵活、信念与恐惧、专注内部与倾听外部等看似矛盾的力量间灵活切换。Reid提出投资论文作为指导决策的框架工具，同时强调产品分发策略往往比产品本身更重要，融资是战略金字塔的底层基础。最后，他指出伟大的创始人需要持续学习能力、清晰表达 mission 的能力，以及与联合创始人建立深度信任和协作的能力。

核心要点

1. 破除超人迷思：伟大的 founder 不是全知全能的 super person，而是拥有几项独特 superpowers 并能组建互补团队的普通人。

2. 团队配置：最佳 founding team 通常是 2-3 人，可实现技能互补、弥补各自弱点，应强烈偏好有 co-founders 且建立高度信任。

3. 位置选择：伟大 founders 会搬到对要解决的问题最强网络所在的地方，而非认为我可以在任何地方成功，不同类型创业需要不同生态。

4. 逆向思维：真正有价值的 contrarian thinking 需要建立在我知道而批评者不知道的具体洞察上，而非简单的与众不同。

5. 投资论文框架：拥有清晰的投资 thesis 说明我知道什么而其他人不知道，并通过数据验证信心增减来指导决策。

6. 矛盾平衡：创始人需要在坚持与灵活、信念与恐惧、关注内部与倾听外部之间灵活切换，而非非此即彼。

7. 产品分发优先：战略金字塔中产品分发往往比产品本身更重要，融资是最底层基础，需从一开始就 architect 好。

8. 信任与协作：联合创始人需要花 20+ 小时深入对话，提前讨论可能的分歧和退出机制，建立 robust 的信任基础。

视频全文转录（中英双语）

以下为完整中英双语转录，已加标点。英文在前，中文在后，逐段对照。

由 Groq Whisper 转录 → M2.7 B 方案整文标点 + 分段 → M2.7 段号保留翻译 → 逐段对照。

[段 1]

Thank you, Sam. So, when I looked through the syllabus of this class and thought about what I could possibly add that would be useful in addition to the various skills, one of the things that I’ve been thinking about has been: how do you think about yourself as a founder? How do you think about what the skill set is? And what are the things that you should be thinking about in terms of: am I ready? How do I get ready? Is it the right thing for me? These sorts of things. So let’s start with the perception of what a great founder is. And classically, this tends to be Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos.

[译文 1]

谢谢你，Sam。所以，当我翻阅这门课的课程大纲，并思考除了各种技能之外，我还能增加什么有用的内容时，我一直在思考的事情之一是：你如何审视自己作为创始人？你如何看待所需的技能组合？以及你应该思考哪些问题，比如：我准备好了吗？我该如何准备？这件事适合我吗？诸如此类的问题。所以让我们从"伟大的创始人是什么样子的"这一认知开始。从传统上看，人们通常会想到Steve Jobs、Bill Gates、Elon Musk、Mark Zuckerberg、Jeff Bezos。

[段 2]

And it’s an image of founder as superwoman or superman, right? Who has this panopticon of skills. And I can use the word panopticon because I’m here at Stanford, but it’s things like: I know how to do product market fit; I’m great at product; I’m great at strategy; I’m great at management; I can fundraise; I can do all of these different skills. And part of what you’re looking for in a great founder, in the kind of theory of the founder as super person, is: I’m looking for someone who is awesome at all of these things; they are well-rounded; they are diverse; they can bat on all skills. And part of how I found this kind of emphasized in the beginning of my own entrepreneurial journey is I remember reading an article that said, you know, Bill Gates, who is smarter than Einstein, right?

[译文 2]

这就是创始人形象，如同女超人或超人，对吧？拥有这种panopticon技能的人。我可以用panopticon这个词因为我在Stanford，但就是像这样的东西：我知道怎么做product market fit；我很擅长product；我很擅长strategy；我很擅长management；我会fundraise；我会所有这些不同的技能。你在一个伟大创始人身上寻找的一部分，在这种创始人作为超级人物的理论中就是：我正在寻找一个在这些方面都很出色的人；他们是全面发展的；他们是多元化的；他们能在所有技能上都能胜任。我自己的创业历程早期就强调这一点，这部分源于我记得读过一篇文章，那篇文章说，你知道，Bill Gates比Einstein更聪明，对吧？

[段 3]

And you’re like, well, look, Bill Gates is really smart and is very accomplished, but I’m not quite sure smarter than Einstein is actually a phrase that even Bill would want to be actually next to. And it’s partially because I think it’s this image of founder as super person, which is that a great founder is someone who can do anything, jump over tall buildings in a single bound, all of these sorts of things. And the reality is a founder is someone who deals with a ton of different headaches. And no one is universally superpowered. Generally speaking, you hope to have a couple of superpowers: some things that are unique edge to you; some things that are unique to the problem that you’re trying to solve; some things that may help you give an edge because actually competitive differentiation and competitive edge is super important.

[译文 3]

你可能会说，嗯，你看，Bill Gates真的很聪明，也非常有成就，但我不太确定"比Einstein更聪明"这句话是Bill真正想要与之并列的。这部分是因为我认为这是创始人作为超人的形象，即一个伟大的创始人是一个能做所有事情、一跃跳过高楼的人，所有这类的东西。而现实是，创始人是一个处理大量不同头疼问题的人。没有人是全能的。一般来说，你希望能有一些超能力：一些对你来说独特优势的东西；一些对你试图解决的问题来说独特的东西；一些可能帮助你获得优势的东西，因为实际上竞争差异化和竞争优势是非常重要的。

[段 4]

But it’s not actually, in fact, a function of genius. As a matter of fact, frequently it’s very hard to tell the difference between madness and genius because usually it’s the results that play out. And sometimes when you’re dealing with uncertain environments, you may even be genius and later be thought to be a mad person, or you may be a mad person and you turn out to be lucky and you’re later thought to be a genius. So it’s actually kind of a challenging set of, like: how do you think about these sets? You know, what is the whole set of skills? And when us mere mortals, you know, come into this kind of battle, what is the right way to think about it?

[译文 4]

但实际上，这并非取决于天才。事实上，通常很难区分疯狂和天才，因为通常是由结果来展现的。有时候当你面对不确定的环境时，你可能实际上是天才但后来被认为是疯子，或者你可能是个疯子但结果很幸运，后来被认为是天才。所以这实际上是一组颇具挑战性的问题，比如：你会如何思考这些集合？你知道，整个技能集合是什么？而当我们这些普通人面对这样的竞争时，正确的思考方式是什么？

[段 5]

And so. You know, when I thought about this question of how one is a great founder, you know, part of what you get to is—oh, and actually, this is probably the slide that for people on video, this may have been a suboptimal choice, but it’s like these are all skills that are super important, right? These are all things that you say, well, okay, this is really, really important to do, and you must, in fact, actually do this well, and it begins to look like a superhuman task. And so what I did is I decided to take a subset of these and focus on some of the interesting things to think about: what is it that actually makes a great founder?

[译文 5]

所以呢，大家知道，当我在思考一个人如何成为伟大创始人这个问题时，你们知道，你会发现——哦，实际上，这张幻灯片对于看视频的人来说可能不是一个最佳选择，但这些技能都是超级重要的，对吧？这些都是你会说，好吧，这件事真的、真的非常重要，你必须事实上把它做好，然后它开始看起来像是一项超人的任务。所以我所做的是决定选取其中一部分，专注于一些有趣的思考点：究竟是什么造就了一位伟大的创始人？

[段 6]

Because it’s actually not that you score 10 out of 10 on all these, you know, the entrepreneurial Olympiad, and you are actually the best at all of these things. So let’s start with team. And so one way to kind of, I think, talk about exploding the kind of the myth of the super founder is that actually, in fact, usually it’s best to have two or three people on a team rather than a solo founder. It’s not that the solo founders don’t actually play out and they can’t be successful, but most often, two or three people is actually, in fact, a much better approach. When I look at these things as an investor and I say, You know, what is a good composition of a project, and founders that are likely to succeed?

[译文 6]

因为实际上并不是说你在这些方面都能拿到10分满分，你知道，在创业奥运会上，你实际上就是所有这些方面的最佳选手。所以让我们从团队开始。那么我认为，有一种方式可以打破超级创始人这种神话，那就是，实际上，通常来说，最好是有两到三个人的团队，而不是单独创始人。这并不是说单独创始人不会成功，他们也可以很成功，但大多数情况下，两到三个人实际上是一个好得多的方式。当我作为投资人来看这些事，我会说，你知道，一个项目的良好构成是什么样的，什么样的创始人组合更有可能成功？

[段 7]

It’s usually there’s two or three of them. And the reasons are because, for example, we’ve already talked about the fact that there’s this very broad set of skills. There’s this whole set of questions about how you adapt your company in order to be successful, and if you actually have two or three founders, you have different skills, you can compensate because, by the way, everyone has weaknesses—you can compensate for each other’s weaknesses, and you can address the diversity of problems that you encounter as a founder. So one of the things that I suggest when you look at essentially a founding team is to have a real high preference for having co-founders, having a high degree of trust for those co-founders.

[译文 7]

通常会有两到三个创始人。原因在于，比如说，我们之前已经讨论过这样一个事实：有一整套非常广泛的技能。还有一整套关于如何调整你的公司以获得成功的问题，如果你实际上有两到三个创始人，你拥有不同的技能，你可以互相弥补，因为——顺便说一下——每个人都有自己的弱点——你可以弥补彼此的弱点，你可以应对作为创始人会遇到的各种问题。所以，当我审视一个创始团队时，我建议的一件事是，对拥有联合创始人这件事要有强烈偏好，对这些联合创始人要有高度的信任。

[段 8]

Because one of the things, by the way—part of the whole entrepreneurial thing is there’s lots of ways to die. One of the ways to die is you get a year down the road with your co-founders, and then you’re going through a messy divorce, and that is not always but frequently fatal. And then also, the diversity of tasks that you’re trying to do—and actually, okay, yes, I was about to say that will be suboptimal from the viewpoint of being able to look at the slides. The next thing is location. And so frequently I’ve heard told to me, It’s like, oh, Silicon Valley aggregates all of this super talent, which it does. All of this super talent, which it does, in terms of what actually, in fact, the reason why Silicon Valley startups are so successful is because all of these great people—immigration, which is hugely important for talent and founders—emigrate here.

[译文 8]

顺便说一下，其中一件事——整个创业的一个部分是，有很多种死法。其中一种死法是，你和联合创始人走过一年后，然后你们正在经历一场混乱的分道扬镳，这虽然不总是但经常是致命的。然后还有，你试图处理的任务多样化——实际上，好吧，是的，我正要说的是，从能够看幻灯片的角度来看，那会是次优的。下一件事是地点。我经常听到别人告诉我，就像，哦，Silicon Valley 聚集了所有这些超级人才，它确实做到了。所有这些超级人才，它确实做到了，就实际情况而言，Silicon Valley 创业公司如此成功的真正原因是，所有这些优秀的人——移民，这对人才和创始人来说非常重要——都迁移到这里来了。

[段 9]

And that’s part of the reason. Now, it’s actually, if you think about it, from basic math, even if you take something that Silicon Valley is super strong at, which is essentially software skills in the last two decades. Not all of the great software people move here. Not all of them can move here. There are many of them in various other parts of the world. And so why do I put choice of location as one of the things that comes down to thinking about whether or not you’re a great founder? Well, the reason is because what great founders do is seek the networks that will be essential to their problem and their task, and they realize it isn’t just about like kind of like I am super person.

[译文 9]

这也是部分原因。现在，实际上，如果你仔细想想，从基本数学来看，即使你拿硅谷非常擅长的东西来说，也就是过去二十年中本质上属于软件技能的东西。并不是所有优秀的软件人才都会来这里。并不是所有的人都能来这里。世界上很多其他地方都有很多这样的人。那么为什么我把地点选择列为判断一个人是否是优秀创始人的因素之一？原因是，优秀的创始人会寻找那些对他们的难题和任务至关重要的网络，他们意识到这不仅仅是“哇，我是超级人物”之类的。

[段 10]

I can do this anywhere. I can do this, you know, in, you know, the Antarctic, etc. It’s in order to be successful, I have to go to where the strongest networks are for the particular kind of problem or the particular kind of thing I’m doing. And Silicon Valley, by the way, is super good at some kind of tasks, some places that you essentially try to solve certain kinds of problems. But it is not good at all of them. Let me take, you know, kind of two examples. So one is Groupon. I don’t think Groupon could have ever been founded here. Even though it’s a software product, it actually even generates a network, which, you know, obviously a lot of the great networks are here, and uses a kind of internet technologies, a mobile product, and everything else, all of which we have a lot of great skills here in Silicon Valley, and the networks are really good for this.

[译文 10]

我可以在任何地方做这件事。你知道的，在南极洲等等地方都可以做这件事。想要成功的话，我必须去往对于我所处理的特定问题或特定领域来说拥有最强人脉的地方。顺便说一句，硅谷在某些类型的任务上确实非常出色，在某些地方你基本上是在尝试解决某些类型的问题。但它并非在所有事情上都擅长。让我举两个例子吧。一个是Groupon。我认为Groupon不可能在这里创建。即使它是一个软件产品，它实际上还产生了一个网络，很明显这里有很多出色的网络，而且它使用了一种互联网技术、移动产品，以及其他一切，所有这些都是我们在硅谷拥有大量优秀技能的东西，网络在这方面也真的很好。

[段 11]

One of the things that’s central for Groupon for its early days was having massive sales forces. And massive sales forces, strengths and weaknesses of networks tend to go together. Silicon Valley tends to be pretty adverse to plans that involve like, oh, we’re going to rent a 25-story building. And in 20 of those stories, we’re going to have floors of sales people. And that’s how we’re going to get our thing going. That kind of plan here tends to not get a lot of interest, tends to get a lot of criticism, tends to not have talent aggregate to it, but tends to have financiers talk about things like capital efficiency and network effects and other kinds of things that are key here.

[译文 11]

Groupon早期最重要的事情之一是拥有庞大的销售团队。庞大的销售团队、网络的优势和劣势往往是并存的。硅谷往往非常排斥这样的计划，比如说我们要租一栋25层的大楼，然后在这栋楼的20层里放满销售人员，这就是我们要推动业务发展的方式。这类计划在这里往往不会获得太多关注，往往会招致很多批评，往往不会吸引人才聚集，但往往会让投资人谈论资本效率、网络效应以及其他此类关键因素。

[段 12]

And so it’s actually not a surprise that actually, in fact, Groupon was required to be actually in Chicago, which is really good at this, as a way of actually kind of getting going and showing that even software startups can be in other places. But even if you begin to think about it, you say, okay, well, what kinds of, you know, other kinds of startups would someone be an idiot to move here to do? Think of someone who were doing a fashion startup, not fashion art. Think of someone doing a fashion startup, not fashion a la Poshmark, which is a mobile marketplace, et cetera, which are a bunch of things that are good here. But I’m designing a new fashion company, and I’m going to come to Silicon Valley to do it.

[译文 12]

所以实际上，Groupon被要求在芝加哥成立，这其实并不令人意外，因为芝加哥真的很擅长这一点，作为一个真正起步并展示软件初创公司也可以在其他地方发展的方式。但即使你开始思考这个问题，你会说，好吧，那什么样的其他类型的初创公司会让人搬到这里来做是愚蠢的呢？想一想想做时尚初创公司的人，不是时尚艺术那一类。想一想想做时尚初创公司的人，不是像Poshmark那样的时尚，Poshmark是一个移动市场，等等，这些都是在这里做得很好的东西。但我正在创建一家新的时尚公司，我要来硅谷做这件事。

[段 13]

That’s actually not such a great idea. And as I said, The fashion company might be a great idea, but you want the networks that support what you’re doing. And so part of the reason why where should I locate my startup is a test for thinking about, am I a great founder, is because part of what happens when you’re actually founding a company is you’re going, I will go to where it’s successful to be. Because the metaphor that I frequently use for entrepreneurship is jumping off a cliff and assembling an airplane on the way down. And the reason is because it’s hard. It has a quasi-mortal exit by which you’re default dead. And so you’re taking every possible chance to actually win.

[译文 13]

这实际上不是个好主意。正如我所说，时尚公司可能是个好主意，但你需要那些支持你事业的人脉网络。所以，“我应该在哪里创办我的创业公司"这个问题之所以是检验我是否是一位伟大创始人的方式，部分原因是，当你在真正创办一家公司时，你会想，我会去成功的地方。因为我经常用来形容创业的比喻是，从悬崖跳下，在坠落过程中组装飞机。原因是这非常艰难。它有一个准致命的出口，你默认是死路一条。所以你会抓住每一个可能的机会来真正获胜。

[段 14]

And so great founders go, Look, I’ll move to where the network is. And that network is, you know, this graphic is frequently Silicon Valley. But for tech startups, for mobile, for networks, for marketplaces, you know, this is a really good place to do it. For a bunch of other things, you should think about whether or not it’s a different location. Now, here’s something that, you know, it’s very in vogue, very conventional to say you’re contrarian these days. And so let’s talk a little bit about what contrarianness actually, in fact, is. So it’s actually pretty easy to be contrarian. It’s hard to be contrarian and right. And in particular, when you’re thinking about is my idea contrarian or contrarian enough, it’s How does a smart person actually disagree with me?

[译文 14]

所以伟大的创始人会这样做：“看，我会搬到有网络的地方去。“那个网络，你知道的，经常是指硅谷。但是对于科技创业公司、移动应用、网络、市场平台，你知道的，这是一个真正适合做这些的地方。但是对于其他很多事情，你应该考虑是否应该选择不同的地点。现在，有一件事，你知道的，这些天说自己是"逆向思维者"是非常流行、非常常见的。所以让我们聊聊"逆向思维"实际上到底是什么。所以实际上成为逆向思维者是很容易的。成为逆向思维者同时又是正确的，这是很难的。特别是当你在思考我的想法是否够逆向或者是否足够逆向时，这是一个聪明人会如何真正不同意我的问题。

[段 15]

right? Because if you can’t think of a smart person who isn’t like ignorant or just crazy or something else, but is a smart person who is somewhat expert in this or thinks that your idea has some serious challenges, then it actually isn’t contrarian. And contrarian is always—actually, this is one of the things that Sam and I talked about at Startup School—is contrarian is actually relative to an audience. So when you’re thinking about contrarian in terms of a really good contrarian idea, it’s like, Okay, what would other, say, good consumer internet people think is actually in fact not yet a good idea? And part of when you think about contrarian is to say, Okay, what’s the way that what do I know that other people don’t know?

[译文 15]

对吧？因为如果你想不出一个聪明的、不是那种无知或疯狂或其他什么的、而是某种程度上是这个领域的专家、或者认为你的想法有一些严重挑战的聪明人，那它实际上就不是逆向思维。逆向思维总是——实际上，这是Sam和我在Startup School讨论的事情之一——逆向思维实际上是相对于受众而言的。所以当你在思考一个真正好的逆向思维想法时，就像是，好吧，其他比如说优秀的消费互联网人会认为什么实际上还不是一个好主意？当你思考逆向思维时，部分是要说，好吧，什么是我知道而别人不知道的？

[段 16]

Because it isn’t just, Oh, I’m brilliant and other people aren’t, and that’s the reason my contrarian thing is right. That’s a very bad test. Might happen to be true. Of course, lightning could also strike you in the field. So think a lot about, like, what is it that I know that other people don’t know? So for example, in the very early days of LinkedIn, part of what I advise all founders to do is go talk to every smart person who will talk to you and give you feedback. So at LinkedIn, I walked around and said, Here’s my idea. What do you think? Two-thirds or more of my network, including some of the very, very smart people, all thought I was nuts.

[译文 16]

这并不是因为，“哦，我很聪明，其他人不聪明”，所以我的逆向思维是对的。这是一个很糟糕的检验标准。也可能碰巧是对的。当然，雷电也可能劈中田野里的你。所以要多想想，到底我知道什么别人不知道的东西？比如，在LinkedIn非常早期的日子里，我建议所有创始人都要做的一件事，就是去找每一个愿意和你交谈并给你反馈的聪明人聊聊。所以在LinkedIn，我到处走走说，这是我的想法，你们怎么看？我的人脉中三分之二甚至更多的人，包括一些非常聪明的人，都觉得我疯了。

[段 17]

And the reason why I thought I was nuts was because they said— Well, look, it’s a network product. It’s only valuable with a bunch of people in it. First person, no value. Invite second person, second person, first person in it, no value for either of them. They already know each other. When do you actually begin to deliver on your use case, which is like 500K to a million people, right? And so you’re never going to get the size. It’s never going to grow. Now, what I knew that the critics didn’t know was that I could think of a set of different ways by which people say, look, it’s pretty easy to say, look, I believe in the vision of this, or I think it’s interesting, or I think a product like this should exist, or I’m willing to play around with it.

[译文 17]

我认为自己疯了的原因是他们说——好吧，你看，这是一个网络产品。只有当有很多人在里面时它才有价值。第一个人，没价值。邀请第二个人，第二个人、第一个人在里面，对他们两个都没价值。他们已经互相认识了。你实际上什么时候才能实现你的使用场景，大约是50万到100万人，对吧？所以你永远达不到那个规模。它永远不会增长。现在，我知道而批评者不知道的是，我能想出各种不同的方式，人们会说，好吧，说我相信这个愿景，或者说我觉得这很有趣，或者说我觉得这样的产品应该存在，或者说愿意尝试一下。

[段 18]

And I can leverage those sets of interests to grow the network to get to enough size that you could begin to deliver on the value propositions in which LinkedIn had. And that was the specific thing that I knew that the critics weren’t thinking about. And so when you think about being contrarian, you have to think about how is it that smart people disagree with me, they disagree with me from a position of intelligence, and there’s something that I know that they don’t know that actually, in fact, will play out to be true. Now, in this case, in general, as a founder, it’s good to be contrarian in the real sense and right. Now, the other last part on the contrariness is to think about there’s lots of different ways to be contrarian.

[译文 18]

我可以利用这些兴趣群体来扩大网络规模，达到足够的体量，这样你就可以开始实现LinkedIn曾提出的价值主张。而这正是批评者们没有考虑到的地方。所以当你思考逆向思维时，你得想想那些聪明的人为什么会不同意我的观点，他们是从智慧的角度不同意我的，但我知道一些他们不知道的东西，而这些东西实际上最终会被证明是正确的。在这个问题上，总的来说，作为一名创始人，在真正意义上逆向思考并且判断正确是一件好事。现在，关于逆向思维的最后一个部分是，要想到有很多不同的方式可以做到逆向。

[段 19]

So, for example, a frequent one will be like, oh, yeah, that’s a good small idea, but actually, no, it’s not small at all. Like, oh, yeah, that’s a good small idea, but actually, no, it’s not small, it’s large. Or, you know, actually, in fact, you can assemble the talent. Or while most consumer Internet startups tend to be, like, for example, there’s another LinkedIn example, tend to be only successful if they’re rocket ships, actually a gradual compounding curve can actually be very, very valuable. LinkedIn never had its rocket ship moment. It was kind of compound year by year. But that, in the consumer Internet, tends to be atypical to the pattern. So here you begin to get to a bunch of sorts of problems that essentially founders run into, which is like, well, should I be doing the work or should I be recruiting people and delegating the work?

[译文 19]

所以，举个例子，经常会出现这样的情况，哦，是的，这是一个不错的小想法，但实际上，不，它根本不小。比如，哦，是的，这是一个不错的小想法，但实际上，不，它不小，它很大。或者，你知道，实际上，事实上，你可以整合人才。或者，虽然大多数消费互联网创业公司往往是这样的，比如，又一个LinkedIn的例子，往往只有在成为火箭般快速增长的企业时才能成功，但实际上，渐进式的复利曲线实际上可以是非常非常有价值的。LinkedIn从未有过它的火箭时刻。它是逐年复合增长的。但在消费互联网领域，这往往是非典型的模式。所以在这里，你开始遇到一系列创始人会遇到的问题，比如，嗯，我应该自己工作还是应该招聘人员并委派工作？

[段 20]

And classically, the answer to this is, actually, in fact, you need to do both. And in fact, not only do you need to do both, you need to do sometimes one at 100% and sometimes the other one at 100%. And sometimes, even though this is not so good at math, both at 100%. And so what you’ll see is this is actually classic when you begin thinking about what is a great founder, is you navigate what is apparent paradoxes. So another one that I frequently talk about is you’ve got to be both flexible and persistent. And the reason for this is entrepreneurs are frequently given the advice to have a vision, stay firm against adversity, realize that you have this vision, that is contrarian to what other people think and just stay on track, train or what other people think and just stay on track.

[译文 20]

传统上，答案实际上是，你两者都需要做。事实上，你不仅需要两者都做，有时候一个需要做到100%，有时候另一个需要做到100%。有时候，即使这在数学上不太合理，两者都要做到100%。所以你会发现，当你开始思考什么是伟大的创始人时，你实际上是在处理这些明显的悖论。所以我经常提到的另一个是，你必须既有灵活性又要坚持不懈。原因在于，创业者经常被告知要有一个愿景，在逆境中保持坚定，要意识到你有这个愿景，这个愿景与别人的想法相悖，就坚持走下去，不要在乎别人怎么想，就坚持走下去。

[段 21]

The user wants me to add punctuation to this text. Let me go through it carefully and add appropriate punctuation marks. The text appears to be a transcription of someone speaking, likely about entrepreneurship and being a founder. Let me work through it: get through the difficult times and get there. The other piece of advice given with equal vigor is listen to data, listen to customers, pivot, be flexible. Part of the thing this comes out to being in terms of being a great founder is to say, well, when should I be persistent? When should I be flexible? And the vehicle that I most often use for this is you should have on a project you’re doing, like a company, an investment thesis that essentially says why you think, possibly contrarian, why you think this is potentially a good idea.

[译文 21]

用户希望我给这段文字添加标点符号。让我仔细通读一遍并添加适当的标点符号。这段文字看起来像是某人的演讲记录，可能涉及创业和创始人身份。让我来处理：熬过艰难时期并到达那里。另一个被同样强调的建议是：倾听数据，倾听客户，灵活调整，保持弹性。这个问题的核心归结为：怎样才能成为一个优秀的创始人？答案是：我应该在什么时候坚持？什么时候应该灵活？我最常用的方法是，在你正在做的项目中，比如一家公司，确立一个投资论点，它本质上解释了为什么你认为——可能是逆势地——为什么你认为这可能是一个好主意。

[段 22]

It should include what you know that you think other people don’t know. And then as you’re going into the battlefield, you go, am I in fact increasing confidence in my investment thesis or decreasing confidence in my investment thesis? Because if I’m increasing confidence, then stay on track, be persistent. And by the way, sometimes even with adversity, your confidence can increase. If it’s decreasing, that doesn’t mean jump out. PayPal, LinkedIn, Airbnb, a whole bunch of startups I’ve been part of have had months where you were like, oh, my God, why did we ever think this was a good idea? It was kind of a valley of the shadows moment. So, for example, in PayPal, it was August 2000.

[译文 22]

这应该包括你所知道的、你认为别人不知道的东西。然后当你在进入战场时，你要问自己，我实际上是在增强还是削弱对我投资论点的信心？因为如果我在增强信心，那就保持轨道，坚持下去。顺便说一句，有时候即使面对逆境，你的信心也会增强。如果信心在下降，这并不意味着要跳出去。PayPal、LinkedIn、Airbnb，还有很多我参与过的初创公司，都有过那样的月份，你会说，天哪，我们为什么会认为这是个好的想法？这有点像是在山谷阴影中的时刻。比如，在 PayPal，是 2000 年 8 月。

[段 23]

We were burning $12 million in one month. The expense curve was exponentiating. We had no revenue. Decrease in confidence. However, we say, okay, what do we do in order to fix that? And that gives you your immediate action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. Wait, there’s a duplicate at the end: action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. This seems like a transcription error. I should probably just fix it to action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan. Let me continue: Another one is, should you have belief or should you have fear, right? Should you have, you know, could you, should you essentially go, well, no, no, I have this vision of the way the world should be and I should ignore everything else and I should just go at that.

[译文 23]

我们一个月烧掉1200万美元。支出曲线呈指数级增长。我们没有任何收入。信心下降。然而，我们说，好的，我们要怎么做才能解决这个问题？这就给了你一个即时的行动计划。另一个问题是，你应该拥有信念还是应该拥有恐惧，对吧？你知道，你能否、你应该基本上这样做，算了，算了，我有一个关于世界应该如何发展的愿景，我应该忽略其他一切，我应该朝着那个方向前进。

[段 24]

Well, again, part of what being a great founder is, is being both able to hold the belief, to think about where it is you want to be doing and why I don’t want to be going, but also be smart enough that you’re essentially listening to criticism, negative feedback, competitive entries, where you’re kind of going, okay, is this changing my investment thesis? Is this changing what I’m planning on doing? And doesn’t mean you lose confidence. You have the confidence, but you also essentially have the peril. I think peril should probably be parallels or something else, but I’ll keep it as written. Again, in this kind of thing of how do you put these two things together, should I focus internally, build a product, ignore the world, ignore competitors, etc., or should I focus externally?

[译文 24]

好吧，再说一遍，成为伟大创始人一部分是，既要能够坚持自己的信念，思考你想要去往哪里、为什么我不想去，同时也要足够聪明地去倾听批评、负面反馈、竞争对手的情况，在那里你会想，好吧，这是否改变了我投资论文？这是否改变了我计划要做的事情？

这并不意味着你失去信心。你有信心，但你基本上也有危险。

我认为peril应该可能是parallels或其他什么，但我会保持原样。

再说一遍，在这个关于如何把这两件事结合在一起的事情上，我应该专注于内部、构建产品、忽略世界、忽略竞争对手等等，还是应该专注于外部？

[段 25]

Should I be recruiting? Should I be meeting people? Should I be gathering network intelligence? Again, the answer is both. And the reason why I’m focusing on these kind of it’s both rather than either or is because part of what makes a great founder is the ability to be flexible across these lines, to sometimes be 90% one way, sometimes be 80% the other way, be executing the judgment on what does the current problem look like? How is it that when I’m trying to solve this, that I should say, this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work?this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work?

[译文 25]

我应该招聘吗？我应该见人吗？我应该收集网络情报吗？答案同样是两者兼顾。我之所以专注于这类两者兼顾而非非此即彼的问题，是因为成为伟大创始人所需的特质之一，是在这些界限之间保持灵活。有时90%朝一个方向，有时80%朝另一个方向，在执行时要做出判断：当下的难题是什么样的？当我试图解决这个问题时，我应该说，这就是我们应该做的，以及我应该如何分配工作？这就是我们应该做的，以及我应该如何分配工作？

[段 26]

And part of when you think about these things, There’s another duplicate: the work?this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work? I should fix this. Let me rewrite this with proper punctuation: Get through the difficult times and get there. The other piece of advice given with equal vigor is: listen to data, listen to customers, pivot, be flexible. Part of the thing this comes out to being in terms of being a great founder is to say, well, when should I be persistent? When should I be flexible? And the vehicle that I most often use for this is: you should have on a project you’re doing, like a company, an investment thesis that essentially says why you think, possibly contrarian, why you think this is potentially a good idea.

[译文 26]

当你思考这些问题时，还有另一个重复的话题：关于工作分配——我们应该做什么？我应该如何分配工作？

挺过困难时期，坚持下去。

另一个同样有力度的建议是：倾听数据，倾听客户，灵活转向。

要成为一个伟大的创始人，其中一部分需要搞清楚的问题是：我什么时候应该坚持？什么时候应该灵活？我最常用的方法论是：对于你正在做的项目，比如一家公司，你应该有一个投资论点，它本质上阐述了你为什么认为——可能是逆主流的——这是一个潜在的好机会。

[段 27]

It should include what you know that you think other people don’t know. And then as you’re going into the battlefield, you go, am I in fact increasing confidence in my investment thesis or decreasing confidence in my investment thesis? Because if I’m increasing confidence, then stay on track, be persistent. And by the way, sometimes even with adversity, your confidence can increase. If it’s decreasing, that doesn’t mean jump out. PayPal, LinkedIn, Airbnb — a whole bunch of startups I’ve been part of have had months where you were like, ‘Oh, my God, why did we ever think this was a good idea?’ It was kind of a valley of the shadows moment. So, for example, in PayPal, it was August 2000.

[译文 27]

它应该包括你所知道的、你以为别人不知道的东西。然后，当你进入战场时，你要问自己，我是真的在增加对我投资论的信心，还是在降低信心？因为如果我在增加信心，那就保持正轨，坚持下去。顺便说一下，有时候即使遇到逆境，你的信心反而可能增加。如果信心在下降，这并不意味着要跳出去。PayPal、LinkedIn、Airbnb——我参与过的一大批初创公司都有那么几个月，你会觉得"天哪，我们怎么会觉得这是个好主意？“那是一种低谷时刻。比如，在 PayPal，那是 2000 年 8 月。

[段 28]

We were burning $12 million in one month. The expense curve was exponentiating. We had no revenue. Decrease in confidence. However, we say, okay, what do we do in order to fix that? And that gives you your immediate action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan. Wait, I still have that duplicate. Let me think about this differently. Maybe the duplicate was in the original text and I should just combine it properly. Actually, looking at the original more carefully: action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. This looks like a mistake where plan. was followed by at and that…. It might be a transcription glitch. Let me just make it: action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan.

[译文 28]

我们一个月烧掉1200万美元。费用曲线正在指数级增长。我们没有收入。信心下降。然而，我们会说，好的，我们要怎么做才能解决这个问题？这就给了你一个立即的行动计划。这就给了你一个立即的行动计划。等等，我还有那个重复的。让我换个角度思考。也许重复的内容在原文中，我应该只是正确地合并它。实际上，更仔细地看原文：action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan。这看起来像是一个错误，plan. 后面跟着 at and that…。这可能是转录错误。让我就这样处理：action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan.

[段 29]

Similarly: the work?this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work? Should be: the work? This is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work? Let me go through this more carefully and add punctuation: 1. get through the difficult times and get there. - This should probably start with capitalization: Get through the difficult times and get there. 2. The other piece of advice given with equal vigor is listen to data, listen to customers, pivot, be flexible. - Add colon after is: is: listen to data… 3. Part of the thing this comes out to being in terms of being a great founder is to say, well, when should I be persistent?

[译文 29]

同样的：工作？ 这就是我们应该做的事情，我应该如何分配工作？ 应该是：工作？ 这就是我们应该做的事情，我应该如何分配工作？ 让我更仔细地检查一遍并添加标点：1. get through the difficult times and get there. - 这应该以大写开头：Get through the difficult times and get there. 2. The other piece of advice given with equal vigor is listen to data, listen to customers, pivot, be flexible. - 在 is 后面加冒号：is: listen to data… 3. Part of the thing this comes out to being in terms of being a great founder is to say, well, when should I be persistent?

[段 30]

• This is fine, but well could have comma after. 4. When should I be flexible? - Fine. 5. And the vehicle that I most often use for this is you should have on a project you’re doing, like a company, an investment thesis… - This should be: is: you should have… 6. …that essentially says why you think, possibly contrarian, why you think this is potentially a good idea. - This is a bit awkward. Maybe: that essentially says, possibly contrarian, why you think this is potentially a good idea. 7. It should include what you know that you think other people don’t know. - Fine. 8. And then as you’re going into the battlefield, you go, am I in fact increasing confidence in my investment thesis or decreasing confidence in my investment thesis?

[译文 30]

• 这没问题，但后面可以加个逗号。4. 什么时候应该灵活处理？- 可以。5. 对于这种情况我最常用的工具是：你应该在一个项目中，比如一家公司，一个投资论点……- 应该是：is: you should have…（是：你应该有一个……）。6. ……它本质上说明了为什么你认为——可能是逆向思维——为什么你认为这可能是个好主意。- 这个有点别扭。可以改成：它本质上说明了，可能带有逆向思维，为什么你认为这可能是个好主意。7. 它应该包括你所知道的、你认为是别人不知道的东西。- 可以。8. 然后当你要进入战场时，你会想，我的投资论点实际上是在增强信心还是在削弱信心？

[段 31]

• Fine. 9. Because if I’m increasing confidence, then stay on track, be persistent. - Fine. 10. And by the way, sometimes even with adversity, your confidence can increase. - Fine. 11. If it’s decreasing, that doesn’t mean jump out. - Fine. 12. PayPal, LinkedIn, Airbnb, a whole bunch of startups I’ve been part of have had months where you were like, oh, my God, why did we ever think this was a good idea? - Add quotes and capitalization: …like, ‘Oh, my God, why did we ever think this was a good idea?’ 13. It was kind of a valley of the shadows moment. - Fine. 14. So, for example, in PayPal, it was August 2000. - Fine. 15.

[译文 31]

好的。9. 因为如果我的信心在增长，那么就要坚持到底，保持执着。 - 好的。10. 还有，顺便说一下，有时候即使面对逆境，你的信心也可能会增长。 - 好的。11. 如果信心在下降，但这并不意味着要退出。 - 好的。12. PayPal、LinkedIn、Airbnb，还有我参与过的一大批创业公司，都有过这样的月份——你会觉得，天啊，我们当初怎么会觉得这是个 好主意？ - 添加引号和大写：……like, ‘Oh, my God, why did we ever think this was a good idea?’ 13. 那时候有点像进入了人生的低谷。 - 好的。14. 比如说，在PayPal，那是2000年8月。 - 好的。15.

[段 32]

We were burning $12 million in one month. - Fine. 16. The expense curve was exponentiating. - Fine. 17. We had no revenue. Decrease in confidence. - Could add a before Decrease: A decrease in confidence. 18. However, we say, okay, what do we do in order to fix that? - Fine. 19. And that gives you your immediate action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. - This is problematic. Looking at it, it seems like there’s a glitch. Maybe it should be: And that gives you your immediate action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan. But that doesn’t make sense. Or maybe: And that gives you your immediate action plan at, and that gives you your immediate action plan.

[译文 32]

我们一个月烧掉了$12 million。- 好的。16. 费用曲线正在指数级增长。- 好的。17. 我们没有收入。信心下降。- 可以在Decrease前加a：A decrease in confidence。18. 然而，我们会说，好吧，我们该怎么做来修复这个问题？- 好的。19. And that gives you your immediate action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. - 这有问题。Looking at it, it seems like there’s a glitch. - 也许应该是：And that gives you your immediate action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan. - 但这没有意义。Or maybe: And that gives you your immediate action plan at, and that gives you your immediate action plan.

[段 33]

That also doesn’t make sense. Actually, looking more carefully, maybe the original had action plan. At and it got concatenated. Let me just fix it to: And that gives you your immediate action plan. 20. Another one is, should you have belief or should you have fear, right? - Fine. 21. Should you have, you know, could you, should you essentially go, well, no, no, I have this vision of the way the world should be and I should ignore everything else and I should just go at that. - This is run-on. Let me punctuate: Should you have, you know, could you, should you essentially go, well, no, no, I have this vision of the way the world should be, and I should ignore everything else, and I should just go at that.

[译文 33]

这也说不通。实际上，仔细看，也许原文有个 action plan。At 和它连在一起了。让我改成：这样就给你一个即时的 action plan。20. 另一个问题是，你应该抱有信念还是应该抱有恐惧，对吧？- 好的。21. 你应该，你懂的，你能，你应该本质上这样想，嗯，不，不，我有一个关于世界应该怎样的愿景，我应该忽略其他一切，我应该就这样去做。- 这是个流水句。让我标点：你应该，你懂的，你能，你应该本质上这样想，嗯，不，不，我有一个关于世界应该怎样的愿景，我应该忽略其他一切，我应该就这样去做。

[段 34]

22. Well, again, part of what being a great founder is, is being both able to hold the belief, to think about where it is you want to be doing and why I don’t want to be going, but also be smart enough that you’re essentially listening to criticism, negative feedback, competitive entries, where you’re kind of going, okay, is this changing my investment thesis? Is this changing what I’m planning on doing? - This is long. Let me break it: Well, again, part of what being a great founder is, is being both able to hold the belief, to think about where it is you want to be doing and why I don’t want to be going, but also be smart enough that you’re essentially listening to criticism, negative feedback, competitive entries, where you’re kind of going, okay, is this changing my investment thesis?

[译文 34]

好的，再说一次，成为一个伟大创始人的部分特质是，既要能够坚守信念，思考你想要做什么以及为什么我不想去，但同时又要足够聪明，实际上是在倾听批评、负面反馈、竞争对手的情况，你心里在想，好的，这是否改变了我的投资论点？这是否改变了我的计划？

[段 35]

Is this changing what I’m planning on doing? 23. And doesn’t mean you lose confidence. - Should be: And it doesn’t mean you lose confidence. 24. You have the confidence, but you also essentially have the peril. - peril seems wrong here. Maybe skill or will? But I’ll keep it. 25. Again, in this kind of thing of how do you put these two things together, should I focus internally, build a product, ignore the world, ignore competitors, etc., or should I focus externally? - Fine. 26. Should I be recruiting? Should I be meeting people? Should I be gathering network intelligence? - Fine. 27. Again, the answer is both. - Fine. 28. And the reason why I’m focusing on these kind of it’s both rather than either or is because part of what makes a great founder is the ability to be flexible across these lines, to sometimes be 90% one way, sometimes be 80% the other way, be executing the judgment on what does the current problem look like?

[译文 35]

这会改变我计划要做的事情吗？23. 并不意味着你会失去信心。——应该是：而且并不意味着你会失去信心。24. 你有信心，但你也本质上拥有危险。——peril在这里似乎不对。也许是skill还是will？但我会保留它。25. 再一次，在这类事情中，你如何把这两件事结合在一起，我应该专注于内部，开发产品，忽略世界，忽略竞争对手等等，还是应该专注于外部？——可以。26. 我应该招聘吗？我应该见人吗？我应该收集网络情报吗？——可以。27. 再一次，答案是两者都有。——可以。28. 我之所以专注于这类事情是两者而非非此即彼的原因是，成为一个伟大创始人的部分条件是能够灵活地跨越这些界限，有时90%朝一个方向，有时80%朝另一个方向，根据当前问题看起来是什么样来执行判断？

[段 36]

• This is long and a bit confusing. Let me try: And the reason why I’m focusing on these kind of — it’s both rather than either or — is because part of what makes a great founder is the ability to be flexible across these lines, to sometimes be 90% one way, sometimes be 80% the other way, be executing the judgment on what does the current problem look like? 29. How is it that when I’m trying to solve this, that I should say, this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work?this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work? - This has a duplicate.

[译文 36]

这段话很长，而且有点让人困惑。让我尝试解释：我之所以关注这类（这是两者兼具而非非此即彼的），是因为伟大创始人的特质之一就是能够灵活切换，有时90%偏向一方，有时80%偏向另一方，根据当前问题的情况来执行判断。29. 当我试图解决这个问题时，我应该怎么说，这就是我们应该做的，以及我应该如何分配工作？这就是我们应该做的，以及我应该如何分配工作？——这段有重复。

[段 37]

Fix: How is it that when I’m trying to solve this, that I should say, this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work? 30. And part of when you think about these things, - This is incomplete, but it’s the end of the text. Let me put it all together now. I’ll go through sentence by sentence and add punctuation: Get through the difficult times and get there. The other piece of advice given with equal vigor is: listen to data, listen to customers, pivot, be flexible. Part of the thing this comes out to being in terms of being a great founder is to say, well, when should I be persistent? When should I be flexible?

[译文 37]

修复：当我试图解决这个问题时，我应该怎么说，这就是我们应该做的事情，我应该如何分配工作？30. 当你思考这些问题时，部分是——这不完整，但这是文本的结尾。让我现在把它们全部整合起来。我会逐句浏览并添加标点符号：度过困难时期并到达那里。另一条同样强烈给出的建议是：倾听数据，倾听客户， pivot，灵活应对。部分关于成为伟大创始人这件事可以归结为：好吧，我什么时候应该坚持？什么时候应该灵活？

[段 38]

And the vehicle that I most often use for this is: you should have on a project you’re doing, like a company, an investment thesis that essentially says, possibly contrarian, why you think this is potentially a good idea. It should include what you know that you think other people don’t know. And then as you’re going into the battlefield, you go, am I in fact increasing confidence in my investment thesis or decreasing confidence in my investment thesis? Because if I’m increasing confidence, then stay on track, be persistent. And by the way, sometimes even with adversity, your confidence can increase. If it’s decreasing, that doesn’t mean jump out. PayPal, LinkedIn, Airbnb — a whole bunch of startups I’ve been part of have had months where you were like, ‘Oh, my God, why did we ever think this was a good idea?’ It was kind of a valley of the shadows moment.

[译文 38]

而我最常用的工具是：你正在做的项目，比如一家公司，应该有一个投资论点，本质上可能是逆向的，解释你为什么认为这可能是个好主意。它应该包括你所知道的、而你认为别人不知道的东西。然后当你进入战场时，你要问自己，我是增加了对投资论点的信心，还是降低了信心？因为如果我在增加信心，那就保持正轨，保持坚持。而且顺便说一下，有时候即使面对逆境，你的信心也可能增加。如果信心在下降，这也不意味着要跳出去。PayPal、LinkedIn、Airbnb——我参与过的一大批初创公司都曾有过这样的月份，你会说“天哪，我们当初怎么会认为这是个 好主意？”那有点像进入了死荫幽谷的时刻。

[段 39]

So, for example, in PayPal, it was August 2000. We were burning $12 million in one month. The expense curve was exponentiating. We had no revenue. A decrease in confidence. However, we say, okay, what do we do in order to fix that? And that gives you your immediate action plan. Another one is, should you have belief or should you have fear, right? Should you have, you know, could you, should you essentially go, well, no, no, I have this vision of the way the world should be, and I should ignore everything else, and I should just go at that. Well, again, part of what being a great founder is, is being both able to hold the belief, to think about where it is you want to be doing and why I don’t want to be going, but also be smart enough that you’re essentially listening to criticism, negative feedback, competitive entries, where you’re kind of going, okay, is this changing my investment thesis?

[译文 39]

比如，在PayPal，那是2000年8月。我们一个月烧掉$1200万。费用曲线正在呈指数级增长。我们没有任何收入。信心在下降。然而，我们会说，好吧，我们该怎么做才能解决这个问题？这就给了你一个即时的行动计划。另一个问题是，你应该拥有信念还是应该拥有恐惧，对吧？你应该知道吗，你基本上应该说，呃，不，不，我有这个世界应该怎样的愿景，我应该忽略其他一切，我就朝着那个方向前进。好，再说一次，成为伟大创始人的一部分，是既能够坚持信念，思考你想要去哪里以及为什么我不想去，但也足够聪明，能够基本上倾听批评、负面反馈、竞争者的进入，你会想，好吧，这是否改变了我的投资论题？

[段 40]

Is this changing what I’m planning on doing? And it doesn’t mean you lose confidence. You have the confidence, but you also essentially have the peril. Again, in this kind of thing of how do you put these two things together, should I focus internally, build a product, ignore the world, ignore competitors, etc., or should I focus externally? Should I be recruiting? Should I be meeting people? Should I be gathering network intelligence? Again, the answer is both. And the reason why I’m focusing on these kind of — it’s both rather than either or — is because part of what makes a great founder is the ability to be flexible across these lines, to sometimes be 90% one way, sometimes be 80% the other way, be executing the judgment on what does the current problem look like?

[译文 40]

这在改变我的计划吗？这并不意味着你失去信心。你有自信，但你也基本上面临风险。再者，关于如何把这两件事结合起来的这类问题——我是应该专注于内部、打造产品、无视世界、无视竞争对手等等，还是应该专注于外部？我应该招聘吗？我应该见人吗？我应该收集网络情报吗？再者，答案是两者都要。我之所以关注这类问题——两者都要而非非此即彼——是因为成为伟大创始人的要素之一是能够灵活切换，有时90%朝一个方向，有时80%朝另一个方向，根据当前问题是什么样的来执行判断？

[段 41]

How is it that when I’m trying to solve this, that I should say, this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work? And part of when you think about these things, Wait, I should double-check the peril part. The original says: You have the confidence, but you also essentially have the peril. This doesn’t make grammatical sense. Looking at the context, it might be skill or will or maybe it’s parallels as in parallel thinking or something. But since the instruction is just to add punctuation, not to change words, I’ll leave it as is. Also, looking at the beginning: get through the difficult times and get there. - This should be capitalized since it’s the start.

[译文 41]

怎么会在我尝试解决这个问题的时候，我应该说，这就是我们该做的事，而我应该如何分配工作？而当你思考这些事情时，部分是——等一下，我应该检查一下peril这部分。原文说的是：你有自信，但本质上你也面临着危险。这在语法上不太通顺。结合上下文，可能是skill或will，或者也许是什么parallels，比如parallel thinking之类的。但既然指示只是加标点，不改字，我就保持原样。另外，看看开头：熬过艰难时期并到达那里。—这应该大写因为是一句话的开头。

[段 42]

Let me look at that duplicate section again: action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. If I parse this char by char: a-c-t-i-o-n- -p-l-a-n-.-a-t- -a-n-d- -t-h-a-t- -g-i-v-e-s- -y-o-u- -y-o-u-r- -i-m-m-e-d-i-a-t-e- -a-c-t-i-o-n- -p-l-a-n-. Wait, that’s not right. Let me look at the original again: action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. Actually, looking at the user’s input: that gives you your immediate action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. It looks like plan. followed by at - maybe it was plan. At and got concatenated? Or maybe it’s plan at (as in, the plan at which point…)? Actually, looking more carefully, I think it’s a transcription error where something like: And that gives you your immediate action plan.

[译文 42]

让我再看看那段重复的部分：action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan。如果我逐字符解析：a-c-t-i-o-n- -p-l-a-n-.-a-t- -a-n-d- -t-h-a-t- -g-i-v-e-s- -y-o-u- -y-o-u-r- -i-m-m-e-d-i-a-t-e- -a-c-t-i-o-n- -p-l-a-n-。等等，那不对。让我再看看原始内容：action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan。实际上，看用户的输入：that gives you your immediate action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan。看起来像是plan.后面跟着at——也许本来是plan. At然后被连接在一起了？或者也许是plan at（比如，在某个时间点的计划…）？实际上，仔细看，我认为这是一个转录错误，原本应该是：And that gives you your immediate action plan。

[段 43]

At [some point], and that gives you your immediate action plan. Or maybe: And that gives you your immediate action plan at, and that gives you your immediate action plan. Neither makes much sense. Let me look at the full context: However, we say, okay, what do we do in order to fix that? And that gives you your immediate action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. Hmm, maybe it should be: However, we say, okay, what do we do in order to fix that? And that gives you your immediate action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan. Or maybe: However, we say, okay, what do we do in order to fix that? And that gives you your immediate action plan at, and that gives you your immediate action plan.

[译文 43]

在[某个时刻]，这样就给你你的立即行动计划。或者：这样就给你你的立即行动计划，这样就给你你的立即行动计划。两种说法都没太大意义。让我看看完整的上下文：然而，我们说，好吧，我们该怎么做才能解决这个问题？这样就给你你的立即行动计划。这样就给你你的立即行动计划。嗯，也许应该是：然而，我们说，好吧，我们该怎么做才能解决这个问题？这样就给你你的立即行动计划。这样就给你你的立即行动计划。或者：然而，我们说，好吧，我们该怎么做才能解决这个问题？这样就给你你的立即行动计划，这样就给你你的立即行动计划。

[段 44]

Actually, looking at the second duplicate: the work?this is what we should be doing and how should I be dividing the work? This is clearly work? This is… with the space missing. So the first one is likely plan. At -> plan.at with the period and space missing. But what does At mean here? Maybe: And that gives you your immediate action plan. At [the same time], and that gives you your immediate action plan. Or maybe it’s: And that gives you your immediate action plan at [this point], and that gives you your immediate action plan. But that’s awkward. Let me think… maybe the original was: And that gives you your immediate action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan.

[译文 44]

实际上，看看第二个重复的部分： 工作？这是我们应该做的事情，以及我应该如何分配工作？这显然是在说工作？这… 缺失了空格。 所以第一个可能是plan。 At -> plan.at，缺失了句号和空格。 但"at"在这里是什么意思？ 也许原句是：And that gives you your immediate action plan. At [同时]，And that gives you your immediate action plan. 或者也许原句是：And that gives you your immediate action plan at [这一点]，And that gives you your immediate action plan. 但这样读起来很别扭。 让我想想… 也许原句是：And that gives you your immediate action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan.

[段 45]

That would make sense as an emphatic repetition. Or maybe: And that gives you your immediate action plan at [that moment], and that gives you your immediate action plan [at this moment]. But without the context, I’ll assume it’s a duplicate error and fix it to: And that gives you your immediate action plan. Actually, looking at the user’s text again: action plan.at and that gives you your immediate action plan. Let me read it as: action plan. At and that gives you your immediate action plan. Maybe it should be: action plan. At [the same time], and that gives you your immediate action plan. Or maybe: action plan at [the point of decrease in confidence], and that gives you your immediate action plan [when confidence increases].

[译文 45]

这作为强调性重复会说得通。或者也许：这给了你在那个时刻的立即行动计划，这给了你在此刻的立即行动计划。但没有上下文，我会假设这是一个重复错误并修正为：这给了你立即的行动计划。实际上，再次查看用户的文本：action plan.at 并且这给了你立即的行动计划。让我读作：action plan. At 并且这给了你立即的行动计划。也许应该是：action plan. At [the same time], and that gives you your immediate action plan. Or maybe: action plan at [the point of decrease in confidence], and that gives you your immediate action plan [when confidence increases].

[段 46]

But I think the safest is to just add the punctuation to make it readable: action plan. And that gives you your immediate action plan. Wait, the user says Another one is after this, so the sentence ends here. Let me check if there are other issues: - PayPal, LinkedIn, Airbnb, a whole bunch - could add em-dash: PayPal, LinkedIn, Airbnb — a whole bunch - valley of the shadows moment - this is a reference to valley of the shadow of death - peril - likely wrong word, but I’ll leave it Let me write the final version: Get through the difficult times and get there. The other piece of advice given with equal vigor is: listen to data, listen to customers, pivot, be flexible.

[译文 46]

但我认为最安全的做法就是添加标点符号使其可读：行动方案。这样就给你一个即时的行动方案。等等，用户说另一个在这之后，所以句子在这里结束。让我检查是否有其他问题：

• PayPal、LinkedIn、Airbnb，一大堆 - 可以加个破折号：PayPal、LinkedIn、Airbnb — 一大堆
• 幽谷时刻 - 这是对"死荫的幽谷"的引用
• 危难 - 可能是用词不当，但我会保留

让我写最终版本：

渡过艰难时期，然后到达那里。另一个同样有力的建议是：倾听数据，倾听客户，灵活调整，保持弹性。

[段 47]

Part of the thing this comes out to being in terms of being a great founder is to say, well, when should I be persistent? When should I be flexible? And the vehicle that I most often use for this is: you should have on a project you’re doing, like a company, an investment thesis that essentially says, possibly contrarian, why you think this is potentially a good idea. It should include what you know that you think other people don’t know. And then as you’re going into the battlefield, you go, am I in fact increasing confidence in my investment thesis or decreasing confidence in my investment thesis? Because if I’m increasing confidence, then stay on track, be persistent.

[译文 47]

关于成为伟大创始人，有一点很关键，那就是问自己：我应该在什么时候坚持？什么时候应该灵活？我最常用的工具是这样的：在你做的项目中，比如一家公司，你应该有一个投资论题，基本上是反共识地说明为什么你认为这可能是个好主意。这个论题应该包含你所知道的而你认为别人不知道的东西。然后当你进入战场时，你要问自己：我实际上是在增强还是削弱自己的投资论题的置信度？因为如果我在增强置信度，那就保持方向，坚持下去。

[段 48]

And by the way, sometimes even with adversity, your confidence can increase. If it’s decreasing, that doesn’t mean jump out. PayPal, LinkedIn, Airbnb — a whole bunch of startups I’ve been part of have had months where you were like, Oh, my God, why did we ever think this was a good idea? It was kind of a valley of the shadows moment. So, for example, in PayPal, it was August 2000. We were burning $12 million in one month. The expense curve was exponentiating. We had no revenue. A decrease in confidence. However, we say, okay, what do we do in order to fix that? And that gives you your immediate action plan. Another one is, should you have belief or should you have fear, right?

[译文 48]

而且，顺便说一句，有时候即使身处逆境，你的信心也会增强。如果信心在下降，但这并不意味着你就此放弃。PayPal、LinkedIn、Airbnb —— 我参与过的一大批初创公司，都曾有那么几个月，你会想，天哪，我们当初怎么会觉得这是个不错的主意？那是一种置身于阴影峡谷的时刻。比如说，在 PayPal，那是 2000 年 8 月，我们一个月就烧掉了 1200 万美元，费用曲线正在呈指数级增长，没有任何收入，信心大幅下降。然而，我们会说，好吧，我们该怎么做才能改变这种状况？这样就为你提供了立即可行的行动方案。另一个问题是，你应该拥有信念还是应该心怀恐惧，对吧？

[段 49]

Should you have, you know, could you, should you essentially go, well, no, no, I have this vision of the way the world should be, and I should ignore everything else, and I should just go at that. Well, again, part of what being a great founder is, is being both able to hold the belief, to think about where it is you want to be doing and why I don’t want to be going, but also be smart enough that you’re essentially listening to criticism, negative feedback, competitive entries, where you’re kind of going, okay, is this changing my investment thesis? Is this changing what I’m planning on doing? And it doesn’t mean you lose confidence. You have the confidence, but you also essentially have the peril.

[译文 49]

你应该有，你知道的，你应该，我基本上应该这样走，嗯，不，不，我有一个对世界应该怎样的愿景，我应该忽略其他一切，然后就这样去做。嗯，再说一遍，成为一个伟大创始人的一部分，就是既能够持有这个信念，思考你想要做的事和你为什么不想做的事，但同时也要足够聪明，以至于你基本上在倾听批评、负面反馈、竞争对手的出现，你会想，好吧，这是否改变了我的投资论点？这是否改变了我的计划？这并不意味着你会失去信心。你有自信，但你也要基本上保持危机意识。

[段 50]

Again, in this kind of thing of how do you put these two things together, should I focus internally, build a product, ignore the world, ignore competitors, etc., or should I focus externally? Should I be recruiting? Should I be meeting people? Should I be gathering network intelligence? Again, the answer is both. And the reason why I’m focusing on these kind of — it’s both rather than either or — is because part of what As you say, like, this is another one that’s kind of classic. People say, well, I’m completely motivated by data. It’s what customers said to user groups. You know, I’ve a lot of entrepreneurial methodologies, lean, other kinds of things are talked about. It’s like gather the data, be guided on the data.

[译文 50]

再说一次，在这种如何把这两件事结合在一起的事情上，我应该专注于内部、打造产品、无视世界、无视竞争对手等等，还是应该专注于外部？我应该招聘吗？我应该见人吗？我应该收集网络情报吗？再说一次，答案是两者都要。而我之所以关注这类——两者都要而非非此即彼——是因为正如你所说，这也是一个有点经典的问题。人们说，呃，我完全由数据驱动。这是客户对用户组说的话。你知道，有很多创业方法论，lean，其他类型的都在讨论。就是，收集数据，由数据指导。

[段 51]

Well, actually, in fact, data only exists within the framework of a vision that you’re building to a hypothesis of where you’re moving to. And the data can even be negative, and you can think, well, actually, in fact, this negative data means I need to change or alter the way that I’m thinking about something, but I actually keep on a specific vision about what I’m doing. And, by the way, sometimes even when you have that specific vision, you don’t necessarily actually ever end up at that big vision that you were thinking about. So, for example, at PayPal, we distributed these T-shirts that said the new global world currency. Right, well, actually, in fact, one of the…

[译文 51]

嗯，其实，事实上，数据只存在于一个愿景的框架内，而这个愿景是你正在构建的、关于你要走向何方的一个假设。而且数据甚至可能是负面的，你会想，嗯，其实，事实上，这个负面数据意味着我需要改变或调整我思考某事的方式，但实际上我对正在做的事情坚持一个特定的愿景。而且，顺便说一下，有时候即使你有那个特定的愿景，你也不一定最终真的到达你一直在思考的那个大愿景。所以，举个例子，在PayPal，我们分发了一些T恤，上面写着"新全球世界货币”。对，嗯，其实，事实上，其中一个……

[段 52]

and I know Peter’s been here, um, one of the jokes I told Peter is like, well, actually, we do have this new world global currency. What we’re trading in is dollars. You may have heard of it. It’s existed for a while, right? We’re essentially a master merchant for that. Um, now, of course, this presages what might be happening with bitcoin, although you know there’s the whole other topic there. However, the key thing is, is that vision of saying we are creating a kind of a universal network that allows anyone to pay, anyone to become a merchant, to bring the electronics into the speed of commerce, bring the electronics into the speed of commerce at any business that is being transacted, that vision kept a true north by which we say, well, first we think we’re going to have a banking model.

[译文 52]

我知道Peter也来过这里，呃，我跟Peter开的玩笑之一是，呃，实际上，我们确实有这种新的世界货币。我们交易用的是美元。你可能听说过。它已经存在一段时间了，对吧？我们本质上是这方面的超级商家。呃，当然，这也预示着比特币可能正在发生的事情，虽然你知道这完全是另一个话题。然而，关键的是这个愿景——我们正在创建一种通用网络，让任何人都能付款，任何人都能成为商家，让电子产品进入商业速度，让电子产品进入任何正在进行的商业交易的速度——这个愿景一直是我们的北极星，我们用它来说，好吧，首先我们认为我们会有一个银行模式。

[段 53]

Then we think we’re going to have a debt model. Oh, no, we’re actually going to have a master merchant model. And how does that actually play out? So you’re always combining the vision and the data. And the data is within the framework of a vision. And sometimes, of course, what you learn changes your vision. Now, this is one of the ones that I actually think… we saved this special picture for one of the ones that I actually think is quite key, is that normally entrepreneurs, founders, are thought about as having, like, they’re risk takers, right? Whereas everyone else cowers in fear from this notion of risk, they boldly go out. Now, that’s true. You have to be a risk taker.

[译文 53]

然后我们以为会有一个债务模式。哦，不，我们实际上会有一个主商户模式。这实际上是如何运作的呢？所以你总是在结合愿景和数据。数据是在愿景的框架内的。当然，有时候，你学到的东西会改变你的愿景。现在，这是我实际上认为的一个……我们保存这张特别的图片是为了其中一个我实际上认为非常关键的点，那就是通常企业家、创始人被认为拥有这样的特质，他们是有风险偏好的人，对吧？而其他人都被风险这个概念吓倒，他们却勇敢地走出去。现在，这是真的。你必须是一个敢于冒险的人。

[段 54]

You have to be thinking about how do I make a really coherent bet on risk because, in fact, the only really big opportunities, the only contrarian opportunities that smart people disagree with you on happen to be one that have risk associated with them. On the other hand, part of the skill set that when you’re beginning to apply how you think about risk as an entrepreneur is you’re beginning to think about, like, how do I take intelligent risks? How do I take a focused risk that if I’m right about that one thing, then a bunch of other things break my way? And once I start doing that, I try to figure out how to make my one-shot possibility as high as possible, e.g., how do I minimize other risks?

[译文 54]

你必须思考如何对风险进行真正一致的押注，因为事实上，那些真正大的机会，那些聪明人与你意见相左的逆向机会，恰好都是伴随着风险的机会。另一方面，作为创业者，当你开始应用你对风险的思考方式时，部分技能包括你开始思考：我如何承担明智的风险？我如何承担一个集中的风险——如果我对那一件事判断正确，那么很多事情都会对我有利？一旦我开始这样做，我就试着弄清楚如何让我的单次成功概率尽可能高，例如，我如何将其他风险最小化？

[段 55]

How do I essentially take this risk in an intelligent way that doesn’t just go, oh, yeah, risk to the wind, who cares, but let’s go? And so this kind of combines that, you know, this image, which I think is the best of the images we’ve found for this yet, is kind of the sense of how to think about it. Now, back to what I was saying in terms of having an investment thesis, so part of having an investment thesis is you chart it out. It’s kind of a list of bullets. You say, like, for example, on early LinkedIn, it was like, Look, everyone is actually going to be benefited by a public professional network. Everyone will realize, including companies, that it’s better to have it play out this way.

[译文 55]

我怎样才能真正以一种明智的方式承担这个风险，而不是说"哦，是啊，把风险抛到脑后，谁在乎呢，冲就完事”？所以这就把两者结合起来了，你知道，这张图，我觉得这是我们找到的关于这个问题的最好的图片之一，它代表了一种思考方式。现在回到我之前说的关于投资论点的话题，拥有投资论点的一部分是你要把它列出来，基本上就是一张要点清单。比如，你说，在LinkedIn早期，情况是这样的：看，每个人实际上都会从公开的职业网络中受益。所有人，包括公司，都会意识到，让事情以这种方式发展是更好的。

[段 56]

The initial set of adoption will come from essentially people who, like, visualize the world this way or are willing to play with it, and then eventually the mass market will come on as they begin to have a network that is already delivering a value proposition to them. That’s what kind of an investment thesis can look like. And then, you know, you’ve got economics, so like initially recruiting and then broadening other things. You have that investment thesis, and you say, Is my investment thesis increasing or decreasing in confidence? Do I think that the data that I get from the market, when I talk to smart people, how does that change my confidence in it? And this is actually how you essentially minimize risk.

[译文 56]

最初采用者基本上是那些以这种方式看世界的人，或者愿意尝试它的人，然后随着网络已经为他们提供价值主张，大众市场最终会加入。这就是一种投资论 thesis 可以呈现的样子。然后，你知道，你还要考虑经济学，比如初期招募然后扩展其他方面。你有了这个投资论 thesis，然后问自己：我的投资论 thesis 的置信度是在提升还是在下降？当我与聪明人交谈时，我从市场获得的数据，我认为这些数据如何改变了我对它的信心？这实际上就是降低风险的核心方法。

[段 57]

So, for example, very early, very early days in PayPal, part of what happened is they said, Okay, well, we’re going to do cash on mobile phones. We’ll do cash on Palm Pilots because it’s really easy. We actually realized the cash on Palm Pilots wouldn’t work even before we launched the product because basically what happened is I went in and said to Max and Peter, I said, Look, here’s our challenge. Our challenge is, this room probably doesn’t remember what Palm Pilots are. They were like early PDAs. And so we lived in where what was Palm Pilot Central and the whole use case was splitting the dinner tab, and how many people at every one of the table would have a Palm Pilot split your dinner tab?

[译文 57]

所以，举个例子，在PayPal非常早期的日子里，发生的一件事是，他们说，好吧，我们要实现手机上的现金支付。我们要在Palm Pilots上做现金支付，因为这真的很容易。但实际上，我们甚至在产品发布之前就意识到Palm Pilots上的现金支付行不通，因为事情基本上是这样的——我走进去对Max和Peter说，我说，看，这就是我们的挑战。我们的挑战是，这个房间里的人可能不记得Palm Pilots是什么了。它们就像是早期的PDAs。所以我们就生活在Palm Pilot Central的世界里，整个用例就是分摊晚餐账单，餐桌上会有多少人每个人都带着一个Palm Pilot来分摊晚餐账单呢？

[段 58]

Zero to one in every single restaurant. So you could even just by thinking it through, you realize the direction you’re on is going to hit a minefield and you need to pivot. And that’s when Max Levchin came up with the idea of saying, Actually, in fact, we could sync by emails, we could have email payments as the backbone of this. And we’re like, Oh, that’s a good idea. And, of course, that’s what the whole thing kind of pivoted into. And that’s part of thinking through minimizing the risks as you’re actually executing. Here’s another one that’s kind of classic, which is, well, should I have this long-term vision or should I be solving local near-term problems?

[译文 58]

每一家餐厅都从零到一。所以你仅仅通过深思熟虑，就能意识到你所走的方向将会踩到雷区，你需要转型。而就在这时，Max Levchin提出了一个想法：实际上，我们可以使用邮件同步，我们可以让邮件支付成为其核心。我们当时就觉得，哦，这是个好主意。当然，整个事情就是朝着那个方向转型的。这也是在执行过程中思考如何最小化风险的一部分。还有另一个比较经典的问题：我是应该拥有长期愿景，还是应该解决眼前的本地化短期问题？

[段 59]

And, again, the answer is both. It’s these paradoxes. And the question is, is you jump between them. You should always have a long-term vision in mind because if you actually completely lose your direction, you’ll just be solving random problems. But at the same time, you have to solve local near-term problems in order to get to the long-term vision. Eventually, you’ll find yourself in some field where there’s not a good path out of. But if you’re not focused on solving the problem that’s immediately in front of you, you’re hosed. And so part of the question about how you put these things together is: you say, okay, short term, what’s the thing I need to be doing today?

[译文 59]

答案两者都是。这就是这些悖论。问题在于你如何在它们之间跳跃。你应该始终在心中保持长期愿景，因为如果你完全失去方向，你就会只是在解决随机的问题。但同时，你必须解决眼前的近期问题，才能达到长期愿景。最终，你会发现自己在某个领域里没有好的出路。但如果你不专注于解决眼前的问题，你就完蛋了。所以关于如何把这些东西整合在一起的部分问题是：你说，好吧，短期来说，我今天需要做的事情是什么？

[段 60]

Have I made progress today? Have I made progress this week? But is it largely on path? So I’ll give you an example of how this plays out in terms of financing or in terms of strategy. So people frequently think product strategy is fundamental to how startups work, like I have a product idea, that’s the thing, I’m a founder. Actually, in fact, the next level down on strategy is usually product distribution, whether it’s consumer internet or enterprise or anything else. Because actually, in fact, no matter how good your product is, if it doesn’t get to customers, you’re hosed. So usually you have to have product distribution is more fundamental than the actual product itself. And the one below it is financing.

[译文 60]

我今天有进步吗？我这周有进步吗？但这是否基本在轨道上？

所以我来给你们举一个例子，说明这在融资方面或战略方面是如何体现的。

所以人们经常认为产品战略对初创公司的工作方式是根本性的，就像我有一个产品想法，这就是关键，我是一个创始人。

实际上，在战略的下一个层级通常是产品分销，无论是消费者互联网还是企业或其他任何领域。

因为实际上，不管你的产品有多好，如果它不能到达客户手中，你就完蛋了。

所以通常你必须拥有产品分销，这比实际产品本身更根本。

而比它更下一层的是融资。

[段 61]

And the reason why it’s financing is: if you run out of money and the whole effort goes away, even if you have a really good idea, it doesn’t work. So frequently when you’re executing on a good strategy, you’re actually, in fact, thinking about the next fundraising. When I’m raising money, I’m thinking about how I’m set up for it. I’m establishing relationships that would be key to that. And I’m not executing like, oh, the only thing that matters is I get to the next fundraising, because you have this business that you’re building. But I’m thinking that as a core strategy in terms of how I’m executing. And frequently you’re thinking about how does my product distribution work, such that the financing works well.

[译文 61]

而之所以需要融资的原因是：如果你资金耗尽，整个努力就会付诸东流，即使你有一个非常好的创意也没用。所以当你执行一个好的策略时，你实际上经常在考虑下一轮融资。当我在融资时，我在思考如何为融资做好准备。我正在建立对融资至关重要的关系。但我并不是在执行时想着"哦，唯一重要的是我能达到下一轮融资”，因为你还有正在建立的业务。但我将其作为如何执行的核心战略来思考。而且你经常在思考如何让产品分销运作良好，以使融资顺利进行。

[段 62]

And that’s kind of how you architect these things together. So how do you know if you might be a great founder? Well, you should have some superpowers. It’s, generally speaking, in software, useful to be a good product person. It’s useful to have good skills about kind of leadership, of bringing networks in, of persuading people. And it’s useful to be able to, and this is kind of the most fundamental, to recognize whether or not you’re on track or not. To have both that kind of belief but also paranoia about: am I tracking against my investment thesis? And when you do that the right way, and you’re learning and you’re assembling people and you’re assembling networks around you, that’s, generally speaking, how you end up being a great founder.

[译文 62]

这就是你如何把这些东西整合在一起构建的方式。那么你怎么知道自己是否可能成为一位伟大的创始人呢？你应该拥有一些超能力。一般来说，在软件领域，成为一个优秀的产品人是非常有用的。拥有良好的领导力技能、建立人脉网络的能力、说服他人的能力都是很有用的。还有一种能力，我认为这是最根本的，那就是能否认识到自己是否在正确的轨道上。既要有这种信念，同时也要有那种偏执：我是否正在按照我的投资论题在前进？当你用正确的方式做到这一点时，你在学习，你在召集人才，你在身边建立起人脉网络，这一般来说就是如何最终成为一位伟大创始人的方式。

[段 63]

Now, classically, I deliberately put up five white male pictures, is classically you have a kind of a these are the iconic founders. But in fact, founders can be very diverse. They can be extraordinarily talented at different areas because there’s different kinds of entrepreneurial companies. There’s different kinds of problems that they’re trying to solve. And I don’t just mean diversity in terms of classic. You know, kind of gender, race, et cetera. Diversity in age, diversity in experience. You know, Jack Ma was a teacher before he got into this. That’s the kind of thing that you should think about. And so kind of thing that you should think about. And so the question is: how you cross uneven ground, how you assemble networks around you, how you get people to assemble this.

[译文 63]

现在，传统上我故意展示了五张白人男性的照片，传统意义上你会觉得这些就是标志性的创始人。但实际上，创始人可以非常多远。他们在不同领域可以非常有才华，因为创业公司有不同的类型。他们试图解决的问题也有不同的类型。我不仅仅是指经典意义上的多样性，你知道，比如性别、种族等。年龄的多样性，经验的多样性。你知道的，马云在进入这个领域之前是一名教师。这种事情你应该考虑。所以你应该考虑这种事情。所以问题是：如何穿越不平坦的道路，如何在你周围建立网络，如何让人们聚集在一起。

[段 64]

It’s a constantly changing problem to face when you are trying to found a company. And so I think that the thing that I was trying to get people to think about with this is to say there’s not one skill set. There’s an ability to learn and adapt, an ability to constantly have a vision that’s driving you, but to be taking input from all sources, and then to be creating networks around you. And that’s essentially what makes a great founder. And your ability to do that while crossing uneven ground in a fog, which is kind of the way that entrepreneurs work, because you don’t really know. Like, did you always know this was going to work?

[译文 64]

当你创办一家公司时，你需要面对一个不断变化的问题。所以我认为，我试图让人们思考的是，并不只有一种技能组合。有一种能力是学习和适应，有一种能力是不断拥有驱动你的愿景，但要能够从所有来源获取信息，然后围绕自己创建人脉网络。这本质上就是成就一位伟大创始人的关键。而你的能力在于，在崎岖不平的道路上穿越迷雾来做这些事，这正是企业家的运作方式，因为你其实并不真正知道。比如说，你是否一直都知道这会成功？

[段 65]

No, unless you’re crazy, right? Although sometimes crazy works. So with that, I will now go to a few questions. But it was kind of this mindset of founders, which is kind of key. And if there’s no questions… Oh, here. I’m curious about how LinkedIn — how you targeted the early adopters, that you selected and skimmed over the strategy for getting the right early adopters that you knew would strengthen your investment thesis and really help it take off. Because it seems like every startup faces that same challenge. So one of the really fundamental things is to think about product distribution. Things is to think about product distribution as key. And for LinkedIn, we had a couple things going for us.

[译文 65]

不，除非你疯了，对吧？虽然有时候疯狂确实管用。那么接下来，我进入几个问题。但这就是创始人的一种心态，这是关键。如果没有问题了……哦，这儿。我很好奇LinkedIn——你们是如何锁定早期用户的，你们筛选并略过了获取正确早期用户的策略，而你知道这些早期用户会加强你的投资论点并真正帮助它起飞。因为似乎每个初创公司都面临同样的挑战。所以真正根本的事情之一是要把产品分发作为关键来思考。是要把产品分发作为关键来思考。对于LinkedIn，我们有一些有利条件。

[段 66]

So one, the web was boring in 2003. Basically what happened is everyone thought the consumer network was over, and so people were doing clean tech and enterprise software and everything else. It’s a much harder problem now because everyone thinks the internet and mobile is interesting. And so breaking through the noise is really key. So the strategy we used wouldn’t work. We just actually set up, sent out some invitations to a group of people, and then tuned the mechanism, and did PR to get people. Like one of the decisions we made early that was right was to say: should we only allow it as invite-only, or should we allow cold signups? The reason we should allow cold signups is because the people who are super enthusiastic about this weren’t necessarily the people we knew.

[译文 66]

所以，第一点，2003年的网络很无聊。基本上发生了什么情况呢，大家都认为消费网络已经结束了，所以人们在做clean tech和企业软件以及其他一切。现在这个问题要难得多，因为每个人都认为互联网和移动端很有趣。所以突破噪音真的很关键。所以我们当时用的策略现在行不通了。我们实际上只是建立了一个系统，向一群人发出邀请，然后调整机制，做公关来获取用户。比如我们早期做出的一个正确的决定是：我们应该只允许invite-only，还是应该允许cold signups？我们应该允许cold signups的原因是，那些对这件事超级热情的人未必是我们认识的人。

[段 67]

So they would sign up and spread it. That sort of thing were all the kind of decisions we made. Now that challenge is much harder because the challenge, when you think about product distribution, is: how are you competing for potential customers or potential members’ time, and what do they have to believe in? Back in 2003, it was like, Well, a professional network — that’s potentially a good idea. What the hell? I’ll play with it. There’s not a lot of other things for me to look at. Today, There’s tons of things. And so your strategy today when you’re looking at product distribution has to be, what is my really decisive edge? What is the hack that I know that other people don’t know?

[译文 67]

所以他们会注册并传播它。这种事情就是我们做出的各种决定。现在这个挑战要难得多，因为当你考虑产品分发时，挑战是：你如何与潜在客户或潜在会员争夺时间，他们需要相信什么？早在2003年，情况是这样的：好吧，一个职业社交网络——这可能是个好主意。管它呢？我来试试。我没有太多其他东西可看的。今天，有很多东西。所以今天当你在考虑产品分发时，你的策略必须是：我的真正决定性优势是什么？我知道而别人不知道的那个诀窍是什么？

[段 68]

Yeah. As an investor, when someone comes to you, how do you tell if he’s a good founder or not from just like our pitch? So how do I know if someone’s a good founder? So how do I know if someone’s a good founder or not? Well, it’s not. I’m a huge believer in references. Usually, I only ever actually — no, 100% of the time in this case — I only meet with someone when they come to me through a reference. So one of the things, by the way, after this I have to run off because I have a meeting I need to get to, if you want to actually get time and attention, really find a reference.

[译文 68]

是的。作为投资人，当有人来找你时，你怎么判断他是不是个好创始人？只从pitch我怎么知道他是不是好创始人？那我怎么知道某人是不是好创始人？这个嘛，不是的。我非常相信reference（推荐）。通常我其实只有在——不，100%的情况下——只有当有人通过reference来找我时，我才会见他。所以顺便说一句，之后我得赶着走了，因为有个会议要参加，如果你想真正获得时间和关注，真的要找到reference。

[段 69]

It’s not a pitch to using LinkedIn. It’s a question of — this is how you sort out time. You can find a reference, like Sam knows me — not to throw Sam under the bus. Yes. And so a reference to me is, in fact, the way that I do this. And so, for example, when I met with the Airbnb guys, part of the reason why I could interrupt them two minutes into their pitch and say, I’m going to make you an offer to invest. I want to hear the rest of the pitch because I think what you’re doing here is magical and awesome, was because I’d already had references on them. That was only two minutes, not even 30 minutes, because I already knew about them before coming in.

[译文 69]

这不是在向你推销LinkedIn。这是一个关于——这就是你如何整理时间的问题。你可以找一个推荐人，比如Sam认识我——不是要把Sam推出去当替罪羊。是的。所以推荐对我来说是，事实上，这就是我做这件事的方式。所以，举个例子，当我和Airbnb那帮人见面时，我能在他们只讲了两分钟就打断并说我要给你投资offer，我之所以想听完整的pitch是因为我觉得你们正在做的事情很神奇很棒，是因为我已经有关于他们的推荐了。那只用了两分钟，甚至不到30分钟，因为我进来之前就已经了解他们了。

[段 70]

And by the way, by and large, that’s some version that is true of most of the great investors. And it’s that network that’s really key. I think there was a question over here too. So would you consider density of insight to be a strong signal for great founders? Density of insight is a strong signal for great founders. Can you say another sentence? So being able to distill a thesis out of a whole variety of obstacles to build down to a concise sentence? Well, I would definitely say that the ability to say coherently what you’re targeting and to articulate something that isn’t trying to boil the ocean or a Swiss army knife approach, but is like one focus, like, look, if we’re right about this, then it works.

[译文 70]

顺便说一下，总的来说，这在大多数伟大投资者身上都有某种程度的体现。而这个网络才是真正关键的。我觉得这边也有个问题。那么你认为洞察密度是伟大创始人的强烈信号吗？洞察密度是伟大创始人的强烈信号。你能再说一句话吗？那么能够从各种各样的障碍中提炼出论点，浓缩成简洁的句子？嗯，我肯定会说，能够连贯地说明你的目标，能够清晰地表达某个东西，不是试图把大海煮沸或者瑞士军刀式的方法，而是像是一个焦点，比如说，如果我们在这件事上是对的，那么它就能奏效。

[段 71]

That is actually pretty important to being able to judge a founder because if you don’t have that level of clarity, you’re not going to be able to assemble the network behind you. You’re not going to be able to get investors. You’re not going to get employees. You have to be able to articulate a very clear mission about what you’re doing. And insight is helpful, although a little bit of this depends on the stage. I find myself attracted to founders who have analyzed the problem a good way, but frequently I’ve seen great founders who do not present good analysis but have an instinct about what they’re doing. And so you more chart what’s going on around them?

[译文 71]

这实际上对于评判创始人非常重要，因为如果没有那种清晰度，你就无法组建你背后的网络。你就无法获得投资者。你也无法招到员工。你必须能够清晰地阐述你所做的事情的使命。洞察力是有帮助的，虽然这在一定程度上取决于阶段。我发现自己会被那些很好分析问题的创始人所吸引，但我也经常看到很多伟大的创始人并没有呈现很好的分析，但对他们在做什么有直觉。所以你更多地观察他们周围发生的事情？

[段 72]

When Lincoln had like five years of — I guess wrap up time? What kept you going to keep doubling down on the original? How do I keep persistence? Because actually LinkedIn went through — Let’s see. For those who remember, we were treated as the little alternative to Friendster, then to MySpace, then to Facebook. So we had a lot of different—like, we are the little teeny one next to these respective giants each of the time. Ultimately, for me, when I was thinking about LinkedIn, this gets back to the investment thesis as a mechanism—I continued to believe the action. In fact, the right economic system design for every individual’s life and for organizations’ lives is to have public professional profiles; that world is the way the world should be.

[译文 72]

当Lincoln大概有五年的时间——我想是收尾的时候？是什么让你继续加倍投入最初的（愿景）？我怎样才能保持持久性？因为实际上LinkedIn经历了——让我想想。对于那些还记得的人，我们曾被认为是Friendster的小替代品，然后是MySpace，再然后是Facebook。所以在每个时期，我们都只是这些各自巨头旁边的小不点。最终，对我来说，当我在思考LinkedIn时，这要回归到投资论文作为一种机制——我继续相信这个行动。事实上，对于每个人的生活和组织的生活来说，正确的经济系统设计是拥有公开的职业档案；那个世界才是世界应有的样子。

[段 73]

Everyone’s much better off with it. And we are getting closer to that than everyone else. It may be that it hasn’t taken off as fast as I’d like. It may be that the general world is going, Oh, this social stuff is really interesting. We could only get in the news in the summer of 2003 by saying we were Friendster but for business, which is completely nonsensical once you begin to look at the thing. But it was like, Okay, we’ll cover you because it’s Friendster but for business. And that was important to begin to get people to pay attention to us. And so the confidence was that world—I still have confidence, believe that it should exist.

[译文 73]

每个人都从中受益更多。而我们比任何人都更接近这一点。可能它没有像我希望的那样快速发展。可能外界正在想，“哦，这种社交的东西真的很有趣”。在2003年夏天，我们只能说自己是“商务版的Friendster”才能上新闻，一旦你开始深入了解这件事，这说法就完全不合理了。但当时的情况是，好吧，我们会报道你，因为你是“商务版的Friendster”。而这对于让人们开始关注我们来说很重要。所以我一直相信那个世界——我仍然有信心，相信它应该存在。

[段 74]

And no one is getting closer to it than we are. It’s taking us maybe longer than I’d hoped to get there, but that’s okay. So, that’s it. When you get it wrong—when you meet a founder that you think is going to be really good and seems to be able to move between these opposing forces, and on paper it seems like they’re going to go the distance—what is it that makes you get wrong about someone that looks good in first observation? Well, to some degree, you can only fully cross these kind of minefields by actually going and doing it. So you’re going to be wrong about your hypothesis. The kinds of things that frequently get you wrong—or when you think that a person, because they, like, for example, one of the tests that I frequently use in an interaction is I push on an idea sometimes.

[译文 74]

没有人比我们更接近它了。到达那里可能比我们希望的更久，但没关系。所以，就是这样。当你看走眼时——当你遇到一位你认为会很出色、似乎能够在这些对立力量之间游走的创始人，纸面上看他们似乎能够坚持到底——是什么让你对第一眼看起来很好的人做出错误判断？嗯，在某种程度上，你只有真正去实践才能完全穿越这类雷区。所以你对自己的假设判断失误是必然的。那些经常让你看走眼的情况——或者说当你认为一个人，比如我在互动中经常使用的一个测试方法是，我会推进一个想法，有时候会这样测试。

[段 75]

And what I’m looking for is both flexibility and persistence. I’m looking for—no, I have conviction in what I’m thinking, and I’m arguing it, but I’m listening to what you’re saying, and I’m adapting to the concerns and whatnot of how you think about that. Sometimes you’ll find someone who says, Look, I’ve learned to mimic that behavior. So I’ve learned to say, for example, I’ve learned to look like I’m reasoning with you, and I look like I’m thinking about the challenge you bring up, but actually, in fact, I’m ignoring you. And ignoring me, that might be fine. Ignoring the world in general is usually a disaster. And so those are the kinds of things that in the measurement you can see essentially getting wrong.

[译文 75]

我所寻找的是灵活性和坚持性。我不是在寻找——不，我对我所思考的内容有坚定的信念，我也在为之争论，但我在倾听你所说的，我也在适应你的顾虑以及你对此的想法。有时候你会发现有人说，看，我已经学会了模仿这种行为。所以我学会了说，举个例子，我学会了看起来像是在和你进行推理，我看起来像是在思考你提出的挑战，但实际上，我是在忽略你。忽略我，那可能没关系。忽略世界通常是一场灾难。所以这些是你在衡量中能看到本质上是错误的东西。

[段 76]

But usually the kind of thing—like, Right, is the way of doing it. And so, like, does the learning break down, or is there some major skill set? Is there an ego issue that gets in the way? Like, well, I must be the great, like, everyone must adulate me, and that will cause you to behave wrongly in adapting to the problem. Those kinds of things. I think I have one last question. The woman in the back. What makes a great co-founding team? And from your perspective, what makes a good partnership when you’re evaluating how to be a great co-founder? Co-founding team, how to evaluate, and then how to think about co-founders. So the first thing is, it’s super important that you collaborate really well.

[译文 76]

但通常是这样的事情——比如，对，这是做事的方式。那么，比如，学习是否会出问题，或者是否存在某种主要技能缺陷？是否存在某种自我问题阻碍了你？比如，我必须是伟大的，每个人都必须崇拜我，这会导致你在适应问题时做出错误的行为。这些类型的事情。我想我还有一个问题。后面的那位女士。什么造就了一个伟大的联合创始团队？从你的角度来看，在评估如何成为一个伟大的联合创始人时，什么构成了一个好的合作关系？联合创始团队，如何评估，然后如何思考联合创始人。所以第一件事是，你能够真正良好地合作是超级重要的。

[段 77]

That was the kind of the point I was making during the team, the initial part of that. Because if you, in fact, don’t have pretty good serious trust, you know, kind of a way of… it’s 150 that I’m supposed to end, right? Two or five. Oh, two or five. No, no, no, no. I’ll keep going. Sorry. I misread the time. So I will have time for more questions. Sorry. I was trying to be good. So, okay, let me give a little bit longer answer to this then. So the key thing is when you’re thinking about founders is: do you have a diversity of the necessary strengths across the whole range of strengths that would be useful?

[译文 77]

这就是我在团队初期部分提出的观点。因为如果你实际上没有相当程度的信任，你知道，这是一种方式……我应该在150结束，对吧？

2或5。

哦，2或5。

不，不，不，不。

我继续说。

抱歉。

我看错时间了。

所以我会有时间回答更多问题。

抱歉。

我本来是想守时的。

好的，让我给一个稍微长一点的回答。

所以关键是，当你在考虑创始人时：你是否在所有可能有用的能力范围内，拥有了必要能力的多样性？

[段 78]

Frequently you need one technical founder, at least. Frequently you need to have someone who is going to be dedicated to the business side, fundraising, these sorts of things. That’s kind of classically the skill set when you think about the two to three. And usually it’s kind of some composition across them. And that’s kind of like what you think of as founders one when you’re thinking about a founding team. When you get the next level deep, for example, one of the things that people will classically tell you is, for example, don’t invest in a husband and wife team. And actually, that adds a little extra freight to it and everything else because, you know, there’s personal dynamics also upset what’s going on.

[译文 78]

通常你至少需要一位技术创始人。通常你需要有人专注于业务方面、融资等事务。这基本上就是当你考虑二到三人时典型的技能组合。通常是他们之间某种程度的组合搭配。这基本上就是你在考虑创始团队时会想到的一号创始人。当你想得更深入一层时，例如，人们通常会告诉你的一件事是，比如，不要投资夫妻团队。但实际上，这会给你和其他事情增加一些额外的负担，因为你知道，个人关系动态也会打乱正在发生的事情。

[段 79]

I actually think that what you’re looking for is: do they collaborate well? Do they help each other get to truth? So, for example, I am most heartened when I’m talking to a team that when they’re reasoning to each other, they’re not like, oh, we’re just all singing from the same thing. It’s like, oh, but did you think about this? Or what about this is a challenge? You’re navigating the field of battle, which has a bunch of risks. For example, one of the things that was pretty common in PayPal is Max, who invented the fraud systems and everything else, would frequently come into Peter’s office—Peter Thiel, Max Levchin—and say, look, here are some things that are going to kill us, and let me focus you on them.

[译文 79]

我其实认为你在找的是：他们是否合作得好？他们是否帮助彼此找到真相？所以，举例来说，当我与一个团队交流时，如果他们在相互讨论时不是那种"哦，我们都只是在唱同一首歌"的状态，我会最受鼓舞。而是说，“哦，但你想过这个吗？“或者"这个有什么挑战？“你正在穿越战场，那里有一堆风险。例如，在PayPal非常常见的一件事是，Max（他发明了欺诈系统和其他一切）会经常走进Peter的办公室——Peter Thiel, Max Levchin——然后说，看，这里有一些会杀死我们的东西，让我让你专注于它们。

[段 80]

So it’s not like we’re all just kind of saying, oh, yes, we’re all singing our kumbayas, but we are adjusting to what is truth and what’s the problem we need to solve. What’s the problem in the short term? What’s the problem in the long term? And how are we tackling it? And that composition within a team, that collective problem-solving, that collective learning is the kind of thing that actually usually makes great teams. Thank you for this wonderful lecture. I recall Peter Thiel says, ‘We all dream of a flying car, but we end up with 140 kilometers.’ So I ask you, you know, how do we identify great founders in different sectors? Someone might be a social network.

[译文 80]

所以这不是说我们都在唱那种天真的团结歌，而是我们在调整自己去面对什么是真相，什么是我们需要解决的问题。短期的问题是什么？长期的问题是什么？我们如何解决它？团队中的这种组合，这种集体解决问题，这种集体学习，实际上通常是造就伟大团队的东西。谢谢你的精彩演讲。我记得Peter Thiel说过：“我们都梦想着飞行汽车，但结果只得到了140公里。”所以我想问你，我们如何在不同的领域识别出优秀的创始人？有些人可能是做社交网络的。

[段 81]

So different founders, different areas—how do you identify them? So the talk was aimed at kind of what is unique about the mindset, I think, of founders that are great founders across all founders. That’s part of what this was—an attempt to say, ‘Look, because there are differences.’ So, for example, in software, speed to market, speed to learning is really key. In hardware, if you screw it up, you’re dead. So accuracy really matters, because if you build and ship the wrong thing, you’re hosed. So, generally speaking, as an investor, and this is part of the reason why a lot of investors have a certain set of things that they then learn pretty well and try to reapply—because they try to understand a domain well enough to be able to identify which are the founders in this domain that really matter.

[译文 81]

不同的创始人，不同的领域——你是如何识别他们的？所以这个演讲的目的是找出优秀创始人的思维方式有什么独特之处，我认为这是在所有创始人中找出伟大创始人的一种尝试。这也是演讲的一部分——试图说明“看，因为存在着差异”。例如，在软件领域，快速上市、快速学习是非常关键的。在硬件领域，如果你搞砸了，你就死定了。所以准确性真的很重要，因为如果你生产和运输了错误的产品，你就完蛋了。一般来说，作为一名投资者，这也是为什么很多投资者会有一套特定的东西，然后学得很好并尝试重新应用的原因——因为他们试图足够深入地理解一个领域，以便能够识别在这个领域真正重要的创始人是谁。

[段 82]

And if we’re investing in this domain, how do we do that well? And so there are attributes that are unique per domain. So, for example, one of the classic ones is: how good must you be at operational efficiencies in terms of margins, cost controls, etc.? You’re dealing in the world of atoms, including even in commerce—you’ve got to be really good at that. You’re doing a digital game, like a Zynga-like startup—it doesn’t matter at all. And so you look for that kind of fit and proclivities. And part of the beginning of this is—it’s not actually, in fact, that it’s one person is good at everything. One of the funniest conversations I had with a friend of mine who worked for me at my first startup, SocialNet, is he looked at me and he said, ‘Reed, I would never hire you to be a manager at McDonald’s.’ I’m like, ‘Yeah, I wouldn’t either.

[译文 82]

如果我们要在这个领域投资，如何才能做得好？不同领域有不同的属性。比如，一个经典的问题是：在利润率、成本控制等方面，你需要有多强的运营效率能力？如果你是处理实体世界的事务，包括商业领域，你就必须在这方面很强。如果你在做数字游戏，比如像Zynga这样的创业公司，那就不重要了。所以你要寻找那种契合度和倾向。这件事的开端其实是——事实上，一个人不可能在所有事情上都擅长。我和一位在第一家创业公司SocialNet为我工作的朋友有过一次最搞笑的对话，他看着我说：“Reed，我永远不会雇你来当麦当劳的经理。“我的反应是：“是啊，我也不会雇我自己。”

[段 83]

I’d be terrible at that.’ And so it’s the skill set that fits, but also the whole point of this is actually navigating a set of things that look like paradoxes—sometimes being heavy on one, sometimes heavy on the other—and having the right judgment at the moment in terms of what you’re doing. And that’s what tends to be more universal. You mentioned that it took you longer than you would have liked to grow. You speak a little bit about how to know whether or not you should stay in or how to know when to give up. Also, maybe with respect to your personal goals or how it fits in. So the question is, basically, how do you know when to pivot?

[译文 83]

“我肯定做不好那个。“所以关键在于技能匹配，但更重要的是，实际上是在处理一系列看似矛盾的事情——有时候侧重这个，有时候侧重那个——并且在当下做出正确的判断什么该做什么不该做。而这才是更普适的东西。你之前说你的成长速度比预期慢。你也提到了一些关于如何判断是否应该坚持、如何判断何时该放弃的见解。同时，也许与你的个人目标以及它如何契合有关。所以问题本质上是：你怎么知道何时该转型？

[段 84]

Part of the reason why having an investment thesis and your confidence in investment thesis and being pretty clear on that is—generally speaking, the answer that I give people is: if your confidence is unmeasured for a fairly long time or is decreasing, Because, unmeasured for a fairly long time, should be decreasing, and it’s decreasing, and then you go into intense mode where you’re trying to figure out what kinds of things you would do that would increase your confidence, and that’s failing. That’s a seriously good time to think about pivoting. And you might have theses on can we raise money? You might have theses on will, what’s the pattern by which the product distribution or growth or viral invitation or SEO or anything else will work?

[译文 84]

之所以要制定投资论点、对自己的投资论点充满信心并且对此非常清晰，部分原因在于——一般来说，我给人们的答案是：如果你的信心在相当长一段时间内未经衡量，或者是下降的，因为如果相当长一段时间没有衡量，信心应该是下降的，而且它确实在下降，然后你进入紧张模式，试图找出能提高信心的各种方法，但都失败了。这绝对是一个认真考虑转型的绝佳时机。而且你可能有关于"我们能筹集到资金吗？“的论点。你可能有关于"产品分发或增长或病毒式邀请或SEO或其他任何东西会以什么模式运作？“的论点。

[段 85]

And it’s like, well, I tried these three things, and this fourth thing doesn’t seem as good as these three, and the next two things that I think about seem even worse. That begins to decrease your confidence, and that’s when you should think about pivoting. A frequent mistake when it comes to pivoting is to wait until you’ve essentially crashed into the wall and everything is dead, and you can’t maneuver anymore, and you waited way too long. Now, in terms of personal career goals and so forth, part of the thing that I would say that is one of the things that I had meant to talk to you during the slides, that since I misread the time, I rushed through it a little bit.

[译文 85]

就像这样，我尝试了这三样东西，而这第四样东西看起来不如这三样好，而我想的下两样东西看起来更糟。这开始削弱你的信心，而这就是你应该考虑转型的时候。关于转型的一个常见错误是等到你基本上撞墙了，一切都没戏了，你再也无法操作了，你等得太久了。现在，就个人职业目标等而言，我想说的一部分事情是我本想在幻灯片期间和你们谈的事情之一，但由于我看错了时间，我稍微讲得快了一点。

[段 86]

One of the classic questions is balance. And I actually think founders have no balance. Like, one of the funniest conversations I ever had was with a governor of Colorado. It was like, We’re going to attract really great entrepreneurs here because we have this balanced lifestyle. And I was like, We’re going to attract really great entrepreneurs here because we have this balanced lifestyle. Like literally, if I ever hear a founder talking about, Oh, this is how I have a balanced life, they’re not committed to winning. And so the only really great founders are like, I am going to literally pour everything into doing this. Now, it only may be for a couple years. I may do this for a while, then go do all things.

[译文 86]

经典问题之一是平衡。我其实认为创始人没有平衡。比如，我进行过的最有趣的对话之一是和科罗拉多州州长的一次对话。他说，我们要吸引优秀的创业者来这里，因为我们有这种平衡的生活方式。我当时就想说，我们要吸引优秀的创业者来这里，因为我们有这种平衡的生活方式。说真的，如果我听到一个创始人在谈论，哦，我的生活是这样的平衡，那他们就不是致力于获胜。所以真正伟大的创始人都是这样的，我会倾尽所有去做这件事。现在，这可能只是几年时间。我可能会这样做一段时间，然后去做所有其他的事情。

[段 87]

But while I’m doing this, I am unbalanced at this thing. It’s not to say you don’t take breaks, not to say you don’t go on dates or whatever else, but you’re super focused on this because it’s really hard and there’s lots of ways to die, and that’s the reason why the jumping off the cliff metaphor is one of the ones that I classically use. So, your definition of contrarianism depends on the idea of identifying uncertain opportunities which others don’t necessarily see. Overall, how efficient do you think the startup ecosystem is at identifying good opportunities? So, how good is the startup ecosystem at identifying contrarian opportunities? Let’s see, that’s kind of a challenge because the moment it kind of actually becomes in vogue, it’s less contrarian.

[译文 87]

但在我做这件事的时候，我在这方面是失衡的。这并不是说你不休息，不是说你不去约会或做其他事情，而是你超级专注于这件事，因为这件事真的很难，而且有很多方式会失败，这就是为什么“跳下悬崖”这个比喻是我经典使用的比喻之一。所以，你对逆向主义的定义取决于识别他人不一定能看到的不确定机会这一理念。总体而言，你认为 startup 生态系统在识别好机会方面的效率如何？那么，startup 生态系统在识别逆向机会方面有多擅长？让我想想，这确实是个挑战，因为当它真正变得流行起来时，它就不那么逆向 了。

[段 88]

I’d say it’s mixed sometimes because part of what makes a great investor is an ability to go, Look, I take this radical shot. I take this radical shot. I take this radical shot. And there’s enough people who are investors, there’s usually someone. If you can find your way to them, network finding your way through the network is sometimes difficult, sometimes tons of noise, hard to get through the network. 有时候会有大量噪音，很难得到信号。另一方面，有时候会有一些事情，简直就是，你知道，完全疯狂。就像一件有趣的事情是，你知道，基准资本是唯一愿意投资eBay的。你知道，如果你一年半前跟硅谷的大多数人聊比特币，他们肯定会告诉你，什么？比特币？他们根本不知道那是什么。顺便说一句，比特币最终会如何发展，目前仍不清楚。虽然我认为，基于加密货币的分布式信任系统，我认为，几乎肯定会存在于这个世界。而真正的问题是，比特币是第一个还是最后一个加密货币？第一个？那会有新的和新的特性。最后？因为它是那个拥有网络效应并且已经在运行的。所以我认为它在这方面相当不错。经常发生的情况是，人们认为自己是逆向投资者，因为他们正在做一些他们认为是独特组合的事情。我会给你们两个例子，希望这些发给我的人——创始人——我会收到大约30份每天发给我的推销信，我基本上不会看，除非标题里有什么让我觉得好笑的东西，在这种情况下我大多数时候是当喜剧看的，我会分享两个喜剧的例子。其中一个是可穿戴尿布，就是那个，你知道，你有一个电脑监控，你知道，孩子有没有，你知道，在小便或大便，他们会通知你，然后你会想，如果你离你的孩子那么远，这类事情，其他方面可能也是个坏兆头。另外一个是那种定制的电子商务大麻管。你就会想，哦，我有一个逆向投资的点子。是的，你确实有，但不是正确的方式。所以，不管怎样，我认为总的来说，这个系统在这方面相当好。后面那位？除了社交网络，提前，我想，你怎么看待创造市场与……创造市场与发现市场？嗯。好的。好的，所以这实际上，这是一个具有挑战性的问题。经常——而且这是对逆向投资话题的一个很好的延伸——就像，经常会有这种经典的问题，哦，市场已经存在了吗？这是因为它将会巨大还是根本不存在？好消息是，通常是两者之一，对吧？所以，这意味着追求大多数人不认为存在市场的东西，但你有一个理由相信它实际上有时经常是一个好赌注。然而，它有时可能会完全失败。而当你在检验你的投资论点时，你正在做的事情之一是：什么会让我认为那里是否有市场？因为在最初，没有市场，所以，当然，从概念上讲创造市场是可能的。人们认为这是一种新需求。另一方面，问题是：如果人们甚至不知道自己作为一种类别想要它，你怎么快速获得采用？所以他们说，好吧，但是人们…… 他们 just realize，就像一个经典的创业失误一样，一个经典的说法是，如果人们 just realize，一旦它存在，他们就会意识到他们真的很喜欢它，他们会成群结队地排队购买。好吧，有少数企业家，史蒂夫·乔布斯是其中之一，能够做到这一点。大多数时候，事情不会那样发展。所以你必须在你的投资论文中说，为什么你认为当你考虑一个尚不存在市场的时候，你知道别人不知道的逆向基础让你认为那个市场应该存在？例如，LinkedIn 的一个微观例子实际上是，分类招聘实际上是报纸的一种做法，是信息时代的一种做法，而直接招聘人是网络时代和互联网的一部分，这实际上就是招聘应该进行的方式。现在，验证这一点相对容易，但这就是你思考可能存在新市场的那种情况。最后一个问题。是的，最后一个问题。你什么时候才能知道你认识一个人足够长的时间来创办一家公司？萨姆在第一课中告诉我们的事情之一是，你需要找一个我们认识很久的人。但当你们创办 PayPal 时，例如，你们认识多久了——那是一大群人。那么你怎么知道，好吧，我足够信任这些人来创办一家公司？所以我重复了部分问题，因为它被记录下来了等等。确保人们听到它。但问题基本上是，你如何知道你足够信任一个人来做联合创始人？有很多不同的变量会影响它。而且，看，这是你承担的风险之一。你 kind of get to a thesis of, do I think that I know them well enough? 现在我要举一个我认为超级有用的类比。所以我告诉我的投资组合公司 CEO 或创始人的事情之一，当他们考虑雇佣 CEO 时，我认为唯一的方法是当你 down to the people that you’re thinking you may hire as a CEO, you spend 20-plus hours with them, right, where you go into as much depth in the conversation about anything you think is a possible difference of opinion, belief, work style, so you’ve identified all this up front so that you’re just, it’s not that you have a contract.

[译文 88]

我会说情况是复杂的，因为成为伟大投资者的一部分能力是：看，我会进行这个激进的尝试。我会进行这个激进的尝试。我会进行这个激进的尝试。而投资人中总会有足够多的人，通常会有人愿意投资。如果你能找到他们的方法，通过人脉网络找到出路有时很困难，有时噪音很大，很难穿透这个网络。有时候会有大量噪音，很难得到信号。另一方面，有时候会有一些事情，简直就是，你知道，完全疯狂。就像一件有趣的事情是，你知道，基准资本是唯一愿意投资 eBay 的。你知道，如果你一年半前跟硅谷的大多数人聊比特币，他们肯定会告诉你，什么？比特币？他们根本不知道那是什么。顺便说一句，比特币最终会如何发展，目前仍不清楚。虽然我认为，基于加密货币的分布式信任系统，我认为，几乎肯定会存在于这个世界。而真正的问题是，比特币是第一个还是最后一个加密货币？第一个？那会有新的和新的特性。最后？因为它是那个拥有网络效应并且已经在运行的。所以我认为它在这方面相当不错。经常发生的情况是，人们认为自己是逆向投资者，因为他们正在做一些他们认为是独特组合的事情。我会给你们两个例子，希望这些发给我的人——创始人——我会收到大约30份每天发给我的推销信，我基本上不会看，除非标题里有什么让我觉得好笑的东西，在这种情况下我大多数时候是当喜剧看的，我会分享两个喜剧的例子。其中一个是可穿戴尿布，就是那个，你知道，你有一个电脑监控，你知道，孩子有没有，你知道，在小便或大便，他们会通知你，然后你会想，如果你离你的孩子那么远，这类事情，其他方面可能也是个坏兆头。另外一个是那种定制的电子商务大麻管。你就会想，哦，我有一个逆向投资的点子。是的，你确实有，但不是正确的方式。所以，不管怎样，我认为总的来说，这个系统在这方面相当好。后面那位？除了社交网络，提前，我想，你怎么看待创造市场与……创造市场与发现市场？嗯。好的。好的，所以这实际上，这是一个具有挑战性的问题。经常——而且这是对逆向投资话题的一个很好的延伸——就像，经常会有这种经典的问题，哦，市场已经存在了吗？这是因为它将会巨大还是根本不存在？好消息是，通常是两者之一，对吧？所以，这意味着追求大多数人不认为存在市场的东西，但你有一个理由相信它实际上有时经常是一个好赌注。然而，它有时可能会完全失败。而当你在检验你的投资论点时，你正在做的事情之一是：什么会让我认为那里是否有市场？因为在最初，没有市场，所以，当然，从概念上讲创造市场是可能的。人们认为这是一种新需求。另一方面，问题是：如果人们甚至不知道自己作为一种类别想要它，你怎么快速获得采用？所以他们说，好吧，但是人们……他们 just realize，就像一个经典的创业失误一样，一个经典的说法是，如果人们 just realize，一旦它存在，他们就会意识到他们真的很喜欢它，他们会成群结队地排队购买。好吧，有少数企业家，史蒂夫·乔布斯是其中之一，能够做到这一点。大多数时候，事情不会那样发展。所以你必须在你的投资论文中说，为什么你认为当你考虑一个尚不存在市场的时候，你知道别人不知道的逆向基础让你认为那个市场应该存在？例如，LinkedIn 的一个微观例子实际上是，分类招聘实际上是报纸的一种做法，是信息时代的一种做法，而直接招聘人是网络时代和互联网的一部分，这实际上就是招聘应该进行的方式。现在，验证这一点相对容易，但这就是你思考可能存在新市场的那种情况。最后一个问题。是的，最后一个问题。你什么时候才能知道你认识一个人足够长的时间来创办一家公司？萨姆在第一课中告诉我们的事情之一是，你需要找一个我们认识很久的人。但当你们创办 PayPal 时，例如，你们认识多久了——那是一大群人。那么你怎么知道，好吧，我足够信任这些人来创办一家公司？所以我重复了部分问题，因为它被记录下来了等等。确保人们听到它。但问题基本上是，你如何知道你足够信任一个人来做联合创始人？有很多不同的变量会影响它。而且，看，这是你承担的风险之一。你 kind of get to a thesis of, do I think that I know them well enough? 现在我要举一个我认为超级有用的类比。所以我告诉我的投资组合公司 CEO 或创始人的事情之一，当他们考虑雇佣 CEO 时，我认为唯一的方法是当你 down to the people that you’re thinking you may hire as a CEO, you spend 20-plus hours with them, right, where you go into as much depth in the conversation about anything you think is a possible difference of opinion, belief, work style, so you’ve identified all this up front so that you’re just, it’s not that you have a contract.

[段 89]

It’s not like, oh, we’re signing a contract and this is how we do it, but we’ve established the conversation. We’ve gone to all the parameters. We’ve had a conversation about what we might agree with or disagree with. 我经常认为值得讨论的一件事几乎是像离婚一样的东西——为什么我们会想要离婚，什么会让我说这不 work 了，并将其作为其中的一部分 upfront 覆盖，因为到了那个时候，当你进入战场时…… It’s like which is hugely stressful, you go through the valley of shadow, and the moment you’ve at least got the basis of it, we’ve already conversed about a wide variety of things, we’ve set up essentially some expectations about how we might be playing together, and if it begins to vary off that, it’s relatively easy to bring it up in a way that you’re problem solving. And that’s the kind of thing that I think you should be fairly confident that you have that level of trust.

[译文 89]

这不像我们签署合同，然后就这样做了，但我们已经建立了对话。我们已经讨论了所有参数。我们已经就我们可能同意或不同意的方面进行了对话。我经常认为值得讨论的一件事几乎是像离婚一样的东西——为什么我们会想要离婚，什么会让我说这不 work 了，并将其作为其中的一部分 upfront 覆盖，因为到了那个时候，当你进入战场时……这非常紧张压力大，你穿越阴影的山谷，一旦你至少有了基础，我们已经就各种不同的事情进行了对话，我们本质上已经设定了一些关于我们可能如何合作的期望，如果它开始偏离这些，相对来说更容易以一种解决问题的方式来提出。而这正是我认为你应该相当有信心的事情——你已经有了那种程度的信任。

[段 90]

For me, frequently, it’s to have a set of robust conversations such that it’s like, if something comes up later, it’s like, well, we talked about this inversion, and we can bring that up. So, anyway, with that. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

[译文 90]

对我来说，经常是进行一系列深入的对话，这样的话，如果之后出现什么问题，我们就可以说，我们之前讨论过这个反转，可以把它提出来。所以，不管怎样，关于这个。非常感谢你们。谢谢。谢谢。谢谢。

Source: bilibili BV1oWKpzoE1Z